Lightnews — Scholar-powered news

P. Andrew Torrez

@andrewtorrez.bsky.social

6/ That's "no credible evidence" that protests grew out of control, "no evidence" that there was any significant damage to any ICE facility, no credible testimony that ICE was unable to perform its duties & no impact on ICE arrests in and around Portland.

More detailed findings of fact based on the trial testimony and exhibits are forthcoming following this Court’s full review of the record. Based on the trial testimony, this Court finds no credible evidence that during the approximately two months before the President’s federalization order, protests grew out of control or involved more than isolated and sporadic instances of violent conduct that resulted in no serious injuries to federal personnel. The violence that did occur during this time period predominately involved violence between protesters and counterprotesters, not violence against federal officers or the ICE facility. Although card readers at the ICE facility were occasionally damaged, this Court has found no evidence so far, based on the testimony at trial, that any significant damage to the ICE facility occurred in the two months preceding September 28, 2025. The credible testimony has not shown that ICE was unable to effect arrests or otherwise perform the agency’s duties. Although the evidence so far showed that protesters frequently blocked the driveway of the ICE building, the evidence also showed that federal law enforcement officers were able to clear the driveway. And even when the building closed from mid-June to early July due to property damage that occurred on June 12, 2025, ICE’s Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ERO”) office was able to temporarily relocate to another facility in Portland for administrative purposes until the building reopened.

November 3, 2025 at 3:51 AM

P. Andrew Torrez

@andrewtorrez.bsky.social

5/ Judge Immergut says she will rule on the merits by Friday. So far, she seems unmoved by the govt's argument that protests in June necessitated sending in troops in October., even under the most deferential standard possible.

Applying “a great level of deference to the President’s determination that a predicate condition exists,” id. at 1048, this Court nonetheless concludes that the President’s invocation of Section 12406 was likely not made “in the face of the emergency and directly related to the quelling of the disorder or the prevention of its continuance,” id. (quoting Sterling, 278 U.S. at 400). Critically, the credible evidence at trial established that following a few days in June, which involved the high watermark of violence and unlawful activity outside the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) building in Portland, Oregon, the protests outside the ICE facility between June 15 and September 27, 2025, were generally uneventful with occasional interference to federal personnel and property. Although there were sporadic instances of unlawful behavior, federal law enforcement, along with local law enforcement, were able to manage the situation and arrest and prosecute those responsible for criminal conduct.

November 3, 2025 at 3:48 AM

P. Andrew Torrez

@andrewtorrez.bsky.social

1/ Judge Karen Immergut (a Trump appointee) just issued a remarkable, five-day preliminary injunction in Oregon v. Trump, where the parties just concluded a three-day bench trial on the merits of deploying national guard troops to Portland, Oregon.

storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.us...

This Court heard three days of testimony and argument in a trial that ended 48 hours ago.1 During the trial, the parties introduced over 750 exhibits, many of which are voluminous. This Court heard the trial testimony and arguments of counsel and has been in the process of diligently reviewing all the evidence. The interest of justice requires that this Court complete a thorough review of the exhibits and trial transcripts before issuing a final decision on the merits. In addition, this Court must consider the parties’ post-trial briefing, which was filed only 24 hours ago. Moreover, this Court must fully analyze and explain its findings of fact and reasoning in an opinion. This Court asked the parties whether they would agree to maintain the status quo for a week from the conclusion of trial, during which the National Guard would remain federalized but not deployed, in order to allow this Court to perform these tasks and issue a final opinion on the merits. Defendants declined.

November 3, 2025 at 3:44 AM

P. Andrew Torrez

@andrewtorrez.bsky.social

1/ In Abrego's criminal trial in the Middle District of Tennessee, the trial judge ordered the gov't to produce documents in camera (that means only to the judge, not Abrego) for initial review.

Absurdly, the gov't DID NOT BATES NUMBER THOSE DOCUMENTS.
storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.us...

