Students face royal defamation charges over political parody parade at university Four Thammasat University students face royal defamation charges after they participated in a political parody parade at the university last year. The case stems from a post on a page titled “Thammasat University independent political parody group,” in which cloth signs were posted. The complaint was filed by a police officer from the Khlong Luang Police Station, according to Thai Lawyers for Human Rights. Some students had previously been summoned to the police station for interrogation as witnesses in this case. According to the police report, the social media post contained images of white cloth signs with political messages. The signs were placed in five different locations on Thammasat University’s Rangsit Campus. One sign, reportedly held up by four people, was found to refer to the monarchy, and the four were later identified as the suspects in this case. The activity was reportedly held to coincide with the Queen Mother’s royal funeral procession, which travelled from Chulalongkorn Hospital to the Grand Palace. The authorities concluded that the messages on the signs targeted the Queen Mother, and that they constituted insult and defamation against a member of the royal family. The four students for whom this was the first offence were charged with royal defamation and violation of the Computer Crimes Act. All of them denied the allegations. They were released after questioning and required to report on 20 February. 21-year-old Maimok, one of the four students, stated that students who staged activities at the university should not be prosecuted, as the university should be a safe space for them. “I do not want anyone to be prosecuted under Section 112 (royal defamation) in this era. Thailand is not a barbaric country,” noted Maimok. He also encouraged voters, regardless of their political stance, to approve drafting a new constitution in the first referendum on constitutional amendment scheduled for 8 February. According to TLHR, since the number of royal defamation prosecutions rose significantly in 2020 during the administration of former Prime Minister Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha, approximately 289 people in 320 cases have been prosecuted under this draconian law. eng editor 3 Fri, 2026-01-23 - 13:37 * News * Royal defamation * Section 112 * lese majeste * TU Political Parody group (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Chiang Mai students, residents organize campus run to call for new constitution As part of a campaign calling for people to vote in favour of a new constitution in the upcoming referendum, residents and students in Chiang Mai organized a run through Chiang Mai University campus yesterday (21 January). Participants also handed out pamphlets about the referendum and why a new constitution should be written to replace the 2017 Constitution. Nantatchaporn Srijan, one of the participants, said that she would like people to vote in favour of a new constitution because, not only was the 2017 Constitution written by the junta, but it also took away the people’s powers, such as being able to keep independent bodies in check. * Thailand is heading for a historic constitutional referendum. Here is what’s happening. The event is part of a nationwide campaign for a vote in favour of a new constitution. For the third week in a row, campaign events took place in several provinces, while volunteers are visiting markets and setting up stalls at political parties’ election campaign events to inform people about the referendum and campaign for a vote in favour. Yesterday, park runs were organized at 4 public parks in Bangkok, as well as on campus at Kasetsart University. A group of cyclists also biked to the event at Benchasiri Park.  Similar events also took place in Nonthaburi, Ayutthaya, Nakhon Si Thammarat, Chantaburi, and Rayong. eng editor 1 Thu, 2026-01-22 - 19:00 * News * 2026 referendum * Constitutional amendment (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Military reform can boost Thai economy Sorawut WongsaranonThis is part 3 of the series Part 1: Is downsizing the Thai military possible? Part 2: How to reform Thailand’s military service? As the border conflict with Cambodia fuelled a surge of nationalism, the military was cast as a national hero. With the 2026 election closing in, People’s Party campaigners, who have long proposed military reform, reported being questioned by market vendors and passers-by over their criticism of the armed forces, making military reform appear far-fetched. Yet pressure to downsize the armed forces persists, driven not only by the opposition but also by some within the military itself, as shown in the first instalment on the military reform series. Structural discontent over compulsory conscription remains unresolved, reinforcing calls for a transition to a voluntary system, as shown in the second instalment. The prolonged tensions have laid bare weaknesses in combat readiness linked to inefficient procurement and the need for reform of the budget procedure, which is the focus of the last instalment of the series. This raise the question whether blind increases in weapons procurement budgets are truly cost-effective. In late May 2025, during parliamentary debates on the 2026 Budget Bill, Chayaphon Satondee, an MP of the People’s Party, which has also been at the forefront of exposing the security sector’s Information Operation against its own citizens, revealed that much of the Thai military’s equipment suffers from inadequate maintenance, with some weapons systems sidelined due to a lack of spare parts. Attributing this problem to inefficient procurement practices, Chayaphon proposed fixing regulations to increase domestic procurement and help develop Thailand’s own defence industry, an approach that could benefit not only the military but also the economy. The challenge is how to ensure that when national budgets are used to purchase expensive foreign systems, Thailand gains more than just the weapons themselves. Improve budget procedures Wiroj Lakkhanaadisorn, a People’s Party MP and former chair of the House Committee on Military Affairs, said that over the past two years, there has been noticeable improvement in how the armed forces propose their budgets. The White Papers and explanations given to the parliamentary budget committee have become far more detailed and transparent, clarifying how funds will be used. The armed forces have also been more willing to disclose procurement information to the committee, rather than classifying everything as a military secret. Among the three branches, the Royal Thai Air Force has shown the greatest clarity. However, a major problem remains in the way budgets are explained during hearings of the Select Committee on the Annual Budget Bill. The armed forces still rely on a single commander from each service to provide explanations, acting in a capacity equivalent to a department director-general—despite the military’s deeply layered hierarchy. Wiroj proposed two key changes. Firstly, department-level commanders must present and answer questions directly before the committee, since the funds involved come from taxpayers. Secondly, Section 17 of the 2020 Regulations of the Ministry of Defence on Budgeting must be amended. This regulation grants the armed forces special privileges not afforded to other agencies, allowing service commanders to consult directly with the Budget Bureau to revise their budgets and only inform the Defence Minister within 45 days afterward. Under this regulation, service commanders can effectively change budget allocations without prior ministerial approval. This elevates the regulation to the practical level of an act of parliament and gives the military the status of a state within a state. “The minister becomes just a nobody. After 45 days, you have purchased something already, you have issued the TOR, and you have begun the bidding already. If budgetary power is not pulled back to the executive or the legislature, we will never see a military under civilian government, never see a military that belongs to the people. That picture will never happen, because you can spend the budget however you want, change it however you want because it’s done legally,” said Wiroj. Improving budget processes and transparency underpins not only more effective procurement, but also a shift in civil–military relations towards civilian oversight, downsizing efforts, reform of military service, the development of domestic weapons production, and reduced reliance on foreign technologies—allowing resources to be focused where they matter most. Towards domestic production “[When it comes to] the weapons procurement budget, the way I and the People’s Party think about it, we sat down and calculated and found that we may have to ask the public to agree to increasing the military budget—and it is very likely to that it will happen, because funding for development of the military is really limited at the moment.” said Wiroj. This increase is despite the potential budget gain from proposed downsizing efforts which include reduction of personnel. Any increase in defence spending, he said should come with a greater proportion of domestic procurement, so that additional funding helps build Thailand’s own defence industry. This industry is already designated as a strategic target under the national strategy, one of the few elements of that strategy he said he actually agrees with. Beyond that, Thailand’s defence industry has the potential to create a full supply chain, generating high-skilled jobs within the country. This would not only produce economic benefits but also enhance national security, as Thailand would no longer need permission from foreign technology owners to upgrade its weapons systems. Reliance on foreign procurement has created persistent problems for the Thai military — ranging from maintenance and upgrades to spare parts stockpiling — while offering little benefit to the Thai economy, as it does not contribute to industrial development or workforce skills. As a result, any foreign weapons purchases should be tied to industrial and technological offset policies. If such mechanisms are put in place, he said, the public could be persuaded to accept increased defence spending aimed at enhancing the military’s capabilities. For example, Wiroj said that Thai Aviation Industries (TAI) has already obtained licences to maintain large aircraft and military helicopters—demonstrating Thailand’s existing strengths in engineering and technical expertise. The former Chair of the House Committee on Military Affairs also argued that the Thai military must develop its own military drone capabilities, relatively low-cost weapons capable of missions ranging from reconnaissance to destroying high-value assets such as tanks or naval vessels. Civilian drone systems, he said, cannot simply be repurposed for military use because of security risks, including software vulnerabilities that could expose the location of drone operators to adversaries, as well as the danger of flight data being transmitted abroad. If rival countries purchase systems from the same manufacturer, he asked, how can Thailand be confident that its data would not be compromised? Thailand therefore needs to develop its own military drone systems—and, if possible, turn them into export products. Wiroj pointed to Sweden’s model as an example. Sweden separates responsibilities between two agencies: the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration, which consolidates military requirements and tasks domestic industry with developing weapons systems for the government; and the Inspectorate of Strategic Products, which oversees the export of strategic military goods, ensuring that Swedish weapons are used strictly for defence, not aggression, and that recipient countries are democratic, non-hostile, and unlikely to become adversaries of Sweden. However, the Thai military has yet to complete its policy for drone operations, including deployment and counter-drone measures. Military drones range from large unmanned aerial vehicles like the US Predator to small, infantry-level portable drones. Without a coherent policy, procurement, operations, and inter-service coordination risk becoming disorganised and ineffective. While there are private Thai companies with the capacity to manufacture export-quality defence products, they face military regulations that act as barriers. One such rule requires that any weapon system procured by the Thai military must already have been deployed by the manufacturer’s home country. This effectively disqualifies Thai firms from consideration. “I believe we may need to also increase the budget for the military, but in exchange for domestic procurement with clear, step-by-step principles. And all TORs must be reviewed to ensure fairness, and there must be no criteria that excludes domestic defence manufacturers,” Wiroj