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theory0.bsky.social
Theorist
@theory0.bsky.social
Interests in economic, social, evolutionary theory.
Reproductive dynamics as a game.
Loci <-> Players
Alleles <-> Strategies
Genotype <-> Strategy profile.
Common interests (all loci get same payoff/fitness).
Sexual reproduction converges to monomorphic pure NE genotype.
Mutations add alleles/strategies. Transition to new NE with higher fitness.
www.biorxiv.org
December 9, 2024 at 4:22 AM
Cultural evolution driven by subjective selection. Enjoyed the paper, but not wholly convinced by the subjective/objective dichotomy used. Yes, selection can occur towards intermediate goals, but it still seems like a kind of messy objective selection.
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/...
Subjective selection and the evolution of complex culture
Why is culture the way it is? Here I argue that a major force shaping culture is subjective (cultural) selection, or the selective retention of cultural variants that people subjectively perceive as ...
onlinelibrary.wiley.com
December 9, 2024 at 2:07 AM
Harmonic games are the opposite of potential games. In potential games, player incentives are aligned, in harmonic games, player incentives are opposed. Turns out that no-regret learning is Poincaré recurrent in harmonic games. i.e. dynamic returns to close to its starting point.
No-regret Learning in Harmonic Games: Extrapolation in the Face of...
The long-run behavior of multi-agent online learning -- and, in particular, no-regret learning -- is relatively well-understood in potential games, where players have common interests. By contrast,...
openreview.net
December 9, 2024 at 1:39 AM
Hello world.
December 5, 2024 at 7:27 AM