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The Court rescheduled the case seventeen times and relisted it four times.

...in oral arguments in GEO Group, Inc. v. Menocal.

I haven't seen it cited anywhere (presumably because it's not on Westlaw or Lexis), and I don't believe I've seen other antebellum case like this from Pennsylvania, either. It's Commonwealth v. Crause, 3 A.L.J. 299, 303 (Pa. Ct. Oyer & Terminer 1846). Crause shot and killed a man who had unjustifiably attacked him; the court ultimately opined that this wasn't justifiable self-defense, because the attack didn't threaten serious harm (not a controversial legal principle at the time): He [the decedent] had inflicted a blow upon his person. He had made no attempt upon his life. He used no weapon nor had he any weapon about him. There was no apparent danger of loss of life or of great bodily harm. There was no attempted felony upon his person, nor was there any threatened. The deceased was caught by one of the persons present. Those present in the house had interposed to prevent further violence upon the person of the prisoner. Where then was the necessity, this urgent necessity to take his life? The necessity must be a necessity founded in his own safety. It did not exist. But the court also made opined that the defendant's being armed didn't by itself show that he was guilty of "willful, deliberate and premeditated" (and therefore first-degree) murder, partly based on the right to bear arms: There is no proof that the prisoner was at this place to seek this quarrel, or that he did seek it. There is no proof that he was there to afford the deceased an opportunity to begin this quarrel with him, so that he might have an excuse for taking revenge upon him. He had this weapon upon his person, it is true. It was heavily charged. But the citizens of this Commonwealth have a right to bear arms "in defence of themselves." This right is a constitutional right, and one which, "shall not be questioned." Therefore, taking the act done, and all the circumstances which attended it, was the killing wilful, deliberate and premeditated? If it was not, the prisoner is not guilty of murder of the first degree. If it was, then he is guilty of murder of the first degree. The author of the opinion was Judge John Banks, who was apparently a moderately prominent Pennsylvania official of the time: He had run for Governor in 1841 (getting 45% of the vote) and in 1847 became Pennsylvania Treasurer. The post Seemingly Unknown Antebellum Pennsylvania Case Briefly Mentioning the Right to Keep and Bear Arms appeared first on Reason.com.

My contribution to this year's Esperanto film festival (I need your "likes" on YouTube).