said. The military appears to have acknowledged this issue. Defence Minister Gen Natthaphon Narkphanit said the regulation would be reviewed and amended. That said, domestic procurement alone cannot fully meet the military’s needs. Certain weapons systems, such as fighter aircraft, remain beyond Thailand’s current technological and manufacturing capabilities. eng editor 1 Thu, 2026-01-22 - 15:57 * Feature * military reform (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Is downsizing the Thai military possible? Sorawut WongsaranonThis is part 1 of the series Part 2: How to reform Thailand’s military service? Part 3: Military reform can boost Thai economy Military reform was a central issue in Thailand’s 2023 general election, with the People’s Party emerging as the most prominent advocate of change. As the 2026 election approaches, however, a border conflict has erupted, fuelling an unprecedented surge of nationalism and restoring the military to a position of heightened public reverence — raising fresh doubts over whether reform remains politically possible. Yet calls for change have not disappeared. In an interview with Wiroj Lakkhanaadisorn, a People’s Party MP and former chair of the House Committee on Military Affairs, a set of concrete proposals emerges. Despite his uncompromising stance on civilian oversight, Wiroj demonstrates a detailed understanding of perspectives within the armed forces — and, crucially, some within the military appear to share his view. This first instalment of three-part series on the military reform examines one foundational question: can the Thai military realistically be downsized? Too little, too late. One way to look at the size of the Thai military is through budget allocations and troop numbers. Looking at the budget, more than 50% of annual defence spending is consistently allocated to salaries and welfare for personnel across all branches, including both career officers and conscripts. And in terms of manpower, data from 2023 show that the Thai armed forces had nearly 400,000 personnel, including conscripts. Defence budget and personnel expenditure (2022–2026) Year Total defence budget (baht) Personnel budget (baht) Share (%) 2022 201,666,421,000 105,034,561,800 52.08 2023 194,498,728,200 107,439,035,500 55.24 2024 195,743,956,500 109,164,420,400 55.77 2025 199,721,388,900 106,645,839,500 53.40 2026 204,241,797,100 107,789,631,400 52.78 Source: Annual Budget Acts, fiscal years 2022–2026 Military personnel by branch (February 2023) Agency Commissioned officers Non-commissioned officers Enlisted soldiers Total Office of the Permanent Secretary 3,588 2,586 1,366 7,540 Armed Forces Headquarters 6,295 11,905 1,973 20,173 Royal Thai Army 34,259 102,611 108,105 244,975 Royal Thai Navy 13,691 27,711 23,078 64,480 Royal Thai Air Force 12,197 18,108 13,908 44,213 Total 70,030 162,921 148,430 381,381 Source: Status of Ministry of Defence Personnel, February 2023, cited in the unofficial study “Reduction of Ministry of Defence Personnel for a Modern Military” by Maj Gen Sathaporn Krasaesaen, written as part of the Senior Executive Development Programme, Civil Service Training Institute,, Office of the Civil Service Commission, 2023. Can a force of this size be considered efficient? More progressive voices among both civilians and the military say no. While plans to downsize already exist within the armed forces, their implementation is expected to be modest at best and to take far longer than many members of the public have been calling for. Old soldiers never die “Generals today were cadets at the Armed Forces Academies Preparatory School in the past. They are the result of miscalculations in manpower planning. Back then, we feared the Cold War would escalate, so large numbers were recruited,” Wiroj said. ”Now they are nearing 60. They haven’t done anything wrong. I think this is something the state must deal with and not asses that there are more than needed and simply cut them loose.” Wiroj maintains that downsizing remains necessary. Firstly, the military’s early retirement scheme must offer stronger incentives. According to the Office of Military Service Commission, an early retirement scheme was implemented under Cabinet resolutions between 2008 and 2018. Eligible personnel received a lump-sum payment based on the remaining years of service, capped at 8–15 times the final monthly salary, including position allowances. Under the current scheme, it has been reduced to 7–10 times. “The reduced incentives led to fewer generals or colonels joining the scheme and it is limited to generals only. Your scheme should also be open to colonels. And there is no publicity from the military.” said Wiroj. Secondly, the military’s highly fragmented departments and units need to be consolidated. However, Wiroj likened the process to merging two schools, each with its own principal. “If neither has done anything wrong, and both are hard-working and committed, what do you do?” he said. Wiroj argued that successful reform must be carried out gradually to minimise resistance. Who implements the reforms also matters. “For the political side to dissolve agencies at random wouldn’t be right. Having the owner of an agency propose abolishing it is unrealistic,” Wiroj said. “So there needs to be a central internal body of the military, like a consultancy, to come in and study when personnel numbers are reduced to a level where they can be realistically joined to a certain agency.” Thirdly, military personnel numbers could be reduced. According to the Royal Thai Army, the approved strength currently stands at 133,357 personnel. However, cutting the roughly 88,000 conscripts is not feasible. Instead, he argues that a more realistic scope for cuts lies in other sections, which together account for around 45,000 personnel. These include around 4,000 personnel in command units, 8,000 in administrative and logistics roles, 21,000 in regional units, 8,000 in training and military doctrine, and another 4,000 in national development units. Together, these could be reduced by roughly half — to around 20,000 positions—bringing total army personnel down to roughly 110,000. If certain functions are necessary, “they can be procured as service contractors, as other government departments do,” Wiroj said. He suggested that routine maintenance tasks such as mowing lawns, gardening, and cleaning toilets be outsourced instead of assigning them to conscripts — a practice so entrenched that it continues to be reproduced in Thai soap operas. Insiders agree “More than half of the Ministry of Defence’s current budgetary burden is spent on personnel. This affects the budget available for mission operations and project implementations, including procurement of military hardware and spare parts acquisition, and maintenance,” wrote Maj Gen Sathaporn Krasaesaen, Assistant Director-General, Office of Military Service Commission, Ministry of Defence, in ‘Reduction of Ministry of Defence Personnel for a Modern Military’, a report prepared in 2023 as part of the Senior Executive Development Programme, Civil Service Training Institute, Office of the Civil Service Commission. The report closely mirrors proposals put forward by Wiroj, outlining reform targets the military had set for itself. The obstacles it identifies reflect deep-seated institutional inertia. Early retirement schemes that were implemented by the Cabinet, the Military Service Commission and the National Defence Council approved the majority of retirement applications. However, it has been argued that these schemes resulted in the loss of too many capable personnel, forcing the Ministry to recruit and appoint new staff to replace those who had left. Early retirement participation by approval authority Fiscal Year Cabinet Military Civil Service Commission National Defence Council 2008 460 820 1 2009 422 640 2 2010 5,511 189 – 2011 6,175 – – 2012 6,913 48 6 2013 4,783 529 9 2014 2,459 305 10 2015 4,035 33 6 2016 5,258 48 15 2017 6,318 160 13 2018 8,679 162 17 2019 – 278 8 2020 – 678 15 2021 – 933 19 2022 – 958 18 2023 – 952 – Total 51,013 6,733 139 Source: “Reduction of Ministry of Defence Personnel for a Modern Military,” Maj Gen Sathaporn Krasaesaen, 2023. The military also sought to reduce the number of generals in advisory positions and commissioned officers in operational roles. Specifically, advisory positions were to be cut from 768 to 384, and commissioned officers from 2,696 to 1,349—half of their 2008 levels. However, positions eliminated in some areas were effectively reabsorbed into newly established units. Even if not at the same scale, this prevented the intended reductions from being fully achieved. A plan to reduce active-duty military personnel by 5% by 2027 failed during 2021–2022 due to lack of an integrated, ministry-wide recruitment system. Efforts to replace military personnel with civilian officials did not clearly reduce overall personnel numbers or the Ministry of Defence’s budget. And attempts to reduce conscription intake proved difficult, as it was viewed as having a direct impact on the military’s missions. Maj Gen Sathaporn proposes restructuring units based on threat assessments, including comparative analyses of military capabilities within ASEAN, developing integrated manpower plans; outsourcing, more targeted cuts — such as reducing special advisory general positions to 288 by 2028 with minimal disruption, developing multi-skilled personnel, and implementing an early retirement scheme limited to low-performing personnel. But again, the report cautions that the proposals will face “a lack of acceptance from relevant agencies.” Units slated for downsizing are likely to resist change, while legal constraints, potential impacts on personnel morale, and the financial burden of early retirement schemes and investments in replacement technologies pose additional challenges. Reform of the Defence Council For downsizing to work, the Defence Council, a key decision-making body in military governance, must allow measures to be implemented. At present, it does not. Among its many problems, only two of the Defence Council’s 25 members are civilians—the defence minister and deputy defence minister, who serve as Chair and Deputy Chair. The remaining members comprise 19 military officers and three “qualified experts” nominated by the Defence Council itself. This composition stems from the 2008 Ministry of Defence Organisation Act, a legacy of the 2006 military coup. An attempt to amend the Act was ultimately shelved after the draft bill was withdrawn from the parliamentary agenda. Proposals have come from three sources. Regarding the Defence Council’s composition, the Pheu Thai Party proposes a 15-member Council comprising nine military officers, one director-general-level civil servant, and three external experts. The People’s Party suggests a smaller 12-member Council with the weakest military presence—five military officers alongside five external experts. By contrast, the Judge Advocate General’s Office proposes a 21-member Council that would retain the strongest military influence, with 14 military officers and five external experts. The greater the military presence, the weaker the civilian oversight, increasing the need for political manoeuvring for the Council to function. However, all proposals share common elements: reducing the number of Council members, adjusting the proportion of external experts, and transferring the power to nominate those experts to the Cabinet—with final approval by the Defence Minister—rather than allowing the Defence Council to appoint them internally. “They [the military] say they don’t want politics to interfere, but a structure that is completely made up of soldiers alone like this slows the armed forces down,” Wiroj said, noting that even senior officers on the Council have privately acknowledged that many proposals are stuck in a queue. “This is something that needs to be discussed and resolved. I say it’s possible to talk about it, because progressive-minded officers, they already know that the current Defence Council structure is extremely slow. It’s not that they’re unaware of the problem.” eng editor 1 Thu, 2026-01-22 - 15:03 * Feature * military reform * Wiroj Lakkhanaadisorn (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Wrong Island, Long Island The lightning occupation of Long Island by a NATO force spearheaded by Greenland Special Forces has exposed serious flaws in US defences and called into further question the controversial interventions by President Trump on the international scene. A NATO spokesperson said that their mission to seize and occupy Long Island had been successfully achieved with no loss of life or damage to property. Opposition has been minimal and limited to ‘a handful of the usual suspects in MAGA hats spouting misinformation from Fox News’. The NATO move came after US forces engaged in almost simultaneous attacks on Greenland, where Trump has consistently demanded ownership, and a