#EconSky #EconJMP

Hi! Could I please be added? :)

Thanks so much, Alex!

My results imply that...
- Advisors may not consider how Choosers will respond to their recommendations
- Prompting them to do so may improve their ability to steer Choosers towards better decisions

Read more here: alexballyk.github.io/personal-web...

Thanks! Feedback is welcome!🙂 [7/7]

In my Beliefs Experiment, I prompt Advisors to guess the Chooser’s strategy before sending their recommendations. I find that Advisors become much more likely to send optimal recommendations. [6/7]

In my Main Experiment, I find:
- Despite learning that Choosers consistently reject a recommendation to switch to sprinkler 3, most Advisors send sub-optimal recommendations
- Many Advisors always recommend the sprinkler above the plant pot [5/7]

A Chooser should reject a recommendation to switch to sprinkler 3. Thus, an Advisor’s optimal recommendations involve recommending sprinkler 2 when pot 3 is the plant pot. Intuitively, this prompts the Chooser to make a small welfare-improving change, instead of none at all! [4/7]

In the experiments, I frame the game as follows:
- One "plant pot" contains a seed that will grow more if a sprinkler closer to it is turned on
- A Chooser decides whether to accept a recommendation to switch sprinklers, but is wary of the recommendation to switch to sprinkler 3 [3/7]

To study whether paternalistic “Advisors” can persuade reluctant “Choosers” to change their behavior, I:
1️⃣Develop a model of a recommendation game, which characterizes the recommendations an Advisor *should* send.
2️⃣Experimentally test whether Advisors *actually* send them. [2/7]

Hi! Could I please be added? :)