From today's opinion dissenting from denial of certiorari in Veneno v. U.S. by Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas: Petitioner asks us to grant review in this case to reconsider United States v. Kagama (1886). Kagama helped usher into our case law the theory that the federal government enjoys "plenary power" over the internal affairs of Native American Tribes. It is a theory that should make this Court blush. Not only does that notion lack any foundation in the Constitution; its roots lie instead only in archaic prejudices. This Court is responsible for Kagama, and this Court holds the power to correct it. We should not shirk from the task. As "sovereign and independent states," Native American Tribes have governed their internal affairs "from time immemorial." Worcester v. Georgia (1832). Among the sovereign powers Tribes have always enjoyed is the power to redress crimes involving their own peoples. Reflecting as much, a great many Tribes today have courts, not wholly unlike those found in States and counties across the country, open to render justice when one tribal member commits an offense against another on tribal land. In the Major Crimes Act of 1885, the federal government sought to curtail these traditional sovereign tribal powers. There, Congress effectively wrote its own Indian criminal code, directing that tribal members who commit certain major crimes against other tribal members within "Indian country" may be tried and punished in federal court. Kagama. The Act may not have completely displaced tribal criminal-justice authorities. Even so, the law surely represented a sweeping assertion of federal power, one that would be unthinkable elsewhere in the United States. Yes, of course, Congress may adopt a variety of criminal laws consistent with its "limited" and "enumerated" powers under the Constitution. McCulloch v. Maryland (1819). But, no, Congress does not enjoy some "general right to punish" crimes of its choosing "within … the States" however and whenever it pleases. Cohens v. Virginia (1821). Our Constitution "withhold[s] from Congress" that kind of "plenary police power." United States v. Lopez (1995). Despite these foundational principles, this Court in Kagama upheld the Major Crimes Act. To arrive at that result, the Court relied on "little more than ipse dixit." Haaland v. Brackeen (2023) (Thomas, J., dissenting). It had to. Congress's limited and enumerated powers no more include some plenary power over the internal affairs of Tribes than they do over the internal affairs of States. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Kagama itself all but admitted as much. Before the Court, the federal government argued that the Act represented a permissible exercise of Congress's power under the Constitution's Indian Commerce Clause. But the Court rejected that argument, and rightly so, calling it "a very strained construction of th[e] clause." In the Major Crimes Act, after all, the federal government asserted the power to regulate crimes between tribal members on tribal land "without any reference to their relation to any kind of commerce." And while the Indian Commerce Clause may afford Congress considerable authority over "bilateral relations with the Tribes," nothing in it authorizes Congress to "reassign to the federal government inherent sovereign authorities that belong to the Tribes." Brackeen, (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Having dismissed the government's central defense of the Act, the Court was left to advance a hodgepodge of others with no more secure a constitutional footing. First, the Court invoked the Territories Clause. But that provision affords Congress only the power to make "needful Rules and Regulations" for "Territor[ies] … belonging to the United States." And while the Clause may allow Congress to establish local governments in Territories belonging to the Nation before they enter the Union as States, it does not authorize Congress "to exercise municipal jurisdiction" over non-federal lands within a State and over which another sovereign exercises authority. Accordingly, that Clause can hardly supply authority for Congress to regulate conduct on tribal lands within States. Nor, for that matter, does the Clause, rightly understood, endow the federal government with plenary power even within the Territories themselves. Next, and leaving the Constitution behind, the Kagama Court gestured to the European doctrine of discovery. But our Constitution makes no mention of that doctrine. Nor, at least as conceived by the Marshall Court shortly after the Nation's founding, does the doctrine imply plenary federal power over internal tribal affairs. As that Court put it, even after the European "discovery" of North America, Tribes remained "distinct, independent political communities retaining their original natural rights," with only "the single exception" that they could have no "intercourse with any other European potentate than the first discoverer." From this, one might glean that the discovery doctrine meant one European nation