www.aeaweb.org/joe/listing....

www.aeaweb.org/joe/listing....

To see the table of contents or be notified when the book is released, please visit: sites.google.com/view/robbett...

The goal is to both synthesize the broad and rapidly evolving literature into a (somewhat!) coherent narrative and to demonstrate how these behavioral regularities can be incorporated into standard economic theory to better describe how people actually behave.

The book is intended as an accessible yet rigorous introduction for undergrads (and others curious about the field), which emphasizes the iterative process of developing and testing theory to produce more accurate models of human behavior.

Thus, overall, our results indicate that social norms are a meaningful contributor to our current polarization of reality. Please feel free to DM for paper draft and thanks for reading.

What about their punishment/reward behavior? Participants are less likely to punish/more likely to reward accurate and/or partisan answers. But when the two conflict, partisanship wins out: Wrong, congenial responses are rewarded more (punished less) than correct, uncongenial ones.

Both treatments significantly increase the partisanship of answers and decrease their accuracy, and this effect is driven by the uncongenial questions. (Interestingly, there is a partisan difference: Democrats respond more to norm information while Republicans are influenced by punishment/rewards.)

Do these distinct partisan norms influence participants' stated beliefs regarding political facts? We use a 2x2 experimental design that varies whether participants see information about their party's norm while answering and whether co-partisans can pay to financially punish/reward their answer.

These gaps in normative evaluations are not purely attributable to biased beliefs about the correct answer, because respondents' assessments of their party’s norms were more partisan than the actual answers others (drawn from the same subject pool) gave when answering for a small financial reward.

We find clear partisan norms governing responses to factual questions: Both Ds and Rs view accurate -- but politically uncongenial -- responses as being socially inappropriate for members of their party and the norms differ by party for all but one question.

We begin with a motivating experiment, in which we elicit social norms over answers to true/false factual questions related to the election, using the Krupka-Weber method. Partisans report how socially appropriate each answer is for their party & earn a bonus if their rating matches the mode.