5) These are new challenges for Norway’s “total defence” and societal security. Drone technology facilitates hybrid warfare activities and bring foreign conflicts close to home; it causes psychological distress in the population, and this is one of the intentions of the ones using hybrid warfare

4) It is impossible to dissociate yesterday's activities from developments in Poland and in the Baltic countries.We see that drone's attributes (stealth, difficulty of detection, remoteness) make them particularly apt for the battlefield, but also for hybrid warfare below the threshold of war.

... Russian citizens being arrested at Norwegian border crossing sites and airports in possession of drones and drone-collected data on their way back to Russia.

3) Following Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine, many drone-related incidents took place in Norway: drone sightings outside oil platforms and energy installations, drone incursions in the vicinity of airports leading to the temporary closure of some of them, and...

2) As our team at PRIO's RegulAIR project has argued time and again over many years, our research shows that Norway’s drone vulnerabilities have been known for a long time, and Russia’s threat is just making them more dangerous and more explicit. www.prio.org/projects/1902

1) In Norway, investigations the Norwegian Police Service (PST) and the Norwegian Criminal Investigation Department (Kripos). Currently there's no clear identification of where the drones came from or who operated them, but authorities "are taking this very seriously" (Min of Justice dixit)

Yes, unfortunately drone-wise it's always good timing because there's always something going on. I've been covering the issue for 13 years, there's always something to look into. But of course its salience is much bigger now.

European Data Protection Officer, and some fundamental rights NGOs as raising several challenges. Having CSOs and citizens excluded from the processes that create interoperability further reinforces these challenges.

These findings largely apply beyond the empirical case of interoperability - in other words, CSOs and citizens have largely been side-lined in R&D processes that develop security "solutions" in the EU. Interoperability has been described by the EU's Fundamental Rights Agency, the (...)

Still, there are plenty of challenges. In future warfare, drones will move in swarms that can be very difficult to counter. Drone attack capabilities are evolving faster than their countermeasures, and technological development is very rapid. In this case and in others, full security does not exist.

I mentioned that current technology makes it possible, for example, to protect individual buildings or a specific area from drone threats, but NATO's eastern border is very long. I said it is realistic that some parts of the eastern border will be effectively protected from drone attacks.

I highlighted research findings from work carried out together with colleagues @nicholasmarsh.bsky.social, @jocelynmawdsley.bsky.social and Raluca Csernatoni @carnegieeurope.bsky.social. Links available for Youtube, Apple Podcasts and Spotify. tinyurl.com/bdcmfdzp

In 2023 we also received Fabio Scarpello as a visiting fellow at PRIO, participated in multiple academic and policy conferences, engaged with many societal actors and practioners, and organised a scenario workshop with international experts. Now, looking forward to 2024! www.prio.org/projects/1902