could assert certain exclusive "rights" of intercourse with Tribes as "against all other European" claimants. Perhaps, too, the doctrine meant that a private party could not buy tribal land without approval from the relevant European national authority. But even on its own terms, the Marshall Court appreciated, the discovery doctrine did nothing to strip Native American Tribes of "the rights which belong to self government." Worcester. {Even as articulated by the Marshall Court, the discovery doctrine leaves much to be desired. If "discovering" a land is enough to secure certain rights over it, one might wonder why Native Americans hadn't obtained those rights over their lands long before Europeans arrived. As one commentator had already asked by the time of the Nation's founding: "If sailing along a coast can give a right to a country, then might the people of Japan become, as soon as they please, the proprietors of Britain"? } Lacking any other way to uphold the Act, the Kagama Court ultimately resorted to archaic colonial prejudices nowhere found in our republican Constitution and wholly antithetical to it. The Major Crimes Act, the Court insisted, should be left to stand because "Indian tribes are the wards of the nation" and "communities dependent on the United States … for their daily food." Their "very weakness and helplessness," the Court continued, imposed a "duty of protection" upon Congress that came with a corresponding "power." As the Court saw it, "[t]he power of the General Government over these remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, [was] necessary to their protection." For decades, what followed in Kagama's wake was more of the same. In one decision after another, this Court did not look to the Constitution for guidance on the scope of the federal government's powers over tribal affairs. Instead, and often citing Kagama as authority, the Court suggested that the government could exercise a free-floating "[p]lenary authority" over Tribes because they are "wea[k] and helples[s]," and composed of "simple, uninformed and inferior people" who find themselves in the care of "a superior and civilized nation." The plenary power theory Kagama helped spawn not only lacked any basis in the Constitution. It also injected a new "incoherence into our Indian-law jurisprudence." Since the founding and to this day, this Court has acknowledged that Congress enjoys only limited and enumerated powers and that Tribes are "sovereign and independent states." Yet, thanks to decisions like Kagama, this Court has also sometimes suggested that Congress enjoys plenary power to "regulate virtually every aspect of the tribes." "Those two propositions of course clash" because "only one is true." Embarrassed equally by the lawlessness of decisions from the "high plenary power era" and the incoherence they introduced into our case law, this Court has, with time, beaten a slow retreat from them. See Sarah Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 Texas L. Rev. 1, 62 (2002). Just two years ago, that retreat found notable expression in Brackeen where this Court once again recognized that the Constitution affords Congress only "a series of enumerated powers, not a series of blank checks," and that, "like the rest of its legislative powers, Congress's authority to regulate Indians must derive from the Constitution, not the atmosphere." That is exactly right. And it is exactly why this Court must confront decisions, like Kagama, that cannot be explained by the Constitution, but only by the atmosphere of their times. I regret that the Court declines to take up that challenge today. But whether the day of reckoning for the plenary power theory comes sooner or later, it must come. Nor is that day to be feared. If this Court were to overturn Kagama, Tribes could exercise their sovereign powers to address "major" crimes among Indians, something this Court has no business assuming they are too "inferior" or "weak" to do without supervision from a "superior" people. Equally, if Tribes and the government decide that a degree of federal involvement in tribal justice is mutually beneficial, the Constitution affords a lawful way to achieve that end: by treaty. The government may be out of practice using that tool. But Congress often addressed criminal justice matters in treaties with Tribes before the Major Crimes Act, and it could do so again. Doubtless, as the government stresses in its opposition to this petition, many of this Court's plenary power decisions have stood for years. But the same was once said in defense of Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) and Korematsu v. United States (1944). And, as with those cases, our plenary power decisions demand reconsideration if this Court is ever to bring coherence to the law and make good on its promise of fidelity to the Constitution. A matter so grave "'can[not] be settled until settled right.'" The post Doctrine of Federal "Plenary Power" over "Internal Affairs of Native American Tribes" "Should Make This Court Blush" appeared first on Reason.com.

