Africa Is a Country
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Africa Is a Country
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Empty stands are not the whole picture
### Why focusing on attendance figures at the 2025 AFCON is the wrong way to measure the tournament. * * * Michel Nkuka Mboladinga, a DR Congo fan impersonating Patrice Lumumba, during the Africa Cup of Nations in Rabat, Morocco. Image credit Mosa'ab Elshamy via AP. Reading the Africa Cup of Nations through its stands alone means missing what it produces socially. The stands give the tournament a visible form, but they offer only a partial account of how the tournament is lived. The stands bring together, in a single place, gestures that give meaning to the tournament. Michel Kuka Mboladinga’s performance, which reproduced the posture of Lumumba, is a striking illustration of this. Such a scene resonates because it condenses, in a single moment, a political memory and a sporting event. The stadium offers a stage to gestures that then take on a different dimension. It concentrates, and makes legible what would otherwise remain diffuse. This is why the stands continue to occupy a central place in how a tournament is perceived, evaluated, and judged. But a decisive part of the tournament’s experience unfolds in more ordinary spaces, where engagement takes other forms. In cafés, public spaces, and informal settings, often well before the question of going to the stadium even arises. A recent study by the Sunergia Group shows that a large majority of the public in Morocco did not buy a ticket for AFCON, while still remaining engaged with the tournament. This figure is often read as a sign of distance or lack of interest. It deserves a more nuanced reading. As soon as we look at everyday practices on the ground, the picture changes. During the quarter-final between Algeria and Nigeria, the match is broadcast on the televisions of a restaurant. Plates arrive. The meal and the match unfold together. Watching AFCON does not require changing place or breaking with routine. The tournament inserts itself into existing practices, into temporalities already shaped by work, family, and everyday sociability. For many, this is the most suitable form of engagement, allowing a continuous collective experience, requiring neither displacement nor disruption. Sparse stands, when read through television images alone, tell us very little about the tournament’s place in society. A Zimbabwean professor who recently settled in Tangier explains it to me simply, “I work until 9 pm.” The same answer comes from my mototaxi driver, Mouhcin, when I ask whether he has attended a match at the stadium. He answers with a single word: “work.” These responses express neither rejection nor disengagement. Both tell me they follow the matches with interest. These answers point instead to ordinary trade-offs, to everyday priorities. Absence from the stands, on its own, says nothing about the intensity of attention given to the tournament. The stadium thus becomes a possible step, but not a necessary one. The stadium is no longer the natural entry point into engagement and is now part of a broader set of practices and trajectories. Public space, too, extends this experience. At Bab El Had Square in Rabat, collective celebrations emerge after matches. Most are improvised, and people gather there implicitly. Mobilization takes shape because the place and the moment allows it. The public gathers and sings, and vendors circulate. After the final whistle, the match continues in the city. These scenes are not captured by statistics and ticketing figures and broadcast audiences are not designed to capture these forms of engagement. Yet these scenes produce a shared memory, made of collective celebrations. Major football tournaments leave us primarily with memories. They unfold as much in the stands as in urban landscapes, often less during the match itself than in what precedes and extends beyond it. After Senegal’s 1–0 victory over Mali at the Grand Stade of Tangier, rain is falling. The percussionists leave the stands and settle in the exit corridors. An improvised concert begins. People stop, gather, dance. They sing Senegal’s qualification for the semifinals. Celebration spills beyond the planned framework and gives rise to new forms of celebration that take root in the margins. The memory of the tournament is built there, in these interstices. The stands remain central. This is where certain images condense, where certain gestures become visible before entering the tournament’s memory. At the same time, they no longer constitute the natural entry point of engagement for a growing part of the public. The AFCON experience is fragmented. It is distributed across the stadium, cafés, public space, transport, and the scenes and moments of communion before, during, and after the match. This fragmentation is a central feature that needs to be accounted for. Understanding the real impact of a tournament like AFCON requires looking beyond standard indicators of attendance and broadcast audiences. Close attention to lived experience, to everyday uses, and to ordinary choices becomes necessary. Otherwise, a decisive part of what the tournament produces socially remains out of view. The stands do not tell the whole story. Much of what gives AFCON its social meaning unfolds beyond them. * * *
africasacountry.com
January 16, 2026 at 8:58 PM
Between Bambali and Nagrig
### The rivalry between Sadio Mané and Mohamed Salah pushed them to unprecedented heights, but also links two seemingly distant and disconnected villages. * * * Mohamed Salah receives the Player of the Year award with runner-up Sadio Mane, from Youssou Ndour during the CAF awards in Dakar, 2019. EPA/STR via Shutterstock. The best thing about the Africa Cup of Nations is its ability to shrink our vast continent. It spins connections between places assumed to be distant and disconnected, only to reveal how deeply Africans are bound by shared dreams and struggles. The semi-final of the 2025 Africa Cup of Nations between Senegal and Egypt does precisely that, drawing an unlikely line from Bambali, Senegal, to Nagrig, Egypt. Until recently, both villages were unknown even to most Senegalese and Egyptians, let alone the wider footballing world. It was only with the rise of their most famous sons, Sadio Mané and Mohamed Salah, into global stardom that their names began to circulate beyond borders. Bambali and Nagrig could almost be twin villages. Bambali sits quietly in Senegal’s lower Casamance, near the border with Guinea-Bissau. Nagrig lies forgotten in the Nile Delta, suspended between Cairo and Alexandria. In Bambali, they grow rice and mangoes; in Nagrig, jasmine and onions. In parallel, Mané and Salah share so many similarities that they feel like kindred spirits. Both were born in 1992 into modest families in remote agricultural communities. Both were forced to leave home early to pursue the improbable dream of becoming professional footballers. As adolescents, Mané slipped away unannounced to Dakar for trials, while Salah endured four-hour bus journeys each way to Cairo, day after day, just for a chance. Perhaps it is because they share so much that the two grew into such fierce rivals. Make no mistake: the respect between Mané and Salah is genuine. Their relationship remains cordial. But at Liverpool Football Club, their competitive instincts often collided. Mané arrived first and, in his debut season, claimed the right flank as his own, quickly becoming a fan favourite. A year later The Egyptian King arrived and his immediate impact was so overwhelming that Mané was shifted to the left – a position he would eventually master just as convincingly. Over the next five years, the pair combined to produce some of the finest attacking football of the modern era. Yet there were moments when ego and frustration took hold, when passes went unmade and tempers flared. One such moment against Burnley in 2019 became infamous. Salah ignored a wide-open Mané who would have scored with ease. Minutes later, Jürgen Klopp substituted Mané. Furious, Mané erupted at the decision, at the selfishness, at the moment. But what truly fractured Mané’s relationship with Liverpool came later. After Senegal’s historic Africa Cup of Nations triumph in early 2022—the first in the nation’s history—Mané returned a demigod at home. He had scored the winning penalty in the final. Salah never even got the chance to take one. Mané 1–0 Salah. While Senegalese players at other clubs were granted time off and welcomed back with guards of honor, Liverpool chose restraint, wary of upsetting Salah, whose Egypt had lost the final. Months later, the two met again in a 2022 World Cup qualifier, once more decided by penalties. In a deafening Diamniadio stadium, green laser pointers dancing across his face, Salah stepped up. He missed. Mané scored. Mané 2–0 Salah. It is therefore inevitable that the semi-final of the 2025 Africa Cup of Nations in Tangier will be reduced to a single journalistic narrative: Mohamed Salah vs Sadio Mané. The framing is obvious, but that does not mean it should be avoided. Mané vs Salah may well be the greatest rivalry between two African footballers since Drogba vs Eto’o, though this one carries a sharper edge. Salah has more to gain. He is still chasing his first AFCON title, a prize already claimed by peers such as Mané and Riyad Mahrez. Mané, meanwhile, has the chance to tilt the balance decisively in his favor. On Wednesday afternoon, I will watch Egypt vs Senegal with a close eye on the performances of the former teammates. The storytelling potential of the fixture is spellbinding. Yet beyond the headlines, narratives, and tension on the pitch, what remains in front of mind is that the true winners of Mané vs Salah are two African villages that might otherwise have been forgotten. As European football continues to extract African talent, economic benefits at the grassroots level rarely come through transfer fees. Génération Foot, Mané’s boyhood academy, earned only a few hundred thousand dollars from transfer deals that ultimately totaled nearly $100 million. Arab Contractors, Salah’s former club, earned even less for the greatest footballer Egypt has ever produced. In the absence of fair compensation systems, the real financial windfall has come from personal generosity. In June 2021, Mané oversaw the construction of a medical center in Bambali, serving 34 surrounding communes, at an estimated cost of $610,000. His motivation was deeply personal. “The day my father died, I was seven years old,” Mané recounts in the Made in Senegal documentary. “He had a stomachache, but there was no hospital. We tried traditional medicine. They took him to another village and he died there.” Surrounded by local officials, Mané cut the ribbon at the hospital entrance. A bolted plaque reads: “The Bambali Hospital was funded and inaugurated by Mr. Sadio Mané, Senegalese international footballer—Bambali, June 20, 2021.” Salah has followed a similar path in Nagrig, investing in medical infrastructure, donating an ambulance centre and funding a sports complex. In 2022, The Times reported that Salah gives up to 6% of his salary to charitable causes every month. It should not be incumbent upon footballers to provide healthcare, sanitation, and education for their own villages. Yet across much of Africa, this remains the reality. Poor governance creates gaps that are too often filled by celebrity benefactors. And frequently, the first to arrive and celebrate these acts are the very politicians who presided over the neglect. In that sense, the rivalry between Mané and Salah is about far more than goals, medals, or legacy. It is about how two journeys, from Bambali and Nagrig, to the continental stage, continue to reshape the lives of those at home. * * *
africasacountry.com
January 14, 2026 at 8:57 PM
The untameable Victor Osimhen
### The volcanic temperament and irresistible brilliance of the footballing star converge as the Super Eagles close in on continental glory. * * * Victor Osimhen during Nigeria’s 4–0 win over Mozambique at AFCON 2025. Screenshot from CAF’s Instagram, used under fair use. There is a class of footballer, to which Victor Osimhen now unmistakably belongs, against whom the only useful preparation is a steeling of the mind. To face up against those in this cadre is to know what is coming, but be powerless to prevent it. Against Algeria in the 2025 Africa Cup of Nations quarterfinal, poor Ramy Bensebaini had the best view in Stade Marrakech, bearing witness as the striker took flight, laughed in the face of gravity, and headed home. As has been his wont for half a decade now. Dread it, run from it, Osimhen arrives just the same, with the certitude of destiny. The fact that he was able to produce, as the spearhead of a brilliant Nigeria side, such a strong performance against the Desert Foxes was bizarre in light of events from five days earlier. In the round of 16 against Mozambique, with the Super Eagles ahead 3–0 and coasting, Osimhen took umbrage at a pass that did not come his way from left back Bruno Onyemaechi, got into a shouting match with Ademola Lookman, stopped running and asked to be substituted. It was an appalling implosion, a show of impetuousness that was all the more shocking considering that, in the wake of Nigeria’s failure to qualify for the 2026 World Cup, there had been a strong clamour for him to be made captain. It was a popular, if odd, movement, mainly because, for all his gifts, this was a player for whom making headlines for the wrong reasons was not unprecedented. Twice before, Osimhen had, via social media, lashed out at criticism, real and alleged, from Victor Ikpeba and Finidi George, two certified legends of Nigerian football. On both occasions, the court of public opinion just about found in his favor, and coming away from those incidents with little censure (in tongue-in-cheek fashion, he was, in fact, given the Yoruba nickname “Jagun Jagun”—a warmonger—off the back of the latter incident) seemed to suggest he was invincible, above any law. The Mozambique incident, however, was different, and not just for how publicly it played out: For the first time since he broke out at the 2015 U-17 World Cup, the tide was firmly against the country’s golden calf. Born into the miasma of a giant, odious landfill in Olusosun, Osimhen is, in a sense, very much a product of his environment, toxicity roiling just beneath the surface and occasionally spilling over. It is no surprise that the loss of his mother at an early age shaped the person he would become, especially as his father lost his ability to provide for the family not long after, forcing the children onto the mean streets of Lagos. Being the youngest in the family, much of the responsibility for minding Osimhen will have fallen on his two brothers and four sisters. With less direct parental oversight and behavior modeled on the typically combative dynamics between older siblings, it is not unusual for a willful, stubborn streak to develop in younger children, and the effect of that is plain to see even now in his adult life. However, in much the same way as he transcended the circumstances of his birth, he is more than his outbursts. He is the determination that got him out of the muck and through a chaotic, free-for-all screening process for the U-17 national team; the generosity that prompts him to become Olusosun’s Santa Claus at Christmas time, giving back to the community that raised him; the humility that, in truth, makes him far more accessible than he has any need to be. Against this backdrop, it would be too easy to speak of the volatility within him as some malignancy that needs excision, thereby missing what makes him special—that same unruliness is crucial to how he plays. It is the obstinacy, the refusal to come to heel, the railing against convention that powers every run into the channel, every leap. This is less “Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde” and more Marvel Comics’ Hulk, whose heaving fury Bruce Banner must accept as a part of himself in order to find tranquility. Of course, there is a delicate balance between being true to oneself and being defiant when in the wrong. While speculation flew as to the state of affairs within the squad, it is understood that clear-the-air talks were held in the immediate aftermath, with the rest of the squad making their displeasure known to Osimhen in no uncertain terms. The grievance, once aired, was quickly quashed, and while no apologies were made, none were expected. There is an understanding within the squad of his personality: When he lashes out, there is seldom malice or vanity involved; it is because he cares a little too much, because he takes things too personally. It was instructive, then, that after he teed up Akor Adams for the second against Algeria, much of the acclaim from his teammates went to him. The show of unity was important, but even beyond that, it was a strikingly selfless bit of play from a man who stands just two goals away from equalling the Nigeria national team goals record set by the late, great Rashidi Yekini. That mark of 37, set in February 1998 by the one who was called “Goalsfather,” has outlived many great strikers—Julius Aghahowa, Yakubu Aiyegbeni, Obafemi Martins, to name a few. Osimhen has been at pains to keep any comparisons at bay but, in many ways, his campaign in Morocco has not only inched him closer with each match, but has been about addressing much of the criteria by which many would seek to downplay his claim to the pantheon of Nigerian football. With much of his international tally coming into the tournament consisting of goals scored in qualifiers against weaker opponents, there was a suspicion in some quarters that he was something of a flat-track bully. That, coupled with his agonies in front of goal at AFCON 2023, meant he had a point to prove at this edition. It was all well and good putting the likes of São Tomé and Sierra Leone to the sword, but in the form of Yakubu and Ikechukwu Uche, Nigeria have recent experience of great strikers whose legacies are tarnished by the absence of defining tournament performances. Osimhen’s goal against Algeria, therefore, was significant in more than one sense. Not only was it his first in a competitive fixture against an opponent ranked higher than Nigeria in the FIFA rankings, it also nudged the Super Eagles closer to a fourth title, which would tie them with arch rivals Ghana. Yekini scored against a higher caliber of opponents, with just under half of his strikes coming at major tournaments, but if by the end of proceedings in Morocco, Osimhen has the record (joint or singular) as well as AFCON gold around his neck, the particulars of his conduct will be but a footnote in his legend. * * *
africasacountry.com
January 14, 2026 at 8:57 PM
Grounded expectations
### The 2025 Africa Cup of Nations marks a transition period for the Nigerian men's national team. This could be good for them (and the nation). * * * The Nigerian men's national team in Côte d'Ivoire during the 2023 AFCON. Image credit Clement Demazure via Shutterstock © 2023. Ahmed Musa’s retirement from international football was more than just the second recent departure of a Super Eagles captain, following on from that of his successor, William Troost-Ekong. It marked an interesting milestone—Musa was the last surviving member of the victorious 2013 African Cup of Nations side. In the subsequent period, Nigeria failed to defend its title at the next tournament. It didn’t qualify for the 2017 edition either, before two podium finishes sandwiched by a round-of-16 knockout by Tunisia in 2021. Similarly, it made the 2014 and 2018 World Cups but has failed to qualify since, most recently after being knocked out of the continental playoffs by a resurgent DR Congo side, drawing the furor of a football-mad nation expecting to have made it. This transition is also similar at the coaching level. Since the late great Stephen Keshi became only the second man to win the tournament as both a player and a coach, Nigeria has relied on legendary players such as Sunday Oliseh and Finidi George, as well as foreign coaches such as Gernot Rohr and Jose Peseiro, to mixed fortunes. Accordingly, their strategies also changed, with players exposed to attack-minded coaches who neglected the defensive side of the game to coaches who prioritized a solid shape at the expense of leaving frontmen adrift. This uncertainty has led to some frustration with the Super Eagles, and even that might be putting it mildly. Nigeria expects its population and talent bank to make it a powerhouse on the continent, but even its number of continental titles is dwarfed by those of fierce rivals Ghana, neighboring Cameroon, and all-time winners Egypt. Nigeria’s unexpected run to the 2023 Final in Côte d’Ivoire was sandwiched between two World Cup qualification disasters, despite boasting two of the last three African footballers of the year. Yet the response to missing the 2026 World Cup revealed something more unsettling than anger: resignation. The Football Federation president and, most tellingly, the coach, remained in place. No heads rolled. No protests materialized. This muted response mirrors how Nigerians increasingly engage with political leadership—vocal frustration has given way to deep, muted acceptance that systemic failure rarely yields accountability. The federation’s prioritization of self-enriching schemes over player welfare has drawn comparisons with wider governance failures, but these comparisons no longer spark outrage. They simply confirm what citizens already know about how institutions function when accountability is absent. But these complaints aren’t new. What is new is a side that aptly reflects a new era for the Super Eagles, and this current feeling represents a change in the nature of the relationship between the Super Eagles and their fans. For 70+ minutes against Tunisia in their second group match, with Nigeria leading 3-0, fans across the world were spellbound as the side appeared to have finally delivered on the promise that millions have often expected but have usually been reluctant to dream. And while the spirited Tunisian comeback, itself owing to some questionable substitutions, could have dampened this start, this Nigerian side is now quietly but firmly in the conversation at a tournament where only a brave pundit can bet on who would win. Here lies the paradox that defines Nigeria at AFCON 2025: the Super Eagles arrive in Morocco among the favorites alongside the hosts, yet Nigerian fans refuse to believe. Bookmakers rate them highly, pundits cite their talent depth and both star forward Ademola Lookman and coach Eric Chelle were named in the tournament’s side of the group stage. But Nigerians have learned that being favorites is not the same as winning, that potential is not the same as delivery, that talent is not the same as infrastructure. They carry the psychological weight of being expected to succeed while anticipating disappointment—a uniquely Nigerian burden that transforms every match into an exercise in managed hope. This evolution finds its anchor in three key elements that will make or break the future of Nigerian football. First, it is reaching the cusp of diaspora players enchanted by an older legacy. The squads of AFCON 1994 and the 1996 Olympics have inspired millions and their children, who took a chance on Nigeria when it might have been worth holding out for a call-up from a bigger power. Future players faced with a choice internationally will need new heroes, and this side is the culmination of all who came before, and bears the responsibility of inspiring those who will come after. It also further strains the connection to the domestic league, which notably produced key players on previous title-winning sides. That pipeline has not dried up, but it might in the future, not from lack of talent but systematic neglect. Second, it is based on a new generation of leaders whom Nigerians have seen “grow up.” Alex Iwobi, nephew of Jay-Jay Okocha and one of the first diaspora players to choose the green and white, has now marked a decade and has surged through the appearance charts. New captain Wilfred Ndidi has similarly become a symbol of longevity. At the same time, star Victor Osimhen represents the promise of successful young players moving through cadet sides and becoming key elements of the national side. These players, who demonstrate the promise of yesteryears, now represent the hopes of today and can link these ambitions and hopes to forge their own destiny and carry Nigerians’ aspirations with them. Finally, this side represents a shift in how citizens engage with the elements that define society. This could describe how Nigerians engage with political leadership, ahead of 2027’s elections, and even with sentiments around nationhood and security. For the first time in decades, Nigeria doesn’t expect—or rather, it has learned not to. This side can use this space to chart its own course and redefine its relationship with Nigerians, freed from the crushing weight of assumed greatness. Perhaps this transition is not the dramatic fall from grace, but the quiet recalibration of what success means. For now, that’s enough. The Super Eagles don’t need to soar—they just need to take flight. * * *
africasacountry.com
January 5, 2026 at 8:55 PM
The twins who shaped Egyptian football
### While international media focuses on the legacy of Mohamed Salah during this Africa Cup of Nations, Egyptians are focused on a pair of identical twin brothers. * * * The Hassan twins. Image via CAF on X used under fair use. Speaking to the sporting press in Agadir last week, a calm Hossam Hassan, coach of the Egyptian national team, expressed his distaste for holding the Africa Cup of Nations in four year cycles. The 59-year-old’s words were strong, albeit in a much calmer demeanor than what Egyptian football fans have come to expect from him: “Can you change the European system? You can’t. I’m not speaking in my capacity as the Egypt national team coach, but as an African player. God willing, we will fight for our rights.” His words were uncharacteristically lacking self-recognition, referring to himself as “an African player.” Just an African player, as if to blend with the myriad players who belong to this illustrious continent and its rich footballing history. Or, perhaps this was his way of diffusing the attention from the real story for a lot of Egyptian fans during this edition of the Africa Cup of Nations. Much of the international coverage surrounding Egypt centers on Mohamed Salah and his pursuit of an eighth continental crown for The Pharaohs. Omnipresent and unresolved in footballing conversations in Egypt are the whispers about Hassan and his appointment as coach, as well as the appointment of the national team director who occasionally sits beside him in the dugout, his identical twin brother Ibrahim. For those previously unaware, Hossam Hassan is the Egyptian national team’s all-time top goalscorer. He has won AFCON three times, lifting the trophy as captain twice (in 1998 and 2006). He has more goals in the competition than Sadio Mane, Mohamed Salah, Riyad Mahrez, and the same amount of goals as Didier Drogba (in fewer games). Hossam’s notoriety is not just about records and accolades. Growing up in Egypt, Hossam Hassan was the first footballer I was able to recognize, because he and Ibrahim embodied Egyptian football itself. Ask 100 Egyptians to pick the country’s best ever XI, nearly all of them would have Hossam Hassan up front and Ibrahim Hassan at right-back. So revered and famous were both of them that they’re usually just referred to as “The Twins.” For almost the entirety of their playing careers, Hossam and Ibrahim were inseparable. In fact, before Ibrahim’s hair transplant six or seven years ago, a lot of casual fans found it very difficult to tell them apart. (For die-hards it was easy: Ibrahim looks considerably more mean.) This inseparability can be illustrated by a rumor that once circulated about their development as players. As the story goes, Ibrahim was originally a forward, but ended up sacrificing to play at right-back because Hossam could only play as a striker. Even though neither of them have ever confirmed the veracity of the matter, it’s a story that fits both of their profiles very well. While Hossam was a lethal striker, Ibrahim was a complete footballer who just so happened to play at right-back. (During their stint at Swiss club Neuchatel Xamax in 1991/92, he wore the number 10, would often be deployed in midfield, and curled a free-kick to record a famous win for Roy Hodgson’s men against Real Madrid.) Whether this origin story of brotherly sacrifice is true or not remains unimportant in the grand scheme of things. They were inextricably linked both on the field and off—having a joint wedding and children born on the same day. When The Twins—who came through the ranks at Al Ahly—joined Zamalek on a free transfer in the summer of 2000, it marked another defining moment in their careers. Known as the transfer that shook Egyptian football to its core, it is widely acknowledged to have come about after Al Ahly refused to offer Ibrahim a new deal, believing that he was in the twilight of his career. Hossam refused to part from his brother, and so they made the move together. Ultimately, Al Ahly were proven wrong. Despite both being 34 at the time, their move to Zamalek sparked a very successful period in the club’s history, including three league titles and one CAF Champions League. The main takeaway can be summed up by Ibrahim’s words following Zamalek’s 3–1 win over Al Ahly in March 2001: “Anyone who comes after Hossam and Ibrahim, God makes the earth swallow him up.” Hossam and Ibrahim against the world. It has always been that way, and it will always be that way. It’s never been about Al Ahly, or Zamalek, or—arguably—the Egyptian national team either. Two insanely serial winners whose careers have been draped in controversy as much as success, The Twins never shied away from the battlefield, literally. For starters, Ibrahim Hassan never won the AFCON. He was banned from going to the 1998 edition by the Egyptian FA (which Egypt ended up winning and with Hossam finishing as joint top scorer), because he showed the middle finger to Moroccan fans at a qualifier in Rabat. Around two years earlier, the brothers got into a huge melee in Lebanon during a friendly match between the Egyptian national team and a joint XI composed of players from Lebanese teams Al Nejmeh and Al Ansar. The fight grew so big that the Lebanese army had to interfere, and Ibrahim, suspecting an army officer was about to strike his brother with an assault rifle, grabbed the gun from the officer. It doesn’t end there. In 1996, The Twins assaulted a police officer at a nighttime checkpoint in Heliopolis, and in the same year, Ibrahim Hassan faced a prison sentence after a citizen accused him of physical assault in Nasr City. In 2008, Ibrahim Hassan was handed a five year ban by FIFA because he physically assaulted a referee in Al Masry’s game against MO Bejaia in Algeria, topping it off by insulting the Algerian fans in attendance. Eight years later, in July 2016, Hossam Hassan verbally and physically assaulted a photographer then smashed his camera on live TV. So, when Hossam Hassan was appointed coach of the Egyptian national team in February 2024 following Rui Vitoria’s disastrous AFCON 2023, question marks were (rightfully) raised. For fans, it was almost as if the appointment of Hossam (and Ibrahim) evoked the same feelings they did as players, highly controversial but revered. The dilemma on one hand, was that there were arguably better candidates for the positions. On the other hand, The Twins were the reason why a lot of fans in Egypt started loving football in the first place. A lot of Egyptians have a core memory associated with the Hassan brothers that they couldn’t possibly shrug off if, even if they tried. There’s always this discrepancy in football between the pragmatic and the emphatic. We strive for the result, but, perhaps unknowingly, we’d choose to root for the inspirational narrative every single time. There’s a larger-than-life feeling you get when an ex-player returns to coach a team they have history with. Sure, other candidates might’ve been better suited for the job, but their appointment may leave fans feeling flat. With ex-players, it feels like Odysseus’ 10-year-journey home to Ithaca from the Trojan War. Games become battles, wins become victories, and rationality is thrown out the window. The fight on the field then becomes more about conquering the script, not just for the players, but for the followers and fans who carried the story in their hearts. The game becomes contested for the collective memory that binds generations of fans together, across cities, governorates, and eras. Such symbolic reminders allow the Egyptian fan, in particular, to remember a time when they felt heard not marginalized, when clubs had followers not employees, and when the national team’s presence was felt day to day. To dismiss these feelings in favor of pragmatism is to dismiss fandom itself. And football, at its core, has always belonged to those who remember. Hossam and Ibrahim Hassan might’ve not been the best candidates to lead the Egyptian national team. But, their divisiveness and larger-than-life status has given football fans from all around the country a reason to follow the national team. To borrow Manchester United’s bio on X, Hossam and Ibrahim Hassan are hated, adored, but never ignored. Leonidas didn’t die in Thermopylae the same way Maradona’s legend didn’t die in Cape Town. So, whichever way it ends, we’ll live to tell the tale. Because without tales, football would be dead anyway. * * *
africasacountry.com
January 5, 2026 at 8:55 PM
Where are the politics of Bafana Bafana?
