Christian Moore-Anderson
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cmooreanderson.bsky.social
Christian Moore-Anderson
@cmooreanderson.bsky.social
Biology Teacher & Head of Bio (11–18)
📗Making Meaning (Forthcoming)
📘Difference Maker (🇬🇧 & 🇪🇸)
📙Biology Made Real (🇬🇧 & 🇪🇸)
Blog: rb.gy/dyi5a
#EnactiveCogSci
You're welcome :)
November 10, 2025 at 2:43 PM
The new book is based on enactivism but focused on meaning making. It hints at these ideas but does not go down the line of talking about alternatives to storage and retrieval. That would be have to be a different book. I'm planning a new biology one, on models, and aim to talk something it in there
November 10, 2025 at 2:06 PM
Skinner appeared to think (?) that the environment directly controlled behaviour. Maturana & Varela's work originally argued that the environment couldn't do that. The organism was determined by its own structure, so the environment can only trigger it to act in its own way.
November 10, 2025 at 1:10 PM
It won't, because they're not aware of the distinctions in cognitive science. How do you debate what people are not aware of?

Yet, talking constantly of storage and retrieval biases how people act. Language is epistemology.
November 10, 2025 at 1:03 PM
I'm not sure "meaning" was on the radar in behaviourism, because meaning suggests something internal.

Phenomenology is also very important in some areas of enactivism, so directly appreciates personal experience and perception, rather than just reaction.
November 10, 2025 at 1:01 PM
Enactivism rejects cognition as computation of symbols, in favour, instead, of a dynamical systems view of the nervous system. I think behaviourism doesn't have these notions of cognition (it's just behaviour(?)).
Enactivism also deals heavily with meaning, and how that emerges from embodiment.
November 10, 2025 at 12:59 PM
From my little understanding of behaviourism, in this view, the environment causes and controls behaviour.

In enactivism, the environment and organism co-specify each other. Enactivism is also grounded in biology, e.g. autopoiesis and biological autonomy.
November 10, 2025 at 12:59 PM
There has been recent work comparing these:

link.springer.com/article/10.1...

And an accessible talk about it:

www.youtube.com/watch?v=vjFb...

I've read into enactivism, but little into Skinner & his radical behaviourism. There are differences, but to give a good answer, I'll need to read more.
Enactivism, pragmatism…behaviorism? - Philosophical Studies
Shaun Gallagher applies enactivist thinking to a staggeringly wide range of topics in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, even venturing into the realms of biological anthropology. One prominent...
link.springer.com
November 10, 2025 at 12:34 PM
You mean like renaming representation as re-presentation, as Glasersfeld does?
November 10, 2025 at 8:58 AM
The storage in cognitivism is that some symbols are stored "as a representation" of whatever the memory is supposed to represent.

In enactivism, your neural patterns change structure to maintain viable actions. I don't see that as storage, just congruent structural change.
November 10, 2025 at 8:57 AM
My argument is that whatever you choose: "storage" or "no storage" this is a fundament upon which you will derive viable actions. EduCogSciers have sold "storage & retrieval" as the only game in town, but that's not so.
November 10, 2025 at 8:05 AM
Well, it is enactive cognitive science. (There has been some discussion that it has split into a philosophy of nature, and a science of cognition.)
And, yes. We all experience learning, habits, remembering, and forgetting. Enactivism explains them a different way.
November 10, 2025 at 8:03 AM
Well, that is also a position of enactivism, but not cognitivism. Enactivism thinks phenomenology should be included alongside scientific studies. What we experience is part of nature, not a part from it.
November 10, 2025 at 6:54 AM
Well, here's your problem then. Representation is the fundament of cognivitism. And all the EduCogSci stuff comes from cognitivism. Retreival, encoding, storing, processing.
They'll say: Internal thinking is the computational processing of encoded symbols in the brain.
November 10, 2025 at 6:46 AM
answer questions (with others or self) and as they act they adapt to the responses. The meaning comes from the physical and linguistic interactions. And then brain, and acting organ, not a storing organ, plastically adapts its structure to these interactions; new patterns of neurological behaviour.
November 10, 2025 at 5:51 AM
... but in viable actions. In the classroom I teach models with symbols. The students learn the symbols and we use them every lesson. But those symbols aren't encoded into more symbols in their brains. Instead, they are prompted to act by the symbols. They must converse about them and ...
November 10, 2025 at 5:51 AM
In the enactive view, everything is tied to perception and action. We're receiving "Inputs" about the real world which we then "encoded" like a computer. When we learn a concept we develop patterns of neurological action in the brain. The meaning of the concept is not found in storage of symbols...
November 10, 2025 at 5:51 AM
Note that none of this is about how you imagine things, or how you may draw a concept as a representation on paper. You recognise symbols on paper, but are there literal symbols encoded in the brain (two different questions about two different phenomena).
November 10, 2025 at 5:51 AM
The question is this, when we learn a concept, is it "stored" in the brain as "symbols" which can be "computed"? Such that information is "out there" and I can "encode" a mirror version of it into my brain. Which can then be used in reasoning by "retrieving" and "processing" the stored symbols?
November 10, 2025 at 5:51 AM
The trouble here is that there are two different conversations. Lee is discussing his personal experience, which is phenomenological. "I experience concepts this way". The position of representation is not about this. Its about how the brain acts.
November 10, 2025 at 5:51 AM
You don't agree that language is the computational of symbols by the brain? Then you disagree with representationism. But, be careful, this isn't a phenomenological argument, it's discussing what the brain is doing, not what you experience.
November 10, 2025 at 5:33 AM
Your talking about symbols in communication, Cognitive Science is talking about symbols in the brain.
These are very different things. Everyone agrees that words are symbols. Not everyone agrees that the brain computes symbols.
November 10, 2025 at 5:30 AM
Lee, we're having two conversations. I'm discussing cognitive science. You are using the terms in your everyday sense, often phenomenonologically.
I'm not making arguments about symbols being processed & computed in the brain, this is the argument of representationism, and, therefore, cognitivism.
November 10, 2025 at 5:30 AM