Ahmed Ezzeldin Mohamed
a-ezz-mohamed.bsky.social
Ahmed Ezzeldin Mohamed
@a-ezz-mohamed.bsky.social
Assistant Professor of Political Science @iast.fr, ex-fellow @stanfordcddrl.bsky.social @belfercenter.bsky.social, PhD @columbiauniversity.bsky.social| MENA politics, religion and politics, distributive politics, autocracies, mixed methods
Special thanks to my advisers and the awesome scholars who contributed their thoughts and suggestions to this work over the course of its development.
October 27, 2025 at 3:22 PM
5) Political actors might employ different targeting strategies in the same context; rewarding different constituents (supporters vs opponents) at different points in time in response to temporal shifts in threats from formal and informal channels.
October 27, 2025 at 3:22 PM
(4) Distributive politics might follow the electoral calendar. Yet, in societies where tradition and norms matter, religious calendars might be equally important in regulating government strategies and citizen's reactions.
October 27, 2025 at 3:22 PM
(3) Government distribution is not only about serving, but could also be about "showing". Distributive politics can be "performative", and this will shape the timing of distribution and actual targeting strategies.
October 27, 2025 at 3:22 PM
(2) In contrast to evidence from Western contexts, religious distribution might not necessarily reduce government incentives for distribution. Pressures on the government to abide by popular religious norms can turn religious and governmental distribution into complements.
October 27, 2025 at 3:22 PM
(1) Informal institutions (e.g., religion), under certain conditions, might increase the alignment between citizens' demands and policy-making in less democratic settings and compensate -at least partially- for the failures of formal institutions to keep governments in check.
October 27, 2025 at 3:22 PM
But what does this study tell us beyond its specifics?
October 27, 2025 at 3:22 PM
I argue that the religious environment (time-variant) creates reputational pressures and collective action threats during Ramadan, boosting government incentives for distribution and shaping targeting strategies. Religious seasons translate into religious policy cycles.
October 27, 2025 at 3:22 PM
I take the distributive politics of Ramadan as a gateway to understand the alternative mechanisms that regulate citizen-government relationships in religious societies; how can political accountability and policy responsiveness be attained without democracy or elections?
October 27, 2025 at 3:22 PM
The paper documents an empirical regularity in Muslim societies; governments expand their distributive interventions during the religious season of Ramadan; Religious calendars regulate who gets what and when. Why? What is the political rationale behind such policies?
October 27, 2025 at 3:22 PM