From LNU v. Bondi, released Nov. 4, 2025 by Ninth Circuit Judges Richard Paez, Carlos Bea, and Danielle Forrest (though note that, on the merits, the court ruled in petitioners' favor): On behalf of Petitioners, Attorney Mike Singh Sethi filed an opening brief with multiple fabricated citations and quotations. Sethi cited two cases that do not exist: Eduardo v. Garland, 28 F.4th 742 (9th Cir. 2022), cited at pages 5 and 16 of Petitioners' opening brief, and Lay v. Holder, 729 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 2013), cited and discussed at page 16. And Sethi twice attributed quotations to opinions in which the quoted language does not appear: Kamalthas v. INS, 251 F.3d 1279, 1284 (9th Cir. 2001), at page 17 of the opening brief, and Avendano-Hernandez v. Lynch, 800 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2015), at page 19. After the panel denied the parties' joint motion to submit this case on the briefs, Sethi filed a motion to correct the record regarding errata in the opening brief. That motion represented the two nonexistent cases—Eduardo v. Garland and Lay v. Holder—as typographical errors. Sethi sought to replace those cases with two cases that have similar names, entirely different reporter numbers, and in the case of Lay, a different year and a different holding. Both replacement cases either do not support or are weak support for their intended propositions. The motion does not explain how such significant typographical errors occurred. Sethi did not appear for oral argument. Attorney William Rounds appeared on behalf of Petitioners instead. At oral argument, confronted with the above issues, Rounds at first insisted that artificial intelligence was not used to draft Petitioners' briefs and that the errors were typographical. He later conceded that artificial intelligence might have been used by the individual who drafted the briefs, and that said individual was not yet licensed to practice law. Since oral argument, we have identified further issues in Petitioners' reply brief, and we have identified at least two other opening briefs filed in pending cases in which Sethi cites cases that do not exist. {Part of the quote attributed to Bandari v. INS, 227 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2000), on page 4 and 5 of the reply brief does not appear in the opinion. On page 2 of the reply brief, counsel cites Singh v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 1090, 1096–97 (9th Cir. 2007), for a proposition related to adverse credibility, but the case does not discuss adverse credibility. On page 5, counsel represents the holding of Zahedi v. INS, 222 F.3d 1157, 1165 (9th Cir. 2000), as concerning affidavits, but the opinion does not discuss affidavits…. In Anguiano Alvarado v. Bondi, No. 25-2485, Sethi cited three cases that do not appear to exist: Garcia v. Garland, 60 F.4th 1239 (9th Cir. 2023); Hernandez v. Sessions, 873 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2017); and Vasquez-Zavala v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1086 (9th Cir. 2023). In Contreras Pelayo v. Bondi, No. 24-5168, Sethi cited two cases that do not appear to exist, at least at these reporter numbers: Eduardo v. Garland, 28 F.4th 742 (9th Cir. 2022) and Gutierrez-Alm v. Garland, 72 F.4th 446 (9th Cir. 2023).} Attorneys Sethi and Rounds [the lawyer who orally argued the case, but who wasn't on the initial brief -EV] are each ORDERED to show cause in writing, separately, why they should not be sanctioned, suspended, or disbarred from practice before this court under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46(b)(1)(B) for "conduct unbecoming a member of this court's bar," and under Ninth Circuit Rule 46-2(a) for "violating applicable rules of professional conduct." See Cal. R. Pro. Conduct 3.1(a)(2) ("A lawyer shall not … present a claim or defense in litigation that is not warranted under existing law …."); id. R. 3.3(a)(1) ("A lawyer shall not … knowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal …."); see also Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45–50 (1991) (describing "the inherent power to impose sanctions for … bad faith conduct"). The response is due within 28 days of the filing of this order. 9th Cir. R. 46-2(d); 9th Cir. Gen. Ord. 12.9(a). If counsel do not file responses within 28 days, the court will take disciplinary action without further notice. See Fed. R. App. P. 46(b), (c); 9th Cir. R. 46-2(d). If counsel file responses that do not include requests for hearings, the right to a hearing will be deemed waived. Fed. R. App. P. 46(c); 9th Cir. R. 46-2(d)…. You can see the oral exchange at 8:47-13:20 and 24:00-26:15 of this video. An excerpt from the CourtListener oral argument transcript (checked by my assistant and by me): Q: Recently, on behalf of your client, a document was filed indicating that there were errors in the briefing that was submitted and asserting that they were typographical errors. I'd like you to address that point and how they occurred. A: Yes. So, there were two cases. The case names and the citations were somewhat garbled…. It looks like it was a copy and paste error or something like that. Q: Wasn't it the use of artificial intelligence? A: It was not used. Q: [Judge explains the details of one of the misquotations.] … Are you sure? Are you telling me the truth that you didn't use AI to beef up your brief here? A: No. AI was not used to beef up the brief…. Q: [Judge offers more details.] … Did you use AI in using that quote, counsel? A: No…. Q: Then how did it get there? … A: An individual who works at the office drafts briefs, prepares them. Q: Maybe the individual. Did the individual use AI and report it to you? A: It is possible, but that person did not— Q: Aaaaah. A: but that person did not, that person did not indicate that they used AI. And there had been many conversations. Q: Counsel, we're having a hard time believing that because of our review of this case, but we also looked at other cases from your office, and there are other cases that briefs have been filed that are currently pending in this court that have the same problem. And this doesn't look like a typographical error. It doesn't look like a copy and paste job. It looks like there is a use of technology being employed that is not being checked. A: There had been many conversations with that individual who was drafting to verify that AI was not being used. And that individual said that AI was not being used to draft the briefs. And that had been repeated many times…. Q: The person who is doing the drafting is not the person whose name is on the brief that gets filed in the court? … A: No, but the things that do get filed by the court get reviewed by the attorney…. Q: Is the person who is doing the drafting a lawyer? A: No. [He] has graduated from law school, but is not a lawyer. But that person is no longer with the office …. … Q: So as I understand it, you have a non-lawyer … drafting a brief that you don't cite check the cases yourself to see that the language is in there and your boss doesn't either, right? A: It [unintelligible] on every occasion. Q: I'm sorry, what did you just say? A: It sounds like not on every occasion. Q: It sounds like? … The post "Counsel, We're Having a Hard Time Believing That" appeared first on Reason.com.

