Much more to come as this opinion gets digested ...

Our own independent analysis has shown that the divestiture is technically feasible. kgi.georgetown.edu/research-and...

Lastly -- to the question of what evidence are we relying on here? -- the opinion seemingly buys into the narrative that Google and its witnesses shared at trial about the technical infeasibility of the Chrome divestiture.

Importantly, while AI companies “may yet prove to be game changers” the court itself has found that “Google is a monopolist” and the hypothetical future does not eliminate the need to resolve the existing present.

The contrast of this adoption of common AI hype narratives by the same court that meticulously analyzed evidence to establish its general search market definition and liability finding is stark.

The opinion relies heavily on testimony from actors whose business interests benefit from the public perception and belief that generative AI is competitive and growing explosively.

The opinion claims that the “GenAI space is highly competitive” even though the basis for this claim falls far short of what would be expected if generative AI were the market that was the subject of the litigation.

After issuing a liability opinion thoroughly supported by findings of harm in the existing search market, the remedy opinion relies on speculation about future competitive benefit in adjacent markets.

Quite different from what we explored in Considerations for Effective Search Competition Remedies. kgi.georgetown.edu/research-and...

While the opinion includes remedies whose stated purpose is to address both access to distribution and access to data for quality improvement, the hollow approach in both cases is not likely to spur competition.

The court’s opinion pays lip service to the well-supported finding that a package of remedies is required to address the interlocking, mutually reinforcing dynamics of the search market.

The impact of those has been negligible (less than 1% change in Google’s market share) because the OEMs’ total dependence on Android to operate in the market rendered the contractual changes impotent. That dependence is as strong in the US as it is in the EU, so we can expect the same result.

At KGI we think a lot about concrete evidence. Seven years ago, the European Commission instituted contractual prohibitions in its Google Android case that were of a similar nature to those included by the court here.

Despite mentioning five times the finding that the search market is “frozen,” this logic would leave innovation and dynamism in that market suppressed by keeping defaults locked only to the highest bidder.

The court appeared to view potential harm to businesses like Apple, Samsung, and Mozilla that rely on default payments from Google’s monopoly profits as a reason to preserve Google’s payments.