Anna Kurella
@annakurella.bsky.social
Assistant Professor at Leibniz Universität Hannover. Research on party competition, voting behavior and representation.
Reposted by Anna Kurella
❗ Hier das working paper zu diesem Thema von Marc Ratkovic, Thomas Gschwend, @wendering.bsky.social, Kevin Bauer, @annakurella.bsky.social, Oliver Rittmann, @melinscribe.bsky.social, @nschwitter.bsky.social:
www.researchgate.net/publication/...
www.researchgate.net/publication/...
(PDF) Harnessing GPT for Enhanced Academic Writing: Evidence from a Field Experiment with Early-Career Researchers in the Social Sciences
PDF | Large Language Models (LLMs) bring both risk and opportunity to scholarly communication, yet their effects on expert‐level research remain... | Find, read and cite all the research you need on R...
www.researchgate.net
June 23, 2025 at 9:30 AM
❗ Hier das working paper zu diesem Thema von Marc Ratkovic, Thomas Gschwend, @wendering.bsky.social, Kevin Bauer, @annakurella.bsky.social, Oliver Rittmann, @melinscribe.bsky.social, @nschwitter.bsky.social:
www.researchgate.net/publication/...
www.researchgate.net/publication/...
Reposted by Anna Kurella
This supports Riker’s idea of heresthetics and issue entrepreneurship theory, but at the same time demonstrates that there is stability in real-world political competition.
January 30, 2025 at 10:28 AM
This supports Riker’s idea of heresthetics and issue entrepreneurship theory, but at the same time demonstrates that there is stability in real-world political competition.
Thus, I developed a model in which parties compete by taking position in a two-dimensional space and by simultaneously allocating their issue emphasis optimally. The results demonstrate that equilibria exist, and that they tend to be unique.
January 30, 2025 at 10:28 AM
Thus, I developed a model in which parties compete by taking position in a two-dimensional space and by simultaneously allocating their issue emphasis optimally. The results demonstrate that equilibria exist, and that they tend to be unique.
With this paper I seek to address a persistent gap in the formal literature on political competition: We know a lot about parties’ equilibrium policy positions, but not much about equilibrium salience levels.
January 30, 2025 at 10:27 AM
With this paper I seek to address a persistent gap in the formal literature on political competition: We know a lot about parties’ equilibrium policy positions, but not much about equilibrium salience levels.
Our formal and empirical results show that increasing issue salience only leads to vote gains if the party holds a competitive advantage: being moderately positioned on the economic left-right dimension, while taking a unique but not too extreme position on its core issue.
December 12, 2024 at 1:50 PM
Our formal and empirical results show that increasing issue salience only leads to vote gains if the party holds a competitive advantage: being moderately positioned on the economic left-right dimension, while taking a unique but not too extreme position on its core issue.