Auto-post still buggy, but it's being worked on; hope to have daily open threads working well shortly.

From People v. Ocampo, decided by Illinois Appellate Court Justice David Navarro: [Carlos] Ocampo was charged with harassment through electronic communications based on a series of emails .… One of [Ocampo's] pleadings … contained a statement of charges from the Illinois Department of Revenue (IDOR), which sought termination of Ocampo's employment for alleged actions that took place from March 2021 to February 2022. Those allegations were that Ocampo: (1) sent multiple emails to multiple recipients that "contained numerous and unsupported and unsubstantiated allegations against IDOR employees and included inappropriate pictures of his vomit in a toilet bowl"; (2) sent multiple emails that contained "racially sensitive remarks, inappropriate photos, and disparaging comments in an attempt to harm or destroy the reputation of fellow State employees"; and (3) harassed several members of IDOR after having been asked not to contact them. Ocampo was ultimately terminated…. At trial, Vincent Cacioppo testified that he was an IDOR employee for 36 years. He never had contact with Ocampo, except for "hundreds" of emails from Ocampo, starting in 2020. Cacioppo received emails from Ocampo unrelated to work, with false accusations and "nonsense." The emails made Cacioppo feel "horribly because [Ocampo] sent them to everybody in the State legislature, my colleagues." On February 13, 2023, Ocampo sent Cacioppo and others an email with the subject line "insufferable racists." The body of the email insinuated that Cacioppo was in the mob. Cacioppo stated that he had no way to reach out to the other people to say he was not a racist or a bully, and that the emails damaged his reputation. Two days later, Ocampo sent an email to Cacioppo and others with the subject line, "gang of white-skinned primates," and the body of the email indicated that Cacioppo was not only "running a gang of white-skinned primates, but also a ring of corruption and thieves." It also stated that Cacioppo "micromanaged minorities to make them feel incompetent," knew very little about taxes, had emotional outbursts, and was committing "white collar crime." On March 10, 2023, Cacioppo received an email from Ocampo that stated the IDOR discharged Ocampo because "he allegedly harassed Vincent Cacioppo by submitting complaints of systemic discrimination." The email stated that the Office of the Illinois Attorney General "has one week to file an appearance and defend the decision … to keep a mobster, Vincent Cacioppo …." This email was also sent to Cacioppo's colleagues. Two more emails were sent on March 19, 2023. Cacioppo stated that he was embarrassed because the emails were also received by the Chief of Staff, Cacioppo's boss. On March 21, 2023, Ocampo sent Cacioppo an email with the subject line "white collar criminal." The body of the email stated that Cacioppo "might deny that he is part of the KKK, but he can't deny that he is part of a gang that thinks they are better than the street gangs of Chicago, Illinois, because they are white collar criminals." Cacioppo testified that the emails made him feel embarrassed because they were sent to his colleagues in State government who do not know his reputation. Ocampo also attached images to many of his emails. One depicted Cacioppo as "some sort of gargoyle." Another depicted Cacioppo with "some gentleman that looks like he is in some kind of Ku Klux Klan outfit." Other emails contained pictures of KKK members, and Cacioppo's and others' faces photoshopped onto birds sitting on top of a burning state capitol building. Cacioppo found these images to be obscene, embarrassing, intimidating, and harassing. David Mack, a labor relations administrator for the IDOR since 2001, testified that he received emails from Ocampo beginning in 2020. From January 1, 2022, to March 31, 2023, Ocampo sent Mack several hundred emails, sometimes sending him multiple emails a day. He found these emails "harassing in nature, accusatory things that [he had] never done in [his] entire life." Patrick Ross, Chief of Internal Affairs at IDOR, testified that Ocampo sent him several hundred emails over the course of several years. The emails were "relentless" and made it hard for Ross to work. The emails were "accusatory, harassing, demeaning-type emails and pictures." The emails were sent to State legislators, and people with whom Ross had a professional relationship. Ross found the pictures attached to the emails to be embarrassing and humiliating. He testified that Ocampo was linking him to a terrorist group, the KKK, in the images attached to the emails, which was highly offensive…. A person commits harassment through electronic communications when he uses electronic communications for the purpose of "[m]aking any comment, request, suggestion or proposal which is obscene with an intent to offend." … Ocampo only takes issue with the second element of the offense, arguing that the State failed to prove that his emails were obscene. The statute at issue does not define the word "obscene." … [I]n People v. Kucharski (Ill. Ct. App. 2013), [this court] held that the definition of "obscene" [as meaning hard-core pornography] does not apply to the offense of harassment through electronic communications. In Kucharski, the court … found that the Illinois obscenity statute's purpose is to control the commercial dissemination of obscenity, while the electronic harassment statute's purpose is to prevent the personal invasion into people's homes and lives by harassing communications via electronic devices. The court found that … "obscene" as used in the electronic harassment statute "should be afforded its ordinary dictionary definition" of "disgusting to the senses" or "abhorrent to morality or virtue." … [T]he electronic communications Ocampo sent were disgusting to the senses and abhorrent to morality and therefore "obscene" within the meaning of the harassment statute. The recipients of the emails testified that Ocampo's emails accused them of being members of the KKK, of being members of the mob, and of being racists. The emails included graphic pictures of the recipients dressed as KKK members and the State Capitol on fire with the recipients around it. The recipients also testified that Ocampo sent them hundreds of these emails, sometimes several times a day. Certainly, looking at this evidence in a light most favorable to the State, we find that a rational trier of fact could have found the email messages and accompanying pictures to be obscene, and we will not disturb such finding on appeal…. To the extent Ocampo is making a constitutional argument that the harassment through electronic communications statute violates the first amendment …, we have previously rejected that argument and do so again here. "'Speech may not be proscribed because of the ideas it expresses, but may be restricted because of the manner in which it is communicated or the action that it entails.'" Here, criminalizing obscene communication, with an intent to offend, is not content-based discrimination, but rather an attempt to regulate conduct that accompanies the proscribed speech. An obscene electronic communication made with an intent to offend "is restricted by the statute not because its content communicates any particular idea; rather, it is restricted because of the purpose for which it is communicated." … Justice Clare Quish concurred in the judgment. Justice Ramon Ocasio dissented: There are a lot of words you might use to characterize the contents of Ocampo's communiqués—obnoxious, obsessive, and offensive come to mind, as do disturbing, distressing, and defamatory—but obscene is not one of them. The offense at issue is the online equivalent of making dirty phone calls which obviously is not what he was doing. If Ocampo is guilty of a crime, it is not the one charged, and it is not our job to rescue the State from its poor charging decisions…. The Illinois interpretation of the statute, as set forth in Kucharski and applied here, strikes me as unconstitutional. Certainly precisely crafted laws that ban continued unwanted speech sent to a person may be permissible, on the theory that "no one has a right to press even 'good' ideas on an unwilling recipient." But a law that asks juries and judges to decide which messages are "disgusting to the senses" or "abhorrent to morality or virtue" is unconstitutionally vague, and unconstitutionally open to viewpoint-based application. The post Crime in Illinois to Send E-Mails (with Intent to Offend) That Are "Disgusting to the Senses" or "Abhorrent to Morality or Virtue" appeared first on Reason.com.