long list of other countries. The size and complexity of these US military operations seem to have left the home territory unguarded and vulnerable to the NATO takeover. The countries reporting attacks by the US include Denmark, which controls foreign and military affairs for Greenland, and many other NATO members who responded to the US attacks by invoking Article 5 of the NATO charter which says that an armed attack against one NATO member shall be considered an attack against them all. Hostilities seem to be particularly serious in Norway, where US forces were reportedly looking for the hiding place of ‘Trump’s Nobel Peace Prize’, and in Scotland around golf courses owned by Trump where resentment among the local population has seen protests personally directed against Trump, some bordering on the obscene. US forces also attempted an invasion of Iran as a continuation of long-standing enmity between the two countries. Trump had been making threats over the Tehran regime’s reaction to widespread popular protests, supposedly in defence of the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. Ironically, his reaction to similar protests in US cities has been to invoke the Insurrection Act of 1807 and deploy military personnel on city streets where they have been besieged by protestors blowing whistles and throwing snowballs. It is thought that this further weakened US defences and facilitated the NATO attack. The US also attacked Venezuela, ISIL-controlled areas of Syria and Iraq, Nigeria, Yemen and Somalia. In a post on Truth Social, Trump explained the attack on Somalia as revenge for what was happening in Minneapolis where federal forces have been thwarted in their attempts to deport everyone of Somali descent, regardless of their immigration or citizenship status. An attack on Albania was started but then quickly cancelled. A US State Department spokesperson speaking on condition of anonymity explained that this was the result of an error in communication since the target was really Armenia. ‘The President has often confused the two,’ said the spokesperson, adding that he wanted nothing further to do with ‘this idiocy’. He explained that the attack on Armenia was justified because ‘it has a confusing name.’ The concerted US attacks provoked global outrage and US embassies and businesses around the world have been stormed by angry crowds. Pleas by local diplomats for extra protection seem to have gone unheeded as all US troops are engaged elsewhere. Meanwhile, the US has received offers of support from Israel, who claimed that since the population of the New York borough of Brooklyn included large numbers of Jews, the NATO occupation was ‘blatantly antisemitic’. A Kremlin source also revealed that President Putin had offered to ‘drop a few missiles on the Hamptons or other populated areas’ in return for a free hand in recapturing Ukraine and the Baltic States. Putin is reported to have also offered to ‘take Greenland off Trump’s hands’ as a friendly gesture between two great leaders. Reporters on the ground on Long Island say that after the initial shock, local residents were beginning to come to terms with their new situation. NATO officials had come prepared with a publicity campaign to explain that residents would immediately enjoy the rights and privileges of Danish citizens. ‘Free health care? Free education? What’s not to like?’ said one interviewee whose comments have gone viral on social media. Many New Yorkers from Brooklyn and Queens commented that the occupation ‘was better even than Mamdani already’. Reports suggest that residents of Manhattan, the Bronx and Staten Island were inviting NATO forces to cross the bridges and occupy their boroughs too. While most observers focused on the momentous first foreign occupation of mainland US territory in the nation’s history, President Trump seems to have been most concerned about the possible loss of properties owned by his companies that are now under the jurisdiction of a foreign power. NATO leaders have made it clear that they would be willing to make a deal with Trump, exchanging Long Island for Greenland, where US troops, poorly equipped for an Arctic winter, are struggling to overcome the resistance of 56,000 mostly unarmed residents. Observers believe that time is running out for Trump because the longer the inhabitants of Long Island live like Greenlanders, the less likely they will want to go back to living under Trump. eng editor 3 Thu, 2026-01-22 - 14:02 * Alien Thoughts * Harrison George * Satire (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Former ministers found not guilty of ethics breach following senators’ complaint The Constitutional Court has dismissed an ethics breach complaint filed against former Deupty Prime Minister Phumtham Wechayachai and former Justice Minister Tawee Sodsong over the Department of Special Investigation (DSI)’s investigation into alleged vote manipulation during the Senate selection. The complaint was filed by a number of senators, who accused Phumtham and Tawee of trying to interfere with the Election Commission of Thailand (ECT)’s investigation into the alleged vote manipulation by ordering the DSI to take the case. The senators claimed that the order was a threat and an attempt to dominate the Senate, which is part of the legislature, going against the rule of law and the separation of power between the executive and legislative branches. They said that the two ministers lack honesty and integrity, and that this was a serious breach of ethical standards and requested the Senate President to petition the Constitutional Court for their dismissal. The Constitutional Court ruled that Phumtham and Tawee were not guilty of an ethical breach or show that they lack honesty and integrity as they did not make threats or abuse their power to interfere with the investigation. Phumtham and Tawee are no longer ministers, however. They were dismissed along with the rest of former Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s Cabinet when the Constitutional Court dismissed Paetongtarn over a leaked phone call with Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen. eng editor 1 Wed, 2026-01-21 - 17:31 * News * Tawee Sodsong * Phumtham Wechayachai * Constitutional court (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Thailand is heading for a historic constitutional referendum. Here is what’s happening. When Thai voters go to the polls on 8 February, they will receive three ballots: two for the general election, and one for a referendum which will ask them whether they want a new constitution. It will be a watershed moment for Thai politics. Written by a junta-appointed drafting committee, the 2017 Constitution is seen as a deeply flawed document. Civil society networks and political parties have proposed amendments but most of these attempts have failed. For many, a vote in favour of a new referendum would open the door for the public to have a say in the drafting of the nation’s fundamental law, while a vote against would make it likely that future amendments become impossible. Concerns have been raised among civil society, however, that a large group of voters may not even know that the referendum is happening. The Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) is accused of voter suppression; it has not done much to inform voters about the referendum, and allowed only three days for overseas and out-of-constituency voters to register to vote. A campaign launched by a network of civil society organizations advocating for constitutional amendments is now in full swing, informing people about the referendum and calling for a vote in favour. The deciding match The People's Constitutional Drafting Group (ConForAll) organised a park run at Benchakitti Park on 7 January to campaign for people to vote in favour of a new constitution. “Thailand is a country that has never been fully democratic,” said Yingcheep Atchanont, Director of the legal watchdog NGO iLaw. “Since we became a constitutional monarchy around 93 years ago, we have been in a cycle of military coups.” The pattern, Yingcheep explained, is that a coup would be followed by an election conducted under a set of rules designed by coup leaders that are not entirely democratic. Thailand has had 20 constitutions, the majority of which were drafted by junta-appointed bodies after the previous constitution was repealed in a coup. He said that the public has never really been allowed to participate in the drafting process or to elect a drafting body. As a result, he said, Thailand’s constitutions are written to deal with what the elite see as political problems, such as to prevent specific people from assuming office or to keep coup leaders in power. “[The Constitution] has never been a law that incorporates the will of the people about what they want the country to be,” he said. The referendum will be the first time in history that the Thai public has been asked whether it wants a new Constitution to replace one written by a junta. Failing to gain approval for a new Constitution would mean the status quo imposed by coup leaders would put down deeper roots in Thailand, and Yingcheep said that without a vote in favour, he does not see how the 2017 Constitution can be amended. Although he speculates that it is more likely for the majority to vote in favour of a new Constitution, Yingcheep said that the road ahead is not easy. Given the political situation, he noted that the ‘powers to be’ are still seeking to dominate the drafting process. He said he hopes to see an overwhelming majority vote in favour of a new Constitution. “If that happens, it would be an important declaration from the people that they want democracy, that they want the power to be theirs. They do not want a system designed by the military,” he said. “It would be an important starting point for democracy.” Yingcheep Atchanont For Yingcheep, the challenge is not trying to get enough turnout for the referendum or people who disagree. He noted that campaign events in Bangkok have not been disrupted and that the organisers were given permission to use public parks for the events. Instead, the challenge is that voters may not know the referendum is happening or what its implications are. The government and the ECT have not been trying hard enough to make sure people understand what is happening, Yingcheep said. He speculated that the now-caretaker government of Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul did not really want to call the referendum but had to because amending the Constitution was one of the conditions set out in the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the Bhumjaithai Party and the People’s Party which guaranteed the votes for Anutin to become Prime Minister after the removal of Paetongtarn Shinawatra. He also noted that because the referendum is taking place at the same time as the general election, political parties may be too busy with their own campaigns to help convince people to vote in favour of a new Constitution. The hope, he said, now lies with active citizens mobilized to help spread the news. “Whether it will be successful or not is in the hands of the people, not in the hands of the political parties, and the government will definitely not do it,” he said. iLaw and other civil society organizations have launched a campaign informing people about the referendum and calling on them to vote ‘yes.’ They are organizing park runs in Bangkok every Wednesday leading up to election day, with other events also taking part in other provinces. Meanwhile, volunteers are visiting markets to hand out flyers and speaking about constitutional amendments. Yingcheep hopes that the events will attract a large number of participants and volunteers, which could help raise awareness. “If ordinary people stand up and do it, then it’s possible. If not, I don’t know how many millions will go to the polls on 8 February without knowing what the third ballot paper is,” he said. Changing a flawed rulebook The current Constitution of Thailand was drafted by a 21-person committee appointed by the coup leaders in the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) with no public participation in the drafting process. It was adopted in 2017 following a public referendum held amidst repression of dissidents and critics for disseminating information “distorted from the facts or having violent aggressive, rude, inciting, or threatening characteristics.” Persuading voters to vote in a certain way or refrain from voting carried a prison sentence of up to 10 years and a fine of up to 200,000 baht. Meanwhile, the NCPO issued orders restricting media freedom and prohibiting political protests. This prevented open discussions about the pros and cons of the Constitution and the referendum. Over 200 people faced charges for campaigning about the referendum. Some parts of the Constitution were also changed after it was approved in the referendum. The 2017 Constitution has been criticised by civil society as designed for the NCPO junta and its network to remain in power. For the first five years after the Constitution was adopted, the NCPO-appointed Senate was empowered to join the House of Representatives in the vote for a Prime Minister. In 2019, 249 of 250 senators voted for NCPO leader Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha as Prime Minister. In 2023, the Senate refused to vote for Move Forward Party leader and Prime Minister candidate Pita Limjaroenrat, even though the party won the most seats in the House and he was able to secure the majority of MPs’ votes. After the end of the term of the first Senate, new senators were selected in a process where candidates voted among themselves with no public participation. It has been noted that this created the opportunity for a conspiracy to manipulate voting, and that many of the current senators are connected to the Bhumjaithai Party. Bills proposing amendments to the Constitution require approval from one third of senators, giving whoever dominates the Senate effective veto power. So far, 26 constitutional amendment bills have been proposed, and all but one were rejected. According to iLaw, 13 of these bills were approved by a majority in the House of Representatives but could not gain enough Senate votes to pass. A protest in front of parliament in May 2025 called for the Senate to suspend appointments of independent body members as investigation is ongoing over vote manipulation in the Senate selection. Civil society members have made the demand on the grounds that the Senate should not be appointing people to the bodies responsible for investigating senators. (Photo by Ginger Cat) The Senate is also solely responsible for appointing members of independent bodies, including the ECT, the National Anti-Corruption Commission and the Constitutional Court. In 2025, the Senate approved as Constitutional Court judges 2 candidates with connections to the Bhumjaithai Party, while rejecting independent experts like political scientist Siripan Nogsuan Sawasdee. The Constitutional Court has the power to dismiss prime ministers and MPs, dissolve political parties, or declare elections invalid. It has repeatedly invoked vaguely defined ‘ethical standards’ to dismiss politicians from office or dissolve political parties. Since 2017, it has dissolved three political parties, dismissed a handful of MPs, and in the past two years alone, dismissed two Prime Ministers, Srettha Thavisin and Paetongtarn Shinawatra, over ‘breaches of ethics.’ Meanwhile, under the 2017 Constitution, citizens are no longer allowed to petition for the dismissal of politicians or members of independent bodies. When it comes to rights and freedoms, the 2017 Constitution says that the exercise of rights and freedoms must not affect national security, peace and order, or good morals. Previous constitutions specified only certain cases of national security. A number of rights enshrined in previous constitutions are also not included in the 2017 Constitution. These include the right to a free basic education, the right of consumers to be informed, the right to an efficient justice system and to state-appointed legal representation, the right to welfare for the disabled, and the right to healthcare. Instead, these are now “duties of the state.” In previous constitutions, citizens were able to file lawsuits when their constitutional rights were violated and were entitled to compensation. When these rights are framed instead as duties of the state, citizens are powerless to seek such compensation. Voter suppression or mismanagement? But getting to the referendum has not been smooth sailing. In recent weeks, the ECT has been under fire for several mishaps which have led many to accuse it of voter suppression. Civil society organizations and voters have criticized its decision to open registration for overseas and out-of-constituency referendum voting in the narrow window of 3 – 5 January. The period was said to be too short, and it fell just after the New Year holidays, when many voters were returning from trips and might not have had the chance to register. Some voters who registered to vote early or overseas in the general election may also have been left unaware that they have to register separately to vote in the referendum. Demands for the registration period to be extended have been denied. Concerns were also raised that the registration website might not have been able to handle the influx of people accessing it over the last days of registration; in previous elections the site had gone down. On 5 January, some netizens reported that they had issues accessing the website. Some also said they were unable to register to vote because the website was down and they could not access it before registration closed. Moreover, early voting is not allowed in the referendum, so people who have registered to vote early in the general election because they cannot go to the polls on 8 February will not be able to vote in the referendum. ECT Secretary-General Sawaeng Boonmee posted on Facebook that this is because the law allows only out-of-constituency voting, which in the case of the referendum means another province as each province is considered one constituency. According to the ECT, 2,402,178 people registered for advance or overseas voting in the general election, while 1,598,056 people registered to vote overseas or out-of-constituency in the referendum. The difference of over 800,000 raised concerns among civil society that these voters may effectively be denied the right to vote in the referendum. Sawaeng said during a press conference that one should not assume people who register to vote early in the general election will also want to vote outside of their constituency in the referendum. He also said that the registration period cannot be extended because the ECT needs the time to complete other administrative tasks, and that since registration should not take more than three minutes, everyone should be able to do so if they manage their time well. The election observer group We Watch noted that the sample ballot paper in the information booklet published by the ECT is blue when it will actually be yellow, and instead of telling voters to mark the ballot with an ‘X’, the booklet just tells voters to make a mark without specifying that they need to put a cross. Former Election Commissioner Somchai Srisutthiyakorn posted on Facebook that this might cause voters to misunderstand that they can mark the ballot with any symbol, which would lead to a large number of invalid ballots. The ECT has since published an online version of the booklet with an accurate sample ballot paper. Sawaeng told reporters that the content of the booklet was provided by the Cabinet, and that the ECT was responsible only for its publication and distribution. We Watch said that the ECT and the Cabinet have acted unprofessionally. Although a corrected version has been published online, the booklets have already been delivered to voters and the Cabinet and the ECT should take responsibility for their mistakes. The ECT has also been accused of trying to manipulate voters’ decisions; several passages in the booklet have been seen as steering voters towards a vote against. In the list of possible reasons for not drafting a new constitution, the booklet states that drafting a new constitution could lead to more political conflict than section-by-section amendments where the debate would be more limited. It also notes that drafting a new constitution may mean having to waste money on conducting a referendum for final approval. The list of reasons for and against, according to the booklet, came from parliamentary debates on constitutional amendment bills. The ECT is also facing criticisms over the layout of polling stations and the polling station plan which it has published and which is difficult to understand. Although votes for the general election and the referendum are cast at the same polling station, the procedures for the two votes will be kept separate. Voters must present their ID at the first desk to receive the ballot papers for the general election, mark their ballots and put them in the ballot boxes, before repeating the entire process for the referendum vote. Concerns have been raised that the process is unnecessarily complicated and could confuse voters who may inadvertently exit the polling station without voting in the referendum. Civil society organizations have demanded that the ECT change the layout so that all three ballot papers (for constituency MPs, for party-list MPs and for the referendum) are collected at one polling desk and marked in the same booth, but the ECT has refused. An administrative lawsuit has been filed against the ECT over this issue. The road ahead A participant in another park run organised by ConForAll took pictures in front of a backdrop calling for a vote in favour of a new constitution. (Photo by Ginger Cat) The referendum is the first of three that the Constitutional Court has ruled are necessary to rewrite the Constitution. While a double majority – a turnout of more than half of all eligible voters, at least half of whom vote in favour – was previously required, an amendment to the Referendum Act made in 2025 means that only a simple majority is now required. If the majority of voters approve the drafting of a new Constitution, Parliament will have to pass a bill to amend Section 256 of the current Constitution to set up the process of forming the drafting body and drafting the new Constitution. If this amendment receives parliamentary approval, a second referendum is needed to gain public approval. If the amendment to Section 256 is approved by the public, members of the drafting body can then be selected and begin the process of drafting a new constitution. The completed draft will then have to be approved in a third and final referendum. eng editor 1 Tue, 2026-01-20 - 17:19 * Feature * referendum * 2026 referendum * Constitutional amendment * 2017 Constitution (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Appeal Court sentences protester to prison for putting paper on King’s portrait Following a verdict reversed by the Appeal Court, a 34-year-old protester has been sentenced to prison on a royal defamation charge for allegedly attaching a piece of paper with offensive words to a portrait of King Vajiralongkorn in front of the Supreme Court during a protest in 2021. Chukiat ‘Justin’ Saengwong, a protester well known for wearing crop tops at protests, faced seven criminal charges, including sedition and royal defamation, after he attached a piece of paper with the message ‘For dumping filth and rubbish! to the King’s portrait in front of the Supreme Court during a 20 March 2021 protest, according to Thai Lawyers for Human Rights. Chukiat was arrested on the night of 22 March 2021, and detained during the investigation stage. He was released on 1 June 2021. On 15 June 2023, the Court of First Instance dismissed the sedition and royal defamation charges, given that no witness or evidence proved that Chukiat committed the crime as alleged. According to the Court, a photo taken by a police officer only showed an unidentified person reaching towards the portrait, but it did not appear that this person attached the piece of paper. The Court gave him the benefit of the doubt. Chukiat was instead sentenced to one month and fined 2,000 baht for violating the Emergency Decree since he admitted that he participated in the protest. However, since he had never been imprisoned, he was given a one-year-suspension of sentence. He was also ordered to report to a probation officer four times within a year and to perform 12 hours of community service. The public prosecutor appealed the verdict. On 19 January, the Appeal Court reversed the initial verdict, sentencing Chukiat to three years in prison on the royal defamation charge. The Court also revoked the probation imposed by the Court of First Instance, while the other verdicts remained unchanged. Among those in the pro-democracy protests who have been calling for political and monarchy reform, the crop top has been used to lampoon news about the King and the Queen. Chukiat became well known for his speeches and public appearances in protests where he wore a crop top. The nickname ‘Justin’ comes from Justin Bieber, a famous singer who wears crop tops. eng editor 3 Tue, 2026-01-20 - 11:23 * News * Chukiat Saengwong * Royal defamation * Section 112 * lese majeste * pro-democracy protests 2021 (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Appeal Court sentences delivery rider to prison for burning King’s portrait A food delivery rider has been sentenced to prison by the Appeal Court on a royal defamation charge for allegedly attempting to set fire to a portrait of King Vajiralongkorn and Queen Suthida during a protest in July 2021. 