ORDER The Government provided an initial production of documents for in camera review as required by the Court’s October 27th Order. (Doc. No. 186). However, the documents that were produced to the Court were not Bates-stamped. That makes it incredibly difficult for the Court to communicate which documents should be turned over to the defense and which should not. More importantly, it makes it almost impossible to create an appellate record. Accordingly, before 9:00 a.m. on October 30, 2025, the Government shall deliver printed, Bates-stamped copies of all the documents they produced today by zip drive.

October 29, 2025 at 10:30 PM

P. Andrew Torrez

@andrewtorrez.bsky.social

8/ UPDATE

The 7th Cir issued a 24-hour partial administrative stay, relieving Bovino of his obligation to appear before Judge Ellis today (and only today!) pending briefing by the plaintiffs by tomorrow.

storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.us...

IT IS ORDERED that the government’s request for an administrative stay is GRANTED. Pending a decision on the petition for a writ of mandamus, the district court’s October 28, 2025 order is temporarily STAYED only to the extent it required Gregory Bovino to appear in court, in person, each weekday at 5:45 PM. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs shall respond to the petition by 5:00 pm on October 30, 2025.

October 29, 2025 at 9:24 PM

P. Andrew Torrez

@andrewtorrez.bsky.social

6/ Ultimately, the Court said that the problem wasn't the intrusiveness or the magnitude of the sanction but (1) the *form* and (2) the burden on low-level employees (they're "not even corporate bigwigs"). The 7th Cir invited the trial court to make the defendant pay for the plane tickets, just...

And finally we have difficulty understanding the order to change the site of the depositions as a sanction. The parties were all set to conduct the depositions in Amsterdam. Suppose that because of unjustifiable delay, Boehringer has made it more costly for the plaintiffs to conduct discovery there — maybe the plaintiffs bought nonrefundable plane tickets which they couldn't use because Boehringer postponed the depositions. Certainly the judge could make Boehringer pay for the tickets, or for any other unreasonable expense that it imposed on the plaintiffs relating to the scheduled depositions; Boehringer is a huge pharmaceuticals enterprise. The problem is the form the sanction ordered by the judge took — ordering Boehringer to be the court's agent in violating federal legal limitations on compelled discovery in foreign countries, merely so that depositions could be shifted to a place inconvenient for the witnesses who are to be deposed. They are to be punished for the sins of their employer. And they are not even corporate bigwigs, who might feel humiliated by a travel order; so far as appears, they are merely research scientists. They are not responsible for Boehringer's contumacy, yet they are the targets of the sanction.

October 29, 2025 at 8:45 PM

P. Andrew Torrez

@andrewtorrez.bsky.social

5/ The Court foresaw a potential mess with foreign governments. What if the sanctioned party or the witnesses complain to the German government, the 7th circuit asked. "Do we need that?"

And suppose Boehringer complains to the German government, or for that matter the U.S. State Department, that the judge's order is ultra vires and infringes German sovereignty. Do we need that?

October 29, 2025 at 8:45 PM

P. Andrew Torrez

@andrewtorrez.bsky.social

4/ In particular, the 7th Circuit wasn't certain the court's sanction power pursuant to FRCP 37 extended to compel US citizens living abroad from whom there was a valid alternative (and agreed-upon!) means to compel their testimony.

A federal judge is empowered to subpoena a U.S. citizen living abroad to appear before him and be deposed, but only if the citizen's testimony can't be obtained in admissible form otherwise, 28 U.S.C. § 1783(a) — and here it can be, by a deposition conducted in Amsterdam. So that statute was not authority for what the judge did, even with regard to Boehringer's U.S. citizen employees in Germany. And foreigners who are not in the United States are beyond the subpoena power of our courts even if their testimony can't be obtained in admissible form otherwise. Relational, LLC v. Hodges, 627 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir.2010) ("foreign nationals are beyond the court's subpoena power"); United States v. Drogoul, 1 F.3d 1546, 1553 (11th Cir.1993). There is a possible exception, but it is immaterial: Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) provides that "a party may name as the deponent a public or private corporation, a partnership, an association, a governmental agency, or other entity and must describe with reasonable particularity the matters for examination. The named organization must then designate one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or designate other persons who consent to testify on its behalf" (emphasis added). If it be assumed that the rule is applicable to a foreign corporation whose officers, etc., are all foreigners, still the passage we've italicized indicates that only certain types of individual may be designated to testify at such a deposition, and there is no suggestion that any of the 13 persons whom the district judge in this case has ordered be deposed in the United States fit any of the categories. Finally, nothing in Fed.R.Civ.P. 37, the source of judicial power to impose sanctions for disobeying a discovery order, and the stated ground of the sanctions order in this case, purports to enlarge judicial power to impose such orders against foreigners.

