Disagreeable Me
@disagreeableme.bsky.social
Amateur philosopher, professional software developer, Durham, UK. I enjoy exploring disagreements and trying to understand a variety of views.
Happy birthday!
November 7, 2025 at 11:40 PM
Happy birthday!
Either way, it's still a bit sad. In the way of all unwanted presents. But only a bit.
November 7, 2025 at 7:37 PM
Either way, it's still a bit sad. In the way of all unwanted presents. But only a bit.
Also, sometimes people give you cute little baby clothes etc in advance, not suspecting that the baby turns out to be unreasonably large.
November 7, 2025 at 7:35 PM
Also, sometimes people give you cute little baby clothes etc in advance, not suspecting that the baby turns out to be unreasonably large.
Sent you DMs on this
October 29, 2025 at 12:57 PM
Sent you DMs on this
I know you're talking about states rather than atoms; I'm simplifying just to try to get around possible ambiguity or misunderstanding about what constitutes a state. Apologies if this has led to me missing the point.
October 28, 2025 at 2:17 AM
I know you're talking about states rather than atoms; I'm simplifying just to try to get around possible ambiguity or misunderstanding about what constitutes a state. Apologies if this has led to me missing the point.
So if C is the 8 atoms, and E is the 9, and B is some environment of other atoms, then I see no violation of FGM.
October 28, 2025 at 2:15 AM
So if C is the 8 atoms, and E is the 9, and B is some environment of other atoms, then I see no violation of FGM.
Like, suppose, as a toy example, that one mental property is instantiated by having 9 atoms arranged in a 3x3 grid. And suppose another is instantiated by having 8 atoms arranged in a square with a length of 3 atoms. The 3x3 grid achieves both at the same time.
October 28, 2025 at 2:13 AM
Like, suppose, as a toy example, that one mental property is instantiated by having 9 atoms arranged in a 3x3 grid. And suppose another is instantiated by having 8 atoms arranged in a square with a length of 3 atoms. The 3x3 grid achieves both at the same time.
So the same atoms manifest more than one distinct mental property, violating FGM, is that what you mean? But the way I'm looking at it, the same atoms can have more than one distinct physical property.
October 28, 2025 at 1:28 AM
So the same atoms manifest more than one distinct mental property, violating FGM, is that what you mean? But the way I'm looking at it, the same atoms can have more than one distinct physical property.
I think that while I might agree with your argument for doubled qualia, mind-mind supervenience is a different case. There are no distinct physical properties to point to for doubled qualia; there are for mind-mind supervenience.
October 27, 2025 at 2:02 AM
I think that while I might agree with your argument for doubled qualia, mind-mind supervenience is a different case. There are no distinct physical properties to point to for doubled qualia; there are for mind-mind supervenience.
FGM says: "If, at a given time, a single entity instantiates two distinct mental properties, it must do so in virtue of instantiating two distinct physical properties." Two distinct physical properties are instantiated, therefore there's no problem having two distinct mental properties.
October 27, 2025 at 2:01 AM
FGM says: "If, at a given time, a single entity instantiates two distinct mental properties, it must do so in virtue of instantiating two distinct physical properties." Two distinct physical properties are instantiated, therefore there's no problem having two distinct mental properties.
Suppose Searle likes anchovies and Wang hates anchovies. Searle's attitude to anchovies is instantiated by the physical property of having neurons in a certain configuration; Wang's attitude by the physical property of having neurons represent virtual neurons in a certain configuration.
October 27, 2025 at 1:59 AM
Suppose Searle likes anchovies and Wang hates anchovies. Searle's attitude to anchovies is instantiated by the physical property of having neurons in a certain configuration; Wang's attitude by the physical property of having neurons represent virtual neurons in a certain configuration.
Looking at the paper, considerations such as these are why I don't really call myself a physicalist. I'm much more of a functionalist. But I don't think mind-mind-supervenience contradicts your axiom FGM, because there *are* two distinct physical properties.
October 27, 2025 at 1:57 AM
Looking at the paper, considerations such as these are why I don't really call myself a physicalist. I'm much more of a functionalist. But I don't think mind-mind-supervenience contradicts your axiom FGM, because there *are* two distinct physical properties.
Will read when I get a chance. This topic might be a fun one to have a video chat on some time if you're up for it.