28-year-old Sitthichok Sethasavet was accused of setting fire to a portrait of King Vajiralongkorn and Queen Suthida at a royal ceremonial arch on Ratchadamnoen Nok Avenue during a protest on 18 July 2021. He was charged with royal defamation, arson, destruction of property, and violation of the Emergency Decree. Sitthichok said that he was on his way to deliver an order when he passed through the protest on Ratchadamnoen Nok and saw a fire at the royal arch. Since he has experience volunteering in an emergency rescue unit, he tried to put out the fire using a bottle of water mixed with purple grape-flavoured soda that he carried in his motorcycle to drink while working during the day. On the same day, a picture of Sitthichok standing by his motorcycle was posted on Twitter, along with a claim that he set fire to the portrait. Because the photo also showed a pink Foodpanda delivery box, the company’s official account replied to the tweet saying the platform has a policy “against violence and all forms of terrorism” and that the rider in question would be fired immediately. It also said that the platform is willing to help the authorities in pressing charges against the culprit. Over 10 police officers went to Sitthichok’s house in Rangsit and arrested him on 19 July 2021. He was released on 20 July on bail of 100,000 baht. The Court of First Instance sentenced him to three years for royal defamation and six months for violation of the Emergency Decree. Due to his helpful testimony, the total prison term was reduced to two years and four months without suspension. He later appealed the case. The food delivery rider argued that he did not participate in the protest, and the bottle of liquid he used did not contain oil or an inflammable substance, as alleged. In addition, the prosecution witnesses were unable to prove the allegation. He was granted provisional bail on 10 February 2021. Since his first day in prison, Sitthichok went on a hunger strike to protest his own detention. On 19 January, the Appeal Court upheld the initial verdict, adding that the evaporation of chemical substances may have made it impossible to investigate the fuel which was believed to have caused the fire. The Court believed that Sitthichok had no intention to extinguish the fire, but rather intensify it, concluding that he may have foreseen the consequence of such action — damage to the royal portrait. This case highlights a key issue in criminal proceedings, where “intention” is a key factor in determining liability. According to the Criminal Code, a person is liable for a criminal charge only if it is proven that they acted intentionally or foresaw the consequences of their actions. Given that it is not possible to directly prove an accused’s state of mind, the court bases its decision on the surrounding circumstances and evidence, sometimes exercising judicial discretion in interpreting those facts. eng editor 3 Mon, 2026-01-19 - 17:25 * News * Royal defamation * Section 112 * lese majeste * pro-democracy protest 2021 * Foodpanda * Sitthichok Sethasavet (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

ECT urged to revoke redundant voting regulations ahead of elections Ahead of the 2026 elections, which will coincide with the constitutional referendum, the Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) has been urged to revoke its regulations that require voters to identify themselves twice at the same polling station for the elections and referendum, given that the redundant process could cause confusion. On Thursday (15 January), lawyer Thanu Rungrotreungchai filed a petition with the Central Administrative Court, requesting the court to revoke the ECT’s regulations governing the voting procedure in the upcoming elections and constitutional referendum. The general election is scheduled for 8 February. The constitutional referendum, asking whether Thai people agree with drafting a new constitution, will also take place on the same day. Even though the polling booths for elections and referendum are arranged in the same area, the ECT requires voters to identify themselves twice to receive the two ballots to cast their votes in separate booths. A mock polling station arranged by the ECT the polling station had a single entrance and exit. Voters were required first to identify themselves to cast their ballots for the general election (with separate ballot papers for party list and constituency MPs), and then to identify themselves a second time to receive the referendum ballots. ECT regulations also require voters to cast their ballots in the election before voting in the referendum. The lawyer argued that according to the Constitution, the ECT is responsible for facilitating electoral processes and making them convenient for the public, adding that the current regulations are so complicated that they could create a burden for voters, with the risk that those who misunderstand the entire process could inadvertently give up their rights. Those who registered for advance voting in the general election, which takes place on 1 February, will have to vote again on 8 February on the constitutional referendum. Eligible voters living abroad will receive both ballots at the same time by mail, and are required return them to the Thai embassies in their countries by January 27. eng editor 3 Mon, 2026-01-19 - 10:47 * News * Thanu Rungrotreungchai * 2026 General Elections * Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) * Constitutional amendment (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Two netizens face defamation suit for criticising Deputy PM over alleged link to scam network Two netizens have been sued for defamation by Deputy PM Thammanat Prompao after they commented on Facebook about a censure debate in which a People’s Party MP raised concerns about a scam network allegedly linked to Thai politicians. Thammanat has filed 270 defamation cases since October 2025 related to online comments linked to a scam network. Thai Lawyers for Human Rights (TLHR) reported that two netizens, Tharathorn from Saraburi and Ekarak from Chachoengsao, face defamation lawsuits for their online comments targeting the Deputy PM and Agriculture Minister Thammanat. Both of them went to report at Phayao Police Station on Thursday (15 January). Meanwhile, Tharathon has received a summons from November 2025. He requested the case to be transferred to Saraburi, but his request was rejected. He had to travel over 600 kilometres to Phayao Police Station. Their comments stemmed from MP Rangsiman Rome’s speech in parliament in September 2025 about a scam network allegedly linked to Thai politicians, including Thammanat himself. During the censure debate, MP Rangsiman questioned the Deputy PM’s relationship with Ben Smith, also known as Benjamin Mauerberger, who is allegedly involved in scam network operations in Cambodia. The scrutiny followed the release of a photo showing Thammanat together with former PM Thaksin Shinawatra and Mauerberger, which was published by prominent investigative journalist Tom Wright. Rangsiman himself was recently sued for defamation by Benjamin Mauerberger on 12 January. Thammanat told the media on 2 October that he had initiated legal proceedings against those involved in the censure debate on this issue and against 270 netizens who commented about it. Apart from Tharathorn and Ekarat, another citizen, Suphaphorn Phosri, revealed that she had received a summons in a case filed by Thammanat at Phayao Police Station. The charge stems from her Facebook post about Thammanat’s qualifications, which have been questioned by the general public. In her post, she is alleged to have said that instead of clarifying, Thammanat chose to threaten those who questioned him. According to TLHR, since 2019, Thammanat, then an MP candidate for the Palang Pracharath Party in Phayao Province, has filed an array of charges against Phayao residents, university students who posted Facebook criticisms of Party MPs during the election campaign, or even against MPs from a rival political party, including Chaithawat Thulathon of the Move Forward Party. Thammanat has been a controversial political figure since he served time in prison in connection with a drug trafficking conviction in Australia in 1994. Despite multiple scandals, his political rise has secured him influential positions. Prior to his current role, Thammanat served as Agriculture Minister under former PMs Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha and Srettha Thavisin. Regarding the drug trafficking case, Thammanat said during a censure debate in 2020 that the Australian Court convicted him by mistake, as the heroin in fact ‘was flour,’ an excuse which has gone viral on Thailand’s social media platforms. The Constitutional Court was asked to rule whether Thammanat was disqualified from holding a ministerial post because of his drug conviction in Australia. The Court ruled that as his conviction was by an Australian court not a Thai court, he was not disqualified. eng editor 3 Sat, 2026-01-17 - 12:01 * News * online freedom * Thammanat Prompao * scam (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Cartoon by Stephff: Thai grim reaper of serial negligence Cartoon by Stephff: Thai grim reaper of serial negligence eng editor 1 Fri, 2026-01-16 - 15:39 * Multimedia (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Two killed in another crane collapse in Thailand Two people have been killed when a crane collapsed on Rama II Road. The incident occurred just a day after a train collided with a collapsed construction crane, under the oversight of the same contractor, in Thailand’s northeast, leaving 32 killed. The latest fatal crane collapse occurred on Thursday (15 January), crushing two passing cars and killing two people. It was being used in the construction of elevated expressway No.82 on Rama II Road in Samut Sakorn province. The project was approved in 2021 by the Cabinet of former Prime Minister Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha. Then Transport Minister Saksayam Chidchob reportedly signed the project’s Integrity Pact. Following the collapse, Deputy PM and Transport Minister Phiphat Ratchakitprakarn announced the temporary suspension of all elevated roadway construction for public safety, stating that the Ministry would call upon all contractors to discuss and review safety standards. He added that contractors must fully comply with safety measures before resuming any construction. Meanwhile, PM Anutin Charnvirakul later terminated contracts in two projects regarding the Rama II expressways under the oversight of Italian-Thai Development. The incident occurred just a day after a moving train, No.21 travelling from Bangkok to Ubon Ratchathani, collided with a fallen crane in Nakhon Ratchasima, resulting in 32 killed and dozens injured. The construction work is being handled by the same company involved in the Rama II Road incident, Italian-Thai Development, which, despite several fatal incidents in recent years, has continued to receive numerous state concessions. * At least 32 killed as crane collapses onto train According to Bangkok Biz News, the company won at least 213 state construction bids worth no less than 134,000 million baht since 2015. Since 2017, projects overseen by the company have also had five fatal incident, resulting in approximately 128 deaths. Last year, Thailand witnessed the collapse of a 33-storey building, the only structure to collapse during a fatal earthquake, resulting in the deaths of nearly a hundred workers. The construction project was also overseen by Italian-Thai Development, and legal proceedings are still ongoing in the court. These incidents highlighted how common deadly construction accidents are in the country. Rama II Road, which serves as the main route connecting Thailand’s capital to the South, has been under construction for decades and has undergone several construction projects with different phases and contractors. It is one of Thailand’s most dangerous roads.  