5. My takeaways:
• US officials consider conventional deterrence of nuclear use to be a valuable option.
• There is no consensus about how conventional (or nuclear!) deterrence could work.
• The US and allies should stop denigrating its credibility and start enhancing it.

4. The results get a bit wild and offer an unusually detailed look at how US officials understand the value of nuclear weapons and the operation of deterrence. In this specific (easy) scenario, 17 of 20 former officials recommended a conventional response and 11 favored conventional deterrence.

3. To understand the potential and risks, the article surveys recent technical developments and then presents the results of twenty “tabletop interviews” with former senior US civilian and military officials who might plausibly have been consulted on how to deter a North Korean attack.

1. Crises, acquisitions, and policy all suggest that conventional weapons are taking on a larger role deterring nuclear use. My new article in @intsecurity.bsky.social examines why US officials would consider conventional options when they have nuclear options available and how they might use them.

You've got to be pretty egregious if your use of the "nuclear modernization budget" as a slush fund made it to the front page of the New York Times.

It's an important point. America is not a trustworthy ally. There is nothing the left can say to allies to reassure them. They can commiserate and fantasize, but the only thing that will reassure the world is to defeat fascism at home. (by @vermontgmg.bsky.social via @davidryanmiller.com)

The New York Times:

Great moments in America as a force for good in the world.

Exponential arsenals happen because, left to their own devices, warheads will naturally divide into multiple warheads, i.e. proliferate. This is how you get arms races.

Yes, 2022 language almost identical.

The proposal slices responsibility along the wrong axis. What we need is an ASD Strategic Deterrence, who can coordinate nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities to improve plans and reduce risk. Instead, the proposal will further isolate nuclear planning. More weapons, less policy.

But the document also has subtle ambiguities on critical points.

Did the president direct that US forces need to "deter" multiple adversaries simultaneously but not limit damage or restore deterrence?

Will plans contain more nonnuclear options than before?

In several ways, the document goes out of its way to avoid placing constraints on Trump's ability to build out the arsenal and to order its use. That's frustrating, given the very real and widespread fear about illegal use in 2020.