### While most sports in South Africa are inseparable from the national political imagination, men's football manages to stay relatively removed. * * * First match of the 2010 FIFA World Cup—Mexico vs. South Africa in Soccer City, Johannesburg. Image credit Celso Flores via Flickr CC BY 2.0. The connection between sport and politics is implicit, particularly in African football. The beautiful game has long functioned as a site of resistance, liberation, identity, and togetherness. These politics surface at every level of the game: from the federation to the team, from players to fans. But, then there is Bafana Bafana. The South African men’s national football team exists in a curious parallel universe. Despite football being the country’s most popular sport, the national selection can shrug off political codes in a way others cannot. This is uncharacteristic, especially considering how the country’s affinity for political discourse permeates elsewhere. No team in South Africa is more demonstrative of the entanglement between sports and politics than the men’s national rugby team. In 1995, Nelson Mandela famously reclaimed and christened the Springboks as the vehicle for the Rainbow Nation project. However, that blessing would to turn out to be a burden, as they would become the ultimate representation of the promise and the failure of that dream. Since then, rugby has remained a space where the country attempts to exorcise its racial demons. And, despite the team’s world dominance, the leadership of a black captain, and a beloved coach in Rassie Erasmus who has a better track record of integrating non-white players than previous iterations, they are not absolved from having to explicitly engage with the country’s greater politics. In fact, these elements only raise the stakes further. The fans add a dimension to this dynamic with their own ideological investments that turn every major victory into a discussion of South Africa’s inequality and racial disparity. SA Rugby, as an institution, has also willingly taken up political matters into its own hands. The union found itself in hot water in early 2023 when Jewish organizations accused them of discrimination for disinviting the Tel Aviv Heat from the Mzanzi Challenge competition—well in advance of October 2023. Individual players have used the sport to confront gender-based violence (GBV) in South Africa. Makazole Mapimpi made a moving dedication to Uyinene Mrwetyana, a university student brutally murdered because of her gender, during the 2019 World Cup. Team captain Siya Kolisi has spoken out on GBV in several interviews and press conferences, and more recently lent his support to Women For Change’s Purple Campaign. Cricket South Africa (CSA) is also no stranger to politics. In 2020, Lungi Ngidi faced backlash from ex-Proteas players after his repeated demonstrations in support of the Black Lives Matter campaign in the aftermath of George Floyd’s death. A year later, CSA would issue a directive for players to take a knee during the 2021 T20 World Cup. All the players obliged except for Quinton de Kock, and he withdrew from a match in protest. He would later apologize and then join in on the gesture, explaining that he was in support of the movement. That is not the only site where cricket became political. CSA came under fire from Jewish organizations after they stripped David Teeger of his captaincy of the U19 Cricket team. Teeger had made comments in support of Israeli soldiers during an award ceremony in late October 2023, yet was still initially appointed captain. Following a formal complaint from a pro-Palestine organization to the South African Sports Confederation and Olympic Committee (Sascoc), CSA revoked his captaincy citing security concerns. In 2022, CSA launched their annual Black Day Campaign with the women’s team to raise awareness about GBV. The promotional material also featured senior men’s players to demonstrate a united front. However, this stands in sharp contrast to how CSA has ignored multiple appeals from various organizations, and from the South African sports minister himself, for the men’s team to boycott Afghanistan in response to the Taliban government severely restricting women’s rights. Women’s sport, structurally marginalized in general, is forced to be political. Across every code, women must confront massive disparities in wages and resources to simply participate. And, these battles sometimes stretch into the very question of race and gender. For example, Caster Semenya’s exclusion from competing by World Athletics and her subsequent court case demonstrate how Black women are denied the very category of woman, as Hortense Spiller’s seminal 1987 essay, “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book” powerfully illustrates. The above examples are far from exhaustive, but they show how various sport codes are continuously engaged in political conversations at multiple levels. Bafana Bafana does not do the same. The men’s national football team is comparatively aloof. And, it’s not like the opportunities are not there. Ahead of this year’s Africa Cup of Nations (AFCON), Bafana coach Hugo Broos made a racist and sexist comment about Mbekezeli Mbokazi and his agent. To be clear, contrary to much of the media coverage, the statement was neither tongue-in-cheek nor the fault of English being Broos’s second language. It revealed an ideological belief. Relating Mbokazi’s tardiness to his blackness which must then be corrected through modeling whiteness—demonstrated through the phrase “but he will get out of my room as a white guy”—is white supremacy 101. Blackness is framed as a site of deviance, negligence, and perpetually in deficit while whiteness is constructed as the locus of virtue, order, and discipline. To understand this statement as anything else fails to recognize how anti-blackness works.This is not revolutionary insight; it is a basic argument of critical race theory and Afropessimism. The comments did raise some eyebrows, but not enough to create a storm, and they are certainly not affecting the squad and their campaign presently. In fact, a glance at responses to the ENCA video or chatter on X shows that many Black fans are not only unperturbed but have affection for Broos. The difference here, and why it matters, becomes clearer when contrasted with rugby. If Erasmus had made a similar comment about any Black player in the national squad, it would dominate the tournament narrative and the results would become secondary. We’ve seen this before: during and after South Africa’s 2019 Rugby World Cup campaign in Japan, much of the coverage centered on a moment caught on camera when Mapimpi was excluded from a post-match huddle with six white players. Erasmus and Mapimpi found themselves repeatedly explaining that it was part of a ritual or an inside joke, depending on who you ask, but it didn’t quell the noise. It became another flashpoint to discuss race in rugby. Another opportunity where Bafana Bafana could have engaged politically, but haven’t is with the case of Israel. South Africa’s case in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against Israel made the country’s position on Palestine clear, effectively giving sporting organizations the green light to do the same. The only act of solidarity from football at the national level came from South African Football Association (SAFA), which hosted two exhibition matches against the Palestine men’s national team in early 2024. But here’s the catch: the games featured an invitational squad with no involvement from the current Bafana Bafana team. Since then, there have been calls from pro-Palestine organizations, from the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), and even an open letter penned by former Mamelodi Sundowns player Sipho Ndzuzo, demanding the federation and team to join in the campaign to suspend Israel’s participation in world football. Those calls have fallen on deaf ears. While SAFA’s invitational was an act of goodwill, the place where politics are tested are not in what is embraced, but in the things that are actively refused; where the line is drawn. So, why is Bafana seemingly so unaffected by politics? Perhaps, that’s the way the SAFA wants it. The federation is a drama factory, and constantly in the news for corruption, strained sponsor relationships, and financial crises. The last thing they need is their prized gem taking a stand in regards to anything. While every major sport has had to address GBV to some capacity, Bafana Bafana, have not had to. Perhaps that’s because current SAFA president, Danny Jordaan, allegedly hired a PR firm, using federation funds, to clean his image after being accused of rape in 2017. Furthermore, when the football coach condescendingly refers to a player agent as a clueless “little woman” during a press conference, with the federation’s full backing, it becomes evident that contempt for women is tolerated institutionally. Before they left for AFCON, the sports minister pledged an additional R5 million (over $300,000) to Bafana Bafana. This is consistent with how the men’s team has always been rewarded, regardless of performance. Banyana Banyana (the women’s team) are not afforded these luxuries; neither are the rugby, cricket, or athletics squads. Bafana never have to fight for legitimacy, even when their results are poor. This is less a reflection of the nation’s love of football, than a reflection of a chauvinistic culture embedded in the greater society. Unlike rugby and cricket, football does not have to answer for an exclusionary past and therefore does not become a site of redress. Since it already belongs to Black South Africans, Bafana is not expected to be pedagogical in the same way. The Springboks must be “Stronger Together” and reflect a progressive, unified South Africa; the Proteas have to be “#MoreThanCricket,” to emphasize that the squad isn’t just playing for glory, they are playing to reconcile the nation. And, the success of a team or a specific athlete in women’s sports has to serve as a mechanism to break down barriers and affirm to young girls that their dreams are valid. Meanwhile, Bafana is not even held to the standard of winning, a good showing is simply enough. Their position in the national imagination means they are not morally interrogated and are not primed to take on the political responsibilities that define other sports. Not favorites at AFCON, Bafana are rewarded for just existing, and in that, there is politics and the shape of the game itself. * * *
africasacountry.com
January 4, 2026 at 8:54 PM
Just touched down in Morocco
### Does the development of African football necessitate a trade off in vibes at continental tournaments? * * * Photo by Idriss Meliani on Unsplash Ahead of South Africa’s final group match against Zimbabwe, Bafana Bafana head coach Hugo Broos sat down with a gaggle of South African journalists, and in a moment of candor sparked a debate that has since rippled across the African footballing world. “In the Ivory Coast and in Gabon, every second of the tournament you felt that you were in a tournament,” Broos said. “When we went by bus to training, people were waving flags, running alongside us. Here, you see nothing. There is no vibe. There is no typical AFCON vibe. I don’t feel it here.” The remarks proved divisive. Some echoed Broos’ assessment, while they angered others. Those who agreed with him drew comparisons between the ongoing 2025 Africa Cup of Nations and the 2023 edition in Côte d’Ivoire, arguing that the current tournament lacks some of the spontaneity, warmth, and energy that defined the last AFCON. Others, however, felt Broos’ comments carried the stench of European essentialism. He implied that “African vibes” can be reduced to caricatural spectacle: people running after buses, screaming and dancing. Regardless of what side one lands on the issue, it’s important to underline that this was not Broos’ first controversial media outing in recent weeks. Before the tournament even kicked off, the 74-year-old Belgian unloaded on young defender Mkezeli Mbokazi for arriving late to camp. “He is a black guy, but he will leave my room as a white guy,” Broos said, without ever clarifying what he meant. He later took aim at Mbokazi’s agent, Basia Michaels, after she facilitated a move to Chicago Fire in a move that many felt undersold the youngster’s talent. Broos dismissed her as “a little woman (that)… thinks she knows football…” The Bafana coach denied being racist or sexist, though he conceded that his choice of words “was not the right one.” Most South African journalists I spoke to shared the assessment that Broos is not racist by nature, but profoundly clumsy with his language. As for his AFCON comments, many felt they were accurate. So, perhaps the issue demands a simpler framing. Let’s define the terms: What are AFCON vibes? This is my fifth AFCON, and having attended both the 2023 tournament in Côte d’Ivoire and the current one, I believe that I can put forth a fair comparison. What made the 2023 edition so special was not merely footballing quality, but its setting. Côte d’Ivoire is a country deeply embedded in a region defined by migration and movement. Treichveille in Abidjan is home to thousands of Burkinabè, Malian, Senegalese and Guinean fans. Fans watched matches together, broke bread with one another, let off streams of jokes at each other’s expense and celebrated with one another. The tournament felt shared. Morocco, as host, was always going to struggle to replicate that environment. This year’s tournament remains one of the better-organized AFCONs I’ve attended, yet several factors have undeniably contributed to a more muted atmosphere. Unlike West Africa, North Africa is not a region characterized by regional integration. Travel between Morocco and its neighbors is neither free nor easy. Algeria’s border closure is one obstacle. The decision to move AFCON to the winter months is another. This winter has been particularly rainy, and while that has been a blessing for a water-stressed region grappling with drought, it has undeniably pushed people indoors and away from public spaces. On Friday, January 2nd, I joined colleagues in search of Congolese supporters in Rabat’s Medina and the Kasbah of the Oudayas. We wandered for hours through the two stunning UNESCO heritage sites, animated by Moroccan families enjoying a beautiful evening. Yet we only encountered a handful of Congolese fans and they refused to be filmed. It was disappointing for a city hosting nearly a third of the tournament’s matches. Then there was “Yalla,” Morocco’s official tournament app. Organizers made the app mandatory for journalists and fans alike, but it was an unmitigated disaster from launch. Bugs were endless. Fan IDs were issued only to holders of biometric passports, despite the fact that several African countries do not issue them. E-visa requirements further delayed or discouraged potential visitors, particularly from neighboring countries. Finally—and perhaps this is more my personal intuition than tangible evidence—but, I can’t help but wonder if Moroccans are simply too accustomed to hosting football events. When you host as often as Morocco has, and when you have a World Cup on the horizon, novelty can fade. To voice any of this publicly, however, is to invite backlash. As a journalist, that can be exhausting. If objective observation is unwelcome, you sometimes wonder why continental media is invited at all. There are enough communications agencies perfectly capable of producing glossy tributes of the hosts without opening the doors to scrutiny. Yet, one interaction this week shifted my perspective. A ride-share driver, making casual conversation, asked me the question I’ve been asked every day for the last two weeks: “How do you find Morocco?” I responded honestly, that I loved the country, that people had been incredibly kind, that the infrastructure was world class. He paused, then said something that lingered. “All of us Moroccans have sacrificed for this AFCON. All of us. The price of everything has gone up. Vegetables used to cost three or four dirhams—now they are double.” His words reframed everything. They explained why criticism can feel personal and why online backlash is so visceral. Many Moroccans feel personally implicated in the hosting of this tournament. That leaves us with a final question that is crucial for the future of the AFCON, and modern football in general: Is the price of development a culture that lacks in spirit? The global trend thus far has been that development always means controlled, sanitized football, engineered for consumption rather than communion. Yet, in Africa, profit has never been at the center of why we practice sport. That does not mean the game should not be profitable or that labor should not be compensated fairly, but there is danger in over-commodifying our football, which we all find attractive precisely because of its organic nature. And, as FIFA’s corporate shadow looms ever larger over African football, we must remember that the success of our tournament is inextricably linked to the freedom of people to travel, gather, and experience football together. * * *
africasacountry.com
January 3, 2026 at 8:55 PM
Cédric Bakambu’s gesture
### How the Congolese national team has become a rare source of unity, recognition, and solidarity for communities living through war. * * * Cédric Bakambu celebrates for DR Congo at AFCON. Screenshot from Instagram, used under fair use. To protect the safety of those quoted, some names have been changed. When Cédric Bakambu scored to give the Democratic Republic of Congo the lead against Senegal he once again reinforced his position as Congo’s favourite son. The goal took his tally to 20 for The Leopards, just two behind the nation’s top goal scorer ever, Dieumerci Mbokani. But it’s not Bakambu’s goal scoring that has made him the idol that he is in Congo, rather what he did after scoring. Every goal, for club and for country, that Bakambu scores is followed by a now iconic celebration. He stands tall, covers his mouth with one hand, and with the other he makes a gun pointing at his head. It’s a powerful symbol of communion with Bakambu’s compatriots in Eastern Congo who have guns to their heads while the world stays silent. And nowhere is Bakambu more loved than in Eastern Congo. “I love to see that celebration,” Fiston, a school teacher from Bunia, the capital city of the Ituri Province on the border of Uganda tells Africa is a Country. “It [the celebration] was a huge meaning for us. It says that they’re also with us on the East side of DRC. It shows us that we’re together. Even if they’re so far, they have compassion.” Life is not easy for Fiston who as a child was nicknamed “Shabani Nonda” after the former national team player. While not as famous as the conflict to the south in Goma, Bunia is still a region in conflict and as Fiston says, is in the “red zone” of Congo. People try to go about life normally but in the knowledge that violence can flare up at a moment’s notice, a state that has been present for well over 50 years. After renewed violence earlier this year, which according to Medecins Sans Frontieres, has displaced more than 100,000 in Ituri, life in Bunia is marked by strict curfew that starts at 11 p.m. every night. But there is one exception. “On the day of the football they don’t do that [enforce curfew]. The day of the football game you can see people working anytime they need without being disturbed,” Fiston says. Instead, bars and restaurants are open late into the night. “When there is a match, you can see people wearing the jerseys and scarves. Everyone is involved, even though we’re so far. We are Congolese.” Bunia may be more than 1,700 kilometres from Kinshasa and the Congolese government—in fact Bunia is closer to Addis Ababa and Mogadishu than it is to its own nation’s capital—and for residents of Ituri it is even further away emotionally, but for football fans like Fiston, The Leopards are as close to Bunia as they are to Kinshasa. That isn’t simply a sentiment shared by Fiston and those in Ituri. Blaise was born and raised in Goma, once a fixer for the United Nations peacekeeping mission in the city, he was made redundant when the UN pulled out of the city as the M23 rebel group took control. “People love and trust the Leopards. When there is a game, the town is empty, no one is one the streets,” says Blaise. “Even if we are very far from Kinshasa and the political situation is very complicated because we’ve been separated, we still love the national team.” Like in Bunia, the presence of M23 rebels who have denounced President Félix Tshisekedi’s Kinshasa government, does not stop fans from celebrating, in fact the rebels themselves still support The Leopards. “Here in Goma, we see even rebels calling people to watch and support the team,” explains Goma resident and journalist Michel. “The head of the youth department of M23 called people to support and show pride for the national team in the world cup qualifiers.” This continent spanning love for a national team isn’t a new thing, far from it. The collective memory of cities like Bunia and Goma remember the legendary teams of the 1960s and 1970s who won two AFCONs. For Blaise and Fiston, they keep up with young stars like Noah Sadiki and Nathaneal Mbuku via social media. For their fathers and grandfathers, it was the radio that kept them informed of the performances of Kazadi Mwamba or Ndaye “the assassin” Mulamba. That generation that was at the heart of building the young and fragile national identity of DRC reached the holy grail of the World Cup in 1974, the first sub-Saharan nation to do so. It’s now been half a century since then and The Leopards have not been back to the World Cup, until now. A new generation of Congolese players, many of whom grew up in Europe as part of the diaspora, are on the verge of qualifying for the World Cup. Having beaten Cameroon and Nigeria in the final round of African World Cup qualifiers, all that stands between them and Congolese immortality is a playoff match in March. Just as it played a role in forging a national identity in the 1970s, The Leopards once again are at the heart of a nation that is seeking an identity in a fragmented world. Thanks in part to the growing representation of players from the diaspora, this squad is the most representative of Eastern Congo in decades. Players Noah Sadiki, Axel Tuanzebe, Rocky Bushiri and Michel-Ange Balikwisha all hail originally from Eastern Congo. And those stars are bringing a new hope to the residents of Goma and Bunia. “At the moment the hope is powerful,” explains Michel. “With the war in some places in Eastern Congo people don’t feel like they are a citizens of anywhere or of any country.” “But the team gives us hope, the joy of being a citizen of one country, it makes people forget about the pain and gives you the feeling of being Congolese, that you still have a country, still standing up.” At the last AFCON ahead of their semi-final tie against hosts Côte d’Ivoire, Bakambu was joined by his teammates in his protest. Instead of singing the national anthem, they all covered their mouths and held a finger gun to their head. While the TV directors tried to cut away from them and the fans that joined in, the world saw their protest. For millions of people around the world, it was their first exposure to the conflict in Eastern conflict. Now fans are hoping for a similar protest if the team can make it further, or even more powerfully at the World Cup and for Blaise in Goma, it is a test of their nerve. “If they are really Congolese they should do the same and tell the world what is happening.” While many may scoff at the idea of a football team playing any role in conflicts or peace building, all three of Blaise, Fiston and Michel recalled Didier Drogba’s legendary appeal to the people of Côte d’Ivoire to lay down their arms after the Elephants qualified for the World Cup in 2005. For Fiston, football as a tool for peace and reconciliation is not academic, but reality. After fleeing to Kinshasa in the early 2000s, Fiston returned to his home town of Kisangani which had been devastated by violence carried out various militias as well as government forces and UN peacekeepers. “When I came back to Kisangani in 2006 after the war there what brought people together there was the football. Football was a way to bring back life to the area,” he remembers. Fiston continues: I remembered we played against the soldiers of a big general—I won’t say his name—in a street where we lived. We organized football games against the soldiers of the general. We gave him a letter and the general accepted and bought the jerseys and balls and we played them. That day was a big party. After the game we ate and drank with them. It was amazing. I remember after that day, the soldiers and us we felt like in the same family. I can tell you, before that the soldiers terrified people. It was so hard, but the football game has the role to play and can play a role in conflict. This national team may not ever bring an end to conflict in Ituri or Kivu, but whether playing in Rabat or the United States of America, they can bring hope to a nation crying out for it. * * *
africasacountry.com
December 30, 2025 at 8:52 PM
Three footballers walk into a stadium
### What the presence of an unlikely trio of football icons at AFCON tells us about migration, African identity, and the histories that continue to shape the modern game * * * CAF President Patrice Motsepe greets former France and Real Madrid manager Zinedine Zidane during the Africa Cup of Nations. Image: Confederation of African Football (CAF), via Facebook, 24 December 2025. Zinedine Zidane, Kylian Mbappé and Riyad Mahrez walking into the same stadium sounds like the opening line of a bad joke, yet it is exactly what the Africa Cup of Nations is bracing for on Sunday night, when Algeria face Burkina Faso at the Stade Moulay Hassan. Mahrez will be there as Algeria’s captain, the standard-bearer for a team riding his early-tournament brilliance. Zidane will take his seat in the stands as a father first, watching his son Luca marshal Algeria’s defence from goal. Mbappé, in Morocco during the Ligue 1 winter break, is there to support his closest friend, Achraf Hakimi, but his presence will also be felt in solidarity with Les Fennecs. Together, the three form a bizarre Venn diagram of footballing excellence, shared origins and divergent paths. Zidane and Mahrez were late bloomers who rose to mythic status for their respective footballing nations. Mahrez and Mbappé are products of the greater Parisian suburbs, part of a generation that reshaped French football in its own image. Zidane and Mbappé, both born to proud Kabyle families, were the gravitational centres of France’s World Cup triumphs in 1998 and 2018. And yet, beneath these commonalities lie stories that could not be more different. Zinedine Zidane’s journey is well-known. His father, Smail, arrived in France in the 1970s as part of the wave of Algerian labour migration that helped rebuild the country’s postwar economy. That journey was made possible by the 1968 Franco-Algerian accords – a legal framework that has recently become a political target for France’s resurgent right. Mbappé belongs to another generation entirely. His mother, Fayza Lamari, was born in France, and his story reflects the experience of a generation raised in the banlieues after the 2005 Paris riots. A generation of kids increasingly alienated from the idea of France as a benevolent republic and distanced from its political elite. One of the most revealing moments from Mbappé’s childhood came during a television interview at his academy. Long before he became the poster child of French football, he answered a question about football in the banlieues with disarming clarity: “In any case, it’s clear that the best players are all ‘black’ or ‘Arab.’” It wasn’t a sociological thesis, just a kid repeating what everyone was saying in Bondy. Mahrez grew up 20 kilometres away in Sarcelles, another Parisian suburb, shaped by the same communities and codes. But the reason his family arrived in France is what hasn’t been reported on and it sets his story apart. Mahrez’s father, Ahmed, did not migrate in search of work, but in search of survival. His family originates from El Khemis, an Amazigh enclave near Tlemcen that has clung fiercely to its ancestral traditions. When I visited El Khemis years ago, one of Ahmed’s closest friends, Djilali, recounted the journey that would ultimately define Mahrez’s life. Ahmed had been a gifted amateur footballer for NR Beni Snous, but after his playing days he developed severe heart problems. The surgery he needed was simply not accessible in Algeria at the time. “I told him, ‘My friend, if you want to live, get a passport—we’ll escape to France, and I’ll figure it out,’” Djilali said. “We went through Oujda, then Tangier. One night, I thought he had died. I tried to wake him and couldn’t until I threw water on his face. He was in a terrible state until we reached Paris.” In France, Ahmed Mahrez received urgent, life-saving care despite having no legal status. He then settled in the Parisian suburbs where Riyad was later born. His story is one of migration driven by necessity, shaped by the infrastructural limits of post-independence Africa, but also one that stands as a credit to the French social system, which is also under attack by the far-right in recent years. On the pitch, the results of these intertwined histories are undeniable. African migration has been a net positive for both French and Algerian football. When Algeria line-up against Burkina Faso, as many as seven starters will be the children of immigrants. It is this reality that has helped turn Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia into continental forces. Off the pitch, images of Zidane and Mbappé in the stands will go viral on social media. If Mahrez continues his luminous form, his play will help rack up millions of views, pushing the Africa Cup of Nations further into the global imagination. Zidane, Mbappé and Mahrez will never share the same pitch, but their convergence at the AFCON tells a deeper story. It is one that shows how football reveals the ways identities overlap and intertwine, and how, where politics so often insists on division, the game still finds a way to bring people together. * * *
africasacountry.com
December 28, 2025 at 9:18 PM
The Senegalese paradox