October 29, 2025 at 8:45 PM

P. Andrew Torrez

@andrewtorrez.bsky.social

3/ Boehringer involved a trial court sanction that, inter alia, moved depositions from Amsterdam to New York City for 13 witnesses who were either US citizens living abroad or German nationals.

The 7th Circuit said the $1 million fine was okay but wasn't so sure about compelling foreign witnesses.

The sanctions include fines, totaling almost $1 million, that the judge imposed for various abuses; this part of his order is not so questionable (if it is questionable at all) as to be a plausible candidate for mandamus. But in addition he imposed a nonmonetary sanction that is deeply troubling. It relates to depositions that the plaintiffs' counsel wants (and is entitled) to take of 13 employees of Boehringer, all of whom work in Germany and 10 of whom are German citizens (the other three are U.S. citizens). The parties had agreed that the depositions of these 13 potential witnesses would be conducted in Amsterdam. But when the plaintiffs asked the district judge to impose sanctions on Boehringer for discovery abuses, one of the sanctions they asked for was (we quote the judge) that the site of the depositions be changed to "a place convenient to the [plaintiffs] and [to] the defendants' [Boehringer's] United States counsel. This is a financial issue but also a timing issue because of the many delays caused by the defendants['] actions and the extraordinary time it takes to fly to Amsterdam and the logistics of setting up the necessary working space there." Because of what the judge found (and we do not take issue with his finding) to be Boehringer's interminable discovery delays, the judge determined "an appropriate sanction pursuant to [his] inherent powers to be to require [Boehringer] to produce all employees for deposition in the United States," either "in New York City or such other place as the [plaintiffs] and the defendants shall unanimously agree upon" (emphasis added). Obviously the plaintiffs will not agree either to a European locus for the depositions, or to any place in the United States that Boehringer might prefer to New York City. So New York (in all likelihood) it will be.

October 29, 2025 at 8:45 PM

P. Andrew Torrez

@andrewtorrez.bsky.social

2/ For example, the VERY FIRST CASE this motion cites is In re Boehringer, 745 F.3d 216 (7th Cir. 2014) for the proposition that mandamus is appropriate to reverse court orders that are an abuse of power.

This is a... curious citation, to say the least.
scholar.google.com/scholar_case...

This Court has recognized that mandamus relief is appropriate to reverse court orders that “amount to a judicial usurpation of power or a clear abuse of discretion.” In re Petition of Boehringer Ingelheim Pharms., Inc., & Boehringer Ingelheim Int’l GmbH, in Pradaxa (Dabigatran Etexilate) Prods. Liab. Litig., 745 F.3d 216, 219 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 371 (2004)). Such relief is particularly warranted where, as here, an order raises serious separation-of-powers concerns by interfering with core Executive Branch operations.

October 29, 2025 at 8:45 PM

P. Andrew Torrez

@andrewtorrez.bsky.social

1/ The gov't just asked the 9th Circuit for a writ of mandamus telling Judge Ellis in Chicago she may not force Greg Bovino to show up in her courtroom every day, wear a body cam & personally stop teargassing peaceful protestors.

I don't think it'll work.

storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.us...

Since the entry of the TRO, however, the court has placed evolving and increasing burdens on the government in a purported effort to monitor compliance with the order. Although the government has endeavored to provide the court with the information it has requested, the court’s demands have become untenable. In the course of a hearing on October 28, the district court again modified the TRO to further micromanage DHS officers’ operations in the field, including how their uniforms must appear; imposed burdensome and ongoing disclosure obligations on the government; and questioned counsel about non-record material, including videos taken and sent in by the public. The hearing culminated in the October 28 order that Chief Bovino—a senior DHS officer who is overseeing various aspects of CBP’s daily operations in the Chicago area—appear in person at 5:45 PM every weekday to “report” to the court and answer whatever questions the court might have. That unprecedented order interferes with Chief Bovino’s ability to undertake his responsibilities, is unnecessary to secure compliance with the TRO, and is completely untethered to the claims and allegations underlying this lawsuit.

