Danke. Bis Jahresende lässt sich die Liberalisierung allerdings nicht ändern. Zumal sie mit EU-Richtlinien verbunden ist.

Können Sie bitte erläutern, wie das gemeint ist?

📝 Apply via JKU system:
🔗 karriere.jku.at/hcm/jobexcha...
💬 Feel free to DM me or email if you have questions!

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🧠 Requirements:
• Master's degree in economics or related field
• Strong theory background
• Very good English (C1)
• Programming in Python/R a plus
• German not required

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📌 Topics:
• Microeconomic theory
• Market design
• Game theory
• (Optional) Experimental econ or structural econometrics

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👨‍🏫 Work with me on the DFG-funded project:
“Strategic Uncertainty in Market Design”
You'll also have time for your own research, with the option to enroll in our structured PhD program.

Thanks, Alex 😊

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🧠 Conclusion: A new model of behavior in multi-unit auctions under strategic uncertainty. Our paper expands the toolkit for auction theory and contains much more
📄 Read more: doi.org/10.1016/j.je...

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Design implication: Depending on the competitiveness, the auctioneer might want to steer bidders’ information towards the informational extremes of maximal uncertainty or BNE.

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Policy twist:
📈 In competitive markets, BNE outcomes yield higher revenue.
😬 But in low-competition settings, BNE can result in collusive equilibria with zero revenue.
😮 Minimax-loss bidders, unaware of such collusive schemes, don't coordinate — and often generate higher revenue in these cases.

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🧪 Experimental evidence aligns:
– In PAB, BNE says to bid the same on both units, but real bidders often bid less for the second unit.
– In UPA, BNE predicts a zero bid on the second unit, yet subjects consistently bid positive amounts.
✅ These behaviors are what minimax-loss bidding predicts.

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Key result: Even with multi-dimensional private values, optimal bids can be computed efficiently. In pay-as-bid (PAB) auctions, the minimax bid is unique. In uniform-price (UPA) auctions, unique only if bidders are constrained in the number of bid steps (as in many practical auctions).

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Minimax-loss bidders don’t guess opponents' behavior. Instead, they protect against the worst-case regret.
💡 They ask: "What bid minimizes the maximum money I might leave on the table, no matter how others bid?"