(yet another clue that fodor was a self-hating pragmatist)
November 10, 2025 at 2:09 PM
(yet another clue that fodor was a self-hating pragmatist)
on a second's more thought, putnam is almost certainly more directly who fodor got it from
November 10, 2025 at 2:03 PM
on a second's more thought, putnam is almost certainly more directly who fodor got it from
Yeah, "belief fixation" is originally from Peirce, but I share the impression that Fodor injected it into cogsci and current phil mind. (And my vaguer impression is that Quine might be the main bridge from Peirce to Fodor?) But you find the term sprinkled throughout 20th C epistemology and phil mind
November 10, 2025 at 1:59 PM
Yeah, "belief fixation" is originally from Peirce, but I share the impression that Fodor injected it into cogsci and current phil mind. (And my vaguer impression is that Quine might be the main bridge from Peirce to Fodor?) But you find the term sprinkled throughout 20th C epistemology and phil mind
hahah yeah well you know i'm on your team there! just pointing out that some of the more reasonable people who aren't on our team want to go in for a way of cashing out betterness that isn't super metaphysically committing
November 5, 2025 at 5:49 PM
hahah yeah well you know i'm on your team there! just pointing out that some of the more reasonable people who aren't on our team want to go in for a way of cashing out betterness that isn't super metaphysically committing
i know this is something that people would yell at me about, but eg while lewis uses his conception of naturalness to do some metaphysically heavy stuff, the conception of naturalness itself doesn't seem super metaphysically substantive to me. ditto khalidi's simple causal theory of natural kinds
November 5, 2025 at 5:40 PM
i know this is something that people would yell at me about, but eg while lewis uses his conception of naturalness to do some metaphysically heavy stuff, the conception of naturalness itself doesn't seem super metaphysically substantive to me. ditto khalidi's simple causal theory of natural kinds
going consumer-based by ultimately going interpretivist: good
but also there are ways of making the kind of naturalness he would otherwise need pretty metaphysically lightweight
but also there are ways of making the kind of naturalness he would otherwise need pretty metaphysically lightweight
November 5, 2025 at 5:32 PM
going consumer-based by ultimately going interpretivist: good
but also there are ways of making the kind of naturalness he would otherwise need pretty metaphysically lightweight
but also there are ways of making the kind of naturalness he would otherwise need pretty metaphysically lightweight
which ones do you like?
November 2, 2025 at 11:07 PM
which ones do you like?
Since weighing in on the reality of IQ while telling all of my peers that they harbor a rotten assumption isn't quite polemical enough for my tastes, I conclude by claiming that all psychology is folk psychology.
Hope you enjoy! (5/5)
Hope you enjoy! (5/5)
October 27, 2025 at 6:33 PM
IQ is a lousy conception of intelligence: it serves neither cognitive scientific nor social purposes particularly well. Nevertheless, it captures a real difference between minds. Lesson: don't assume that the very best ways of talking about minds are the only accurate ways. (4/5)
October 27, 2025 at 6:33 PM
For readers who do care about metaphysics, I argue that reflection on IQ reveals that a hegemonic assumption about the ontology of mind is false. (3/5)
October 27, 2025 at 6:33 PM
If you're a culture warrior who doesn't care about metaphysics, you can skip to §3 of the article for my critical chronicle of the development and public dissemination of IQ tests over the course of the 20th century. (2/5)
October 27, 2025 at 6:33 PM
when i read "i often imagine that it's raining," i think i tentatively interpret it as "have mental imagery" (but know it might mean "think"), and then that interpretation grows more definite by the end of the sentence
October 18, 2025 at 2:20 PM
when i read "i often imagine that it's raining," i think i tentatively interpret it as "have mental imagery" (but know it might mean "think"), and then that interpretation grows more definite by the end of the sentence
i think it becomes available in (2) too, the interpretive switch is just harsher
when i read "i imagine that it's raining," i confidently interpret it as "think", and then revise that interpretation by the end of the sentence
when i read "i imagine that it's raining," i confidently interpret it as "think", and then revise that interpretation by the end of the sentence
October 18, 2025 at 2:20 PM
i think it becomes available in (2) too, the interpretive switch is just harsher
when i read "i imagine that it's raining," i confidently interpret it as "think", and then revise that interpretation by the end of the sentence
when i read "i imagine that it's raining," i confidently interpret it as "think", and then revise that interpretation by the end of the sentence
ah no I'm sorry for the obnoxious self-promotion! it's an excellent paper.
September 24, 2025 at 6:43 PM
ah no I'm sorry for the obnoxious self-promotion! it's an excellent paper.
...I'd say the contrast is between the objective standards applying absolutely vs the objective standards applying only relative to a particular purpose/interpreter/stance/model/whatever)
September 24, 2025 at 6:35 PM
...I'd say the contrast is between the objective standards applying absolutely vs the objective standards applying only relative to a particular purpose/interpreter/stance/model/whatever)
(To be clear, I think there are good reasons to call these "objective standards". But insofar as you're discussing the objective standards in order to draw a contrast with relativism...
September 24, 2025 at 6:35 PM
(To be clear, I think there are good reasons to call these "objective standards". But insofar as you're discussing the objective standards in order to draw a contrast with relativism...
Yep, that's right. (I'm a full-blown relativist, not just a contextualist.) Of course, I have arguments that all (superficial) interpretivists should give up on wanting an absolute standard of belief. But I don't expect to convince you of that here!
September 24, 2025 at 6:28 PM
Yep, that's right. (I'm a full-blown relativist, not just a contextualist.) Of course, I have arguments that all (superficial) interpretivists should give up on wanting an absolute standard of belief. But I don't expect to convince you of that here!
Agreed that it's an important distinction, and yeah "absolute" is better than "objective." FWIW, I think I'm a better foil on that score than Dennett! (I do go fully in for the kind of view you're rejecting; Dan only flirted with it; details in the "Interpretivism and norms" paper linked above.)
September 24, 2025 at 6:23 PM
Agreed that it's an important distinction, and yeah "absolute" is better than "objective." FWIW, I think I'm a better foil on that score than Dennett! (I do go fully in for the kind of view you're rejecting; Dan only flirted with it; details in the "Interpretivism and norms" paper linked above.)