### How Senegal rose to become one of the most fertile grounds in African football, and why this success still struggles to transform the local football economy. * * * Sadio Mané of Senegal celebrates victory after winning the 2019 Africa Cup of Nations Semi Final match between Senegal and Tunisia at 30th June Stadium. Image credit Mohsen Nabil via Shutterstock © 2019. Pour la version française, cliquez ici. Over the past decade, a silent revolution has reshaped the landscape of Senegalese football. Far from European stadiums, far from the spotlight of major international competitions, a new ecosystem has emerged, driven by a generation of coaches, executives, and scouts who have ushered the country into an era of methodical professionalization. The revolution has helped national teams win titles across almost every age category, secure successive World Cup qualifications, and—most importantly—has set conditions for the emergence of precocious talents exported to Europe or the Middle East on a yearly basis. All metrics seem to point to the irresistible rise of an African giant, but built into the fabric of this success story is a menacing paradox. While Senegal has become a global reference point in player development, its football economy remains one of the most vulnerable on the continent. Between sporting euphoria and structural precarity, the country presents the troubling image of a brilliant model that is hauntingly fractured. # Revolution of the academies In the early 2000s, Senegalese academies were improvised structures, sometimes without standard pitches or a full-time staff. A quarter-century later, and some of them rival the best European academies in methodology and rigor. The transformation has been as gradual as it has been radical. “Visionaries like Saer Seck understood before most other African countries that the key to success at the national team level lay in academies,” explains Bertrand Dasilva, Managing Director of the Diambars Institute—one of Senegal’s premier academies. Founded with Patrick Vieira and Bernard Lama, the academy imposed a new standard: that of a complete player—athletic, disciplined, and supported academically, nutritionally, and psychologically. “We don’t just train players; we train professional athletes,” insists Dasilva. That ethos has spread across the national territory and even inspired initiatives beyond Senegal’s borders. From Dakar to Ziguinchor, structures have multiplied, synthetic pitches have been nailed down, weight rooms assembled, video technology acquired, data specialists hired, and so on. The outdated trope of a hastily appointed run-of-the-mill coach has disappeared. “The myth that only a foreign coach can deliver modern training is over,” affirms Pape Malickou Diakhaté, former captain of Senegal and now General Manager of US Ouakam. “When it comes to building football academies, local know-how has reached a level that even surprises European recruiters.” The success of Senegalese academies is in the detail. In the best academies, players quickly pick up the micro-skills of elite football: coordinated pressing, rapid transition play and workload management. Training sessions are filmed, broken down, and analyzed meticulously. “When I scout in Senegal, I know I’ll see youngsters already familiar with positional play,” observes Sandro Conti, an independent Serie A scout. As a result, national teams are now fed a pool of young but mature talent. In recent years, Senegal has won the 2021 Africa Cup of Nations, as well as the U20, U17, and U15 AFCONs, often steamrolling the opposition. More than 80% of selected players come from structured academies. “They arrive in the national team with tactical customs already internalized,” explains El Hadj Abdoulaye Seck, former coach at Diambars, Génération Foot, and the Mauritanian and Comorian national teams. “That changes everything: we can immediately work at the elite level, not on basic acquisition.” This early mastery not only translates to national team succes, but also accelerates integration at club level, in Senegal and in Europe. “The transition to the professional world is much faster than before,” confirms Diakhaté. In just a few years, Senegal has become one of the most sought-after talent reservoirs in the world. The direct consequence of this rise in quality is the explosion of transfers to Europe, Asia, or the Gulf. The Senegalese player is now perceived as a known commodity. A disciplined technician, and a robust athlete with a strong mentality. “It’s a real brand,” assures FIFA agent Oumar Koliba Soumaré. “The Senegalese footballer is a naturally technical and physical athlete, capable of adapting very quickly to any environment, thanks to our core cultural values. European clubs know that behind every young Senegalese prospect lies methodical work.” The success of Senegal’s youth players has also shone a spotlight on the ingenuity of a new generation of local coaches. “The players’ natural qualities were not enough; they needed a framework,” emphasizes Nfally Badji, goalkeeper coach at Diambars and former U17 international. “We built that framework with limited coordinated means, but with a modern vision.” Senegalese coaching expertise is now also being exported. Local coaches are sought after all over the Global South. Behind this façade of success, however, another picture emerges… that of a structurally fragile local football scene. # Domestic football taken advantage of National team performances are a seductive showcase, but they mask a contrasting economic reality marked by underfunded clubs, underpaid players, and infrastructure lagging behind the country’s ambitions. “We win on the pitch, but we lose in the boardrooms,” states Djibril Diallo bluntly. Diallo is a legal expert and keen observer of Senegalese football. For him, Senegal’s sporting ascent has not been matched by corresponding institutional transformation. “Administrative structures are still managed as they were in the 1990s. That is to say without financial flow control, modern governance tools, or real professionalization. You cannot build a football industry on an associative and informal model,” he argues. Diallo’s diagnosis is shared by Bousso Dieng, a management expert working with several institutions including UFOA and the Dakar 2026 Youth Olympic Games, who sees this lack of a clear legal framework as one of the main obstacles to the development of national football. “The legal vacuum is colossal. A professional footballer’s legal status is not recognized, clubs are not considered sporting enterprises and contract protection is almost nonexistent,” she explains. According to her, this structural flaw opens the door to unresolved disputes, a constant drain of talent and opaque practices that weaken the local economy. “As long as the law does not protect players, clubs, and investors alike, Senegal will remain a sporting giant built on a fragile administrative foundation. Performance alone cannot compensate for the absence of a sporting rule of law,” she warns. The Senegalese local football economy is one of survival. In the absence of significant TV rights, powerful sponsors, or an adapted tax framework, clubs survive through transfers. “When you haven’t paid salaries for three months, you’re forced to sell,” confides a club president under anonymity. Selling becomes an act of survival, not a lever for development. The Senegalese Ligue 1 prize money of 20 million CFA francs ($36,000) for the champion illustrates this fragility. Despite some visible progress, local players’ salaries remain among the lowest on the continent. Most local players make between 50,000 and 200,000 CFA francs per month ($90 and $360 per month), and that’s not counting recurring delays in salary payouts at certain clubs. This precarity pushes many footballers into exile in less prestigious but better-paying leagues: Libya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Guinea. “Senegal trains the players, but other African leagues reap the rewards,” laments Abdoulaye Sall, a plugged-in player agent. Said talent drain has direct consequences for clubs’ international performances. The departure of Senegalese players often occurs mid-season, before even clubs are able to stabilize a squad. “Every time a team starts to become competitive, it loses half its roster,” explains Saikou Seydi, a local journalist. Ultimately, it becomes impossible to compete sustainably in the CAF Champions League or the CAF Confederation Cup due to the lack of continuity within squads. Aware of this structural fragility, the new president of the Pro League, Babacar Ndiaye, has committed to cleaning up a championship he found drained and heavily indebted. “Collectively, we must be between 50 and 60 million CFA francs ($90,000 and $110,000) in debt,” he stated after his election, referring to a deficit inherited from the previous leadership. “We will hold a meeting to share information, but there are also those who owe money to the Pro League,” he added, alluding to sponsors who have yet to honor their commitments. His objective is clear: “In the short or medium term, the champion must be able to break even the day after being crowned.” During his campaign, Ndiaye had promised to increase the bonuses awarded to top-ranked clubs. He confirmed that the Ligue 1 champion would now receive 40 million CFA francs ($72,000), while the runner-up would receive 10 million ($18,000). A measure aimed at strengthening the league’s attractiveness and encouraging a higher level of competition. This revaluation is also intended to compensate for the abolition of “travel grants” by the new Ministry of Sports, a major blow for teams involved in African competitions that previously benefited from this logistical support. “If you add CAF’s $50,000 and the Federation’s subsidy, that should cover the costs of competing in the first round for our representatives in Africa,” Ndiaye assured, calling for stricter management and greater anticipation of costs associated with continental campaigns. # A troublesome legal vacuum Professional football still has no clear legal existence in Senegal. Clubs are not recognized as sporting enterprises, contracts are insufficiently protected, and disputes are often handled informally. “As long as this vacuum persists, the system will remain vulnerable,” warns legal expert Awa Ndiaye. Partnerships between Senegalese academies and foreign clubs often resemble one-sided agreements. Europeans provide equipment or occasional assistance, but in return obtain privileged access to the best Senegalese talents. “It’s a subtle form of outsourcing,” analyzes Nfally Sirabé Diemé. The absence of adapted taxation, the circumvention of official channels and establishment of undervalued transfers means that economic benefits largely escape Senegal. “The country has become a footballing tax haven,” observes Seydi bitterly. “We are operating within an informal economy,” deplores Bousso Dieng, sports manager and senior official of the future Dakar 2026 Youth Olympic Games. Without a legal framework, without solid TV rights, without incentive-based taxation, without structural investment, football in Senegal remains precariously balanced. The paradox is powerful and troubling. The country of Teranga boasts the best training systems in Africa, a high-performing national team, talents exported en masse… But also a drained domestic league, financially dependent clubs, and a system of exploitation plundered by better-organized foreign actors. Without deep legal, economic and institutional reform, the paradox risks overshadowing the revolution. Senegal will remain a country that creates the champions of tomorrow, without fully benefiting from the value they generate. * * *
africasacountry.com
December 27, 2025 at 10:24 PM
Sounds of the Africa Cup of Nations
### What it sounds like on the ground in Morocco at the 2025 edition of Africa Cup of Nations. * * * Screenshot from CAF on X © 2025 (Fair use). It is impossible to imagine the Africa Cup of Nations without music. The opening ceremony is always launched with a commissioned anthem. It is rare to catch sight of young African players without headphones on. Increasingly, teams now arrive at stadiums with loudspeakers in tow, breaking into synchronized chants or dances as they make their way to the dressing room. Now that Matchday 1 of the 2025 AFCON is in the books, we’ve had enough time to get a sense of what everyone has been listening to at Africa’s biggest football party. Here’s a round-up of what players and fans are listening to after the opening matchday of the tournament. Stadium arrivals have become one of the defining features of the AFCON. In no other competition do teams step off their bus chanting in unison as they enter the stadium and walk toward the dressing room. With every edition, these moments grow bigger and more theatrical. At the 2023 AFCON in Côte d’Ivoire, Cameroon’s Nathan Douala captivated the continent by carrying a loudspeaker and leading the Indomitable Lions into stadiums while blasting _“_ Pour le kior _,”_ a controversial song about the extremes people go to in pursuit of drugs. While some Cameroonians felt the display reflected poorly on a national institution, much of the continent found it entertaining. This year, the standout stadium arrival belongs to Equatorial Guinea’s Nzalang Nacional. When they stepped off the team bus at Stade Mohamed V in Casablanca ahead of their December 24 match versus Burkina Faso, they put on a show perfectly suited for CAF’s social media channels. Led by Emilio Nsue, the squad burst into a synchronized rendition of _“_ Los chicos del Nzalang _”_ by Mac Miguel B. The song is irresistibly catchy. After a few listens, it’s impossible not to join in on the “me gusta” and “que pasa, que pasa” refrains alongside the players. A genuine hit. ### **National team anthems** For many Comorians, their relationship with the AFCON began at the 2021 edition in Cameroon. In their first-ever appearance, the Coelacanths stunned the world by defeating Ghana and reaching the Round of 16. To mark the moment, 11 of Comoros’ biggest rappers, including Alonzo, Soprano, Rohff and Vincenzo came together to create this iconic track. Patriotic football songs are often tacky and overproduced, but this one stands out. The star power is undeniable, and it remains a track that players and fans alike genuinely enjoy—still widely used by the squad in their everyday social media posts. ### **Team presentations** There is plenty the Confederation of African Football gets wrong when organizing the AFCON, but its marketing and digital teams consistently deliver. From sleek graphics to stylized team presentations, CAF has mastered the art of social-first content. While posing in front of a green screen, Burkina Faso’s Georgi Minoungou danced passionately to _“_Weedo _”_ by Burkinabé artist Floby—a song about resilience, self-belief and dignity in the face of hardship. The Benin Cheetahs, meanwhile, jumped on a TikTok challenge set to Congolese rapper Naza’s _“Tout donner”_ (“Gave it all away”). Angola are arguably one of the most musical teams on the continent. They need no excuse to dance. So when Cleyton M’s _“_ Money _”_ came on during media day, it was no surprise to see Ary Papel, Neblu and others joining in on the viral TikTok trend. ### **In their headphones** Bafana Bafana’s stadium arrivals are usually marked by Mohau Nkota and Ronwen Williams leading the squad in ancestral and spiritual chants. But if we were to imagine what the younger players are listening to right now, it would almost certainly be CIZA’s _“_ ISAKA (6AM)”. To the north, Zambia’s Chipolopolo are known for their religiosity, but players like Frankie Musonda and Fashion Sakala also stand out for their flamboyance. Their soundtrack would likely include Yo Maps’ _“_ Mr and Mrs _.”_ ### Solidarity against the odds One of the most heartwarming storylines of the 2025 AFCON has been the camaraderie between Algerian and Moroccan supporters. It’s a reminder that while governments may be at odds, football has the power to unite people. In this spirit, one football chant has been trending on TikTok. It began in early December, when Algerian and Moroccan fans celebrated Morocco’s Arab Cup triumph by singing _“Zkara fi Air Algerie”_ (“In defiance of Air Algerie”) at Souq Waqif in Qatar. The original version tells the story of Ultras Inferno—supporters of an Algerian club—responding to Air Algerie’s decision to hike prices ahead of an inter-club match in Casablanca. In protest, fans famously crossed the closed land border into Morocco illegally. Light-hearted as it may seem, the lyrics capture the mindset of much of North African youth: faced with political absurdities, defiance becomes a form of expression rather than resignation. Though the song had nothing to do with the AFCON initially, its message feels uncannily relevant as Algerian fans overcame numerous obstacles to travel to Morocco in pursuit of continental glory. * * *
africasacountry.com
December 26, 2025 at 10:27 PM
AFCON and the politics of Africanhood
### In Morocco, football has become a site for the slow re-Africanization of the country’s national identity. * * * Amsafrane summit in Azilal, Morocco. Image credit Terry137 via Shutterstock © 2020. Morocco is witnessing an unprecedented footballing renaissance. Its officials’ decades-long strategic endeavor to promote football has paid off by enabling both its men and women teams to outperform their competitors in recent years. After playing the semi-final game of the World Cup in 2022, winning the 2025 FIFA U-20 World Cup in Chile, and winning the Arab Cup in Qatar in December 2025, the country is currently hosting the African Cup of Nations until January 18, 2026. The AFCON’s opening ceremony—which, in the words of journalist Amina Ibnou Cheikh, “confirmed to the world that Morocco shares with Africa the roots of its earliest human and cultural heritage”—presented a plenary corrective to prevalent notions of Moroccan history and identity by anchoring the country in Africa. The many criticisms of the state’s over-investment in sports that have accompanied the championship should not overshadow the equally important analysis of the way Morocco’s participation in these planetary events has continuously re-Africanized and re-Amazighized its identity. Accordingly, the country’s organization of this year’s AFCON is a rare opportunity to examine how the intersection of Negritude and Amazighitude constructs a new sense of Africanhood forged through football, migration, and _métissage_. Instead of the more abstract Pan-Africanism and trans-border Africanness, I use Africanhood, which evokes a sense of porous and multidirectional neighborliness, to reflect on the ways in which Negritude and Amazighitude have seeped into each other in the last four decades. No other continental event parallels the AFCON’s power as a stage to unfurl Africanhood. This cup, which was organized for the first time in Sudan in 1957, is not just an ordinary championship during which the best African teams play against each other to determine the Continent’s champion. In fact, the AFCON has been a crucial (formerly) biennial ritual through which Africa is cyclically recentered in the consciousness of generations of its children. African audiences, while watching football games that last for a month, learn names of places from Yaoundé to Dar es Salaam and from Tripoli to Bangui. I grew up in a small village in the south of Morocco, but names, such as Roger Milla, Moussa Ndao, Rashidi Yekini, Eston Mulenga, and many others, filled my ears, populated my imaginary, and materialized in my peers’ football games in the dirt field, where we played between the mountains. Because my mother is black, the performance of these players gave me pride and opened up my world to understand that there were many more high-achieving black people in the world than there were in my tiny village. My memories of the AFCON were immersed in sub-Saharan African rhythm, technique, physical endurance, and a determination to pursue the ball until the last breath in the game. Now, I realize that even as I sat in front a black-and-white television set to watch the AFCON games in the south of Morocco in the 1990s, I participated, unconsciously, in an important performance that shaped my awareness of my place in a larger Africanhood whose theoretical terms I had not yet had a chance to learn. Published in 1978, _La Poésie de l’action_ is a book of conversations between President Léopold Cédar Senghor and Tunisian writer and journalist Mohamed Aziza. Senghor explains Negritude as a tool to reclaim space for black African thought and experience. For him, Negritude is “objectively, the totality of the values of the civilization of the black world,” but he also draws a distinction between his understanding and Césaire’s. Negritude, for Césaire, is a “certain will and a way of living these values.” Much has been said about the shortcomings of Senghor’s Negritude, but reading Aziza’s _La Poésie de l’action_ reveals that there was more to him than meets the eye. Engaging with Senghor’s thought from my Amazigh positionality, I reemerged from reading _La Poésie de l’action_ feeling more sympathetic to a project whose pioneers harnessed their racial identity to earn their people a spot under the sun in an era of total colonial darkness. It might look easy today, but placing ourselves in the shoes of Senghor, Césaire, and Damas, and attempting to navigate their context would reveal that Negritude was an extraordinary feat. It taught black intellectuals, artists, and ordinary people the value of their lives and inspired them to undertake endeavors to reach their full potential. Unfortunately, Senghor had nothing to say about the Amazigh Cultural Movement (ACM) and how its advocacy related to Negritude. The ACM was launched in 1966. That is twelve years before the publication of _La Poésie de l’action_. Its birth was a result of the post-independence states’ denial of Amazigh people’s cultural and linguistic rights. Not only were the indigenous Amazigh language and culture marginalized, but states in Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, and Mauritania, following the vogue of Arab nationalism, put in place systematic de-Amazighization policies in order to Arabize their populations and extirpate Imazighen from their ancestral homeland. As a consequence of these misguided policies, which are reminiscent of the United States’ “internal colonialism” vis-à-vis the Indigenous and racialized people, Amazighitude (_Timmūzghā_) emerged as the critical consciousness of Imazighen (sing. Amazigh) vis-à-vis their cultural, linguistic, and civic dispossession within Tamazgha. A neologism, Tamazgha, which overlaps with the historical _Bilād al-barbar_ , extends from the Canary Islands to West Egypt and from the Mediterranean to sub-Saharan Africa. Amazighitude has since its inception catalyzed novel, albeit still untapped, thought-provoking ideas about space, language, citizenship, and Africanhood. Most important, Amazighitude meets Negritude in its strive to rehabilitate a portion of Africans who have a civilization of their own but who were stripped of the means to not only express it, but to even continue its transmission into the future. Senghor is an important linchpin for the intersection of Negritude and Amazighitude in the AFCON. He was not only a mill of ideas and concepts, but also a poet-president; a man who mastered the verb, but also wielded the power to make the verb be. His double function endowed him with the connections that facilitated the encounter between Negritude and Amazighitude. In his preface to Moroccan politician Mahjoubi Aherdan’s 1990 book _Iguider ou le mythe de l ’aigle_, Senghor emphasized that this tale was distinguished by its “rootedness in the living values of Berberitude: of the eternal Africa, which is the cradle of humanity.” Berberitude was mostly like Senghor’s name for the resonances between Aherdan’s work and Negritude. In a remarkable observation, Senghor told Aziza that after World War II he passed from a “Negritude-ghetto” to “Negritude as enrootment (enracinement) and openness,” and it is within this stage that we can locate his gestures towards “métissage” as well as cultural, and even genetic, cross-fertilization as a horizon for humanity. Metissage can only happen when people share or live in the same space, and the rise of mixed marriage between Moroccans and other Africans living amongst them confirms this rule. Senghor may have been wrong about many things, but, thanks to migration, his notion of métissage has been borne out by the reality of Moroccan society today. Over 110,000 African immigrants live in Morocco. Unlike what comes to mind, not all these migrants are undocumented, and thousands of them have not undertaken the perilous journey through the Sahara to enter the country. Thousands are students, and hundreds more are educators, interns, physicians, litterateurs, businesspeople, and musicians while others are patients of Moroccans doctors and life partners of Moroccan citizens. Speaking more concretely, there is something to be said about Imazighen’s proverbial xenophilia (love of foreigners or strangers) as a foundation for the ongoing metissage that is one of the markers of Africanhood through daily contact between different Africans in Moroccan neighborhoods. In fact, both Amazighitude and Negritude embrace and enable métissage as a path to transcend communal boundaries towards a potential becoming The importance of Amazighitude as a metissage-enabling force can be noticed in the sea change in Moroccans’ attitude vis-à-vis other Africans in the country. An eye opener, Amazighitude is not a tool to obfuscate consciousness in polysemic verbiage or in search of what makes an authentic Amazigh experience. Rather it is an agentive awareness of and the ensuing endeavor to end oppression, racialization, and minoritization. This conscientious manifestation of Amazighitude was embodied by Ahmed Dgherni, an Amazigh lawyer and founder of the short-lived Amazigh Democratic Party. Instead of solely recognizing the millennial economic, cultural, and demographic extensions that have always tied the different parts of Tamazgha to each other, Dgherni made a compelling case for a different kind of citizenship in which Africanness and Tamazghanness serve as a basis for belonging. Thus Dgherni refused “to consider Africans, particularly those who hail from Tamazgha, as foreigners in Morocco.” Unlike Senghorean metissage, however, Amazighitude, as it is articulated by Dgherni, instantiates Tamazgha as a space for concrete mobility, discovery, collaboration, and human relationships that have been disabled by state borders. Similarly to Negritude, which has functioned as a connector between people of African descent across the globe, Amazighitude is Imazighen’s critical gateway to other oppressed and Indigenous peoples who have been subjected to myriad forms of violence. Instead of being a point of arrival, Amazighitude should be perceived as a site of uninhibited liberation from the cultural and ideological alienation that prevents Imazighen from acquiring consciousness of their belonging to a mass of African peoples whose Negritude and their Amazighitude are the two faces of the same coin. Liberation in this context means the capacity to reimagine the world from the position of those who experienced dispossession and oppression, which will enable straddling hyphens and soldering the gaps for the emergence of Amazigritude (a combination Amazighitude and Negritude) as a substrate for the geographical and human connectivities that undergird Africanhood. Despite the resonances between the two words, Amazighitude and Negritude have significant differences. The former is race-averse, whereas the latter, at least in its early twentieth century version, emerged in a context in which it was crucial to articulate its racial dimensions. Only by reading the subtleties of Senghor’s discussions of difference and wedding them to the discourses of the proponents of Amazighitude about an ecumenical Tamazgha can we perceive how these two projects coalesce and converge in manners that have not yet been examined. Hence, the importance of recognizing the AFCON’s festivities, which in addition to competing teams, bring together bodies, confront perceptions, and enact Africanhood on a land that struggled for a long time to acknowledge its Amazighitude. As Moroccans debate whether football is the most efficient place for their state to invest their limited resources, the broader trans-continental and transnational debates that the AFCON facilitates should not be overlooked. Rather than looking solely inward, it is also essential to discern how Amazighitude has participated in Morocco’s shift from a “root-[all-exclusive]identity” to one that is open to the world; from an era when blackness and Amazighity were actively erased to one in which they have become a locus of societal consciousness. Judging by the unfolding reality of Africanhood, Amazigritude is our future. We are beyond Tamazgha as a dream and Negritude as a cultural manifesto to empower blackness. What Moroccan cities, neighborhoods, and even villages experience on a daily basis is a demographic, culinary, economic, and linguistic métissage. The AFCON will come to an end in a month, but the Amazigritude it highlights is crucial for the futurity of an all-accepting Morocco. * * *
africasacountry.com
December 24, 2025 at 10:25 PM
The myth of Nigerian football exceptionalism