October 29, 2025 at 8:45 PM

P. Andrew Torrez

@andrewtorrez.bsky.social

I think Judge Berzon sums up the case for optimism on the last page of his dissent; essentially, he's saying that maybe the judges are keeping their powder dry. I hope he's right.

I fear it may not matter. Three terrible 9th Cir decisions may give SCOTUS's 6 conservatives the fig leaf they want.

Hearing a case concerning a stay motion en banc is assuredly unusual. It may well be that those active judges who did not vote to hear this case en banc now are awaiting the merits opinion in this case (and perhaps in Oregon v. Trump, No. 25-6268) before deciding whether the panel’s ruling is seriously wrong in its legal precepts and so merits en banc review. But I continue to think that the President’s disregard for this country’s deep-seated commitment to the principle that armed forces must not be used as civil law enforcers except where there is no alternative should have been headed off now, not later. The panel opinion on the stay motion should have been reconsidered en banc.

October 23, 2025 at 3:56 AM

P. Andrew Torrez

@andrewtorrez.bsky.social

Sung was on the original panel so she may have been disqualified, although given her general tepid engagement at oral argument, may have been a no vote.

Berzon suggests the judges may be keeping their powder dry. Let's hope so.

October 23, 2025 at 3:38 AM

P. Andrew Torrez

@andrewtorrez.bsky.social

This paragraph is pretty good, too. It's "I thought we were all textualists now?"

Specifically, 10 USC 12406(3) says the President must be "unable" to execute the laws to federalize the national guard. Why are we letting a panel decision stand saying that "unable" means "minorly inconvenienced"??

II. The panel opinion’s interpretation of the substantive requirements of § 12406(3) contradicts the statute. As to the substantive standard for triggering the President’s authority under § 12406(3), the panel held that “interference” that “significantly impede[s] the ability of federal officers to execute the laws” is sufficient under the statute to permit sending state National Guard troops onto city streets. Newsom, 141 F.4th at 1052. But § 12406(3) says nothing about “interference” or “significant impediments.” It requires that the President be “unable with the regular forces to execute the laws” before he is authorized to call in the National Guard. § 12406(3) 27 Case: 25-3727, 10/22/2025, DktEntry: 142.1, Page 29 of 43 (emphasis added). “Unable” requires something much closer to complete incapacity than a two-day minor disruption in a discrete location.

October 23, 2025 at 3:36 AM

P. Andrew Torrez

@andrewtorrez.bsky.social

The full 9th Circuit just voted NOT to rehear en banc the panel decision in Newsom v. Trump re: federalized troops in Los Angeles. (The motion for rehearing en banc in the Oregon v. Trump case is still pending.)

No Republican appointees joined the dissent.

storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.us...

Newsom v. Trump, 25-3727 BERZON, Senior Circuit Judge, with whom MURGUIA, Chief Judge, and WARDLAW, FLETCHER, GOULD, PAEZ, CHRISTEN, HURWITZ, KOH, SANCHEZ, and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges, join, regarding the denial of rehearing en banc:

October 23, 2025 at 1:52 AM

P. Andrew Torrez

@andrewtorrez.bsky.social

3/ Judge Graber asked us to try and retain faith in the judicial system for just a little longer.

This feels like that acid test. Portland is not in rebellion. The lasts haven’t broken down. These are lies, and as she says, the judiciary is supposed to operate on facts.

We have come to expect a dose of political theater in the political branches. … We rule on facts, not on supposition or conjecture, and certainly not on fabrication or propaganda. … Above all, I ask those who are watching this case unfold to retain faith in our judicial system for just a little longer.

October 21, 2025 at 1:27 PM

P. Andrew Torrez

@andrewtorrez.bsky.social

7/ If that's the case, the 120 days in the Eastern District of Virginia have LONG since expired.

