Thanks! Sanchez-Siboney's book is great, but Radoslav Yordanov's recent book on Cuba and Eastern Europe is amazing on this

I focused more on the economic logic than anything else, but from what I remember the ideological justification for subsidizing Cuba was less his focus than the COMECON conflicts this resulted in

For Cuba the received wisdom is that the country was a bridge to the Third World as part of international competition, but honestly this seems more inference than well documented fact. Would love to read an archivally based Cuba-Soviet history

Stuff like this is part of why the idea that the Soviet Union exploited Cuba always sounds so absurd to me. Cuba was a massive net drain for the Soviets for the entire post-1959 period. At no point was it mutually beneficial economically, as far as I can tell

I've read that later (70s? 80s?) the Soviets switch off with another country, partially, by trading their soil shipments for those of that third country, which was closer to Cuba, but iirc Cuba sucking up tons of shipping capacity was still a major problem by 1989

I think one thing that might be throwing off the figures here is aid qua aid vs loans, credits, agreements, etc., on preferential conditions that served as de facto aid, because the USSR was providing billions a year in subsidies to Cuba by the 80s

from here

Yes, one of Evo's earliest big reverses

www.theguardian.com/environment/...

About halfway through, but sounds like the issue was that a bunch of major gas deposits were found decades ago -> MAS used them to fuel expanded social spending without doing much to explore for future deposits -> old ones are increasingly exhausted

Might be the difference between being able to insulate Havana even partially from the 20-22 hour a day blackouts in the provinces and even more dire energy rationing

And insulating Havana is essential to prevent more protest waves that often involve roadblocks now

The 1990s are an important antidote to determinism about effects on Cuba, but I also genuinely feel like if Caracas falls that may be game over for Havana.

Venezuelan oil exports are a fraction of what they used to be during the 00s & early 2010s, but even that fraction is key lifeline

Also a poorly organized opposition that was being mowed down in the streets

I think I get Libya being evoked *rhetorically* as a catastrophic outcome (regardless of why it played out that way) which it would be helpful to invoke to shape popular opinion or potentially shape policymaking.

I'm just saying why it doesn't seem good for predicting Venezuela

Also open to being persuaded! Maybe I'm just missing something. I'm definitely no Libya expert either, nor would even reading half a dozen books on Libya make me one.

I'm just explaining why I feel unconvinced

NONE OF THIS is to say that the US should do regime change in Libya. I am consistent on that front. I think it's a bad idea, especially under Trump.

That said, once again, I think Latin American cases like Panama seem better analogues than Libya, Iraq, etc.

Points of difference:
-ethnic politics seem totally different
-porous borders, but not under threat of expanding Islamic State or anything equivalent
-long, though embattled, democratic tradition pre-Chavismo
-opposition seems pretty organized, vs incipient & spontaneous in Libya

Points of similarity:
-entrenched dictatorship based on oil
-lack of much obvious planning
-US incompetence + seemingly more interest in air strikes than boots on ground