They limited injunctive relief to the parties requesting it, so a proper class action of a nationwide class would be one of the few ways to achieve something similar.

I think the largest issue for the panel was a line of binding precedent from SCOTUS on similar statutory language.

Oh no worries! For all our shared commonlaw tradition, there are some notable differences that I am sure I have no idea about. I also want to be clear that I am not defending law firms that chose to cut a deal rather than pursue a legal challenge.

The Atlantic has been covering these issues, though I know it is behind a paywall: www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archiv...

The agreement reached for the Trump admin to rescind the EO: www.whitehouse.gov/presidential...

Text of the executive order: www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/ex...

He doesn't have anything "over" them other than issuing executive orders that threaten the business of law firms who rely on security clearances, government contracts, or clients who might run to other law firms who are not being targeted by the administration. I have some links below.

the principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse for individuals facing various forms of criminal liabilty. If you read legislative history or even the opening sections and subsections of statutes, you'll often see awareness of current or former law.

Some legislatures may legislate ignorantly or incompatibly with already-existing law, creating conflicts or difficulties that courts (or future legislatures) will need to sort out. But I think the canon/inference that legislatures are aware of existing law is less of a legal fiction than . . .

Legislatures often pass laws that they say are declarative of existing law, codify already-existing common law or caselaw, or in other cases abrogate or repeal the currently applicable caselaw on the issue. Is canon of statutory construction sometimes more of a legal fiction? Sure.

Legislators legislate with the current legal state of affairs in mind. That's a fairly reasonable belief. The point of being a legislator is to amend, repeal, or make new law. What law already is in place is highly relevant. Legislatures often . . .

There probably is a lot more to look into around the context of the Fourteenth Amendment and the intent (and meaning) of related words or phrases elsewhere in the Constitution on its initial passage. But this opinion alone covers a lot of ground.

If you are interested in detail here, the opinion all the way through to page 705 has exhaustive detail. You can read the analysis and the other cases cited. Two justices dissented, so feel free to read that and compare. I find the dissent far less compelling.

And the Court notes that holding otherwise "would be to deny citizenship to thousands of persons of English, Scotch, Irish, German or other European parentage, who have always been considered and treated as citizens of the United States." Id. at 694.

After this exhaustive analysis and recounting of caselaw and history (including other countries), the Court was "irresistibly" led to this conclusion: "The Fourteenth Amendment affirms the ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory," with some exceptions. Id. at 693.

The later discussion covers the context of the Fourteenth Amendment, including addressing the understanding of "subject to the jurisdiction" language (e.g., Id. at 678, 680-82, and so on). The Civil Rights Act of 1866 discussed throughout also provides insight into the intent of the 14th Amendment.

The discussion even addresses the few possible arguments in the other direction (e.g., referring to Roman law). All of this discussion (before page 675) is about the state of the law before the Fourteenth Amendment passed.

Pages 653-675 go into extensive detail about what it means to be a natural-born citizen, looking back 300 years in England's history and elsewhere in the world, analyzing several cases to arrive at the consistent conclusion that citizenship derives from birth in the country.