11/10/1975: Buckley v. Valeo argued. Senator James Buckley The post Today in Supreme Court History: November 10, 1975 appeared first on Reason.com.

I participated along with James Burling (Pacific Legal Foundation), Prof. Peter Byrne (Georgetown), and Prof. Sara Bronin (George Washington University).

It's the central question in the tariff cases, and one exchange during oral argument caught my ear

The Court is still living in Justice Kennedy's shadow and Justice Jackson questions whether executive actions have as much force as statutes.

What rights do aliens have under Section 1?

From Judge Judith Levy (E.D. Mich.) in Evans v. Robertson, the I've Seen Fake Cites on Both Sides Now case: The litigants in this case … have been repeatedly warned that factitious citations will not be tolerated by the Court. Judge Stafford ordered Plaintiff and Defendant to "include a written representation that [they have] personally checked each legal citation and each citation is accurate and stands for its asserted proposition" and warned that a failure to do so may result in sanctions. Despite Judge Stafford's order, both Plaintiff and Defendant have violated the Court's express requirements and lied to the Court numerous times…. Defendant's objection, which was previously stricken by the Court, contained several factitious citations…. Plaintiff's objection contains at least two factitious citations…. Plaintiff references these factitious citations despite her declaration of verification, which states "I, the undersigned, verify that the legal authorities cited herein are accurately stated, relevant …, and drawn from controlling or persuasive precedent applicable to the issues presented in this case." … Plaintiff's response to Defendant's objections also contains a factitious citation…. Plaintiff references this factitious citation despite her certification, which states "Plaintiff affirms that all legal authorities cited in this filing have been reviewed and verified for accuracy. All case citations were cross-checked using Westlaw and the University of Detroit Law Library, with the assistance of library staff, to ensure correct citation format, validity, and precedential status as of the date of filing." … In addition, Defendant's response to Plaintiff's objections contains numerous factitious citations…. Defendant references these factitious citations despite her certification …. Next, Defendant's objections to Judge Stafford's Report and Recommendation contains factitious citations. Despite Defendant's certification that "she has personally checked each legal citation in this filing and that each citation is accurate and stands for the proposition asserted," Defendant's citations are not accurate and do not stand for her propositions asserted…. It is obvious that Defendant's certification regarding accuracy is false…. Defendant's "motion to strike Plaintiff's limited rebuttal" contains factitious citations and lacks the required written representation that she personally checked each legal citation and that each citation is accurate and stands for its asserted proposition…. It is appalling that Defendant would use fabricated quotations in her argument that Plaintiff is misleading the Court…. Plaintiff's "consolidated response to Defendant's refiled objections" and Defendant's "motion to strike Plaintiff's limited rebuttal" also contains factitious citations, despite Plaintiff's verification that "the authorities cited herein are true and correct to the best of her knowledge and belief, and that all references accurately reflect the legal sources relied upon in this filing."  … Plaintiff and Defendant's filings with factitious citations are stricken from the record and will not be considered. The Court will also strike filings that purport to be exhibits to filings with factitious citations…. Plaintiff and Defendant have repeatedly lied to the Court and wasted both the Magistrate Judge and the undersigned's time. It is apparent that further sanctions are necessary. Plaintiff and Defendant are ordered to show cause why they should not be sanctioned for repeated failure to follow Court orders and for dishonesty to the Court…. Sanctions may include: * Monetary sanctions in the form of $100.00 per filing with a factitious citation, payable to the Court; * A prohibition on future filings until the monetary sanction is paid to the Court; * Requiring both Plaintiff and Defendant to appear in Court, in person, for a hearing on the record explaining their factitious citations and failure to follow Court orders, and * Revoking both Plaintiff and Defendant's Pro Se Upload privileges, which would require them to file documents either by mail or by hand-delivery to the Clerk's office…. The post They Just Can't Help It, AI Hallucination Edition appeared first on Reason.com.

11/9/1942: Wickard v. Filburn decided. The Stone Court (1941-1942) The post Today in Supreme Court History: November 9, 1942 appeared first on Reason.com.

According to the Attorney General, the First Circuit's clerk refused to "offer any means of filing" an emergency brief after 5:00 p.m.

Something is amiss with our new daily auto-post feature, so I'm manually posting the thread today.

A heavily reported expose on one of the nation's environmentalist organizations in the New York Times

11/8/1994: U.S. v. Lopez argued. Edison High School, San Antonio The post Today in Supreme Court History: November 8, 1994 appeared first on Reason.com.

Non-condensing furnaces, drag shows, and master accounts.

I have long advocated using May 1 for this purpose. But November 7 is a worthy alternative candidate, which I am happy to adopt if it can attract a broad consensus.

Using tort law for environmental protection has a deeper historical pedigree than does resort to administrative regulation.

11/7/1922: Oregon enacts the Compulsory Education Act. Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary The post Today in Supreme Court History: November 7, 1922 appeared first on Reason.com.

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