One of the most striking things about our contemporary culture (and its assumed ‘secularity) is the degree to which it recapitulates mythic and theological patterns long assumed lost and superseded.  This is especially true in the political realm where rival mythologies clash in the form of secular ideologies. One of these myths is the myth of universal emancipation. With Badiou we may credit St.

Abstract Anita Välikangas’s analysis of a broad selection of interdisciplinary funding programs shows that the Social Sciences and Humanities’ (SSH) relegation to subordinate “add-on” roles with limited opportunities for epistemically oriented research in interdisciplinary projects, is already prefigured by funding structures. Beyond holding significant implications for research policy, this finding necessitates a critical reflection on the positionality of the Social Sciences and Humanities (SSH) within STEM-dominated interdisciplinary collaborations.

In “ChatGPT, Education, and Understanding” (2025), Federica Isabella Malfatti provides a thought-provoking account of what it would take for an Large Language Model (LLM) such as ChatGPT to count as a good teacher, insofar as teachers are fosterers of understanding, not just knowledge.[1] The essay is a welcome extension of the current focus on understanding in epistemology to technology contexts, and especially timely given the current concerning state of AI use in education.

The pursuit of knowledge can go wrong in many ways. It can go wrong when trying to gain knowledge through reasoning. We jump to conclusions, ignore disconfirming evidence, improperly interpret evidence, assume the very thing we are trying to prove, favor what is salient or most recent in our memory rather than what is representative. Call these errors of inquiry. The pursuit of knowledge can also go wrong when trying to identify who the trustworthy testifiers are who can impart knowledge to us.

A lot of philosophical work in the last two decades has been at the intersection of theoretical and practical philosophy, especially concerning social aspects of epistemic, linguistic, or ontological phenomena. Although the literature on epistemic and discursive injustice is now quite extensive, it is only recently that philosophers have started to theorize forms of injustice that can be called “metaphysical”. These include phenomena such as ontic injustice (Jenkins 2023), ontic oppression (Dembroff 2018; 2020), ontic exclusion and erasure (Richardson 2023), and categorical and interstitial injustice (Ásta 2019; 2024).

In his fine and philosophically well-argued article “Economics and Politics in the Age of AI” (2025), Vincent Blok asserts that the “technological advancements in digital technologies like AI raise societal concerns about the instrumentalization and datafication of human life” and subsequently that specifically artificial intelligence (AI) leads to “instrumentalization, commodification and datafication of all domains of human life” (1–2). In Blok’s view, it is the notion of an…

Muhammed Nishad’s reflections on Martin Heidegger’s notion of dwelling (wohnen) to interpret the social and political significance of Mosques in the South Indian region of Malabar open an occasion to think about existence and tradition more broadly and in an interconnected manner.[1] As I am neither an expert on Heidegger, nor do I claim a ground in the political and philosophical stakes of engaging him,

My proposal in the initial article (2024) was that literary texts and the expertise of literary scholars have an important role to play in developing new means for exchange and dialogue across disciplines. Put into practice in the salon format, the literary texts that all participants have read support the discussion by providing epistemic common ground and by maintaining the flexibility of a “boundary object” that allows for multiple interpretations, while the expertise of literary scholars in picking up on formal features of the literary texts themselves, serves to structure the metacognitive dimension of the discussion.

My sincerest thanks to the SERRC’s contributors in 2025. Your work cultivated the reception of select articles published in Social Epistemology and Techné and produced insights about ongoing dialogues and projects. I am particularly grateful for the continuing engagement of all our contributors and our readers. … . Highlighted Resources: ❦ SERRC: Of Note, 2024. ❦ SERRC: Of Note, 2023…

Volume 14, Issue 12, 1–71, December 2025 ❧ Basham, Lee. 2025. “Response to Napolitano and Harris on Epistemic Authority.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 14 (12): 1–10. ❧ Tuckwell, William. 2025. “A Comment on Anderson’s ‘Virtuous Virtue Signaling, Morally Good Grandstanding’.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 14 (12): 11–15. ❧ Yang, Yang. 2025. “Knowledge Socialism and/or Capitalism in the Context of AI and Knowledge Governance in China and the West: An Interview with Steve Fuller.”

A massively important concern for our time, at the moment, is the question of epistemic agency, how we can develop it, and how we can protect it from pernicious forces and influences that would undermine it. So, I welcome the debate here unfolding around Mark Coeckelbergh’s article in Social Epistemology, “AI and Epistemic Agency” (2025). The contributions that have appeared so far have made important points.