### The Super Eagles don’t suffer from a shortage of talent, but represent a country unwilling to admit that greatness is not a birthright. * * * Nigerian men's national team at a friendly in Lisbon. Image credit Maciej Rogowski via Shutterstock © 2022. For more than four decades, Nigeria has lived inside a carefully constructed narrative of greatness. In the years that followed the civil war, successive governments turned to soft propaganda in an attempt to rebuild national confidence. Slogans such as “Giant of Africa, _Africa’s most populous nation_ , and _Good People, Great Nation_ were promoted as unquestionable truths. These phrases created a symbolic identity that was easy to recite but difficult to verify. What was meant to serve as balm for a wounded nation became the foundation for a culture of exaggeration that still shapes national self-perception. Many of the children who absorbed these slogans in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s are adults today. Yet the myth survives with remarkable intensity. Its clearest expression appears during football crises. A failed attempt to qualify for the World Cup is met with familiar outrage. Nigerians ask how the country could possibly lose to DR Congo. The surprise is revealing. It suggests a refusal to reckon with the possibility that the country’s footballing status is not what the national imagination insists it is. The belief that Nigeria is too big or too talented to lose to any particular African team reveals a deeper problem. It shows how a society that struggles with electricity, infrastructure, education, sports administration and basic governance still finds comfort in inflated fantasies of superiority. The football pitch becomes a stage on which national delusions play out. The result is an unearned confidence that masks years of institutional neglect. Football is a useful mirror. When a country neglects youth academies, fails to maintain stadiums, sidelines long term planning and treats sports administration as an afterthought, the consequences are predictable. Yet rather than confront these realities, many Nigerians cling to the idea that talent alone will deliver results. Emotional loyalty substitutes for sober assessment. Hope becomes a kind of patriotism that resists scrutiny. The approach to the upcoming AFCON in Morocco is already following this script. Despite repeated failures, many supporters insist that Nigeria must compete for medals simply because it always has. This expectation is not based on current capacity. It is an extension of an aging national story about Nigerian inevitability. Consider the widely repeated claim that the current team is a “crack squad.” A closer look shows something different. The squad is largely composed of players in Turkey, Belgium, Greece and the mid table sections of English and Spanish leagues. The captain plays in Saudi Arabia. His deputy plays in Turkey. This is not a criticism of the players themselves. It is an attempt to recognise the reality of Nigeria’s football economy. A decade ago, Nigerians played regularly for top clubs in England, Spain, Germany and France. That era has passed. The talent pipeline is weaker. The global competitiveness of Nigerian players has declined. Pretending otherwise does not change the situation. The irony is that Nigeria still appears in major football tournaments through its diaspora. Nigerian heritage players represent England, the Netherlands, Germany, Canada and several other national teams. Their success is celebrated as a reflection of Nigerian potential. It also highlights a more difficult truth. The ecosystem that allows these players to flourish exists outside Nigeria. When talented Nigerians succeed on foreign soil, they do so because they benefit from structures and investments that their country has failed to recreate at home. Nigeria is not losing because the world fears its rise. It is losing because it is trapped inside a myth that prevents honest self-reflection. The real challenge is not whether Nigeria qualifies for a tournament or wins a trophy. The challenge is whether the country can abandon the comforting illusion that greatness is a birthright. Slogans and self-praise cannot replace planning, accountability and long-term investment. Until Nigerians accept that footballing excellence is earned and not inherited, the cycle of disappointment will continue. The first step is the simplest. The country must let go of the inflated sense of exceptionalism that has outlived its usefulness. Only then can it begin the harder task of building the institutions that make real achievement possible. * * *
africasacountry.com
December 22, 2025 at 10:24 PM
Salah in isolation
### Distanced at club level, and scrutinized at home, there is no player with more to prove at this Africa Cup of Nations than Mohamed Salah. * * * Salah at a Champions League match in Frankfurt, Germany, October 2025. Image credit Vitalii Vitleo via Shutterstock. It is a well-known tale, but ahead of the AFCON, it is perhaps time to, once more, reflect on Mohamed Salah’s daily bumpy bus journeys as a teenager. Every day on his quest to realize his dream of playing professional football, he traveled four hours up the Nile from his native Nagrig to Cairo and back. That commitment required an obscene amount of sacrifice and discipline in his formative years, and it forced a young Salah to prioritize success above anything else—a theme that continues to define his career. During his recent public rift with Liverpool, Salah responded to being benched for three consecutive matches by stopping in the mixed zone and speaking to a random Norwegian television channel—an extremely rare act from the 34 year old, and proof that he was looking to get something off his chest. “It seems like the club has thrown me under the bus.” He said, emotionless, as the Liverpool press officer, Jack Walker, dropped his head and groaned inaudibly in the background. Simon Hughes, who covers Liverpool for _The Athletic_ , and is the author of _Chasing Salah_ a seminal biography on one of Africa’s greatest players, corroborated that Salah has always been selective when speaking to the press: > Even in his first season, when he scored 44 goals, I remember Liverpool’s press officer had to persuade him to stop and speak to the press about the accomplishment. He was always very reluctant. I think the interview lasted for three and a half minutes. Even in that conversation, he really didn’t want to do it, he wouldn’t give up any of himself. He only speaks when he feels there’s a reason to, or there’s something to address. Of course, there is nothing innately wrong with refusing to speak to media members, but Hughes believes that Salah’s isolation is strategic—borne out of self-preservation after exploding onto the scene during a politically combustive period in Egyptian history: > In the West, we have this perception of Egypt being the Pyramids. Colleagues go to Nagrig and do that journey, visiting the jasmine and onion fields and it’s all quite romantic. The reality is the hardship Salah inherited as a young man due to the political context of the post-Mubarak Arab Spring, means that he has to be very careful about how he presents himself. I’ve been told that he thinks the only way to promote a wider positive message is by doing well on a football pitch and scoring goals. There are notorious examples of the wider Arab and Muslim world urging Salah to tailor his religious or political messaging. His yearly Christmas photos in front of a small tree in his living room are always amusing in that they draw the ire of the hyper-critical zealots that think he’s selling out. A more serious post came a few months into the midst of the Israeli genocide in Gaza. Several Arab stars like Riyad Mahrez, posted messages of Palestinian solidarity in early days, but at that time the wider Muslim world had its eyes trained on Salah’s feed. He eventually published an eerily polished video on X calling for “humanity to prevail.” Most deemed it milquetoast. Nonetheless, his video, which posted record numbers, is a testament to his wider popularity. Hughes again: > We talk about the heroes of Liverpool and the legend, the greatest players, Kenny Dalglish, Steven Gerrard, are almost untouchable. They represent Liverpool as a city, they don’t represent the United Kingdom or England or a religion. Salah represents a massive swathe of people around the world. He never asked for it, but people do see him as a reflection of his country, the Arab world and Islam. His reach is enormous. It’s ridiculous, really, there’s never been a player like it, not just in Liverpool’s history, but in Premier League history. In addition to his club troubles, Salah is fully aware of the enormous expectations placed on his shoulders by the Egyptian public. Salah hails from a country that has won seven Africa Cup of Nations titles, and he succeeds a generation of players that won three consecutive titles on the trot. To employ a phrase coined by Egyptian writer, Ahmed Assem, ahead of the 2019 Africa Cup of Nations, “Salah is the best Egyptian player of all time, but he is not the greatest.” Greatness, to many Egyptians, is defined by ingenuity, magnanimity, and, above all, winning. Those are all characteristics attributed more to Mohamed Aboutrika than Salah. Aboutrika has the philosophy degree, Aboutrika stood up for Palestine without being pushed, Aboutrika propelled Cairo giants Al Ahly to several Champions League titles, Aboutrika came up big when Egypt needed a clutch goal in Cup of Nations victories. No one can deny that most of the criticism that Salah has faced has been unfair. He almost single-handedly dragged Egypt to two AFCON finals in 2017 and 2021 without the talented teammates Aboutrika had. Additionally, the fact that Salah never played for either of Egypt’s megaclubs, Ahly or Zamalek, means that he cannot fall back on a loyal and feral fanbase to protect him when vulnerable. All of those are reasons why Salah has become accustomed to withdrawing into himself, and setting up a protective perimeter. Examples are plentiful. There are anecdotes of Salah being inundated with hundreds of selfie requests upon a return to Nagrig. One Eid break, he allegedly snuck away and left the village. “Aboutrika would have wasted 8 hours of his day taking those selfies,” Assem mused. Another time, when the Egyptian FA used his likeness on the team plane without his permission, his representation sharply reprimanded them for overstepping their boundaries preserving his own self-interests over that of the national association. Salah’s protective perimeter has even been necessary in the geopolitical sphere. Ahead of the 2018 World Cup in Russia, for example, Egypt camped in Chechnya where they were invited to meet controversial leader Ramzan Kadyrov. As is habit, Kadyrov wasted no time in setting up a photo op with the Egyptian star. Salah was reportedly furious with the Federation for their failure to protect him and even reportedly threatened to retire from international football. Ultimately, Salah will be judged subjectively according to our respective inclinations. Some will see him as aloof and self-centered, others that subscribe to a more deterministic worldview will measure his actions against a very tough upbringing and find him reasonable. However you judge him, you are probably not wrong. Just keep in mind that over the next few weeks, as the Egyptian king keeps to himself in an attempt to win the one trophy that’s evaded him, that he prefers to operate alone. * * *
africasacountry.com
December 22, 2025 at 10:24 PM
The boys are back in town
### Bafana Bafana’s resurgence has been forged where South African football always lives—between brilliance and the bizarre. * * * Bafana Bafana supporters at SuperSport Park, Pretoria, June 7, 2008. Photo: Media Club South Africa (CC BY-SA 2.0) This post is part of our special coverage of the 2025 African Cup of Nations. Keep up with video dispatches from Morocco with Maher Mezahi on the African Five-a-Side podcast. Bafana Bafana, as South Africa’s senior men’s national football team is nicknamed, doesn’t do anything in half measures. The team goes from brilliant to bizarre in a spellbinding transformation that would puzzle and amaze even the greatest of shapeshifters. Bafana shot to the stars in 1992 when they emerged from the football wilderness to win 1–0 against the then two-time African champions and World Cup quarter-finalists, Cameroon, in South Africa’s first international match. But they were brought back to reality when Zimbabwe thumped them 4–1 and Nigeria drubbed them 4–0 in Bafana’s formative years—leading to the team being mockingly called the 4X4s. Thanks to home ground advantage, and a sprinkling of Madiba Magic, the 4X4s rose from dust to soar higher than everyone on the continent when they won the 1996 Africa Cup of Nations (AFCON) staged in South Africa. Clive Barker, who brought the AFCON trophy to Mzansi in 1996, also helped the team book their place in France ’98 for their maiden FIFA World Cup appearance. He, however, wasn’t on the plane to France, ejected by the South African Football Association (SAFA) when the two couldn’t find common ground regarding Barker’s remuneration package. That sacking normalized Bafana going back-and-forth between the brilliant and the bizarre. Barker insisted on relying on home-based talent, dismissing the need to bring Europe-based players simply because they play abroad, in a more competitive environment than South Africa, which was still finding its feet in the global arena. In appointing Frenchman Philippe Troussier, SAFA undid the work of the brilliant Barker. Troussier was a complete disaster, fighting with the media and hanging his players out to dry by labeling them as tourists rather than a side that came to compete in France. For him, Bafana’s weakness was the fact that they didn’t have enough players plying their trade abroad—preferably Europe. He failed to grasp what made the team African champions, by focusing on what they lacked instead of building on what they possessed. His bizarre tenure marked the beginning of the two worlds Bafana would hop between. Bafana Bafana would either have a warm coach, usually a local, who could get the players to go through brick walls for him and the country, or a cold, often international, coach who didn’t understand the South African psyche and what was needed to get the best out of Mzansi players. The “warm” coaches were normally undone by the association that failed to back them when they stood their ground with players who wanted to pick and choose which matches they would play. These coaches, however, also refused to stray out of their comfort zone—adopting an approach that didn’t push the team to be great, but settled for being good. The cold coaches were normally removed by player power, with the group showing their displeasure through their performances. In their push for excellence, the cold coaches set standards based on European metrics without understanding the human beings they managed. That mismatch resulted in players not doing self-introspection because the “outsider” was the problem and the entire blame of the team’s poor performance was shifted to the coach. For Bafana to succeed, they needed a coach who could marry the brilliant and the bizarre worlds that the team lives in. Enter Hugo Broos. His appointment was both brilliant and bizarre. An AFCON winner as coach of Cameroon, and a serial winner in his playing days at Anderlecht and Club Brugge in Belgium, Broos brought the winning mentality that Bafana needed. His triumph in Cameroon—where a number of their star players boycotted the national team, opting instead to cement their places at their European clubs—prepared Broos well for what he would experience at Bafana. The Belgian took over a side that had created an environment where certain players believed that simply by just breathing, they deserved to start in the national team. Europe-based players and those plying their trade for the so-called big teams in South Africa behaved like playing for a national team was their birthright. Broos was able to deal with that challenge in South Africa because, when he was met with a group of primadonnas who saw themselves as untouchable in Cameroon, he forgot about them and instead worked with a group of unassuming cubs and turned them into Indomitable Lions. His unfancied side brought the 2017 AFCON to Cameroon, returning the country to the summit of African football for the first time since 2002. But Broos was not a sexy name to South Africans, who are obsessed with brand names in their coaches. He didn’t have the charisma of a Hervé Renard, the profile of national hero that Benni McCarthy had, or the solid CV of a Carlos Queiroz—names that were bandied about as potential Bafana coaches before SAFA appointed a 69-year-old Belgian. Because of that, Broos’s first press conference was cold. One journalist even asked him if this job was part of securing his retirement package. The Belgian adopted a defiant posture. “I am not coming here for a retirement check and then go back to my country with no success. I am not like that,” Broos said, when he was unveiled as Bafana coach on May 12, 2021. “If you look at my CV, it’s a CV with plenty of success. I want success, and I want to win. I am very angry, and I am very disappointed when I lose. I don’t want to lose! But it’s not only me [who will bring success]. I have to build a team that is going in the same direction as me. A team that knows that there is one thing that is important, and that’s the team. Not an individual, a team. We have to create a team.” Bit by bit, Broos removed egocentric and individualistic elements to create a united Bafana. He challenged South African football authority, from the Premier Soccer League (PSL) chairman Irvin Khoza to even his employers at SAFA. The fights that he picked with these bodies were all for the benefit of the players and South African football. He challenged Khoza, demanding the PSL take a pause earlier so as to allow players to rest before they get to AFCON. (Broos lost that battle in 2023, but won it ahead of the 2025 AFCON). He also challenged his bosses to better take care of the junior national teams, rewarding players who did well there—like Shandre Campbell and Tylon Smith who are former Under-20 players who are in the AFCON squad. That endeared Broos to the players, who appreciated having a figure who fights for them and was uncompromising when it came to discipline. Broos even dropped one of the best right backs in Africa, Khuliso Mudau, because he didn’t train at his club when he was fighting over a new contract, a season after backing the player when he was involved in a spat with his Mamelodi Sundowns’ coach. Broos’s biggest success at Bafana is restoring the pride of the national team jersey, which has resulted in success that has filtered down to the junior national teams. The Under-20s are the reigning African champions, who reached the knockout stage of the World Cup, while the Under-17s are regional champions and also advanced to the next round of their age group’s World Cup. Broos achieved this by fighting for the respect of competitions like COSAFA Cup (Southern Africa’s regional championships) and African Nations Championship (the AFCON for local-based players that’s also known as CHAN). He rewarded players who took these competitions seriously. Rushwin Dortley graduated to the Bafana first team after doing well at COSAFA while Malibongwe Khoza earned his first call up after doing well at CHAN. All of this, however, wouldn’t have been possible without the “awakening” at club level. Orlando Pirates’ run in the 2013 CAF Champions League and 2015 CAF Confederation Cup, where they stunned North African opponents, compelled South African clubs to take continental football seriously. Pirates’ success, especially their 3–0 win over Al-Ahly in El-Gouna in the 2013 Champions League, removed the fear factor that South African clubs used over North African sides. That was the heaviest defeat that Al-Ahly had suffered in the Champions League. That record was changed by Sundowns, the 2016 Champions League winners, who thumped Al-Ahly 5–0 in the quarter finals of the 2018–2019 edition of the continent’s premier inter-club competition. Those victories showed the brilliance of South African football teams. But the bizarre crept in during Pirates and Sundowns’ road to the final in those Champions League campaigns—with the two sides failing to win the overall competition that was won by North African sides. Pirates and Sundowns failed to win the Champions League in those seasons because they insisted on playing an expansive brand of football, even in instances where pragmatism was needed. Those were school fees that South African football needed to pay to get to where they are now, as one of the dark horses in the 2025 AFCON after finishing third in the previous edition in Ivory Coast. Bafana achieved that with a largely home-grown squad. Broos, like Barker before him, insisted that just because a player is in Europe doesn’t mean that they are better than the ones playing in the local league. The 2–0 win over Morocco in the last 16, with the Atlas Lions boasting a galaxy of stars from the best sides in Europe, justified Broos’s words. The victory came at the hands of a starting XI that featured nine South Africa–based players and Percy Tau, who was at Al-Ahly at the time. Sphephelo Sithole, who is based in Portugal, was the only player based in Europe. Importantly, ten of the 23 players that did duty for South Africa at the 2023 Afcon refined their talent in the MultiChoice Diski Challenge (MDC, now known as the DStv Diski Challenge). The league is a combination of a reserve league and a developmental institution. To be eligible, players have to be Under-23 to play. But when it was launched, it was changed from an Under-19 league that it was initially supposed to be to a reserve league, because SAFA took umbrage that the professional body (the PSL) was now venturing into amateur football—which is the domain of the association. But slowly, the PSL has been moving the league to what they had originally intended it to be—a place for upcoming talent to cut their teeth in a structured environment. That was another episode of the bizarre and brilliant of South African football, the governing body flexing their muscle over the league, which was doing something that would benefit football. The two organization’s failure to pull in the same direction has hurt Bafana and South African football. It’s why the country has fielded weak teams in CHAN, the Olympics qualifiers, and even in some of the age group competitions with teams not obligated to release their players since they don’t fall under the FIFA calendar, and no sense of patriotism to allow that to happen despite the rules. South African teams that participate in continental football, for instance, sometimes don’t have their domestic schedules cleared so that they can best represent the country, as is the case in other parts of the continent. These issues are slowly being ironed out, which will create room for brilliance to have a permanent home in South African football, instead of being a visitor that’s often chased away by the bizarre. * * *
africasacountry.com
December 21, 2025 at 10:23 PM
A giant chance
### An African Cup of Nations at home for red hot Morocco is a chance to put past trauma aside and charge on to the world stage. * * * Amine Adli and Achraf Hakimi at a friendly in 2023. Image credit Nawfel Ajari via Wikimedia Commons CC BY-SA 4.0. This post is part of our special coverage of the 2025 African Cup of Nations. Keep up with video dispatches from Morocco with Maher Mezahi on the African Five-a-Side podcast. > Before we can become the kings of the world, we must become the kings of Africa. – Walid Regragui, coach of the Moroccan men’s national team What is at stake for Morocco playing an African Cup of Nations at home? On multiple occasions when asked about his impressive Moroccan national team and their prospects of one day winning the World Cup, head coach Walid Regragui immediately and repeatedly stressed the importance of the Africa Cup of Nations. In Rabat at the beginning of December, I interviewed Moroccans about the upcoming tournament for corporate television. Trying to adhere to the stiff standards of buttoned-up professionalism, I probed for light, upbeat answers that would speak about general excitement and anticipation. Yet, as soon as the cameras were switched off, nervousness surfaced. These days in Morocco, that snapback to reality, that pebble nudged in the Atlas Lions’ paw feels tangible across many sectors of the public. If we were to apply the cliché of an unstoppable force meeting an immovable object to this situation, the unstoppable force is unquestionably Moroccan football. Amine El Amri, a Moroccan football journalist, pointed out that his country participated in every single FIFA competition this calendar year except the FIFA Beach Soccer World Cup. That alone hints at the astronomical rise of Moroccan football across all age groups and categories. The immovable object? A 50-year-old mental block around the African Cup of Nations that refuses to crumble. Time and again, despite boasting impressive squads, Morocco have consistently failed to deliver in the knockout stages of AFCON. I began covering the tournament in 2017, so I have witnessed the last four eliminations in person. In 2017 and 2021, Morocco outplayed Egypt only to be undone by their North African rivals. More painful exits came in other years. The 2019 elimination was particularly difficult to swallow. Morocco were on the verge of reaching the quarterfinals, but standing in their way were the Benin Squirrels (not the “cheetahs”). Coached by Hervé Renard, Morocco played compact football, conceding almost nothing but creating little themselves. In the dying minutes, with the score locked at 1–1, Morocco were awarded a penalty kick. Hakim Ziyech, usually clinical from the spot, stepped up. His low effort struck the right post, instantly draining the momentum the Atlas Lions had built late in the match. With spirits dampened and facing an inspired Saturnin Allagbé in the Benin goal, Morocco were eliminated in crushing fashion. The 2023 tournament proved just as frustrating. Fresh off a historic 2022 World Cup semifinal run, Morocco arrived in Côte d’Ivoire as favorites. Once again, the Atlas Lions earned a late penalty. Once again, their star—this time Achraf Hakimi—rattled the woodwork. The defeat to South Africa was a cold splash of reality after the World Cup euphoria, and another reminder of the psychological barrier haunting the team. Since losing the 2004 final to hosts Tunisia, Morocco have never progressed beyond the quarterfinals. The psychological toll of such a drought should not be underestimated. Take Senegal as an example. Prior to winning the 2021 AFCON, the Teranga Lions had never lifted a major football trophy since gaining independence in August, 1960. In the immediate aftermath of that triumph, Senegal went on to win the U17 AFCON, U20 AFCON, and the 2023 African Nations Championship. In the span of a single month, a nation once defined by its mental failures on the pitch transformed its reputation into that of serial winners. Morocco does not need its men’s senior national team to kick the door down for the rest of its football landscape. Despite the senior men’s team leading African football on the World Cup stage, Morocco have enjoyed greater continental success with their youth and women’s teams. The Atlas Lionesses have reached consecutive WAFCON finals. The U23 side won AFCON and claimed bronze at the 2024 Olympics. Morocco’s futsal team has lifted three consecutive African titles. Rather, a Moroccan AFCON victory would be useful in that it would lay the foundations for an opportunity to outdo their 2022 semi-final berth in North America next summer. However, expectations are dangerous because they can be double-sided. “Expectations are so high that anything short of reaching the final could cost Regragui his job,” El Amri explained on the African Five-a-Side podcast. It is a harsh assessment, but Morocco has a deep bench of coaches ready to step in. Tarek Sektioui, for example, has won an Olympic bronze medal in 2024, the 2025 African Nations Championship, and the 2025 FIFA Arab Cup in Qatar. Many in Morocco consider his style more attractive than Regragui’s, and he would undoubtedly relish leading his country on the world stage. Still, such upheaval would hardly be conducive to calm World Cup preparation. It may sound zero-sum, but it is a reality that success at AFCON for Morocco could be inseparable from success at the World Cup. Failure at the AFCON could jeopardize both. That is what is truly at stake for the hosts. Beyond lifting a long-awaited trophy—the lone blemish on a golden decade of Moroccan football—a disastrous AFCON at home could trigger instability, and derail one of Africa’s strongest hopes ahead of the 2026 FIFA World Cup next June. * * *
africasacountry.com
December 20, 2025 at 10:23 PM
On the pitch
