Achim Hagen
@achimhagen.bsky.social
Climate economist | Guest professor Environmental and Political Economics @humboldtuni.bsky.social | Head @pecan-research.bsky.social
If lobbying by trade-exposed polluting companies is strong, an interplay between border carbon adjustments (@carolynfischer.bsky.social doi.org/10.1016/j.je...) and lobby incentives can lead to larger stable coalitions, lower global emissions, and higher welfare.
Political influence on international climate agreements with border carbon adjustment
We study the influence of industrial lobbying on national climate policies and the formation of an international environmental agreement if the coalit…
www.sciencedirect.com
January 22, 2025 at 10:03 AM
If lobbying by trade-exposed polluting companies is strong, an interplay between border carbon adjustments (@carolynfischer.bsky.social doi.org/10.1016/j.je...) and lobby incentives can lead to larger stable coalitions, lower global emissions, and higher welfare.
Small climate clubs should therefore not use trade sanctions.
Small climate clubs should not use trade sanctions
Current pledges to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are insufficient to reach the temperature goal set out in the Paris Agreement and reaffirmed in the…
www.sciencedirect.com
January 22, 2025 at 10:03 AM
Small climate clubs should therefore not use trade sanctions.
Trade sanctions against outsiders can foster cooperation (Nordhaus doi.org/10.1257/aer.15000001) even if outsiders retaliate. However, if retaliation takes place, there is a threshold effect: In small coalitions incentives to be a coalition member decrease whereas in large coalitions they increase.
Trade sanctions and the stability of climate coalitions
We investigate whether trade sanctions against outsiders can foster climate cooperation in self-enforcing international environmental agreements if ou…
www.sciencedirect.com
January 22, 2025 at 10:03 AM
Trade sanctions against outsiders can foster cooperation (Nordhaus doi.org/10.1257/aer.15000001) even if outsiders retaliate. However, if retaliation takes place, there is a threshold effect: In small coalitions incentives to be a coalition member decrease whereas in large coalitions they increase.
This is true. It just seems that these initiatives are not too stable once political sentiment turns against climate policies.
January 13, 2025 at 9:45 AM
This is true. It just seems that these initiatives are not too stable once political sentiment turns against climate policies.
Hi Paul, thanks a lot! Good to see you here as well :)
January 10, 2025 at 12:36 PM
Hi Paul, thanks a lot! Good to see you here as well :)