Since 2018, around 140 people have died in construction accidents. It has also seen over 2,500 accidents, injuring some 1,400 people. eng editor 3 Thu, 2026-01-15 - 22:27 * News * Italian-Thai Development * Quality of life * Rama II (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Civil society demands ECT combine polling booths for election and referendum A network of civil society groups has demanded that the Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) change its polling station layout so voting for the general election and the constitutional amendment referendum can be done at the same time, over concern that the process might be too complicated and voters could miss out on voting in the referendum. Although voting for the general election and the referendum is conducted at the same polling locations, ballots will be marked in separate polling booths. According to an information booklet published by the ECT, voters will present their ID at one polling desk, receive the ballot, and cast their vote in one polling booth, before repeating the process at a second booth. The NGO Coordinating Committee on Development (NGO-COD) and its partner organizations filed a petition with the ECT yesterday (14 January) for the system to be changed so that voters only have to go to one polling booth after receiving all three ballot papers at the same time to prevent confusion and ensure that voters can exercise their rights. The petition said that requiring voters to go through the process twice is unnecessarily complicated, and voters might think that they only need to vote in the general election. Low voter turnout might then reduce the legitimacy of the referendum, which might then be used as a reason to disrupt the process of drafting a new constitution. NGO-COD Chair Lertsak Kumkongsak said that he believes the ECT is trying to make the referendum fail by making the process difficult. He also noted that the information booklet published by the ECT contains passages that seem to convince people to reject drafting a new Constitution in favour of amending specific sections. “Separating the polling booths makes people have to queue up twice and take more time. This obstacle has been created to make people abandon their right to vote in the referendum,” Lertsak said. If the ECT does not respond within a week, he said, the network will file an administrative lawsuit against the ECT for nonfeasance. Meanwhile, Sohabudin Lohyapha, an activist from the Pattani River Protection Network, said that separating the polling booths would make difficulties for voters, especially in rural areas where polling stations are often crammed into tight spaces. Requiring voters to go to separate booths for the general election and the referendum would mean more time spent at the poll and voters might decide not to vote in the referendum. “We need a constitution that really comes from the people to resolve political conflicts and past losses,” he said. “Having rules that make it easiest for people to exercise their right is a very important matter.”  Speaking to reporters this morning (15 January), ECT secretary-general Sawaeng Boonmee said that the ECT will go ahead of the separate polling booths. He claimed they had considered several formats and that this is the best way to conduct the referendum. He also said that changing the layout would cost more confusion as the ECT has already informed the instructors who will be training polling station staff. eng editor 1 Thu, 2026-01-15 - 21:51 * News * NGO Coordinating Committee on Development (NGO-COD) * Constitutional amendment * 2026 referendum (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Civil society network demands gender recognition law A network of civil society organizations has called on political parties to push for a gender recognition law, as not allowing trans people to change their gender markers and limiting legal markers to a binary male or female have led to discrimination against trans, non-binary, and intersex people. The Transmasculine Network for Equality (TransEqual), the Campaign Committee for a National Policy on Transgender Health and Well-being and other civil society organizations held a public panel discussion on Tuesday (13 January) on discrimination and hate crime against LGBTQ+ people. The discussion highlighted the discrimination still faced by the Thai LGBTQ+ community, especially transmasculine and non-binary people, who are unprotected and often unable to gain equal access the justice system. After the panel, the network read out a statement calling for legal gender recognition and for political parties running in the upcoming general election to back a gender recognition law. The statement said that it is a fundamental human right for people to determine their own gender identity, and that gender recognition based on self-determination is an internationally accepted principle. While Thailand has now legalised marriage regardless of gender, it still lacks legal gender recognition for trans, non-binary, and intersex people, and its legal system only recognizes two genders. Not being able to change their gender markers in official documents has resulted in discrimination against trans, non-binary, and intersex people. They have been denied jobs because the gender in their documents does not match their appearance, and they are questioned when accessing public services such as during financial transaction or when going through immigration. They are also treated unfairly or with hostility during medical treatment. The lack of legal gender recognition puts trans, non-binary, and intersex people at risk of violence and harassment due to society’s gender bias. They are also living in insecurity as their identity is not recognized by the state. These cases, said the statement, show that gender recognition based on self-determination is not a privilege but a basic condition for equality. The statement noted that political parties, government agencies, and civil society groups have proposed several gender recognition bills, showing that they also recognize that it is important to have this law. However, these bills were rejected, denying legal protection for trans, non-binary, and intersex people. The network calls on political parties running in the upcoming general election to back a gender recognition law and to commit to passing this law when they are elected to ensure that every citizen’s rights and dignity will be protected in line with the Constitution and international human rights principles. The network stresses that gender recognition is not about specific groups of people but the entire society. Constructive conversation and presenting facts is the way towards a society with gender equality for all. During the event, organizers also addressed issues being discussed online over recent weeks, including the misconception that trans women trick men into marrying them. They said that there is no evidence proving that this occurs, and that gender recognition laws in other countries do not have negative familial or social effect. Allowing legal gender recognition also does not take away the rights of cisgender people; it only extends legal protection to trans people. They also said that, during medical treatment, professionals do not rely simply on gender markers on identification documents but make decisions based on the patient’s physical condition. The World Health Organization (WHO) has recognized gender affirming care as a healthcare standard for improving patients’ quality of life, well-being, and safety. Gender recognition is not an obstacle; instead, it helps create a more friendly and equal healthcare system. In other countries with a gender recognition law, it is found that the law helps citizens feel more accepted, dignified, and a part of society. eng editor 1 Thu, 2026-01-15 - 20:47 * News * Gender recognition * LGBTQ rights * Trans rights * gender equality (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

31-year-old jailed for throwing paint on King’s portrait A 31-year-old former private company employee has been sentenced to 2 years in prison for throwing paint at a portrait of the King in front of a supermarket. Somphon (last name withheld) was charged with royal defamation, destruction of public property, and violation of the Public Cleanliness Act after he was accused of driving by and throwing a bag of red paint at a portrait of King Vajiralongkorn displayed in front of a Lotus Supermarket in Pathumthani’s Rangsit district. According to Thai Lawyers for Human Rights (TLHR), he pleaded guilty to two of the charges but pleaded not guilty to royal defamation. On 29 August 2023, the Thanyaburi Provincial Court found him not guilty of royal defamation, ruling that throwing paint onto the portrait does not constitute an offence under the royal defamation law. He was sentenced to 6 months in prison and fined 10,000 baht. His sentence was suspended for 2 years. However, on 28 May 2025, the Appeal Court overturned the verdict, finding him guilty of royal defamation on the grounds that damaging the portrait was inappropriate and defamatory against the King. He was sentenced to 3 years in prison, reduced to 2 years because he gave useful testimony. The Appeal Court later ruled not to suspend his sentence because he threw paint at portraits of the King displayed at several locations and publicised his actions. Somphon filed an appeal with the Supreme Court which yesterday (14 January) found him guilty of royal defamation for actions deemed to be disrespectful of the King. It noted that he not only sent pictures of the damaged portraits to a group chat but posted them on Facebook, and that there are other posts with derisive comments about the King on his profile page. It therefore ruled that he meant to undermine public respect for the monarchy. Sentenced to 3 years in prison, his punishment was reduced to 2 years but not suspended. TLHR noted that Somphon faces a total of 6 counts of royal defamation. 5 cases involve paint being thrown on portraits of the King and 1 involves spray painting. Courts of First Instance found him not guilty of royal defamation for throwing paint. The Appeal Court has so far overturned the verdict in four cases. He is now facing over 16 years in prison. The case heard yesterday (14 January) is the only one to have received a verdict from the Supreme Court. eng editor 1 Thu, 2026-01-15 - 16:21 * News * Section 112 * Royal defamation * King's portrait (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

2026 General Elections: Triangular party politics under conservative containment With less than a month to go, Thailand is gearing up for a new government amid mounting challenges. Parties are ramping up their election campaigns to capture the voters’ mandate, particularly given the vast number of undecided voters this time. However, the question remains: will the upcoming election bring about significant reform? While this election introduces new dynamics, analysts observed that the continued influence of the conservative apparatus may limit significant change, with the Bhumjaithai Party, a conservative partner, emerging to contest the vote share from both Pheu Thai and the People’s Party To gain insight into the upcoming election and the likely post-election political system, Prachatai spoke with Professor Siripan Nogsuan Sawasdee from Chulalongkorn University’s Faculty of Political Science. Thailand’s next election, scheduled for 8 February, came earlier than expected after Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul dissolved the House of Representatives on 11 December 2025 after a disagreement during the parliamentary session on constitutional amendments. Anutin’s third-largest Bhumjaithai Party assumed power as a minority government in September 2025. The unexpected opportunity came after the removal of former PM Paetongtarn Shinawatra from the Pheu Thai Party over a controversial leaked call with former Cambodian PM Hun Sen regarding the Thai-Cambodian border dispute. Triangular politics and undecided voters Siripan observed that the upcoming elections are likely to form a “triangular” scenario where the three main parties—Bhumjaithai, Pheu Thai, and People’s Party — would not have a large difference in their vote shares. She said voters’ decisions are based on two main considerations: economic livelihoods and expectations for the post-election political system. Voters can be classified into three camps: those who favour the status quo; those seeking abrupt structural change; and those preferring gradual change. Unlike the 2023 elections, where parties were defined by their stance on coup-aligned factions, these lines have blurred for the 2026 elections and no longer serve as a main factor for voters. Each party carries its own wounds, given that Pheu Thai, for instance, formed a coalition government with a party aligned with the coup makers, while the People’s Party voted for Anutin, whose party was known for being pro-military. Siripan noted that these wounds significantly erode public trust, leaving voters feeling betrayed that their chosen parties abandoned their promises. Simultaneously, recent polls surprisingly showed that approximately 30-40% of voters have not made a decision. The figure is considered high compared to the previous elections. “If we look at several polls, we will see a group of voters who have already made a decision, by so-called ‘affection voting’, but this time, we see that the group of undecided voters is high, around 30-40%. Optimistically speaking, we might think that Thai society is becoming more conscious, more rational, and more careful in decision-making,” said the professor. The rising star: Bhumjaithai The rise of the medium-sized Bhumjaithai party in recent years is fascinating. Once underestimated as merely a local patronage party with strongholds in some provinces in the northeastern region, particularly Buriram, Bhumjaithai has now emerged as a political powerhouse, given its unique and strong patronage system. Siripan said that unlike Pheu Thai, where local influential clans under the party can operate independently, Bhumjaithai requires members under its patronage to follow the party’s policies and direction. The party has built its own “political machine.” During Anutin’s tenure as a Public Health Minister between 2019 and 2023, for example, he raised the monthly allowance for village health volunteers. It also established good ties with non-political officials in state agencies. Bhumjaithai’s ability to include technocrats in its government, particularly business executive Suphajee Suthampun, veteran ambassador Sihasak Phuangketkeow, and former Director-General of the Treasury Department Ekniti Nitithanprapas, is another strength.  “Bhumjaithai is very clever, very ingenious in pulling in technocrats and pulling in well-known business leaders under the party’s apparatus, and it received a good response for society, particularly the middle class,” noted Siripan. Bhumjaithai has also benefited from “mass migration,” as 65 MPs from other parties have defected to the party. When combined with its remaining 68 MPs, Bhumjaithai now has around 130 MPs in hand. Siripan estimated that the party is likely to gain more seats in provinces along the Thai-Cambodian border, given former PM Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s mishandling of the leaked phone conversation with former Cambodian PM Hun Sen. Having the opportunity to be in government has allowed the party to use its media channels to communicate directly with the people. The professor viewed this opportunity as “revitalisation,” as the party was previously out of sight. It also allowed Bhumjaithai to promote and deliver its policies, particularly its populist Half-Half Plus scheme, and it has undeniably become a formidable rival in the election arena. When combined with nationalist sentiment during the Thai-Cambodian conflict, Siripan predicted that the party would definitely gain more seats, perhaps as many as 140. Meanwhile, support for Pheu Thai is expected to decline, and the People's Party could see a gain or a loss. However, the real game-changer is the large pool of undecided voters. Containment system and lack of unity among the opposition In the upcoming election, the power to elect the Prime Minister lies with the House of Representatives, directly elected by the people, while the Senate is no longer involved in the process. However, Siripan argued that the 2026 elections will operate under a “containment system” controlled by the elite. The elite in this context—not just the military—consists of conservative blocs, capital groups, especially monopoly capital groups that benefit from state concessions and privileged access to resources, as well as the so-called independent agencies, the senior ranks of the bureaucracy, and even political parties that are brought in. Parties can form a government because they are “allowed” to, and they can operate only within the space the elite define for them. If they step outside the boundaries, the elite have several enforcement tools, ranging from party dissolution to criminal lawsuits, disqualification, or even forming a new party to challenge them. “The conservative apparatus in 2019 was Palang Pracharath. In 2023, it was still Palang Pracharath and United Thai Nation Party, though the two operated separately. After the 2023 election, Pheu Thai’s decision to cross the aisle to join hands in forming a government was like a gateway that allowed it to administer the country temporarily. However, if it does anything that goes against the interests [of the elite] or crosses the drawn boundaries, it will be dealt with accordingly,” said Siripan. Although Pheu Thai joined conservative parties to form the government in 2023, the establishment never considered it truly part of the conservative bloc. If it were, former PM Srettha Thavisin would still be in office, and Pheu Thai’s patriarch Thaksin Shinawatra would not have been imprisoned. “In the 2026 election, the party that the establishment appears to prefer and believes can be within the frame is Bhumjaithai. Personally, I see Bhumjaithai and Pheu Thai as different. Pheu Thai was drawn in as a temporary substitute. Bhumjaithai, by contrast, is believed to be a partner of the conservative establishment,” noted Siripan. Siripan asserted that this does not mean that Pheu Thai and the People’s Party have no chance to form a government if they win the upcoming election. It is not impossible, but their government is likely to be temporary. “If you [Pheu Thai or the People’s Party] gain enough votes in the election, they [the elite] will not want to block you outright. They will let you run, but only within the lane that has already been marked out. If you step outside that lane, there are ways to deal with you, as we have seen in the cases of former PM Srettha, Paetongtarn, or the Future Forward Party and the Move Forward Party,” said the political science professor. The elite also attempts to weaken parties that truly represent the people so that people would believe that they no longer support public hopes for change. To achieve this, the Thai opposition is often pitted against one another. According to Siripan, the strategy has been effective, as opposition parties now have no unity and focus on fighting each other, rather than cooperating in critical moments. “In fact, the path to transforming Thai society lies directly with the strength of the opposition being unified. If we look at the history of transitions to democracy, this is the first important condition. Then there must be political leaders with a strong and genuine commitment to change. But we have stronger egos and so they are unwilling to cooperate,” said Siripan. Typically, political parties with the same ideology tend to cooperate, but in the case of Pheu Thai and the People’s Party, both have deep-rooted conflicts. Both parties compete for the same group of voters. It was evident in the constituencies where MPs from the three main parties ran against one another, and that this often allowed the conservative rival to secure a victory. Siripan asserted that this internal rivalry within the same political camp serves as the primary cause of friction. Siripan also argued that social media platforms are not suitable for political debate since this leads to misunderstanding. However, social media has become the main arena for supporters and intellectual leaders from both parties, and when it comes to debate, it can be easily fuelled. This has undeniably caused deep conflicts between supporters from both parties, perpetuating distrust. “Looking at Thai politics from now on, the greatest concern is that there is no space of trust for cooperation the Red [Pheu Thai]) and the Orange [People’s Party]. The space has shrunk. So, no matter which party wins or which party will form the government, the political system from now on will be built upon a shaky foundation,” noted Siripan. The 2017 Constitution and the need for gradual amendment The containment system maintained by the elite would not exist without a powerful tool, and that tool is the 2017 Constitution. Progressive parties and civil society organisations have long campaigned for its amendment. Notably, the 2026 election will coincide with the first referendum on constitutional amendment amid uncertainty and potential obstacles. “The 2017 Constitution is the most important tool and the important key to maintaining order and the power structure established by the elite. So they do not want it amended because having the 2017 Constitution means they can manage a government they do not favour, even though they allowed it, without needing a coup,” noted Siripan. Siripan remarked that the 2017 Constitution featured “rule by referee,” in which independent government agencies have been weaponised by the elite to resist reform. Even if the Constitution eventually must be amended, what the final version will look like remains uncertain. “If you ask whether we need to amend it, we do. But the amendment process must be sufficiently mature, which means the general public agrees that the constitution should be amended . That is why I have consistently argued that if a full amendment is not yet possible, we should begin with article-by-article amendments,” added the professor. She noted that constitutional amendment is a daunting task and requires gradual change, as some issues cannot be addressed within a certain time frame, while she proposed that provisions regarding PM candidates can be amended immediately.  The 2017 Constitution states that each party can nominate up to three PM candidates, and the candidates do not need to be MPs. Compared to other countries with parliamentary systems, the MP with the most support will undeniably be the PM, and there will be no deadlock. “Allowing three PM candidates [for each party] creates a political roadblock. Importantly, it also diminishes the PM’s political accountability, as the PM is not a member of the House of Representatives,” said Siripan. “Some political parties adhere to the argument that the constitution is the fruit of a poisonous tree and that there is no way that it can ever be a good constitution. But it has to be said that this goes against the facts. Indonesia, for example, still uses a constitution drafted in 1945 by former President Sukarno, who was a total dictator. They still use it, but have amended it article by article on four occasions. Today, the Indonesian Constitution has only 11% of its original content,” she added. The 2026 general elections are like playing a political game with a pre-written script, offering no significant change. Yet Siripan emphasised that there is a dynamic of change. On one side, it may be directed, but the other side is still governed by the nature of society itself. “I’d like people to look at what kind of post-election political system we most want to live in— whether like before, with rapid change, or with gradual change. The greatest danger is that the conservative elite wants to see that the election does not bring change and does not bring hope. If we think that we’re directly fighting this power, we cannot afford to lose hope in elections. Even if the election may not immediately meet our expectations, elections are still the only tool which could actually bring about our vision of the political system we desire,” remarked the political science professor. eng editor 3 Thu, 2026-01-15 - 13:02 * Interview * Siripan Nogsuan Sawasdee * 2026 General Elections * Bhumjaithai Party * Pheu Thai Party * People's Party * 2017 Constitution (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

At least 32 killed as crane collapses onto train At least 32 people have been killed and injured after a construction crane collapsed onto a moving train carrying more than 200 passengers in Thailand’s northeast, renewing concerns over construction safety in the country, following a fatal building collapse last year. Such incidents are not uncommon in Thailand, reflecting a crisis in construction safety oversight. The contractor involved in the latest incident was responsible for the collapse of a partially completed 33-story building last year. On 14 January, diesel train No. 21 (Bangkok - Ubon Ratchathani), which just departed from Nakorn Rachasima’s Nong Nam Khun Station, reportedly collided with a fallen crane. The impact caused carriages to derail and catch fire. At the time of the incident, 171 passengers were on board; at least 32 people were killed, 66 injured, and three remain missing. The crane was being used in the construction of a high-speed railway connecting the Lao border to Bangkok. The railway is a joint project of the Thai and Chinese governments. The agreement was signed by former Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha’s administration on 12 May 2016. The project is divided into multiple phases with different contractors. The project is overseen by a Construction Supervision Consultant consortium (China Railway International Co., Ltd.) and China Railway Design Corporation, but the construction site where the crane collapsed is handled by Italian-Thai Development, chaired by Premchai Karnasuta. The State Railway of Thailand (SRT) provided 80,000 baht in compensation per fatality. In a statement, Italian Thai also vowed to provide assistance and compensation for the families of the deceased and those injured in this incident. PM Anutin Charnvirakul stated that the investigation is ongoing.  He also said that someone must be punished for this tragic incident, adding that the contractor and SRT must be held accountable. Last year, Thailand witnessed the collapse of a 33-storey building, the only structure to collapse during a fatal earthquake, resulting in the deaths of nearly a hundred workers.  The construction project was the joint venture of Italian-Thai and China Railway No. 10 (Thailand). China Railway No.10 is a subsidiary of China Railway International Co., Ltd., the same company overseeing the high-speed railway in the latest tragedy. Legal proceedings from the building collapse are still ongoing in the court, and Italian Thai’s chairperson was just granted provisional bail after being sentenced for allegedly committing 60 wrongdoings in the case. Such incidents are not uncommon in Thailand. According to The Reporter Journey, there have been five incidents involving Italian-Thai Development projects since 2017, resulting in approximately 128 deaths. Despite this, the company has continued to receive numerous state concessions. In addition, similar incidents involving the collapse of launching trusses have occurred twice: in July 2023 during the construction of the Lat Krabang- On Nut elevated roadway and during the construction of the Rama II elevated roadway in 2024. These tragedies highlight serious issues regarding the safety standards of large-scale construction projects, particularly in public areas.  eng editor 3 Wed, 2026-01-14 - 21:19 * News * Italian-Thai Development * China Railway International * High-speed train * the State Railway of Thailand (SRT) * Quality of life (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