### This year, instead of taking a publishing break, we will be covering the African Cup of Nations. To transition, we consider why football still matters in an era of enclosure, mediated presence, and thinning publics. * * * Photo by Victor on Unsplash This post is the introduction (and transition) to our coverage of the 2025 edition of the men’s football African Cup of Nations. Follow our video dispatches from Morocco with Maher Mezahi on the African Five-a-side podcast. There is something stubbornly anachronistic about the pitch. A rectangle of grass, marked out with chalk or paint, governed by rules that are simple enough to learn when you’re young and serious enough to demand a lifetime’s attention. As the old saying goes, “of all unimportant things, football is the most important.” Time on the pitch is not optimized or personalized, but is shared. Ninety minutes pass whether you are ready or not, and nothing can be paused, rewound, or skipped. Bodies gather, not to curate an experience, but to submit to one whose outcome cannot be known in advance. For all its compromises, football remains one of the few mass rituals left in public life that still insists on collective presence—on being there, together, in the same place, at the same time. That insistence matters more now than it once did. Over the past while, it has become harder to ignore how much of collective life has slipped out of reach, and not through dramatic prohibitions but through quieter forms of exclusion. Culture and politics increasingly arrive as images rather than encounters. The dominant experiences of our time are frictionless, mediated, endlessly reproducible—and therefore strangely weightless. We watch more than we attend, and we react more than we participate. We are present everywhere, and almost nowhere. This was a year in which that shift could be felt in the body. Not just in the familiar exhaustion of feeds and cycles of outrage, but in the growing sense that being _there_ —at a match, a concert, a festival, a square—was becoming conditional. Conditional on money, on access, on belonging. The crowd, once assumed to be a public, increasingly resembles a filter. What used to feel shared now feels tiered. What used to feel ordinary begins to feel like a privilege. Football sits uneasily inside this transformation. It is not innocent of it; it has been shaped by money, spectacle, and power for a long time. And yet, the pitch continues to hold open a different relation to time and attention, one that resists full abstraction. You do not watch a match in fragments without losing something essential. You cannot fully outsource the feeling of being in the crowd. The game still asks something of you: patience, attunement, the willingness to be carried along by a rhythm not of your own making. It is for this reason that football remains such a charged site, politically and culturally, even when politics seems to have retreated everywhere else. More than just a metaphor, the pitch is itself a social form. And as the spaces where people once gathered freely become harder to access, more surveilled, more priced, and more mediated, the question is no longer simply what football represents—but what it still makes possible. Of course, people have always been priced out of certain experiences. Luxury boxes, private clubs, front rows and members’ enclosures have long existed alongside more accessible forms of public life. Exclusion, in this sense, is not new. What has changed is not the fact of exclusion, but its object—and the ease with which it is now normalized. For much of the twentieth century, scarcity attached itself to things: land, housing, art, durable goods that could be owned, accumulated, and passed on. Even where access was unequal, these objects existed alongside shared spaces and mass rituals that assumed a public presence. Increasingly, scarcity has migrated away from possessions and toward moments. The most aggressively priced goods today are not assets that endure, but irreproducible experiences: finals, premieres, ceremonies, once-only events whose value lies precisely in the fact that they cannot be replayed or shared without loss. A recent article in the _Economist_ captures this shift with unusual candor. Surveying the declining appeal of traditional luxury assets like fine wine, art, and mansions, it notes that the ultra-rich are redirecting their money toward what it calls “ultra-luxury services”: Super Bowl tickets, Wimbledon debentures, Met Gala invitations, World Cup finals. These are not valuable because they can be resold or inherited, but because they are rivalrous. A seat on Center Court, the piece observes, cannot be duplicated; its worth lies in the knowledge that, for those hours, no one else can occupy it. Luxury, in this account, is no longer primarily about ownership, but about access. Read politically, this is not simply a story about changing tastes. It describes a quiet reorganization of collective life around the enclosure of embodied presence. When scarcity attaches to moments rather than things, being there becomes the scarce good. Events that once presumed a public are reconceived as positional goods, and exclusion takes on a softer, more defensible form. No one is formally barred. Everyone can still watch. But the distinction between attending and viewing hardens into a hierarchy of experience. What is new, then, is not that some people are excluded, but that presence itself is increasingly treated as exceptional, as something to be competed and bid over (see, for a recent example, the fallout from Lionel Messi’s much-publicized “GOAT tour” of India, or FIFA’s handling of ticket pricing for the 2026 World Cup). The rest are offered a technologically sophisticated substitute: access without proximity, connection without participation. The loss is not dramatic enough to register as outright injustice, but is cumulative enough to reshape how collective life is lived. Alongside this reorganization of access, another development has been quietly taking shape. Not yet dominant, not yet universal, but increasingly visible: the rise of live streamers on platforms like YouTube, Twitch, and Kick, who do not offer a finished product so much as a continuous form of mediated presence. Figures like iShowSpeed or Kai Cenat do not ask you to watch something; they invite you to be with them. Their appeal lies less in entertainment content than in co-presence—the sense of inhabiting the same time, reacting together, sharing an unfolding interval of life. It’s a way of inhabiting time with others when shared physical presence is unavailable, deferred, or increasingly costly. What matters here is not that people have abandoned embodied life. They plainly have not. Streets, stadiums, workplaces, and homes remain full of bodies. The shift is more subtle. Streaming introduces a _different expectation_ of togetherness, one that does not replace physical co-presence but begins to shadow it, offering a parallel way of being with others that asks less of us and demands less in return. This is new not because mediation itself is new, but because the form it takes gestures toward a future in which presence no longer needs to be collective to feel social. The promise is not immersion in a spectacle, but continuity of company. You may not be there, but you are not alone. Time is shared, reactions are synchronized, life unfolds in common, but at a distance. What is being rehearsed is not withdrawal from the world, but a loosening of the assumption that public life requires bodies to gather in the same place. The significance of this lies not in what streaming has already done, but in what it prepares us to accept. It lowers the threshold of what counts as participation. It trains us, gently, to believe that being connected is close enough to being together. And once that belief settles, the enclosure of embodied public life no longer needs to be imposed. It will be met halfway. Still, one of the peculiar features of the present moment is that politics feels both omnipresent and strangely unavailable. The language of politics saturates everyday life—identities, consumption, culture, morality—and yet the spaces in which people once encountered one another as a public continue to erode. Polarization intensifies, but shared worlds peter out. Everything is contested; very little is held in common. This is not a return to apathy. On the contrary, the dominant mood is one of constant activation. Opinions circulate at speed, moral positions harden quickly, and crises succeed one another without pause. And yet, much of this intensity unfolds in environments that are structurally incapable of sustaining durable collective action. Engagement is immediate, expressive, and often sincere, but it rarely cements. What looks like politicization frequently bypasses the institutions, habits, and social forms that once translated feeling into force. The result is a kind of hyperreal politics: politics experienced primarily as image, affect, and declaration. It is intensely felt, widely shared, and endlessly mediated, but only intermittently anchored in collective organization. Publics appear and disappear rapidly. Mobilizations flare, peak, and dissolve. The infrastructure that once stabilized political life—parties, unions, civic associations, mass rituals—has not been replaced so much as thinned out, leaving behind a field of heightened sensation with few places for it to settle. This condition invites a certain misrecognition. It is tempting to assume that the problem lies in insufficient conviction, or insufficient radicalism, or insufficient clarity of values. But what is often missing is not passion or commitment, but rehearsal: the slow, embodied learning of how to act with others over time. The ability to endure disagreement, to coordinate movement, to sustain attention, to recognize oneself as part of a collective that is neither purely chosen nor instantly gratifying. It is in this context that older forms of gathering begin to look newly significant. Not as solutions in themselves, and not as romantic holdovers, but as sites where political capacities are formed before they are named as political. Rituals of gathering; whether religious, cultural, or sporting, have historically functioned as a kind of pre-political infrastructure. They taught people how to inhabit shared time, how to submit to collective rhythms, how to be affected by strangers without immediately sorting them into allies and enemies. Recently, I have been thinking about Maher Mezahi’s essay on the politics of Algerian football fandom from our recent special issue on Africa in the mass protest decade. Maher’s account lingers on what happens in and around the stadium: the chants, the gestures, the sustained presence of bodies over time. These were not spaces of explicit political education, and often, they were stifled by surveillance or repression. But, they were also places where people learned how to gather without guarantees—how to remain with one another, how to synchronize movement and voice, how to recognize collective force before it had a name. What stands out is the ordinariness of this learning. Nothing here depends on clarity of program or ideological alignment. What mattered was repetition, rhythm, and the slow accumulation of habit. Long before protest reappeared on the streets, these capacities were being rehearsed elsewhere, embedded in routines that did not announce themselves as political at all. Maher is careful not to overstate the case. Football crowds did not _cause_ the Hirak, and the terrace was not a substitute for organization. But, neither was it incidental. It was one of the few places where collective life could still be practiced under conditions that made other forms of gathering difficult to sustain. When politics eventually returned in visible form, it carried with it dispositions shaped in those spaces, including the ability to occupy space, to endure over time, to act together without needing immediate resolution. What makes the essay stand out is its refusal of romance. The stadium appears not as a site of redemption, but as a fragile and contingent infrastructure that could be repurposed or repressed. And yet, for a time, it held open a capacity that had few other places to go. It carried a potential that did not announce itself in advance, but accumulated sideways. That sideways accumulation matters now. Not because it offers a blueprint, but because it reminds us that political possibility often depends on forms of gathering that appear incidental until they are gone. The erosion of such spaces rarely registers as a crisis at the moment. Its consequences are felt later, when the habits they once sustained are no longer available to draw on. In recent years, much of our work at _Africa Is a Country_ has been animated by a worry about this transformation in human sociality. Even if they are not explicitly named, questions of presence, attention, and shared experience sit just beneath much of what we publish throughout the year. This concern also helps explain a number of editorial decisions we have made along the way, such as expanding into print and investing more deliberately in convenings, screenings, festivals, and other forms of gathering. It has also meant slowing down our publishing rhythm at certain moments, not to disengage, but to concentrate attention rather than scatter it. Across different formats, the impulse has been the same: to treat the public sphere, on the continent and beyond it, not as something to be merely analyzed, but as something that has to be actively sustained. Over the years our biannual “On Safari” post has has evolved to become an essential tool for this practice, becoming a space for reflecting not only on the previous months’ events, but on the conditions under which we encounter them. The pauses that follow have never meant an exit from the world, rather, they are part of a recurring rhythm that offer a chance to slow the pace, take stock, and redirect attention. For the past few years, this redirection has become reflexive in sync with another recurring event: the African Cup of Nations (AFCON) football tournament. We shift our focus deliberately and for the duration of AFCON because football, especially at this scale, remains one of the few events capable of briefly reassembling publics that otherwise appear fragmented and dispersed. For a few weeks, attention is shared rather than scattered; rivalries unfold within a shared frame; time is held in common rather than endlessly individualized. As Maher has argued in his brilliant writing, the tournament’s distinctiveness lies not only in the football itself, but in the social worlds it brings into view: its relative parity, its accessibility, the intimacy between fans, players, and officials, and the way it generates collective memory across borders and generations. Maher, who is both a contributing editor at AIAC and the host of the _African Five-a-Side_ podcast (the best football podcast around), will be leading our coverage of AFCON. His work has consistently treated African football not as an aside to politics, but as one of the places where political history, popular feeling, and everyday life intersect most densely. Under his guidance, our coverage will attend not only to matches and moments, but to the broader textures of the tournament: how it is lived, argued over, celebrated, and contested. To be sure, AFCON is not immune to the dynamics that shape contemporary public life. It is also entangled with money, power, and state ambition, and it is increasingly mobilized as a vehicle for spectacle-led development. This year’s tournament, hosted in Morocco, brings those tensions into particularly sharp focus. As Omar Kabbadj reported for us a few months ago, preparations for AFCON and the 2030 World Cup precipitated the rise of the GenZ212 protest movement, whose demands for healthcare, education, and dignity stand in direct contrast to the state’s prioritization of stadiums over social infrastructure. The juxtaposition of hospitals and stadiums has become a potent symbol, and a reminder of the material concerns that sporting spectacle cannot substitute for. Other silences shape the tournament’s political backdrop as well. Just this week, Zahra Rahmouni’s reporting on Western Sahara at the UN underscores how Sahwari self-determination continues to be sidelined, even as Morocco presents itself as a stable regional hub through sport. In this sense, the tournament itself functions as a kind of reputational laundering, redirecting attention toward spectacle and hospitality while narrowing the space in which unresolved questions of occupation can appear. Solidarity is unlikely to surface under these conditions: any gestures in that direction will be carefully policed, and Sahrawis will remain largely absent from regional and global political consciousness, even as that same consciousness mobilizes powerfully around other struggles over occupation and self-determination, most notably Palestine. And yet, it would be disingenuous not to say something simpler. AFCON is an extraordinary tournament. For all the analysis it invites, it remains unpredictable, uneven, tense, funny, and alive. After the year we have had, with its relentlessness, its moral weight, its exhaustion—there is nothing trivial about wanting to watch, to argue, to be carried along by the spectacle for a while. Wanting to join in does not cancel our responsibility to be critical; it exists alongside it. That, finally, is part of why AFCON matters. Not because it resolves the contradictions that surround it, but because it still creates space for collective anticipation; for joy that is provisional, contingent, and hard-won. In a moment when so much public life feels scripted in advance, that openness is not nothing. It is, at the very least, worth showing up for. * * *
africasacountry.com
December 19, 2025 at 10:26 PM
What does a museum mean here?
### A dispatch from Benin City tells the unfinished story of the Museum of West African Art. * * * Central Hospital, Benin City, 2021. Image via Wikimedia Commons CC BY-SA 4.0. Benin City’s old Central Hospital is gone now. Where the gynecology wing once stood, there is sand, debris, and the upright ribs of reinforcement rods—the anatomy of a building that has not yet decided what it wants to become. It takes effort to imagine what once lived here: women laboring, bones being set, families waiting in the courtyard for news. For more than a century, it served the majority of Edo State’s residents. “There were very fond memories,” a Benin-born source, whose grandparents worked in the hospital, told me. “For it to be leveled for a museum is… difficult.” The Central Hospital once spanned seven hectares, but more than half of it was handed to the Museum of West African Art (MOWAA) in 2022. Even the remaining land proved vulnerable. In early October, Deputy Governor Dennis Idahosa warned the museum against encroaching on the neighboring Specialist Hospital. “This is not a witch-hunt,” he said, but “MOWAA must stick to the law.” The hospital’s disappearance surfaced in almost every conversation I had in early November, when I was in Nigeria for what was supposed to be MOWAA’s opening. It became the quiet fulcrum on which the museum’s promise—and its contradictions—balanced. Artist and writer Jamilah Abu-Bakare, born in Benin City, gave language to this feeling. A hospital, she told me, is a site of repair. So what does it mean for a city’s most visible gesture of cultural revival to begin with the destruction of a place built for healing? “As someone born in Benin City but working in the art world, I realized I could have easily arrived on the wrong side of this,” she said. One day before my scheduled flight to Benin City for a private preview of MOWAA, I was in Lagos with my suitcase half-zipped. As I was finalizing my plans for the trip, my phone lit up with messages from friends—some affiliated with the museum, others international art-world visitors—who were already in Benin City. “Stay where you are.” “They’re not letting us leave.” “Don’t come yet.” Videos followed: men at the gates confronting foreign guests, police moving in, doors locked. No one sounded afraid. Instead, I heard frustration, and the unmistakable clarity of something long overdue cracking open. Within minutes, WhatsApp groups erupted—curators, artists, Edo community members, diaspora Nigerians, journalists, neighbors—all trying to make sense of the rupture in real time. “This interruption was necessary.” “This is years in the making.” “Finally.” Scrolling through voice notes and screenshots, I realized I was witnessing not the breakdown of a museum, but the collapse of the narrative that had been built around it. * * * Long before anyone imagined a museum rising from the ruins of a hospital, there were the Benin Bronzes—cast by hereditary guilds, tended in palace courtyards, invoked in ritual, inscribed with a cosmology in which memory was not metaphor but material. Their story begins long before their theft, yet this pillage hangs over everything. In 1897, British troops razed Benin, exiled Oba Ovonramwen Nogbaisi, and emptied shrines into crates bound for London. What was left became trophies. What remained was a wound. European museums did not arrive at restitution on their own. Activist pressure, the slow moral exhaustion of empire, and the 2018 Sarr–Savoy report—commissioned by President Macron and authored by Senegalese philosopher Felwine Sarr and French art historian Bénédicte Savoy—forced the conversation open. Their partnership, a subtle indictment of Europe’s reliance on African intellectual labor to interpret African loss, helped turn restitution into a new moral currency. For Western institutions, it offered the promise of ethical renewal; for Nigeria, a symbolic path toward redress. In that climate, the idea of a new “home” for the Bronzes took shape. Enter Phillip Ihenacho, a British Nigerian businessman with a background in finance and nature conservation. He had no roots in Benin’s cultural ecosystem, but he had a longstanding relationship with then Governor Godwin Obaseki. In a 2020 BBC interview, Ihenacho remarked, almost casually, “If Godwin is not re-elected, it would be very difficult indeed to continue with a project like this.” It was a revealing admission: The focus of Inhenacho’s engagement with Benin City was political stability, not cultural legitimacy. Many Edo natives I spoke with in the weeks that follow described this—allowing someone outside Benin’s lineage to become the face of a museum built atop Benin’s deepest historical wound—as the project’s original fracture. “Imagine the Louvre had no French staff,” one native told me. “That’s what this feels like.” With Ihenacho driving the project and Obaseki smoothing the political terrain, the museum’s identity began to drift. The Benin Royal Museum was envisioned as a Palace project: a restitution site rooted in the Oba’s custodial authority and the return of royal objects. When it became EMOWAA, the scope widened. The 2020 press release presented the initiative not simply as a royal museum but as a regional arts and research institution—one that acknowledged the Palace while also positioning itself as part of a broader, more modern cultural infrastructure. It marked the first shift away from a singular restitution mandate toward a more elastic, donor-friendly mission. Even then, contradictions were visible. In 2021, Oba Ewuare II publicly accused the Obaseki administration of diverting donor funds, averting the museum’s original plan, and undermining the Palace’s custodial role. Obaseki’s involvement carried its own historical charge. His ancestor, Chief Agho Obaseki, rose to prominence in the political vacuum left by the 1897 invasion, becoming leader of the Benin Native Council—and later Iyase—against the wishes of the new Oba. Whether he collaborated with the British or simply survived them is still debated, but the symbolism in Benin is unmistakable: an Oba was exiled and an Obaseki rose. By 2024, EMOWAA had quietly rebranded as MOWAA. After President Buhari’s 2023 federal decree placing all restituted Bronzes under the Oba’s custodianship, the museum dropped “Edo” and widened its mandate from a local heritage project to a pan–West African, research-driven institution. The “Royal” vanished; “Edo” softened. Soon the institution was describing itself as “independent,” “non-governmental,” “non-royal.” Donors welcomed this. Western media repeated it. More than $25 million in international support followed. I knew the project from another vantage point: In my previous role at the Mellon Foundation, I supported our Black Atlantic portfolio, and MOWAA was among the initiatives we funded—a $3 million grant meant to anchor a broader network of heritage, research, and repatriation work. To funders, MOWAA looked like a sleek new model for restitution: professional, cosmopolitan, legible to global art institutions. It promised to shift the conversation from symbolic return to structural transformation. But MOWAA was not emerging into a vacuum. Benin City already held national and royal museums; long-standing guild systems; shrines; and archives of memory that live in families, compounds, and communities. The Palace’s position has remained consistent for generations: The Bronzes belong under the custodianship of the Oba, as affirmed by the federal decree. The conflict, then, was never simply about museum-building—it was about custodianship, sovereignty, and whose narrative would be allowed to stand. The people of Benin watched the drift take shape. They saw the Palace recede as Obaseki’s influence expanded. They saw Ihenacho speak as though he could arbitrate heritage for a kingdom not his own. They saw the museum’s origin story bend toward a version designed for international legitimacy. So when Western outlets framed the protests on November 9 as anger that the museum “was not called the Benin Royal Museum,” they flattened a century of dispossession into a branding dispute. They missed the political, spiritual, and historical stakes of a city whose memory had already been looted once before. The story that took shape in my conversations with artists, organizers, educators, and voices across the global art world—in Benin and beyond—bore little resemblance to MOWAA’s official narrative. “Benin people see the global art world as colonizers,” one Edo native told me. He wasn’t angry, just tired. “It’s ridiculous that people whose ancestors stole from your people are now telling you what you can and can’t do with your own heritage.” Then he added, almost in a whisper: “For Benin people, this is religious. Like taking a holy relic. The cross. The Kaaba. Something from the Vatican.” Here, restitution is not a metaphor. It is a spiritual breach, which is why MOWAA’s public statement on November 8, the afternoon after the protests, landed so poorly. It framed demonstrators as acting under “misconceptions,” cast the museum as a rational arbiter caught between political factions, and treated “independence” as a neutral fact rather than a political choice. The statement also erased the very shifts that fractured trust and flattened a five-year accumulation of tension into a brief “interruption.” And because it was written for donors, foreign press, and global partners, it reinforced the criticism many Edo people have voiced for years: that MOWAA speaks upward, not inward. That it reports to the world before it answers to the ground beneath it. Edo State’s new governor, Monday Okpebholo, made his position clear early. On November 7, during the Oba of Benin’s historic visit to Government House—the monarch’s first in years—he publicly declared that the museum should be restored to its original Palace-anchored mandate. It was a direct refutation of MOWAA’s independence narrative. On November 10, a few days after the protests, his aides issued an even sharper statement, criticizing the project’s “lack of transparency,” noting that the governor had not even been informed that a foreign delegation was in the state for the preview, and questioning how the initiative had drifted from the Palace “without clarity or consultation.” What few outside Edo realized was that Governor Okpebholo had intervened before the protests. On October 21, he partially revoked MOWAA’s certificate of occupancy after state officials determined the project had expanded beyond the four hectares originally allocated from the former Central Hospital site. The remaining land belongs to the Edo Specialist Hospital and had long been reserved for public healthcare expansion. The governor’s office stressed that the order did not shut down the museum; it simply reissued a certificate covering only the land MOWAA was legally entitled to, reducing the footprint it had been using. News of the land revocation began circulating widely on social media after the November 8 protests. Partners like the German Embassy were blindsided, as were many of us invitees who turned to WhatsApp as a public forum to piece together what was rapidly unfolding. But the shock did not stem from the decision itself. It came from its sudden visibility. Locally, tensions had been accumulating for weeks: The deputy governor’s earlier boundary warning, the Palace’s growing unease, and, according to Edo community members, the Oba’s request that the government rein in MOWAA’s overreach. Both the Palace and the state maintain that MOWAA’s international partners were never briefed on these fractures. For Edo residents, the directive felt less like a shock than a correction. “They knew,” one artist from Benin told me. “They went ahead anyway.” What spread after the protests was not the order itself but its exposure, misread online as a total revocation rather than the boundary enforcement that had already been in motion. * * * On November 8, just days before MOWAA’s scheduled opening, Angels & Muse launched the Black Muse Art Festival—a community-rooted celebration of Benin’s creative lineage. Several people who had flown in early for MOWAA told me they ended up staying for the festival instead, drawn by an atmosphere that felt unmistakably local: woodcarvers and brass casters drifting through the grounds, university students passing between classes, families settling onto benches as performances unfolded. The festival took place in a new 3,500-square-meter sculpture park—a collaboration between local artisans and Nigerian architect James Inedu-George, built on land long envisioned by artist Victor Ehikhamenor as an artistic commons. Over the months leading up to the opening, artisans, shopkeepers, students, and neighbors wandered in and out as the space took shape. Culture here wasn’t something constructed for international guests; it was lived into being by the people who carried it. “Benin has never been new to art-making,” Roli O’tsemaye, the festival’s program director, told me in conversation days after the festival ended. “Bronze casting, brass work, woodwork—these histories have existed for centuries.” What worries O’tsemaye is how institutions enter these spaces with predetermined frameworks, disconnected from the intergenerational ecosystems that had sustained the city’s cultural life. “Class mediates almost every form of cultural participation,” O’tsemaye said. Cultural expansion, she stressed, means little without material contributions—jobs, education—that allow Benin people to imagine futures. For many in Benin, culture is not something being built. It is something that never stopped. * * * Still, the story of MOWAA is one not just of rupture but of real work. During his residency at MOWAA, poet and playwright Inua Ellams wrote seven poems supported by staff he described as “young, energetic, locally focused but globally minded.” To him, the museum felt like a Sankofa gesture: moving forward while looking back. To read MOWAA solely through failure is to miss the people who poured themselves into its promise. Among them is curator Aindrea Emelife, whose _Nigeria Imaginary: Homecoming_ remains one of the most ambitious curatorial projects to emerge from Nigeria. Her curatorial vision treats restitution not as nostalgia but as speculation. It shifts the frame from recovering objects to cultivating the cultural, institutional, and imaginative conditions under which new futures can take root. There’s also Ore Disu, the newly appointed director of the MOWAA Institute, who understands restitution as the work of building infrastructure—research programs, archives, community partnerships—rather than simply receiving returned objects. Under her leadership, the Institute had begun sketching what a more rooted future could look like. Multidisciplinary artist Timilehin Oludare, who was invited to lead a community workshop during the planned opening, told me that MOWAA offered “a new avenue for artists in Nigeria and across Africa,” and he spoke with real admiration for Disu’s leadership. Earlier in the week in Lagos, at a panel on restitution, I asked Disu a question about MOWAA’s future: In an age when the brightest and most fragile objects are compelled to move—one by necessity, the other by history—what kinds of cultural economies make return livable rather than symbolic? It is a tension MOWAA will have to meet directly. Disu didn’t offer a neat solution. She acknowledged it as one of the core tensions shaping her work and emphasized that “livability” must be sustained and animated locally—through indigenous agency, local stewardship, and institutions that can hold memory beyond the spectacle of return. This is the unspoken pressure African institutions face: With so few of them, each becomes a symbol. Every misstep threatens to confirm the same colonial logic that justified the original theft—the claim that Africans “cannot manage” their own heritage. Hannah O’Leary, a senior advisor at Sotheby’s who has spent two decades working with modern African art, put it plainly: “Because there are so few large museums on the continent, each one becomes a beacon. When one faces issues, people abroad generalize: This is what African museums are like. It’s unfair—China has thousands, and no one cares if a few fail.” The consequences of MOWAA’s perceived failure came quickly. On November 15, President Bola Tinubu convened a federal committee to “safeguard national cultural heritage” and soon after the Edo State Assembly opened a probe into MOWAA’s funding. What was once framed as a cultural renaissance is now a matter of state review. Cape Town’s Zeitz MOCAA endured this scrutiny too. Lauded as Africa’s first major contemporary museum when it opened in 2017, it was engulfed in scandal a year later and forced to shoulder expectations no single institution could bear. Only under Cameroonian curator Koyo Kouoh leadership a couple of years later did it begin to regain its footing. This is the impossible history MOWAA inherited. In the weeks after the postponed opening, one question lingers: For whom would the museum open, if it opens at all? For donors protecting investments? For the Palace or the state? For artisans whose hands shaped Benin’s memory long before museums existed? Or for young people imagining futures in a country that keeps telling them to wait? * * *
africasacountry.com
December 18, 2025 at 10:26 PM
Has digital feminism peaked?