On 20 December 2005, Judge John Jones decided in favour of the plaintiffs in Kitzmiller et al v Dover Area School District at the Mid-Pennsylvania US District Court in Harrisburg. I testified as an expert witness for the defence during the trial, which received worldwide attention. Indeed, by the time I returned to the UK after my court appearance, a report had appeared on page three of the…

Recently on X (formerly Twitter), an account that promotes various uses of LLMs (Large Language Models) to their academic followers posted a thread on how to write 4,000 words of one’s PhD thesis in one day. The instructions were fairly detailed. Unfortunately, this particular thread is now gone, but other threads are still available, so let us briefly take a look at a similar one (on the use of Discourse Graphs) to get a sense of the kind of advice this account offers ...

In my review (2024) of János Tőzsér’s monograph The Failure of Philosophical Knowledge (2023), I developed three main lines of criticism, which I then defended (2025) against his response (2025a). In his latest reply, Tőzsér (2025b) zeroes in on my first criticism, which concerns “the book’s lack of discussion of important supporting arguments behind positions it rejects” (59), and seeks to address my “main objections to argument in favor of skepticism and the general anti-skeptical vision that emerges from them” (29).

Intuitively, it is rational for laypeople to defer to experts’ testimony, even when the laypeople’s prior beliefs are in tension with expert opinion. After all, experts are, by definition, a more reliable source of beliefs about their areas of expertise than laypeople. And so, in order to benefit from a particular expert’s epistemic superiority, a layperson has good reason to regard that expert as an epistemic authority.

I’ve studied now Philosophy And Jurisprudence, Medicine,— And even, alas! Theology,— From end to end, with labor keen; And here, poor fool! with all my lore I stand, no wiser than before. — Goethe, Faust Part I If Nick Bostrom’s best-known book, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (2014), was a science fiction version of Dante’s Inferno, his most recent offering,

It is common to equate technological innovation with socio-political progress. In many ways this is not an unreasonable reaction. Afterall, what moves forward the course of history and our socio-political arrangements more than changes to technology and our material condition? Indeed, social conservativism, and its holding to past tradition, has at times resulted in prohibiting new technologies, such as birth control, that threaten to upend such traditions.

We live in a world overflowing with predictions; from recommendation algorithms to risk scores that tell judges, doctors, and even dating apps what to expect next. Behind many of these systems sits a quiet mathematical idea: Bayesian reasoning. But what happens when this “calculus of belief” becomes the structure of everyday judgment? … . Article Citation: Bourgade, Boecyàn. 2025. “Calculated Belief: On Bayesian Reason and the Ethics of Judgment.” …

This interview with Professor Steve Fuller continues a dialogue that began in two earlier conversations—"Knowledge Socialism and/or Capitalism? An Interview with Michael A. Peters” and “Knowledge Socialism and/or Capitalism? An Interview with Steve Fuller.” These exchanges sought to explore the theoretical tension and potential convergence between knowledge socialism and knowledge capitalism, two paradigms that frame contemporary debates on the political economy of knowledge.

To virtue signal is to say or do things in order to enhance or preserve one’s moral reputation (Tosi and Warmke 2020, 14–23).[1] Justin Tosi and Brandon Warmke (2016; 2020) argue that because of its bad consequences, there is a strong moral presumption against virtue signalling. In Tuckwell (2024). I noted that virtue signalling can also have significant good consequences.

“Show Me”—a slogan commonly associated with the state of Missouri, US. There is a third perspective on conspiracy theory and epistemic authority that might be helpful in any discussion of epistemic authority.[1] One skeptical of “epistemic authority” as pivotal in politics and particularly, any discussion of conspiracy and its theory. The very notion of epistemic authority in affairs of society is not just alien to democracy as foundational, it is so easily abused it is dangerous, as dangerous as any theocracy or other…

Controversy has erupted after 21% of manuscript reviews for an international AI conference were found to be generated by artificial intelligence.

Volume 14, Issue 11, 1–81, November 2025 ❧ Koopman, Colin. 2025. “Associationist Philosophy of Technology and Liberal Political Philosophy.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 14 (11) 1–10. ❧ Gärtner, Klaus. 2025. “AI and Epistemic Agency: Responding to Coeckelbergh.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 14 (11): 11–16. ❧ Baumann, Peter. 2025. “Will the Skeptic Ever Go Away? A Further Reply to McCraw.”

Abstract Susan Schneider’s article (2025) on the epistemology of Chatbots is the start to a much larger conversation scholars and educators need to have about the influence these technologies have on knowledge and knowledge production. To that end, I wish to expand this conversation to an aspect briefly mentioned in her paper; the use of these technologies by bad actors and propagandists to shape the worldview of users.

Timothy Lyons's Scientific Realism (2025) is a book in the Cambridge Elements in the Philosophy of Science series. Like all books in this series, its purported aim is to provide an extensive overview of a topic or debate in philosophy of science. In the case of Lyons, the debate is the scientific realism/antirealism debate in philosophy of science, which is philosophically rich with various positions and arguments (Chakravartty 2017).