It's definitely a good one! I also like what Einstein says somewhere about internal and external considerations in favor of a theory (or something to that effect). Fits IBE quite well, I think.

Sounds great, I look forward to reading this.

And we argue, on that basis, that the debate about scientific progress should be seen as central to the various debates about scientific realism.

We show, among other things, that scientists' views about various forms of scientific realism are best predicted by their views on scientific progress -- as opposed to, for instance, their views on the epistemic status of current theories, the no-miracles argument, or the pessimistic induction.

This is hilarious, and makes a good point.

There was some sort of transition from one paper handling system to another, during which my paper seems to have just been forgotten about for a good while. Phil Imprint is doing the best they can with very limited resources so I have lots of sympathy for them.

In the paper I argue for the heretical view that there is a way in which accommodated data provides more support than predicted data.

How could that possibly be right? Read the paper to find out. (It's fully open access.)

I wasn't able to make thismone open access. Preprint available here: philpapers.org/archive/BEDI...

And although we frame the argument as focusin on methods in philosophy specifically, it easily generalizes to other disciplines, and indeed to any systematic research.

The model we use to show this is a sort of extension/elaboration/improvement on the models that Kitcher and Strevens use to model the benefits of cognitive diversity in science.

Should every researcher (in philosophy, for instance) be using the 'best' method available? We show, from surprisingly modest assumptions (e.g. about what 'best' amounts to), that resources should often be spread around to those using other methods, even when we know they're not 'best'.