October 25, 2025 at 2:13 PM
Will read when I get a chance. This topic might be a fun one to have a video chat on some time if you're up for it.
It's doable in principle by someone smart enough. I am not smart enough.
October 25, 2025 at 2:11 PM
It's doable in principle by someone smart enough. I am not smart enough.
In your view, Searle knows that "dog"=🐶, and also knows that "狗"=🐶, but doesn't know that "dog"="狗" and lacks the resources to figure it out. I don't think that's the best way of describing the situation.
October 25, 2025 at 8:53 AM
In your view, Searle knows that "dog"=🐶, and also knows that "狗"=🐶, but doesn't know that "dog"="狗" and lacks the resources to figure it out. I don't think that's the best way of describing the situation.
He's not just a shitty translator, he is completely incapable of translating anything, even a simple noun like "dog". This just isn't a bilingual person. There is a clear functional difference between a bilingual person and Searle. Why oppose the idea of one mind being the substrate for another?
October 25, 2025 at 12:10 AM
He's not just a shitty translator, he is completely incapable of translating anything, even a simple noun like "dog". This just isn't a bilingual person. There is a clear functional difference between a bilingual person and Searle. Why oppose the idea of one mind being the substrate for another?
It's similar to the fact that if I were given an arbitrarily detailed brain scan of your brain in action, it wouldn't really help me read your mind. All the information is there in principle, but there is no way I'm going to be able to figure it out.
October 25, 2025 at 12:05 AM
It's similar to the fact that if I were given an arbitrarily detailed brain scan of your brain in action, it wouldn't really help me read your mind. All the information is there in principle, but there is no way I'm going to be able to figure it out.
Now, in principle, a great omniscience (a Mary) would be able to decode the matrix multiplications and read his mind, revealing his secrets. But the ability to do that requires much more intelligence than just running the algorithm.
October 25, 2025 at 12:04 AM
Now, in principle, a great omniscience (a Mary) would be able to decode the matrix multiplications and read his mind, revealing his secrets. But the ability to do that requires much more intelligence than just running the algorithm.
I think this is obviously wrong. If there is some secret Einstein refuses to reveal, then how are you going to get it from matrix multiplication? You give it input and you get output, in the mode of a conversation. You only learn what Einstein would reveal on conversation.
October 25, 2025 at 12:01 AM
I think this is obviously wrong. If there is some secret Einstein refuses to reveal, then how are you going to get it from matrix multiplication? You give it input and you get output, in the mode of a conversation. You only learn what Einstein would reveal on conversation.
If he is both a Chinese understander and an English understander he should have some ability to translate. But if the CR virtual person (Wang) doesn't speak English, then he will have no such ability.
October 25, 2025 at 12:00 AM
If he is both a Chinese understander and an English understander he should have some ability to translate. But if the CR virtual person (Wang) doesn't speak English, then he will have no such ability.
It is a counterexample to functionalism if the physical system does not instantiate understanding of Chinese. But it does. But the understanding is not Searle's, if "Searle" denotes one of two intentional complexes in the system. Two persons.
October 24, 2025 at 11:57 PM
It is a counterexample to functionalism if the physical system does not instantiate understanding of Chinese. But it does. But the understanding is not Searle's, if "Searle" denotes one of two intentional complexes in the system. Two persons.
I'm not! I'm just saying that we shouldn't expect someone who memorises the Einstein's Brain algorithm to have any special insight into Einstein's private thoughts. All that person has access to is inputs, outputs, and in between a whole lot of opaque matrix operations.
October 24, 2025 at 2:05 PM
I'm not! I'm just saying that we shouldn't expect someone who memorises the Einstein's Brain algorithm to have any special insight into Einstein's private thoughts. All that person has access to is inputs, outputs, and in between a whole lot of opaque matrix operations.
I asked you about operating systems and virtual machines. If a Windows PC is hosting a Linux VM, what is the OS of the PC? How many logical machines are there? Hopefully you see how I would answer these questions. Would you answer them differently? If you think this is not analogous, why not?
October 24, 2025 at 2:03 PM
I asked you about operating systems and virtual machines. If a Windows PC is hosting a Linux VM, what is the OS of the PC? How many logical machines are there? Hopefully you see how I would answer these questions. Would you answer them differently? If you think this is not analogous, why not?
Two complexes of intentional states.
October 24, 2025 at 2:01 PM
Two complexes of intentional states.