Erik Siebert was appointed as interim US Attorney on January 20, and his 120 days expired on May 21. The EDVa judges then invoked 546(d) to keep Siebert on the job.

Interim appointment order by Eastern District of Virginia of Erik Siebert dated May 9, 2025.

October 20, 2025 at 8:22 PM

P. Andrew Torrez

@andrewtorrez.bsky.social

5/ That was very dumb & did not go over well with the 3rd Circuit. But I think it's critical to note that the DOJ chose to make that weak argument instead of arguing that it could re-appoint Habba under 28 USC 546.

The trial court held that the President gets 120 days TOTAL under 546.

III. DISCUSSION My analysis generally proceeds in chronological order. First, I consider whether Ms. Habba’s tenure as Interim United States Attorney pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 546, which began on March 28, 2025, lawfully continued until July 24, 2025, when she purported to resign, and conclude that it did not. As I interpret the law, her interim appointment ended on July 1, 2025—120 days after Attorney General Bondi invoked her power under section 546(a) by appointing Mr. Giordano Interim United States Attorney on March 3, 2025. Thus, Ms. Habba was not lawfully acting as the United States Attorney in any capacity from July 1, 2025 until at least July 24, 2025.

October 20, 2025 at 8:22 PM

P. Andrew Torrez

@andrewtorrez.bsky.social

3/ Otherwise, the position becomes vacant & the Federal Vacancies Reform Act, 5 USC 3345, kicks in.

That means the First Assistant automatically ascends to be "Acting" US Attorney unless the President nominates someone qualified under (a)(2) or (3).

www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/...

(a)If an officer of an Executive agency (including the Executive Office of the President, and other than the Government Accountability Office) whose appointment to office is required to be made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, dies, resigns, or is otherwise unable to perform the functions and duties of the office—
(1)the first assistant to the office of such officer shall perform the functions and duties of the office temporarily in an acting capacity subject to the time limitations of section 3346;
(2)notwithstanding paragraph (1), the President (and only the President) may direct a person who serves in an office for which appointment is required to be made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to perform the functions and duties of the vacant office temporarily in an acting capacity subject to the time limitations of section 3346; or
(3)notwithstanding paragraph (1), the President (and only the President) may direct an officer or employee of such Executive agency to perform the functions and duties of the vacant office temporarily in an acting capacity, subject to the time limitations of section 3346, if—
(A)during the 365-day period preceding the date of death, resignation, or beginning of inability to serve of the applicable officer, the officer or employee served in a position in such agency for not less than 90 days; and
(B)the rate of pay for the position described under subparagraph (A) is equal to or greater than the minimum rate of pay payable for a position at GS–15 of the General Schedule.

October 20, 2025 at 8:22 PM

P. Andrew Torrez

@andrewtorrez.bsky.social

2/ Halligan was appointed pursuant to 28 USC 546, which authorizes the appointment of an "Interim" US Attorney for 120 days.

Once those 120 days are up, the "interim" lawyer is out & only the judges in the district can appoint someone to stay on the job.

www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/...

28 U.S. Code § 546 - Vacancies
U.S. Code
Notes
prev | next
(a)Except as provided in subsection (b), the Attorney General may appoint a United States attorney for the district in which the office of United States attorney is vacant.
(b)The Attorney General shall not appoint as United States attorney a person to whose appointment by the President to that office the Senate refused to give advice and consent.
(c)A person appointed as United States attorney under this section may serve until the earlier of—
(1)the qualification of a United States attorney for such district appointed by the President under section 541 of this title; or
(2)the expiration of 120 days after appointment by the Attorney General under this section.
(d)If an appointment expires under subsection (c)(2), the district court for such district may appoint a United States attorney to serve until the vacancy is filled. The order of appointment by the court shall be filed with the clerk of the court.

October 20, 2025 at 8:22 PM

P. Andrew Torrez

@andrewtorrez.bsky.social

1/ Thanks to Comey's lawyers, we have the appointment order for Lindsey Halligan in EDVa that the gov't has been trying to hide for weeks.

