Geopolitics are not the only reason why UN peace operations struggle today. My latest piece looks at what can be done to ensure that the peace ops review and #UN80 actually take a critical look at whether existing approaches and structures remain fit for purpose.

open.substack.com/pub/casquebl...

The Security Council has not been able to reach agreement on financing #AUSSOM using UN assessed funding (i.e., the “hybrid” implementation of UNSCR 2719). As such, UN support to the AU in #Somalia will continue under existing arrangements through #UNSOS.

undocs.org/en/S/2025/322

Here is the relevant section from my prepared remarks on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2719 to the Security Council Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention in Africa almost a year ago, on 30 April 2024.

Last April, I warned Security Council members that failure to raise the 25% for AU missions while giving access to liquidity measures would harm all current and future UN peacekeeping ops. Now w/U.S. assessments in doubt, it’s time to be realistic about the practicality of moving forward with 2719.

The budget for the #UNAMI transition is now available. It provides details on how the #UN intends to draw down the mission while continuing the implementation of activities through the end of the mandate on 31 December. #Iraq

undocs.org/en/a/79/6(se...

The cost estimates for the human rights section of the 2025 programme (regular) budget are reflected in this table; the U.S. share of the regular budget is 22%.

Yes, the EO specifies that the proportion of the US assessment for the 2025 #UN regular budget corresponding to the US share of UNHRC costs will be withheld.

If the US decides to leave UNESCO, the earliest that this could take place would be the end of 2026.

Under Article II, Section 6 of the UNESCO Constitution, any Member State may withdraw by giving written notice; the withdrawal takes effect on 31 December of the year after notification. [5/5]

As such, the 90-day review of US membership in UNESCO will be a test to see which is more important to US foreign policy (and US posture at the UN) under Trump 2.0: anti-Israel sentiment or countering Chinese influence. [4/5]

The US is prohibited by law from providing funding to UN orgs that recognize #Palestine. UNESCO admitted Palestine in 2011, leading to a loss of US funding and the consequent loss of US vote in the UNESCO General Conference in 2013. [2/5]

TFW DeepSeek starts generating a really solid response to a question about Taiwan but then self-censors and replaces it with this:

The Constitution of the World Health Organization doesn’t actually contain provisions for withdrawal of membership. The U.S., however, joined the WHO under the condition of having the right to withdraw. Congress codified this reservation in law under what is currently 22 USC §290c. [2/3]

The WSJ editorial written by Musk and Ramaswamy last week outlining their plans for DOGE actually included a reference to int’l orgs. It’s not immediately clear what the $1.5 billion refers to, but the mention in a vision statement for cost-cutting is notable in itself.

www.wsj.com/opinion/musk...

UN peace operations are in a period of retrenchment. My latest paper examines how we got here, identifies the shortcomings and tensions in current mission models. It articulates a new approach that can help restore relevance and maximize effectiveness of peace ops. [1/5]

cic.nyu.edu/resources/a-...

Ireland is always seated beside Israel in the UN General Assembly because the seating arrangement follows alphabetical order.

It’s not so bad if you know what you’re looking for and have a handle on document symbols. Here’s a handy guide I whipped up a while back:

casquebleu.org/index.php?ti...

The UN Archives search though? The results it spits out seem totally random every time.