Pretty sure that one’s taken, but I appreciate the deeper meaning—that is, the more scientists, the starker their foreboding

I’m incorporating my previous comments by reference. And props to @paulkelleher.net for the high praise from Cass!
I enjoyed our exegetical exchange yesterday, if that’s an appropriate use of the term.

*what Congress does on a partisan basis through reconciliation is more durable than regulatory policy, but not durable enough, sure.

Were Congress to adopt new climate regulations, that’s subject to the filibuster.

So “workable” should encompass political viability and administrability

I’d agree it’s more workable if legislators, perhaps informed by CBA, set a number in law, like 45Q. But then that’s hard to optimize.

CBA is unworkable w/r/t climate for agencies because it’s neither durable nor stable. Better than nothing, but it looks like Congress has to start over.

That's a fair point. Unless knowledge of benefits is a necessary condition of efficiency? I was reaching the character limit, but pretend instead I'd said: using CBA to set price signals is unworkable w/r/t climate because benefits are too imprecise. Call it a shot in the dark.

CBA can’t tell market actors how many DAC plants to build in 2030 or 2035 and under what conditions they should operate.

Investors need price signals instructing when to reduce versus when to avoid or abate.

CBA yields inefficient price signals w/r/t climate because benefits are too imprecise.

CBA isn’t a great tool here though. It’s okay to assume the future benefits/harms avoided exceed some present costs. But that still doesn’t solve for marginal abatement investments.

Better to set a net zero target (2050 or beyond) and minimize cost of abatement within that parameter.

Rules versus standards & delegation theory: SCC is far too imprecise for stable, durable climate policy

What’s implausible about carbon recovery? 😉

Yoga helps!

It’s worth adding that there’s no path dependency to building out new legislative frameworks and shopping them around. If this admin fails its CAA climate objectives, and the next dem president has another bite at the apple w/ GHG rules, the threat of those rules increases leverage in Congress.

Maybe carbon recovery (like carbon takeback) is a bad idea, but nobody refutes it.

That’s a shame because I’m convinced a CRF framework takes the best of both carbon tax and cap-and-trade without nearly as much baggage.

Please spread the word and send open-minded collaborators my way.

Professor, I share your concern that the CAA may be removed as a tool of real climate progress.

That’s why I’m trying my damnedest to raise awareness about a legislative pathway that’s gone largely unexplored here in the US.

See Section IV.B.👇🏼

digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jelr/vol13/i...

I hope the climate movement is prepared to make an opportunity out of this potential outcome, if and when it arises.

How else should climate advocates prepare for this moment, @volts.wtf, anyone...?

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