### The scandal around Ezra Olubi has exposed the contradictions of Nigeria’s middle-class, online feminism. * * * Photo by Abdulai Sayni on Unsplash Nigeria’s netizens were agog recently with the emergence of various allegations of sexual misconduct and abuse against Ezra Olubi, a popular entrepreneur, software developer, and co-founder of Paystack, one of Nigeria’s most successful financial technology companies. The saga unfolded after the tech entrepreneur was accused of patterns of abuse and harassment by a former lover and long-time acquaintance, Max Obae, popularly identified on X as a feminist. Obae’s allegations included claims that Ezra was demeaning to women and his subordinates, treating them as less human. While Olubi has been convicted in the social media court of justice (and now fired from Paystack), the accusing eye has also turned to Nigeria’s digital feminists, some of whom, it seemed, had been exposed for failing to practice what they preach. Online commentators quickly pointed out that Obae, alongside a few other popular digital feminists, had been happy to be around Olubi, benefiting financially (in some cases, quite substantially) from his success—through access to interest-free loans and cash gifts, among other perks—while claiming to be radical feminists. Some media users keenly following #Ezragate have gone as far as to doxx and out popular Nigerian feminists for their previous online and offline interactions with Ezra. As a consequence of all of this, Nigerian feminists have been spotlighted as a whole and accused of resisting control only from men whom they deem lacking in social and financial strength. Various troll accounts focused on promoting patriarchy have capitalized on this to push their agenda that feminism cannot thrive in the Nigerian context regardless of the economic class involved. In the fashion of Robert Bolt’s quote from _A Man for All Seasons_ , they claim “everyone has her/his price in money, or pleasure, titles, (wo)men, bricks-and-mortar, there’s always something, or in suffering.” A consensus has seemingly emerged: Nigeria’s radical digital feminists are not fighting against the oppression of women; they are fighting to be the oppressor or to benefit from proximity to wealth. They feel wronged only when patriarchal abuses originate from economically powerless men. The supposed betrayal of feminism in Nigeria has emerged as a more interesting debate than the original allegation leveled against Olubi. Somehow, this brings back the question of what Nigerian feminism is and what the major asks are. Is it reduced to men-hating social media rants by petite bourgeois radical feminists, or does it include the struggle of suburban and rural women fighting challenges such as child marriages and socioeconomic marginalization, among other social issues? Who is included in the discourse on Nigerian feminism? Is it reserved only for formally educated women who may be financially and sexually liberated, or can women from disadvantaged settings who earn little or nothing sit at the table? While the broadly accepted definition of feminism is equality of the sexes, in general parlance in Nigeria, feminism is synonymous with being antagonistic to men. Introducing oneself as a feminist does not bring admiration but rather disgust. Men who discuss their feminist ideals are considered weak and thought to be encouraging the bad behavior of wild women. One may wonder, if this bad PR stems from how patriarchal most communities in Nigeria are or if the recent wave of popular feminists has been overzealous. Women from the ruling class are not spared, very few women are given a chance to access top political offices. Even when fortunate to, they are compelled to pander to men in power or face dire consequences, as seen in the case of Senator Natasha Akpoti. If women with socioeconomic and political might can be ousted for being bold and outspoken, the plight of women from disadvantaged backgrounds can only be imagined. Female custodians of patriarchy and their male counterparts tell women to “hush and not act like women,” lest they lose the little power they have. Nigerian women continue to suffer the curse of gender demotion imposed by Abrahamic religions and colonialism. One thing is for sure: The activities, actions, or inactions of a few individuals should not speak for the majority. Feminism in Nigeria has not always been mostly regarded as a negative movement. In precolonial Nigeria, the image of a powerful woman was not frowned at. We read stories of Moremi of Ife, Amina of Zazzau, Inikpi of Igala, Emotan of Benin among others who overturned systems with their bravery. Although these individuals may not be considered as feminists, they were vital in activism and governance. Despite how stifling the colonial system was, women like Nwanyeruwa, Sawaba, Ekpo, and Abayomi pressed on and did not let their guards down. They organized, conscientized, and made administrators cower under their might. Events such as Calabar Women’s Protest, Aba Women’s Riot, and Abeokuta Women’s Revolt give us an insight into how powerful women-championed movements were. In recent years, we have seen feminist organizations focus on empowering girls and women and on expanding financial freedom, while also pushing the government to discard patriarchal laws. Despite some fair criticism, digital feminism has also had some real-world impact in Nigeria. Most notably, during the critical moment of the EndSARS movement, an online group called the Feminist Coalition (FemCo) emerged championed fundraising and provided protesters with legal, health and financial support. However, it is apparent that they do not get enough publicity for their work as they are drowned in the noise that says feminism is synonymous with men-hating. Several organizations with similar feminist agenda struggle to have their voices heard above the daily online debates on the status and place of women in the home and society at large. It is not hard to understand why; people kill to get the scoop on the latest gossip and lack interest in sensible conversations. The discourse of feminism in the Nigerian context has always been quite complicated due to the disparity in socioeconomic classes, culture, and religion. While Nigerian feminism can be described in simple terms as a movement for the emancipation of Nigerian women, the scope of feminist movements, activities, and struggle greatly differ. It is not far-reaching to say that no two women may have the exact experience. The problem is deeper still. As is characteristic of every sociopolitical and economic concept in the country, the privileged class has hijacked and now controls the popular narrative of what the concept means. By the virtue of their relative lack of social visibility, the voices and effort of the Nigerian working-class women have been drowned. But is the feminism of lanyard-wearing annual conference attendees the same feminism of girls and women in disadvantaged communities who cannot freely attend schools or earn a living? One is done from a place of relative comfort, and thus, debates center around gender stereotypes and sexual liberation; while the second fights two enemies: first, the general socioeconomic oppression and second, patriarchy. This is not to undermine the experiences or struggle of the wealthy, but to reflect that regardless of the situation and social class, women are subdued and restricted. Online feminists need to move away from endless debates on who turns the fufu or who cooks the soup, as several issues that demand urgent attention. According to the 2018 Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey published by the National Population Commission (NPC), 31 percent of women aged 15–49 in Nigeria have experienced physical or (in some cases, and) sexual violence. The 2014 NPC Violence Against Children Survey states that about 50 percent of girls who are victims of sexual violence experienced the abuse perpetuated by a family member while 17 percent of victims were abused in school. Thus, a lot of homes and schools in Nigeria are unsafe places for girls and women. Despite femicide, child marriage and statutory rape being underreported, social media platforms are rent with several personal experiences of these ills. A number of on-the-ground organizations work with limited resources to empower and protect women and children. Feminists should, in social media spaces, raise their voices to compel decision-makers to invest in better conditions and then safety of girls and women in Nigeria. There is no one way to advocate— both groups can coexist and work in synergy. There is still a lot to be done in terms of emancipating women. One event cannot define the struggle of Nigerian women who constantly fight against all odds. There is no doubt that every feminist expresses, in their own way, what they see as a crushing tool for patriarchy. However, the feminist struggle in Nigeria needs to depart from sitting in the middle class and embrace more women in disadvantaged communities for the most impact. While it is laudable to champion online spaces and regularly point out the evils of patriarchy, empowered educated women also need to go offline to organize and conscientize women. There is a lesson to be learned from Funmilayo Ransome-Kuti, who opened Abeokuta’s Ladies Club to all women from different social strata to form Abeokuta Women’s Union, a movement so powerful that it unseated a king and ruffled colonial administration. Nigerian middle-class feminists need to embrace women from the working class and rural communities, understand and internalize their struggles and put their weight behind them to ensure their emancipation. Whether ceilings are made of glass or of bricks, they need to be smashed to smithereens. What Nigerian women need as a collective are equal access to education, opportunities, financial freedom, respect, and dignity. * * *
africasacountry.com
December 17, 2025 at 10:23 PM
Mapping Johannesburg’s wounds
### In his latest exhibition, Khanya Zibaya charts the psychic and spatial terrain of a city where homelessness, decay, and human resilience sit uneasily together. * * * "We Should All Be Dead" exhibition in Cape Town. All images courtesy Vela Projects. In his solo exhibition, ominously titled “We Should All Be Dead,” Eastern Cape–born and Johannesburg-based artist Khanya Zibaya charts and interprets the hidden social and spatial anomalies that shape everyday life in Johannesburg. Moving ambidextrously between photography and paper collage, Zibaya fixes his gaze on the city—a boundless metropolis rife with contradictions, both humane and grotesque. Johannesburg is a city of contrasts. On one hand, “Jo’burg,” as it is affectionately known, is celebrated as Africa’s bustling economic epicenter; on the other, it is notorious for high crime levels, pervasive violence, and creeping infrastructural decline. In his presentation at Cape Town’s Vela Projects, Zibaya meditates on these polarities by constructing a visual field of artistic analysis composed of fragments drawn from the lived experiences of the city’s most vulnerable inhabitants A concrete metropolis where the dreams of many are both realized and trampled upon, Johannesburg is small in geographic size but larger than life in its continental and global stature. It is, indeed, a city of complexity. The city is cloaked in an urban mythology, rooted in the economic and political significance it gained following the discovery of gold in the region in the late 1800s. This phenomenon birthed numerous industries in the city and its surroundings over successive generations, fostering Johannesburg’s enduring reputation as a destination for those seeking upward mobility. Consequently, large numbers of people have relocated to the city and its adjacent areas in search of employment and the promise of a better life. Khanya Zibaya, “My Father Has A Job,” 2024. Pigment print on photo rag. Societies emerging from conflict, such as South Africa, carry deep-seated psycho-social traumas rooted in their past. These scars are embodied by their people, persisting in both their minds and future aspirations. Despite the mechanisms implemented by the post-apartheid state to redress past injustices, there has been minimal rupture between the past and the present. The detritus of the country’s painful history is evident across all spheres of South African society, embedded in the scaffolding of social and public spaces and stretching across both rural areas and metropolitan landscapes. Like many of Johannesburg’s inhabitants, Zibaya comes from elsewhere. He migrated to the economic capital from his hometown of Sikote in Tlokoeng, having grown up moving from one orphanage to another. Upon resettling in Johannesburg, Zibaya encountered a new and unfamiliar world, becoming a stranger in his newfound home. Having had a nomadic upbringing, Zibaya is intimately familiar with this sense of estrangement from his surroundings—an acute experience of solastalgia, the feeling of homesickness while still at home. For Zibaya, home is a shifting target, making him not a typical stranger; he is the kind of stranger who is unusually familiar with, and intimately aware of, the opaque predicaments that must be navigated in his new home. This knowledge resides quietly within him—and, in fact, occupies the recesses of many South Africans’ minds, shaped by the realities we share as inhabitants of this country. At one period in history, South African cities were segregated spaces; following the country’s political transformation, these cities had to remould themselves. Indeed, cities can be understood as organisms, constructed to respond to the ever-changing conditions of modernity. It is therefore not uncommon for inhabitants of bustling cities, such as Johannesburg and many others around the world, to experience moments of dysfamiliarity with their urban surroundings. Cities are terrains that are socio-geographically designed to be mutable, and Johannesburg is one such amorphous city. Zibaya, an attentive inhabitant of this formless metropolis, perceptively uncovers the layered imprints the city leaves upon us. He also uncovers the man-made marks we leave behind in cities and their built environments, revealing traces of our existence within them. There is a profound symbiotic relationship between humans and their environments—a truth as old as human civilization itself. If the spaces we inhabit reflect the human condition, what might Zibaya’s collages and photographic works reveal about us? Khanya Zibaya, “Akho siqwanga Egoli,” 2025. Paper collage, acrylic paint, on cotton paper. Sigmund Freud, the father of psychoanalysis, in his book _Civilization and its Discontents_ argues that two fundamental drives can explain the phenomena of life. These drives are Eros or the God of love, synonymous with the life instinct, and Thanatos—the God of death, also known as the death drive. Freud’s meta-psychological consideration was not only to enrich the therapeutic process, but he also believed that they would help to critically analyze the individual and societal developments in the bourgeois culture of his era. Although times have changed and culture has evolved, Freud’s theory of drives continues to offer a generative framework for understanding the multiple layers of meaning that shape both the individual and society. I want to use Freud’s theory of drives to understand Zibaya’s presentation at Vela Projects. Considering Freud’s concept of the interplay between the individual and society, we can speculate that societies, whether understood through the collective unconscious that underpins them or the socio-spatial configuration, tend to mirror these dynamics in profound ways. Freud argues that humans are primarily concerned with their own survival, as members of a species whose continuation is ensured through procreation. The ego and sexual drives are components of Eros: while the ego is oriented toward self-preservation, the sexual drives extend beyond the self, uniting with another to transfer genetic material. Eros, however, is driven by more than the mere urge for genetic procreation. While procreation involves the sexual act, it is also part of a more fundamental and abstract process: the creation of higher unities. Thus, Eros is the drive that continually generates higher unities; it is in this extended form that Eros truly emerges as a fundamental force. This impulse is evident in Zibaya’s work, insofar as the artist seeks to reconstitute his ephemeral recollections of fragments of Johannesburg into consolidated cultural objects of both aesthetic and commercial value. In this process, the notions of creation and survival become legible. Khanya Zibaya, “Men And Their Toys,” 2025. The practice of adorning walls has a long-standing lineage within the Bantu cultural ecosystem. Among the Basotho, for example, women have historically practiced the art of _Ditema_ , an intricate visual language rendered onto the outside surfaces of their homes. This is a rich tradition of symbolic, geometric mural art articulated on the homes of the Basotho, functioning as both aesthetic expression and cultural inscription. This practice is not unique to the Basotho; sub-groups within South Africa’s Bantu-language speaking communities have also long engaged in this decorative tradition. More recently, this aesthetic has been reappropriated within the South African art world, with artists such as Asemahle Ntlonti, Kamyar Binestarigh, and Guy Simpson producing work inspired by walls and the idiomatic exterior features of homes, as well as the interior textures of artist studio spaces. Zibaya states that, in this body of work, he reflects on the ongoing social decay, structural erosion, and spiritual entropy he has observed in everyday life in Johannesburg. He is drawn to the disintegration of the city’s membrane, materialized in the decaying facades of its numerous buildings. Like a surgeon, Zibaya nips and tucks at these walls, aestheticizing the moral, social, and architectural degradation in his striking collages—reproducing the coarse, corroded, and cracked exteriors of Johannesburg’s cityscape. These transmuted surfaces serve as metaphors for the city’s tumultuous status quo and as signifiers of the socio-political, economic, urban, and geographic dissolution affecting segments of Johannesburg. They also evoke the psycho-social trauma endured by its residents. Zibaya’s work primarily focuses on the lower classes, drawing heavily from his own experiences as a vagabond on the streets of Johannesburg. Lower-class populations, particularly the homeless, are often pushed to the margins of both the city and society at large. Having experienced homelessness in a city as brutal as Johannesburg, Zibaya found himself relegated to a subcategory of citizen—a misfit within the urban landscape. While living as an unhoused member of the city, it is unsurprising that he could only come to know the manifold faces of the buildings from which he was excluded. This is because homeless individuals are deliberately alienated from participating in the urban logics that define what it means to be a “good” citizen, reflecting how Western models of society are often structured around the exclusion of others. In societies structured in this way, political and social systems legitimize themselves through what, or whom, they exclude. Zibaya, like countless others whose bodies populate the streets and pavements like lifeless shadows, was denied access to the protections and shelter offered by urban society. Khanya Zibaya, “There’s Something I Must Tell You,” 2025. Rendered obsolete in this sense by the city, Zibaya, a wandering subject, was left without a sense of place or a notion of home. The homeless remain a perennial footnote in the social text of society, particularly in urban areas. As Giorgio Agamben insightfully observes, in Western politics, “bare life” holds the paradoxical distinction of being that which, through its exclusion, constitutes the very foundation of the city of men. The paper collage works, these magnified frames of the artist’s experiences as a displaced body roaming the streets of Johannesburg, demonstrate that the sublime can be encountered in all walks of life. Through the autoethnographic lens he applies to Johannesburg’s brutalist cityscape, Zibaya imparts a coating of dignity to the plight of those marginalized and disregarded by the city. He achieves this through a process that entails the aesthetic sublimation of his own experiences of homelessness, enacted through the production of these collage works. It is noteworthy that Zibaya engages with these cropped representations of isolated architectural elements, transposing them into compelling two-dimensional works of art. Once these works enter the interior of a building—whether an art gallery, a private home, or another space—they are imbued with new meaning, as well as commercial and aesthetic value. The artist’s recontextualisation of these wall abstractions into objects of artistic consumption represents a compelling act of interpolation and transposition. Returning to Freud, as noted above, the Eros drive is counterbalanced by Thanatos, the death drive. Unlike the drive for survival or self-preservation, Thanatos operates in opposition to it, seeking the shortest path toward decomposition. We know that cities enact a modality of violence on their inhabitants, and this violence happens on various levels. As human-mimicking organisms, cities—when perceived as having human characteristics—can be pushed beyond the egotism that seeks to preserve an internal sense of unity, and instead toward a process that unravels and abolishes such unities. This drive, antithetical to Eros, aims to dissolve these unities and return them to their primordial, inorganic state. The violence that cities inflict on their homeless is both grotesque and often indescribable. In these spaces, the homeless are stripped of their humanity. It is not the cities themselves that perpetrate this violence, but the human actors who control them. Cities are machines operated by people in positions of power, who enact social, political, and economic forms of violence upon their inhabitants. The homeless are disproportionately at the receiving end of this direct and indirect violence. Like humans, cities unconsciously will themselves toward destruction. This drive toward self-destruction is not accidental; it is an inherent aspect of human existence, and by extension, a fundamental feature of what constitutes a city. Khanya Zibaya, “Do Not Pee Here,” 2025. Paper collage, acrylic paint, on cotton paper. The photographs included in the exhibition offer an expanded articulation of the liminal zones Zibaya traversed during his wanderings through the city. While the paper collages abstractly represent the realities he explores, the images provide a more socio-realist documentation of these spaces. Captured in black-and-white monochrome, the photographs dwell on the familiar scenes one meets while commuting or moving on foot through the city. Shot largely in the soft fade of evening, their atmospheric stillness and observational sensitivity echo the photographic vernacular associated with acclaimed South African photographer Santu Mofokeng. Mofokeng’s photographs illuminate the textures of everyday South African life, moving beyond the stereotypical news images of Soweto that so often fixate on violence or poverty. Instead, through a deeply personal lens, he records communities living in townships and rural areas, capturing religious rituals and landscapes imbued with historical significance, spiritual resonance, memory, and trauma. Zibaya captures similar scenes with a quasi-romantic air, merging the uncertainty that the dark monochrome casts over the imagery with the aliveness of the fleeting moments he memorializes. Overall, Zibaya’s exhibition at Vela Projects offers a novel account of aspects of city life that unfold on its margins. However, in this context, the edges are internal, deeply imbricated with the core machinations of city life. This is despite the demographic in question, the homeless and lower-class populations, often crudely referred to as the so-called dregs of society who, from a biopolitical perspective, represent some of the most vulnerable and marginalized members of civil society. Zibaya’s artistic perspective blends collage abstraction as a lens into the spatial injustices and socio-political violence inherent in the dynamics of cities. The photographs offer a more intimate encounter with these spaces, and when considered alongside the paper collage works, both can be seen as unconventional forms of cartography, mapping and elucidating the violent spatial realities that exist within the city. Moreover, encoded within these works is a vision of human social space that transcends the predetermined constraints of our current reality—a realm that is more inclusive and no longer a cemetery for society’s outliers, the walking dead. * * * “We Should All Be Dead,” by Khanya Zibaya is exhibiting at Vela Projects Gallery in Cape Town until January 10, 2026.