I think it means Halligan is not long for this job & the Comey and Tish James indictments not long for this world.

storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.us...

ORDER NO 6402-2025 AUTHORIZING LINDSEY HALLIGAN TO BE THE INTERIM UNITED STATES ATTORNEY FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA DURING THE VACANCY IN THAT OFFICE

pursuant to 28 USC Section 546

October 20, 2025 at 8:22 PM

P. Andrew Torrez

@andrewtorrez.bsky.social

A little light morning reading.

(Peter Ticktin has repeatedly represented THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES in court.)

storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.us...

Mr. Ticktin and Ms. Lambert have intentionally engaged in racist and actionable defamation of an innocent young lawyer through frivolous filings to achieve an illegitimate purpose. Plaintiff therefore respectfully requests the Court refer Mr. Ticktin’s conduct to the Florida Bar’s Division of Lawyer Regulation. Mr. Ticktin has been there before.2 Fla. Bar v. Ticktin, No. SC07-369 (Fla. May 21, 2009). 2 Ms. Lambert is under felony indictment in Michigan, so it unlikely a referral to the Michigan Attorney Discipline Board would matter to her.

October 19, 2025 at 3:27 PM

P. Andrew Torrez

@andrewtorrez.bsky.social

1/ MSNBC is reporting that the US Atty for Maryland, Kelly Hayes -- who just indicted John Bolton at Trump's behest -- is herself "bracing for being fired" by Trump when she refuses to bring a bullshit, Lindsey Halligan-style indictment of Adam Schiff.

www.msnbc.com/msnbc/news/t...

Kelly O. Hayes, a career prosecutor serving as Trump’s acting U.S. attorney in Maryland, has been facing intense pressure and questions for weeks from Ed Martin, a Trump ally tapped to run the newly formed weaponization task force at the department, about when she will bring criminal charges against Sen. Adam Schiff, D-Calif.

She has chosen to move forward with a case she feels has merit and that will also be welcomed by the White House: to prosecute Trump’s former national security adviser John Bolton on charges related to mishandling classified information. Hayes has told colleagues she believes some charges against Bolton are reasonable and warranted, a case involving mishandling of classified information that began under the Biden administration, according to MSNBC sources.

But Hayes’ office has been interviewing witnesses in a grand jury probe examining allegations that Schiff defrauded a bank related to financing for a second home in Maryland and is bracing for being fired herself when she explains that there are insufficient facts to bring such a case against the U.S. senator, the sources said.

October 17, 2025 at 4:34 PM

P. Andrew Torrez

@andrewtorrez.bsky.social

Also, we go 2-for-2 in predictions as SCOTUS tells Alex Jones to eat shit JUST LIKE WE TOLD YOU (and notwithstanding his lawyers laughably saying they'd get a "unanimous" vote, even though certiorari doesn't work that way)

with @lizdye.bsky.social

podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/e...

CERTIORARI DENIED

25-268 JONES, ALEX E. ET AL. V. LAFFERTY, ERICA, ET AL.

October 14, 2025 at 4:07 PM

P. Andrew Torrez

@andrewtorrez.bsky.social

2/ Today, Judge Smith entered the order we discuss, "clarifying" & enforcing his injunction preventing the admin from "ham-handed[ly] attempt to bully" states into accepting anti-immigrant conditions to get FEMA aid, calling the new language a "fig leaf."

storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.us...

In effect, Defendants have done precisely what the Memorandum and Order forbids, which is requiring Plaintiff States to agree to assist in federal immigration enforcement or else forgo the award of DHS grants. The fig leaf conditional nature of the requirement makes little difference. No matter how confident Defendants may be of their chances on appeal, at present, the contested conditions are unlawful. Plaintiff States therefore have a right to accept the awards without regard to the contested conditions. Defendants’ new condition is not a good faith effort to comply with the order; it is a ham-handed attempt to bully the states into making promises they have no obligation to make at the risk of losing critical disaster and other funding already appropriated by Congress.

October 14, 2025 at 3:58 PM

Light upyour news

Sign in to Lightnews

Sign up to start reading

Connect Bluesky

Connect with Bluesky

Light up
your news