dan (bayes gays)
@danielluopi.bsky.social
bayesian persuasion, taylor swift, and yuzuru hanyu stan | happy free confused and lonely at the same time | phd and @nsf grf @mitecon | past @northwesternu
yes :) but yea theory production function is very different -- just trying to justify why i got fooled!
May 17, 2025 at 2:25 AM
yes :) but yea theory production function is very different -- just trying to justify why i got fooled!
i actually think this is relatively expected in theory now; frank yang went on the market with 2 solo t5 r&rs, roberto corrao w/ 3 (coauthored, student only), giacomo, etc etc....
May 17, 2025 at 2:25 AM
i actually think this is relatively expected in theory now; frank yang went on the market with 2 solo t5 r&rs, roberto corrao w/ 3 (coauthored, student only), giacomo, etc etc....
also giacomo lanai wrote a solo QJE that was published either his 3rd or 4th year
May 17, 2025 at 2:18 AM
also giacomo lanai wrote a solo QJE that was published either his 3rd or 4th year
harry pei (*published* his second year: bpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/sites.northw...)
bpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com
May 17, 2025 at 2:15 AM
harry pei (*published* his second year: bpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/sites.northw...)
one of them found a typo!
May 7, 2025 at 2:46 AM
one of them found a typo!
are you calling me smelly :(
May 7, 2025 at 2:45 AM
are you calling me smelly :(
Reposted by dan (bayes gays)
That is, funnily enough, a different set of corrections.
May 7, 2025 at 2:16 AM
That is, funnily enough, a different set of corrections.
MANY ARE SAYING!!!
November 23, 2024 at 7:24 PM
MANY ARE SAYING!!!
edit: link update here drive.google.com/file/d/1KmPJ...
x.com
x.com
November 22, 2024 at 8:01 PM
edit: link update here drive.google.com/file/d/1KmPJ...
That's everything for now! The paper does a lot more and can be found below -- any feedback is welcome :) (15/15)
drive.google.com/drive/u/0/fo...
drive.google.com/drive/u/0/fo...
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drive.google.com
November 22, 2024 at 7:55 PM
That's everything for now! The paper does a lot more and can be found below -- any feedback is welcome :) (15/15)
drive.google.com/drive/u/0/fo...
drive.google.com/drive/u/0/fo...
Thus, we show that in a majority of cases, the commitment assumption is relatively innocuous, but there are also some situations where it does have real bite and can't necessarily be microfounded reputationally, as first suggested by Rayo and Segal (2010). (14/15)
November 22, 2024 at 7:55 PM
Thus, we show that in a majority of cases, the commitment assumption is relatively innocuous, but there are also some situations where it does have real bite and can't necessarily be microfounded reputationally, as first suggested by Rayo and Segal (2010). (14/15)
We identify a graph-theoretic condition that ensures sender can secure their Bayesian persuasion payoff, which accomodates all deterministic signals, monotone partitions (with randomization at the boundaries), upper censorship, etc. but does *not* include all bi-pooling policies. (13/15)
November 22, 2024 at 7:55 PM
We identify a graph-theoretic condition that ensures sender can secure their Bayesian persuasion payoff, which accomodates all deterministic signals, monotone partitions (with randomization at the boundaries), upper censorship, etc. but does *not* include all bi-pooling policies. (13/15)
Finally, we use this characterization to think about state-independent persuasion when (1) receiver never sees past state realizations and (2) sender has a "grain of truth," e.g. pays a vanishingly small cost for sending messages. (12/15)
November 22, 2024 at 7:55 PM
Finally, we use this characterization to think about state-independent persuasion when (1) receiver never sees past state realizations and (2) sender has a "grain of truth," e.g. pays a vanishingly small cost for sending messages. (12/15)
The CM condition tightly characterizes equilibrium payoffs in one-dimensional games where the LR players payoff between their signal and action is strictly supermodular: they get (at most) at least their payoff from a monotone strategy when SR players break ties (for) against them. (11/15)
November 22, 2024 at 7:55 PM
The CM condition tightly characterizes equilibrium payoffs in one-dimensional games where the LR players payoff between their signal and action is strictly supermodular: they get (at most) at least their payoff from a monotone strategy when SR players break ties (for) against them. (11/15)
This also gives an upper bound: in *any* equilibrium, if the LR player is likely to be rational, their highest possible payoff is a strategy inducing a (weakly) cyclically monotone graph. The proof is a new application of the martingale convergence theorem, if anyone's interested :)
(10/15)
(10/15)
November 22, 2024 at 7:55 PM
This also gives an upper bound: in *any* equilibrium, if the LR player is likely to be rational, their highest possible payoff is a strategy inducing a (weakly) cyclically monotone graph. The proof is a new application of the martingale convergence theorem, if anyone's interested :)
(10/15)
(10/15)
Our condition is stated in optimal transport terms: a strategy is confound-defeating if and only if its graph has (strictly) cyclically monotone support. This is a new, strict version of well-known sufficiency conditions in the optimal transport literature, dating back to Rochet, 1987. (9/15)
November 22, 2024 at 7:55 PM
Our condition is stated in optimal transport terms: a strategy is confound-defeating if and only if its graph has (strictly) cyclically monotone support. This is a new, strict version of well-known sufficiency conditions in the optimal transport literature, dating back to Rochet, 1987. (9/15)
The key idea is that the LR player's commitment strategy must outperform in the stage game all other strategies that generate the same marginals. If this is the case, then SR players can draw the "right" inference about what the LR player is doing from just marginal data. (8/15)
November 22, 2024 at 7:55 PM
The key idea is that the LR player's commitment strategy must outperform in the stage game all other strategies that generate the same marginals. If this is the case, then SR players can draw the "right" inference about what the LR player is doing from just marginal data. (8/15)
However, all is not lost. In fact, we identify a new condition, "confound-defeatingness," which is sufficient to guarantee the LR player a high payoff even in the game above. (7/15)
November 22, 2024 at 7:55 PM
However, all is not lost. In fact, we identify a new condition, "confound-defeatingness," which is sufficient to guarantee the LR player a high payoff even in the game above. (7/15)