africasacountry.com
December 16, 2025 at 10:22 PM
The missing voices of Western Sahara
### At the UN’s annual Western Sahara debate, everyone gets heard except the Sahrawis themselves. * * * Fishermen in Dakhla, occupied Western Sahara. Image credit Jakub Specjalski via Shutterstock © 2024. Every year in October, sweater weather settles in, coffee orders are syrup-laden, and the United Nations building in New York transforms into a stage for tense deliberations over the renewal of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) peacekeeping mission. This year, the Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 2797, renewing MINURSO’s mandate for a 35th year, but with a shift… the council formally endorsed Morocco’s 2007 Autonomy Plan as “the most feasible solution,” rather than maintaining emphasis on a full self-determination referendum. I followed the international news cycle, and something struck me about the coverage. I spent considerable time looking for Sahrawi voices covering the diplomatic battle unfolding at the UN, but, outside of a few Spanish media outlets, I was largely unsuccessful. There were “regional experts” and “observers of the Maghreb” aplenty. Some were knowledgeable, others partisan. But it was unbelievably difficult to hear from Sahrawis themselves, either in the occupied territories, the liberated zones, the Tindouf refugee camps in southwestern Algeria, or elsewhere. Despite my best efforts, I could not find the opinions of the people whose futures were being negotiated in Manhattan. Very obvious questions then naturally emerge: “Why are Sahrawi voices absent?” And “What do Sahrawis, those most directly concerned by the political negotiations, think about what is happening?” So, I reached out to various activists and put those very questions to them. Tiba Chagaf, a 50-year-old Sahrawi who lives between the Tindouf refugee camps and Spain, revealed that, “In the week leading up to the vote on the resolution, the Sahrawi people took to the streets in massive demonstrations, rejecting any proposal that does not guarantee their right to decide their own future.” For Chagaf, a prominent figure in Sahrawi cultural life, “accepting autonomy after 50 years of resistance in exile is out of the question.” He argues that the resolution sets it up so that “someone gives something they don’t own to someone who has no right over it.” His remarks refer to the deal struck between the Trump administration and the Moroccan monarchy, which exchanged normalization of international relations between Morocco and Israel for US recognition of Morocco’s claim over the Western Sahara. The agreement was ratified in December 2020 with Morocco’s signature of the Abraham Accords. Sahrawis are acutely aware that their struggle for self-determination clashes with the political and economic interests of major Western powers. And that is all the more true now that the Sahel is experiencing a period of intense geopolitical turbulence driven by coups and the proliferation of jihadist movements. Ahmedna Abdi Mebarak, a 26-year-old Sahrawi human rights activist, also claims that Resolution 2797 is “a political maneuver by the United States, which used Western Sahara as a bargaining chip to the benefit of Israel.” He was born in the Tindouf camps and now resides in France, a vantage point from which he recalls the notable role played by former president Jacques Chirac (1995–2007) in the development of Morocco’s 2007 autonomy plan. The former French president, now deceased, maintained great relations with King Hassan II, and then with his son, the current king of Morocco, Mohammed VI. Even after Chirac’s presidential term ended, it was public knowledge that he and his wife regularly stayed in Moroccan luxury hotels made available by the Moroccan king. Even then, the dominant discourse in France often praised Morocco for its “stability” and for its role as a French ally. Mebarak criticizes this stance, arguing that France sees Morocco as a lever for advancing its interests. In his view, the former colonial power “continues to look for a gateway to expand its influence in the Maghreb and across Africa.” Curiously, despite such repeated violations of international law by superpowers, the Sahrawis I spoke with say they still place their trust in African and international legal institutions. Their main “compass,” they insist, remains UN General Assembly Resolution 1514, adopted in December 1960, which calls for the independence of colonized countries and peoples. They also highlight the ambiguity of the latest Security Council resolution, which extends MINURSO’s mandate, but also simultaneously “calls on the parties to engage in discussions without preconditions and on the basis of Morocco’s autonomy proposal.” “It’s four pages of a plan that neither Sahrawis nor Moroccans truly know. No one really understands what the autonomy plan even entails,” insists Mebarak. The lack of detail is, unsurprisingly, a common theme in the Western Sahara conflict, which is often described in Western media as “low-intensity.” Africa’s last colony rarely makes front-page news. And when the media do cover it, they often adopt the Moroccan narrative. In France, for instance, a country that voted in favor of Resolution 2797 at the UNSC, media coverage varies widely depending on the outlet’s editorial line. Outlets considered right-wing tend to lean pro-Moroccan. Only progressive or left-leaning editorial policies give more space to Sahrawi perspectives, such as Mediapart or _L’Humanité_. These outlets are closely monitored by Moroccan influence networks in France. For instance, during the Pegasus spyware scandal, it emerged that _L’Humanité_ ’s senior reporter, Rosa Moussaoui, who has covered the Western Sahara for years, was among those whose phones were targeted by Moroccan authorities using Israeli spyware. Such intimidation tactics are accompanied by disinformation campaigns on social media and smear campaigns in pro-government Moroccan media. _Le360_ labeled Moussaoui “Madame Polisario” and “the most hostile voice against Morocco,” while _Barlamane_ accused _Le Monde_ , Spain’s _El Independiente_ and _El Español_ , and _Middle East Eye_ of promoting a “narrative hostile to Morocco.” Their “offense”? Publishing maps showing the border between Morocco and Western Sahara or using the term “occupied territories” to refer to the Moroccan-controlled zone. Mebarak also explains the attempts to silence Sahrawi voices on the ground, including in France. “Every protest, every conference, every university event, everything we publish on social media is quickly relayed to the consulate, which then mobilizes nationalist Moroccans to disrupt or shut down our activities,” he says. In 2020, a pro-Sahrawi demonstration in Paris descended into violence when pro-Moroccan counter-protesters organized a simultaneous gathering at the same location. Yet, what I learned from those seasonal autumnal conversations was that no amount of intimidation, geopolitical calculations, or dominant media narratives will completely silence Sahrawi voices. And, more importantly, as long as they remain excluded from decisions shaping their future, no lasting solution can be found for the Western Sahara. * * *
africasacountry.com
December 15, 2025 at 10:23 PM
Whose museum is it anyway?
### The dispute over Benin City’s museum project shows that returning stolen art does not settle the question of ownership. * * * Benin bronze at the British Museum. Image credit Son of Groucho via Flickr CC BY 2.0. Amidst the deluge of statements and counter-statements that have accompanied the recent controversy surrounding the Museum of West African Art (MOWAA) in Benin City, Edo State, Nigeria, only two facts seem to be clear: firstly, having a structure called MOWAA wasn’t part of the original plan, and secondly, no one is content with how we got here. At different points, it was something different: a home for the repatriated Benin Bronzes, a $25 million architectural statement to restore cultural pride to the region and a museum for the Royal Court of Benin. That an exclusive preview scheduled in November for selected guests of MOWAA was disrupted by “thugs,” that the Edo State governor reportedly revoked its land rights, and a presidential committee was convened to manage the fallout, have only further obscured the fate of this ambitious project. The irony is difficult to miss: after decades of campaigns arguing that Africans are the rightful custodians of their own artifacts, a triumphant conclusion to a part of this movement has stuttered because Nigerians cannot agree on who those custodians should be. This is infrastructure politics dressed as heritage discourse, revealing fault lines in Nigeria’s cultural politics that the “return stolen art” narrative has conveniently obscured. The Oba of Benin occupies a unique position among Nigeria’s hereditary monarchies. His throne has a single royal family, which means he doesn’t require state government approval for succession—a structural autonomy that most monarchs in Nigeria’s federated democracy lack. This makes his relationship with the Edo State government fundamentally different, and it makes the MOWAA controversy fundamentally unresolvable through the usual political horse-trading. Disentangling the Gordian knot that has now emerged requires that we backtrack at least to 2018. That year, at the meeting of the Benin Dialogue Group, which included the state government, the royal court, federal agencies, and major European museums, an agreement was reached to establish the Benin Royal Museum to house the repatriated Benin Bronzes. Plans for the Royal Museum appeared to gain momentum in the years that followed. In 2019, news broke that “starchitect” David Adjaye had been commissioned to design the museum. By 2020, apparently spurred on by the momentum of the Black Lives Matter protests, a timeline for the return of Benin Bronzes and a new name for the museum—now to be called the Edo Museum of West African Art (EMOWAA)—were announced. According to the 2020 announcement, the EMOWAA initiative would now be led by a Nigerian non-profit, Legacy Restoration Trust, and include an archaeological excavation of any remains of the historical Benin City found below the site of the new museum. Here’s where the story gets complicated. In July 2021, the Oba of Benin issued a scathing statement, denouncing EMOWAA and the Legacy Restoration Trust as an “artificial group” created to “divert” the Benin Bronzes. As the statement further clarified, the initial plans to create a Benin Royal Museum within the vicinity of the Oba’s Palace had continued in parallel and, from the Oba’s perspective, the Royal Museum—and none other—remained the rightful home for the repatriated artefacts. Predictably, the Oba’s statement was followed by a flurry of responses—ranging from repeated protests against EMOWAA by enraged royalists to hand-wringing statements by officials in Western museums, all emphasizing a growing sense of uncertainty about the fate of the artefacts. The tide appeared to turn decisively in the Oba’s favor in 2023, when the Federal government, led by President Buhari of the All Progressives Congress (APC), ruled that the Oba was the rightful owner and custodian of the bronzes, given that they were looted from the royal palace in 1897. This led to questions in Western capitals about the utility of restitution practices that would go to “a single owner,” when the aim was for everyone to have access to them. It appeared, by this point that the EMOWAA management and the state government, led by the opposition People’s Democratic Party (PDP) governor, on one hand, and the APC-led Federal government and the Oba’s palace, on the other hand, were pursuing two different museum structures; EMOWAA, soon renamed MOWAA in an attempt to separate its ambitions from Edo, and, inherently, the Benin Bronzes repatriation —and the Benin Royal Museum, which became the palace’s project to host the bronzes. In time, the royal court would accuse MOWAA of confusing donors about its true ambitions, while MOWAA would state that it “consistently affirmed that it has no claims to these artefacts.” Ironically, Benin City already has a national museum, but the future of the city’s museum landscape quickly became a contest between two competing forces. The state governor wanted a museum in private hands to safeguard against the bureaucratic rot and political volatility that plague Nigerian public institutions. His actions, cited as betrayal of the kingdom, have been compared with those of his grandfather, who the British named as the kingdom’s prime minister after the Oba was deposed, a tested colonial strategy of replacing stubborn rulers with pliant administrators. The project also suffered from the perception that, driven and run by non-indigenes, it catastrophically underestimated the importance of local buy-in. But Governor Obaseki pressed ahead anyway, controversially demolishing a well-known hospital in the city centre to make way for the museum. When elections were held to choose his successor, citizens rejected his preferred candidate, not least due to the perception that the palace’s blessing belonged to the rival APC candidate. The rival in question, now the governor of Edo state, has revoked MOWAA’s land rights and reportedly plans to restore the site to the hospital. In the wake of the recent protests, some foreign and domestic reportage has been critical, framing the demonstrators as “thugs” and the wider opposition as informed by backward locals standing in the way of progress—precisely the problematic narrative that has helped justify keeping African artefacts in European museums for decades. But what if the locals are right? The case for MOWAA has leaned heavily on its appeal to foreign visitors—the promise of tourism revenue, international partnership standards, world-class conservation facilities. This frames cultural appreciation as something performed for external validation. But Benin’s bronze-making tradition hasn’t been frozen in museum vitrines waiting for repatriation. It continues on Igun Street, where craftsmen have historically and still ply their trade, where the culture is living rather than preserved. Does the absence of a $25 million architectural statement actually deprive anyone of the opportunity to engage with Benin’s artistic heritage? It’s also a question about what we mean when we talk about cultural preservation, especially since cultural production hasn’t stopped. This distinction is especially applied between art and craft, where the former is seen as one more “divorced from its social realm,” and the latter is seen as being better applied socially. This sentiment, especially where the bronzes are applied, speaks to how these pieces are valued and why their home communities might value their production and use value more than seeing them behind glass. That might look less impressive, but it is arguably more aligned with how most communities actually relate to their cultural production. There’s a deeper tension here about development priorities. The demolished hospital was a piece of infrastructure that served immediate, tangible needs in a city where healthcare access remains limited. A museum, however culturally significant, registers differently when citizens are weighing heritage preservation against functional public services. Nigeria is replete with museums in almost every state, palaces that double as residences and cultural repositories, festivals and artistic traditions that could fill any itinerary. What limits the potential of these establishments is a combination of insecurity and the reality that cultural appreciation requires a baseline of economic stability and disposable income that many Nigerians lack. To the extent that it presents an exception, Lagos’s cultural economy thrives not because it has better museums, but because it serves an audience with more disposable income. From the point of view of adherents to modernization theory, cultural appreciation, at least of the sort confined to air-conditioned spaces, is perceived as contingent on other prior developmental achievements. This perception further reinforces a myopic view that cultural and social service-oriented infrastructure are at odds, despite the intrinsic and distinct value they both serve in developing society. A balanced assessment of cultural politics in Nigeria must also inquire: are traditional rulers still best placed to serve as custodians of history? This arises especially given the transformation (even “invention” in some cases) of the supposed traditional institutions in their contact with the colonial state, the (d)evolution of their role in modern-day governance, and the limited or coercive history of their actual hands-on role in the creation of such historical artifacts, from the perspective of social history. Taking the Benin Bronzes as an example, some argue that ownership rights should be conferred on diasporic descendants of the transatlantic slave trade, given both the Benin Kingdom’s historical role as a slaving empire and the recent evidence suggesting that manillas exchanged for enslaved Africans were the source of the brass from which the Bronzes were cast. For others, such as Mahmood Mamdani and Lungisile Ntsebeza, the unelected role of chiefs in a political democracy creates an unnecessary contradiction. Edo’s case is unique because of a powerful monarch with a direct claim to ownership (or “custodianship”?) of the artifacts in question. This also means that a response to this situation might not be universally applicable. As such, we are likely to be left with a solution that will no doubt be questioned in different contexts. If nothing else, this highlights the necessity of a more critical engagement with the distinction between state, traditional leaders, and cultural producers. The diplomatic pressure, foreign investment, and international partnerships mean MOWAA is unlikely to be shuttered entirely. But it can—and likely will—become a political football, proving an expensive experiment for its current stakeholders. Sadly for external constituents, its proximity to Lagos by flight cannot discount the reality that its most significant stakeholders, as patrons, promoters, and professionals, will always be Edo people. And some Edo people, for both political and practical reasons, seem unconvinced. The volatility of Nigerian politics and the failure to manage government relations across party lines are navigable problems. The underlying tension—between palace and politics, tradition and bureaucracy, arts and crafts, heritage as living practice and heritage as a preserved object—is structural. Both the palace and the government derive their legitimacy from the populace, which means Edo people truly own the responsibility of preserving their culture. But a museum that serves foreign visitors while locals remain ambivalent, one that externalizes validation through European partnerships while dismantling local healthcare, isn’t cultural preservation. It’s cultural theater. And the audience is walking out. * * *
africasacountry.com
December 12, 2025 at 10:22 PM
Minnesota was promised to us
### Somalis have answered Trump’s latest racist tirade not with outrage but with a tidal wave of trolling. * * * Winter in St. Paul, Minnesota. Image credit Steve Skjold via Shutterstock © 2019. Last week, Donald Trump, in a speech in front of hundreds of spectators, decided to brand Somali immigrants and their American-born descendants “garbage” and ridiculed their home country. However, it seems that the US president didn’t know who he was messing with, as Somalis, rather than taking it on the chin, immediately took to social media platforms and unleashed an avalanche of satirical trolling that brilliantly neutralized his racist rhetoric. Almost everyone on the internet will have seen the wave of memes from what is arguably the most viral Somali social media moment since we found Nimco Happy or the 2020 Eid-ul-Fitr controversy, when Saudi Arabia announced a moon-sighting marking the end of Ramadan but Somali religious authorities disputed it. Many have asked where all of this is coming from, but far from being spontaneous outbursts against the Somali community, it fits into a longstanding pattern that dates back to Trump’s first term. One of his opening salvos was when he posted that Ilhan Omar and other members of the progressive Squad should “go back and help fix the totally broken and crime-infested places from which they came.” Remember when he stood before a crowd, after attacking Ilhan Omar, as they chanted: “Send her back!” This year, however, he has significantly escalated his rhetoric, frequently targeting the sole Somali member of Congress and making disparaging remarks about Somalia, at times concurrently. I’ve lost count of how many times he’s said he told “the head of Somalia” to take her back, or given his take on how bad Somalia is. A part of me knows this isn’t entirely about Somalia. The country is far from being fully out of the woods—still emerging from a three-decade civil war—and no responsible person would claim everything is perfect. But his remarks are undeniably outdated. Much of Somalia is, in fact, doing fine, and despite the political turbulence, many Somali cities are safe to visit. Tourism has even been picking up of late. Djibouti, Ethiopia’s Somali state, and Kenya, each with sizable Somali communities, are also fine. Somalis simply find themselves caught in the crosshairs of Trump’s broader vendetta against the Democrats. Ilhan Omar—whose politics he casts as their most radical expression, and who happens to be a Black Muslim congresswoman—offers a convenient target for rallying his base. Trump’s frequent references to Somalia tap into a reservoir of images and associations shaped by US films, reporting, and literature, from _Black Hawk Down_ to _Call of Duty_. It’s almost too perfect for his rhetorical purposes. A ready-made nightmare vision that, in his framing, Ilhan Omar and the Democrats are bringing to life in the US. So when he says things like “The Democrats have no leader. They remind me of Somalia, OK?,” you get what he means and how it will land. Another part of it is that he, along with other prominent far-right figures, is broadly racist toward Africans, while reserving particular ire for Somalia, which in their minds embodies the worst of the continent. His attacks on the Somali community serve to rally his base, give them a visible opponent, and play on their fears about the direction of the country. Not only have official White House accounts incessantly posted about Somalis, but so have figures like Elon Musk, Ted Cruz and Matt Walsh, who, like Trump, has remained fixated on the topic all year. “Unbearable levels of hypervisibility for such a relatively small global population,” complained Somali poet Momtaza Mehri. Most of us are also struck by the intensity and focus of it all and the danger it poses to Somalis in the US, who must also contend with ICE, which Trump has unleashed like a pack of drug dogs hunting for what he calls illegals. Aaron Reichlin-Melnick, of the American Immigration Council, called it “a state-sponsored hate campaign” against the community. What do you do in a moment when a well-resourced, fanatical president turns the full power of the executive branch on a small minority community, and repeatedly launches rhetorical attacks that give other people license to spew hate? I wouldn’t call _sabbaaxad_ a Somali martial art, though that’s probably the closest description. It essentially relies on using an opponent’s momentum and power against them in wrestling, conceptually not too different from judo in that sense. Unlike judo, however, it assumes the practitioner doesn’t need to be especially strong or big, just smart. And I think that is what happened here. After Trump called the Somali community “garbage” that contributes nothing, focusing the world’s attention on them, Somali social media users took advantage of the moment to highlight not only how absurd it was for the president of the US—a country born as a settler colony—to adopt anti-immigrant rhetoric, but also to do so as an ally of Israel, which is employing the same state-building techniques as the US did: namely, genocide and ethnic cleansing. Somalis seized the moment to parody the story logic that the Zionist project relies on, particularly the way it wraps its territorial claims in a curated mix of cherry-picked scripture, mythology, and exaggerated frontier heroism. By mimicking those tropes, and turning them against Trump, they spotlight how such narratives have long been used to launder the dispossession of Palestinians and to retroactively sanctify the ethnic cleansing of Indigenous peoples in the Americas. The viral video that kicked it all off was a young Somali woman on TikTok claiming that Minnesota was promised to Somalis 3,000 years ago. Since then, Somalis have been joking that they want a two-state solution, that Americans have 49 other states they could choose from, so why not give them one? That Somalis everywhere should make “Som-Aaliyah” to Minnesota. That Somalis were among the founding fathers. That Somali explorers discovered Minnesota, and so it is theirs. And that Minnesota is a made-up name and was actually called “Juba and Somalia.” There are way more examples here. Image via @SonOfSomali on Twitter. The jokes land because the pattern is unmistakable. Somali Twitter simply flipped the script, and it’s given everyone a good laugh, while also exposing just how absurd these claims are, and how much we’re letting Zionists and the far-right get away with. If a state can anchor its legitimacy in ancient texts, a level of selective memory, and a self-appointed mission to rid us of the supposed barbarians of Palestine (I still don’t know who even asked), then why shouldn’t Somalis claim they helped draft the US Constitution or that Minnesota was divinely promised to them in the Bronze Age? You can say it isn’t true (obviously), but then the Somali Public Affairs Committee (mocking AIPAC) will just offer Ben Stiller some money to say otherwise. Did you see the way he immediately jumped to the defense of the Somali community after Trump’s garbage remarks? I don’t want to downplay the seriousness of a US president behaving this way, singling out and targeting a community, but Somalis also tend to relish this kind of banter. If you haven’t explored the world of Somali nicknames, you’re in for a treat. One of my favorite Somali poems is by Abdullahi Qarshe, the iconic poet who chuckled at the Cold War’s division of Berlin, the same city from which Africa had once been carved up. “Look and be entertained,” he said. Abdourahman Waberi, the Djiboutian writer, took this spirit even further, crafting an entire novel that playfully upends global hierarchies in _The United States of Africa_. But it has proved especially effective against a president who routinely mocks his political opponents in an effort to diminish them. Too often in the past, his barbs—especially those aimed at Somalis—were largely ignored, with the exception of Ilhan Omar, who often gave as good as she got. This time, though, they’ve been met with a response that is funny, illuminating, and unexpectedly graceful. * * *
africasacountry.com
December 13, 2025 at 10:22 PM
The golden light of Pops Mohamed
### From Actonville to global stages, Pops Mohamed blended tradition, futurism, and faith—leaving behind a musical archive as luminous as the spirit he carried. * * * Pops Mohamed looking at the Black Disco records. Image taken from the back cover of the "Black Disco - Night Express" reissue by Matsuli Music. Image © Matsuli Music. The supermoon shone radiantly on December 4, the night Pops Mohamed died, aged 75. Our neighbourhood in the East Rand of Johannesburg was plunged into darkness due to a power outage, but the sky was lit up brilliantly, as if illuminated solely by the _noor_ (light) of Mohamed’s spirit. He was a musician, composer, poet, sound healer and producer—a South African cultural hero. He dedicated 50 years of his life to music, releasing 20 albums and sharing the stage with iconic musicians. He navigated Western, Eastern and African sound worlds with ease, depth, and authenticity. Humility and peace were his defining qualities. He spoke in a very soft, calm and gentle manner. On the morning of his _janaazah_(funeral), that peace and light filled the air. He was born Ismail Mohamed-Jan in 1949 in the township of Actonville, Benoni, located east of Johannesburg. In an interview we did just three weeks before his passing, he said: Music? It just came to me. In primary school here in Benoni, most of the classrooms, at least, had a piano. We used to do music lessons and even in high school. One day, I decided, ‘let me give this thing a go.’ I just played two notes, _doom, doom_ , just moving up and up and thought, ‘this sounds nice!’ Then the next day I would go again and start playing. ‘Oh, I’ve got something here’. Music is something that just came to me. He attended William Hills High School in the area. “I was in love with the guitar at the age of 14,” he recalled. “I remember our music teacher in high school was Mr. Nakuda, and he used to give flute lessons.” His parents sent him to the iconic Dorkay House, the pulse of arts and culture in central Johannesburg at the time. He would ride the train from Benoni to Johannesburg to attend lessons there. “I didn’t complete high school because I had to leave to work and help the family. My very first job was a spray painter,” he said. “I didn’t stay there for long, I think just over a year, and then I got fired,” he laughed. When the Group Areas Act reached Benoni in the 1960s, Actonville was segregated as an Indian area, Vosloorus as the Black area and Reiger Park for those of mixed heritage or what the apartheid state termed “Coloured.” Mohamed’s family fell into the latter category because his father was of Indian and Portuguese heritage, and his mother was Xhosa and Khoi. The family was forced to move to Reiger Park in Boksburg. Describing Dorkay House, Mohamed said: That was the one place where you could learn to play any instrument. Most of the plays like the Black Mercado and all the plays that went overseas, were workshopped and rehearsed there. Dorkay House had three floors, and the guy who taught us was a German teacher, Mr Gilbert Strauss. Mohamed stayed there for a year and a half. At the time, popular bands were The Beatles, The Troggs, Cliff Richard, The Shadows and The Flames from Durban. “Playing guitar in those days was a big thing, he recalled, “so you wanted to be a guitar player.” His first band was called Les Valiants, started when he was 14, and in the years that followed, he earned money on the side playing guitar in several pop bands (The Dynamics, El Gringo’s, Childrens Society) throughout the 1960s. He also took lessons at Federated Union of Black Arts (FUBA), located directly opposite the Market Theatre: That was another place where you had all the arts under one roof. I went there to study piano. Rashid Lanie was one of my teachers. He was very young then, and then there was a guy called Denzil Weale—those were the guys who groomed me on piano and jazz appreciation. The secretary at FUBA was Sibongile Khumalo. She wasn’t even popular then, but she came from a very talented family, and she helped me with my royal school exams.” Mohamed got a job at Dorman Long, a steel company in Boksburg, where he worked for 14 years, while doing recordings and gigs over the weekend. It was during this time that he formed a life-long relationship with Rashid Vally—the founder of the iconic jazz record label, As-Shams/The Sun and the popular Kohinoor record store in Johannesburg. I was still living in Reiger Park at that time. There was a talent scout that heard me playing my organ at home, and he said to me, ‘There’s a guy in Johannesburg. His name is Rashid Vally, and he has a record label. I went with him to Kohinoor, and that’s when I met Rashid for the first time. That was in the early ‘70s. I played him a demo of my music on tape and he loved it. That’s how he arranged for us to record.” He wanted me to record what he heard on the cassette. I had to take my organ to the studio. He introduced me to Basil Manenberg Coetzee and Sipho Gumede. Both of them are late now, and were such fantastic musicians. We didn’t even rehearse that much, just two or three rehearsals of all the tunes, and we recorded _Black Disco_. Album art for “Black Disco” (1975). The compositions on _Black Disco_ were a blend of soul, funk and jazz, with Mohamed playing his Yamaha organ, Coetzee on saxophone and Gumede on bass. Their first record was released in 1975. The trio returned in 1976 joined by Peter Morake on drums for _Black Discovery/Night Express_ (re-issued by Matsuli Music in 2016). The series wrapped up with _Black Disco 3_ _,_ featuring Monty Weber on drums and Peter Odendaal on bass. In Gwen Ansell’s great tribute, she describes how _Black Disco_ was the band’s way of being in solidarity against apartheid. “ _Black Disco_ was our way of saying, ‘we are with you,’” said Mohamed. Following the _Black Disco_ series, Mohamed formed Movement in the City, adding the brilliant Robbie Jansen on flute and drumming by Monty Weber and Gilbert Matthews. They recorded two albums: _Movement in the City_ (1979), _Black Teardrops_(1981) and the third in the series was just released. After working in the factory for 14 years, Mohamed decided he’d had enough and wanted to pursue music professionally. He approached Vally to ask if he could work at Kohinoor and learn more about music. “I hated jazz with a passion! The day when I started working for Rashid, he said to me, ‘I’m going to teach you to love jazz as of today onwards.’” He would play music and tell me the history of the artist, Miles Davis and others. Slowly as customers came in and said, ‘We want this album by Keith Jarrett’ or this album, I would play the tracks that they wanted to listen to. That’s how I started falling in love with jazz and getting to know more about the artists. I would also read the back of the albums, the history and all the write-ups. That’s how I learnt. Rashid was like a mentor in that way. I’ve learnt a lot from him, and we had lots of discussions.” Mohamed continues: He mentored me to such an extent that he actually would point to an album and cover the name and ask me, ‘Who is this?’ I would guess and say ‘Dexter Gordon,’ or he would play a track on the turntable and ask me, ‘Who’s playing here?’ I would guess and say, ‘Duke Ellington Orchestra.’ Poem and Illustration on the back of Black Disco, released by As-Shams in 1975, which showed the playful nature and relationship between Pops and Rashid Vally. Mohamed spoke fondly about his three years working at Kohinoor, remembering that on Fridays, the tiny shop was packed with crowds of people and downtown Johannesburg was buzzing: It was so busy because on one corner of Kort street, there was a cinema. We had lots of tailors in that street. There was a Chinese shop which sold fish and chips and was quite cheap. Then we had Kapitans as well, which was very popular …the Indian food. Even Madiba went there, and then of course, _The Star_ building was there, where they print the newspapers. Then on the right-hand side, there was a taxi station coming from Soweto. And then we also had the Stock Exchange there as well. That was the hub of downtown Johannesburg. It has a very, very rich history. We were a happy bunch of people. It was myself, Rashid, his younger brother Chota, and there was a lady who worked with us, Lillian. So Friday is _shillaz_ day. Friday is payday. Everybody’s coming to buy records! And we were always happy. We would buy fish and chips and lots of polony and maybe sometimes biryani, and spend the afternoon eating that food and selling albums, which was really nice. Vally and Mohamed shared a lifelong friendship and an enduring respect. They also made some brilliant music together. Mohamed described Vally as a friend, brother and mentor, saying “that was an experience of a lifetime, in fact, that is the highlight of my career, because that’s where it all started—at Kohinoor and with Rashid Vally.” Pops Mohamed playing keyboard in the 1970s. Photo by Biddy Partridge, supplied by As-shams Archive. Mohamed was an amazing storyteller. For example, the way he recalls this anecdote about his next big career move: I was offered to work for a label in England. I met Robert Trunz from Switzerland, who ran Melt2000. He came with Airto Morreira and Flora Purim to Joburg, and they played for the Arts Alive Festival. He also came by Kohinoor, and he had a cassette of mine. I don’t know where he got it. Then he says, ‘I’m looking for Pops Mohammed’. I said, ‘That’s me.’ The pair started talking, and Trunz invited him to the concert at the festival. “I saw them. They were fantastic. And after that, I took him to Kippies to listen to Moses Molelekwa. He was so impressed, like ‘WHAT?’!” A few days later, Trunz visited the shop and said, ‘How would you like to join my label? I’m starting a record label, but you have to think about it carefully, because I want you to come to England. And then you should recruit all the musicians like Moses Molelekwa and others. I said, ‘Okay, I’ll think about it.’ I thought about it, and then I discussed it with Rashid. And he said, ‘Go for it!’ Mohamed left for England and worked for the iconic Melt2000 label, recruiting and signing the best South African musicians on the label like Molelekwa, Busi Mhlongo, Amapondo, Sipho Gumede and Madala Kunene Upon returning, he went into his own production because going to studios was very expensive. “I would always check out the engineers. I’m self-taught. I learnt by reading books. I fell in love with sound recording from the very first day that I walked into a studio. I knew this is what I want to do.” Mohamed developed his own sound engineering and production skills, formed his own labels and released his own albums and music videos. Ansell’s tribute to Mohamed notes how he was inspired by the sounds of Timmy Thomas, but also by the melodies of Kippie Moeketsi. His musical palette was very diverse. Other albums released include the award-winning _Ancestral Healing_ and _Kalamazoo_, which referred to a small but vibrant multi-racial informal mining township near Reiger Park, which was destroyed by the Apartheid regime. The album has the tune called “Kort Street Bump Jive,” a tribute to the vibrant street Kohinoor was located on. Later, Mohamed released different volumes of _Kalamazoo_ as an album, and also adopted the name for his own label. Pops Mohamed playing the kora at the World Refugee Day Commemoration, The Linder Auditorium, Johannesburg, in 2019. Photo by Roderick Taylor. Mohamed was a pan-Africanist, deeply spiritual and nicknamed himself “Futurist.” His work embodied the past, present and future, and he loved experimenting in sound. His music journey drew from ancestral sounds of the Khoi and San in Southern Africa, to West African rhythms and other sounds from the East. He played a variety of instruments, including mbira, uhadi, kora, mouth bow, various percussion, bird whistle, didgeridoo, berimbau, keyboard, organ and guitar. Themes in his music, aside from politics, were often about peace, unity, spirituality and humanity. Just before the COVID-19 pandemic hit, Mohamed moved back to Actonville to live with his daughter Yasmeen. He got very sick in 2021, but managed to recover and perform again. He received a South African Music Awards Lifetime Achievement Award in 2023. Pops Mohamed meeting one of his heroes, the late tabla maestro Ustad Zakir Hussain backstage in December 2016 in South Africa. Photo by Nisaar Pangarker. There was an outpouring of tributes around South Africa at the news of Mohamed’s death. The greatest tributes were from those whose lives he touched. The lawyer and storyteller, Nkazimulo Qaaim Moyeni, wrote on Facebook: Uncle Pops Mohamed moved through the world with the quiet certainty of a man who had long learned to listen. He spoke about the way he held his spirituality in one hand and his music in the other, and how the two refused to be separated. The drum, the kora, the uhadi and the umrhube were not merely instruments to him; they were gifts. They were tools that opened doors to frequencies older than memory and alive with the essence of _Tasawwuf_. He told me about how he had written dhikrs carried by the breath of the Uhadi and the hum of the Umrhube. In that moment, I understood that to him, his music was not just sound. It was a way of connecting with Allah; it was a remembrance. It was a way of reaching toward the unseen. A tribute from friend Ayhan Cetin: True service is not loud; it is lived quietly, consistently, and sincerely. Pops embodied that. He lived with a heart anchored in humility, loved people without conditions, and used his gifts not for himself but for the upliftment of others. Such people are the unseen pillars of society—those whose goodness holds the world together. And today, the world has lost one of its good human beings, at a time when we need people like him the most. Finally, his music teacher Rashid Lanie wrote: My most personal memory of Pops’ brilliance was his relentless curiosity. He was a rising star artist who sought me out with a humble and fierce determination. He implored me to teach him piano, to deepen his understanding of its theory, its discipline of practice, and the intricate language of jazz improvisation. I was endlessly impressed by his scholar’s heart, his willingness to be a beginner again to feed his spirit. But the true surprise, the Pops magic, was witnessing how quickly he parlayed that newfound knowledge into creation. It was with that expanded harmonic vision that he walked into the studio to record with the legendary Rashid Vally of Sun Records, a seminal moment that married his soul with the heart of South Africa’s progressive jazz heritage. That was Pops: a sponge and a spring, absorbing only to pour forth something new and vital … a vision extended far beyond conventional scales and stages. He was, at his core, an Ancestral Poet. Pops Mohamed playing the mouth-bow at the World Refugee Day Commemoration, Linder Auditorium, Johannesburg in 2019. Photo by Roderick Taylor. Mohamed has left us not only with life lessons but with many musical treasures, enough to dig into for years to come. At our interview, he was very excited about remastering _Kalamazoo Vol. 5_ (a dedication to Sipho Gumede), which he released digitally a few days before he passed. On the day he passed, As-Shams Archive shared an archival first digital release of _Movement in the City 3_. Mohamed was deeply passionate about Islam, practising the daily five prayers. His connection to Islam was not through words but by actions. On the day of our interview, he reminded me to be silent and listen and be mindful during the Muezzin delivering the _Athaan_(call to prayer) from our local mosque – something that showed the respect he carried for his faith. Mohamed’s own mixed heritage, his love for Islam, desire for peace, and constant search for knowledge made him the kind of person who could move fluidly through the world. His gentle nature emphasised the lightness of spirit that he carried. During the last few years of Mohamed’s life, the most important things to him were his faith and his family. He remained a dutiful father and grandfather up to the very end. * * *
africasacountry.com
December 10, 2025 at 10:26 PM
Pints and powerpoints
### From IMF history to astrophysics, Nairobi’s Drunken Lectures turn casual drinkers into an engaged public. * * * Screenshot from Drunken Lectures and Africa Is a Country © Onesmus Karanja. Imagine it’s a Monday evening. You’ve probably had a boring day at work, still struggling to find your footing after the long weekend. When the clock hits 5 p.m., you finally clock out. But instead of heading home, you make your way to the bar and order a drink. A day like this calls for something to soothe the soul. But this isn’t like any other Monday. Lately, Mondays have taken on a new name: Drunken Lectures Mondays. These days, rather than head to the bar just to drink, you also show up to hear a lecture on a chosen topic. You’re relaxed, drink in hand, surrounded by friends—and in that state, you’re ready to think and speak freely. A proper dialectic ensues. Ideas are exchanged, arguments are sharpened, questions asked. That’s the usual scene every other Monday at 254 Beer District in Westlands, Nairobi, where the Drunken Lectures are held. The series began on February 24, 2025, with a lecture titled “The Economy During the First Nyayo Decade,” delivered by yours truly. I took people through the performance of the Kenyan economy between 1978 and 1988, focusing especially on the structural adjustment programs being pushed by the IMF as a condition for the loans they offered Kenya to resuscitate its economy. More than 100 people showed up that night. Not bad for our very first event. So where did the idea come from? Like many things today, it started on TikTok. Mutinda Kilonzo came across a video of Lectures on Tap in New York, where people were sitting in a bar sipping beer while listening to a lecture. He shared it on Instagram in late December and asked his followers if they would be interested in something similar here. The response was overwhelming. So we got to work. The goal was simple: to create a space for nerds to share what they love. Every day, we meet people who are deeply knowledgeable in their fields, and many of them are hungry to share that knowledge—or to find someone to talk to about it. But they’re often limited. Local universities don’t function as true knowledge hubs, and becoming a lecturer usually requires a master’s degree, which comes with its own set of barriers. That leaves the internet, which doesn’t always provide the kind of interactive, grounded exchange people crave. There’s often a mismatch between those eager to teach and those eager to learn. We decided to bridge that gap by meeting people where they already are: at the bar. The idea was to take intellectualism out of the lecture hall and return it to a more organic third space—one where people feel comfortable, a little loose, and ready to engage. We weren’t reinventing the wheel. Back in 1995, Wahome Mutahi did something similar when he took theater out of formal halls and into the bars. Through Igiza Productions, he scripted and dramatized Gikuyu plays like _Mugaathe Mubogothi_ (_His Excellency the Hallucinator_) and _Igoti ria Muigi_ (_The People’s Court_), staging them in places like Ngara and Nyeri so that everyone had a chance to see them. In fact, bars have long served as intellectual spaces. Impressionism was born out of barroom conversations among Edouard Manet, Claude Monet, Pierre-Auguste Renoir, Paul Cézanne, and others at Café Guerbois in Paris. Existentialism, too, took shape through discussions among Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Raymond Aron, Albert Camus, and Martin Heidegger over apricot cocktails at the Bec-de-Gaz. Across history, bars have always made space for dissent, experimentation, and the exchange of ideas. Cognizant of this tradition, we felt it was important to take matters into our own hands—to take back intellectual life and bring it to the bar, where people can talk freely, their minds loosened not only by drink but by the casual, collective energy of the space itself. Behind the scenes, the idea quickly grew into a fully fledged operation. After floating the concept, Mutinda Kilonzo began assembling a team. First, he brought on Matthias Mwangi as the resources and logistics manager, responsible for partnerships and the welfare of the team. Then I joined as lectures coordinator, in charge of curating the lectures we host. We use a Google Form where prospective lecturers apply by submitting their name, the title of their proposed lecture, a detailed breakdown of their content, and an explanation of why they believe their topic matters. Based on its relevance and the strength of the proposal, I select the lecture for the upcoming session. Once chosen, the lecturer prepares a PowerPoint presentation and conducts a demo lecture over Zoom with me and Gaul Saul Simiyu, our lead researcher. The demo is more than a dry run—it’s an interactive session where the lecturer teaches as they would to a crowd. Gaul and I provide suggestions, identify weak points, and help fine-tune the flow of the talk. Where needed, Gaul also helps build out research or refine slides. We also have a dedicated media team: Anthony Kabuthu serves as official photographer and Ernest Mungai as videographer. You can see their work on our social media pages—sharp, energetic, and full of life. Our communications lead, Jemimah Mukasa, handles our digital presence and sends out our official newsletter. On the ground, our operations are run by Ted Muhota Wambugu and Winstone Odhiambo, while our emcee and host, Timothy “Hamster” Mbuthia—easily the funniest millennial on earth—keeps the mood light and the energy high. At the center of it all is Mutinda himself, managing the brand and curating every event. He handles marketing, community building, media engagements—basically everything that gives Drunken Lectures its pulse. With the team in place, the program settled into a rhythm. Gates open at 5:30 p.m., and by 6, the event kicks off with a group presentation. Each table becomes a group—usually eight people—and they’re handed a sarcastic or provocative prompt inspired by the evening’s topic. One member presents the group’s defence at the front, and the funniest group—judged by crowd reaction—wins a prize. For instance, during the lecture “Why Your Votes (Don’t) Count,” one group was asked to argue that “people’s votes shouldn’t be deemed equal, and should vary depending on one’s education, wealth, or career.” That meant explaining why a rich, educated doctor should get three votes, while a rural farmer’s vote might not even count. Just for laughs—but also, strangely illuminating. At 7 p.m., the main lecture begins. The bar is fitted with five screens, and attendees can also follow the PowerPoint presentation on their phones via a shared Google Drive link. After the hour-long lecture, there’s a Q and A from 8 to 8:30 p.m., where audience members dig deeper, challenge ideas, or just satisfy their curiosity. Then we end on a high note: a trivia game based on the evening’s lecture. It runs for half an hour, live on participants’ phones, with prizes for the top three scorers. By 9 p.m., the formal program ends, and people mingle, swap contacts, or quietly slip out. So far, we’ve hosted 18 lectures. Topics have ranged from politics to brewing, astrophysics to architecture. Keith Ang’ana opened with “The Kenyan Economy During the First Nyayo Decade.” Tracey Mukami spoke on “The Kraft of Beer Brewing.” JohnMark Njihia took us through “The Great Lakes Conflict.” Gakuru delivered a powerful talk on “Art and Its Role in Politics.” Dr. Innocent Ouko explored “The Biological Evolution of Male and Female Attraction.” Gaul Saul Simiyu broke down “The Magic Behind Cars.” Wamboga Okoth compared “Neoliberalism in Kenya vs. Uganda.” Julians Amboko addressed “The Finance Bill 2025.” Prof. Eric Mwaura tackled “The Geometry of the Universe.” Chao Tayiana traced “The Colonial Roots of Police Brutality in Kenya.” A stellar trio—John-Allan Namu, Justine Wanda, and Tom Mukhwana—discussed “How Journalism Builds and Breaks Societies.” Wangu wa Majani shared “The Tea Behind Kenyan Tea.” Kimemia Macharia unpacked “Historia ya Ugawanyaji Mashamba Nchini Kenya.” Mega Muia dissected “The Art of Stealing Music in Kenya.” Wakili Mutua Mutuku asked, provocatively, “Is Consent an Illusion?” Brenda Ngoya taught us “How to Design a City.” Brian Sengeli explained “How the Electoral Process Works.” And Wairimu Gathimba offered a sobering lecture on “Debt in the Global South.” After the June 2025 protests, there emerged a deep hunger for context—for knowledge of Kenya’s long history of political agitation. It felt wrong to be in the streets demanding change without knowing how people had fought, organized, and sacrificed in generations past. That intuition led to the idea of organizing a public festival, one that could blend popular education with culture, music, and memory. We called it Uchungu na Uhuru—Swahili for Pain and Freedom. It took place on Saturday, September 13, 2025, from 2 p.m. to 8 p.m., at Nairobi Street Kitchen. Among our key partners was Africa Is a Country, whose support we remain deeply grateful for. The festival offered three lectures, an exhibition, and a musical performance. Two of the talks explored how pain and struggle have been central to Kenya’s historical quest for freedom. Ngartia Kimathi gave a powerful lecture on the country’s early resistance movements, tracing how communities mobilized against colonial intrusion from the late 19th century. Then, Kimemia Macharia took us through the complex path toward independence, detailing the strategies and sacrifices that shaped Kenya’s liberation struggle. After these two historically grounded lectures, I presented a talk titled “Why Protests Work (Sometimes).” In it, I traced protest histories ranging from the 1908 Maseno School strike, to the 1922 demonstrations for Harry Thuku’s release, to the 1950s trade union marches, the clandestine organizing of the 1980s, and the iconic protests by the mothers of political prisoners in the 1990s. Each example yielded a lesson. My closing argument was simple: If we are to protest today, let’s do so with knowledge of what has worked, what hasn’t, and why. To soften the emotional weight of these histories, R&B singer Njoki Karu offered a soul-stirring musical performance. Her renditions of “Mawio” and “Holes” brought a quiet catharsis to the crowd—closing the lecture portion of the festival with intimacy and grace. What followed was a wide-ranging panel discussion, which brought all the lecturers on stage for an open Q and A. Unexpectedly, Boniface Mwangi—who had recently announced his presidential bid—joined the panel and quickly became the focus of questions. Attendees wanted to know how he planned to lead, what distinguished his platform from others, and why he believed he was the one to bring genuine change. For a moment, the stage became a site of radical accountability: a public square, open and unfiltered. In addition to the talks, the team at PAWA 254 curated a powerful exhibition tracing both Kenya’s first liberation (from colonial rule) and second liberation (for multiparty democracy). It featured unsung heroes, bold organizers, and vivid archival material that mapped the contours of struggle in image and text. PAWA Radio was also present, recording interviews with attendees about their hopes, grievances, and reflections on state power. Our emcee for the day, Kibunja, kept the energy high and the mood vibrant. When the event ended, what lingered was a shared feeling: People left more informed, more grounded, and more hopeful. So where to next? Mutinda Kilonzo, the driving force behind Drunken Lectures, is now laying plans for a regional tour that will take the format to towns and cities across and beyond Kenya. Everyone, he believes, deserves the chance to experience the magic of public intellectualism in public spaces. Some of these future events may take the form of culturally focused festivals—one for each community in their home county, where people can learn about their histories, see their artifacts, and hear their stories told by one another. Others may carry themes that cross borders: lectures on debt, climate, sexuality, political systems—where the audience spans many regions but shares a common stake. The dream is to organize festivals more regularly, possibly every quarter. The next one might be on finance—an accessible and ambitious deep dive into the structures and myths that shape our relationship to money. And so, if you’re ever in Nairobi, or if Drunken Lectures passes through your city—inshallah—make a point to join us. Have a drink, learn something, argue a bit, dance a little. See you there. * * *
africasacountry.com
December 9, 2025 at 10:40 PM