2026 budget: Projects honouring the monarchy receive an extra 4 billion baht The 2026 budget bill was enacted on 18 September 2025, detailing national expenditures of 3.78 trillion baht (about US$121 billion) for the fiscal year starting 1 October. Since 2020, amid public calls for transparency from major institutions, including the monarchy, Prachatai has been reporting on the monarchy's budget. These reports had been made to advocate for transparency and efficiency in resource allocation for the public benefit, as exemplified by the British monarchy, which provides public accounts and is open to criticism. In this report, the expenditure is categorised into two kinds: first, direct spending that covers palace operations, such as security, travel, or the budget for the Royal Agencies ; and second, indirect expenditures, or funds allocated to projects by other agencies in the name of honouring the monarchy or in support of the initiatives of royal family members. There has been no significant change in direct spending of approximately 20 billion baht; however, indirect expenditures in the 2026 budget are 4,123 billion baht higher than last year, making the monarchy-related budget the highest in seven years. At the time of publication, Prachatai had not received an explanation for the increase. Record-breaking lump sum The 2026 direct and indirect expenditure on the monarchy is 41,766,249,400 baht, with 20,095,219,400 baht in direct expenditure and 21,671,030,000 baht in indirect expenditure, amounting to 1.10 percent of the total state budget. Fiscal year Direct spending (mil THB) Indirect spending (mil THB) Total (Mil THB) Share of the total state budget 2020 19,685 10,043 29,728 0.93% 2021 20,653 16,575 37,228 1.12% 2022 20,931 14,829 35,760 1.15% 2023 16,923 17,829 34,752 1.09% 2024 18,472 17,720 36,192 1.04% 2025 19,703 17,912 37,643 1.00% 2026 20,095 21,671 41,766 1.10% Most direct spending goes to Royal Agencies The junta-approved Royal Administration Act of 2017 transferred designated government agencies to come under royal authority with provisions allowing them to be restructured and administered “at His Majesty's discretion.” This year, the agencies, namely the Office of His Majesty’s Principal Private Secretary, the Bureau of the Royal Household and the Royal Security Command, received the largest direct spending budget, amounting to 9,272,098,000 baht. The budget did not show further details on how the money would be allocated among these agencies. Another item of 404,157,100 baht was listed to be used by the Cabinet Secretariat to coordinate with Royal Agencies and requests for decorations. 9 billion baht for security The second largest slice in the direct budget covers security operations, amounting to 9,121,654,300 baht. The details are as follows: * Royal Thai Police: Royal protection and security for the King and royal family - 1,658,318,200 baht. * Office of the Prime Minister: Aerial security, ensuring the highest level of security for the monarch and royal family members - 5,897,494,200 baht. * Office of the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Defence: Supporting and providing security for the royal institution - 1,010,720,000 baht. * Royal Thai Army, Ministry of Defence: Providing security details and honouring the monarchy, and developing the system in doing so - 180,121,900 baht. * Royal Thai Navy, Ministry of Defence: Providing security - 355,000,000 baht. * Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters, Ministry of Defence: providing security details and honouring the monarchy - 20,000,000 baht. The direct budget also shows 1,062,357,700 baht provided for royal domestic and international travel, and to welcome foreign leaders. This year, almost 235 million baht was allocated to projects outlined to protect, respect, and support for the monarchy’s mission. A total of 234,952,300 baht was spread among a number of agencies: the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), the Ministry of Defence’s Office of the Permanent Secretary, the Royal Thai Army, the Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force, and the the Royal Armed Forces Headquarters. Examples of projects under this category are activities to honour the monarch and prevent harassment towards monarchy, reinforcing the monarchy’s stability and implementing royal desires. Lastly, 1,525,000,000 baht was given to Department of Public Works and Town & Country Planning for construction and maintenance of facilities under the Royal Special Projects. The budget is spent on procurement of hardware, construction of supporting facilities, and the hiring of advisors. The details of Royal Special Projects in 2011-2021were given as construction and maintenance costs for special royal activities within the royal premises. Since the phrase “within the royal premises” was deleted in the 2022 budget bill, Prachatai has not included this expenditure in its reports. Most indirect expenditure to be spent on Royal Projects 41 Royal Projects with no specific names given were given a total of 9,605,473,300 baht in funding. 2,932,391,000 baht, the bulk of this budget, goes to the Royal Irrigation Department, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, as the agency that supports many Royal Projects. Two proposals are given slightly over a billion baht without specific project details. One is the Department of Local Administration’s proposals to implemented Royal Initiatives in public health, and the other is from the Office of the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Public Health, described as ‘Royal Projects and honouring the monarchy’. Most of the funding for named royal projects is allocated to irrigation and water source development projects, totalling 3,216,825,600 baht. Nakhon Sri Thammarat flood relief projects secured the largest funding of 1,234,458,200 baht. Another 2,500,000 baht is allocated under the Central Budget to be used to support any Royal Projects that may be initiated during the fiscal year involving many official agencies. Other Royal Projects that are given public funding: * 55 Projects specifically initiated by the monarch or other royal family members, with a specific responsible agency, such as education projects in remote areas, the Roi Jai Rak projects, and a support grant for the Distance Learning Foundation under Royal Patronage, totalling 2,777,414,900 baht. * 38 rural area development projects nationwide under Rajabhat Universities, totalling 1,688,099,900 baht. * 11 highland development projects, 138,510,300 baht. * 6 Disease-Free Animals, Save Humans from Rabies Projects, initiated by HRH Princess Chulabhorn, 378,959,200 baht. * 67 Rare Plant/Plant Genetic Conservation Projects, 305,654,700 baht. * The TO BE NUMBER ONE project initiated by HRH Princess Ubol Ratana, 241,078,500 baht. In the name of the Monarchy Over two billion baht is scattered among many agencies for proposals under the name of the monarchy. 1,549,261,800 baht is allocated to 31 projects aimed at honouring or promoting pro-monarchy sentiment. A budget totalling 911,252,600 baht is also given to royal medical projects, royal education grants, foreign aid missions, and royally-sponsored funerals under 24 projects,. The King’s Sufficiency Economy Philosophy, referring to various ideas initiated during the reign of the late King Rama IX is still mentioned in budget proposals. In this fiscal year, 775,588,700 baht is allocated to 32 projects dealing with the sufficiency economy and other related royal projects. A total of 82,910,500 baht is allocated to various expenditures, such as Royal Ceremonies and Important Governmental Events (11 million baht), the National Housing Authority’s Housing Project for Royal Guard Officers (18.07 million baht) and the Care of Royal Elephants by the Forest Industry Organization (8.66 million baht). Questioning met with restraint Since 2020, opinions in parliament regarding the monarchy-related budget have seen some developments. Despite the conservative majority in the upper and lower houses, questions on spending have been answered by various agencies to some degree. On the other hand, people who expressed their opinions were met with royal defamation lawsuits. Noppon Archamas, a data officer from Thai Lawyers for Human Rights (TLHR), explained that cases that did not include elements that implicated the monarch were likely to be dropped, while those that did were likely to lead to guilty verdicts. He also pointed out that cases questioning how the budget is spent were likely to be punished as allegations. By and large, judges did not give defendants the chance to enter budget details as evidence, and the defence of honest criticism in the public interest was not granted. Budget scrutiny has seen more progress in the House of Representatives than the Senate, according to Senator Tewarit Maneechai, a member of the Ad-Hoc Committee on 2026 Budget Appropriation. During the bill’s second reading in mid-August, People’s Party MP Sirikanya Tansakul raised questions over the 800 million baht increase in one year in Royal Agencies’ spending, the fifth highest increase of all agencies. A delegate from the Cabinet Secretariat responded that the large increase was partly due to the staff pay rises, which were made every three years unlike a typical annual raise. The Royal Agencies had also increased staffing levels from 14,600 to 15,000. There have been proposals  to deal with redundancies within the budget by, for example, reducing the security related activities which are scattered across the security sector, both military and police. Tewarit said there was no discussion among Senators regarding the budget because the Senate has no direct role in budget allocation other than approving or rejecting the bill passed from the Lower House, and that most Senators are conservative. As a member of the budget bill scrutiny committee, however, Tewarit raised the question of how royal projects across the nation evaluated their effectiveness. For example, he questioned how the Royal Rainmaking Project measures its success in addng to natural rainfall? The Office of the Royal Development Projects Board (ORDPB), as the agency that oversees and facilitates royal projects, affirmed that every project was subject to an evaluation both from ORDPB and external entities, and related reports are available to be submitted. Tewarit underlines that questioning the monarchy-related budget does not amount to criticism of a specific individual or institution, but rather a check-and-balance mechanism that aims to serve public interests as money is spent most efficiently. eng editor 1 Mon, 2026-01-12 - 13:57 * Feature * Thai monarchy * Monarchy budget * 2026 budget * Monarchy reform (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Civil society network organizes park run to call for vote in favour of new Constitution The People’s Constitutional Drafting Group, a network of civil society organizations campaigning for a new constitution, organized a running event at Benchakitti Park on Wednesday (7 January) to call for people to vote in favour of a new Constitution in the upcoming referendum, which will take place on 8 February, the same day as the general election. The referendum will be a historic moment. iLaw director Yingcheep Atchanont noted that, in more than  90 years since it became a constitutional monarchy, Thailand’s constitutions have been repeatedly repealed and replaced by something written by coup leaders who designed systems to stay in power. This referendum is the first time that the Thai public has been asked to vote whether it wants a new Constitution. If the majority vote in favour of a new Constitution, he said, it would show that the public wants a full democracy and not a system designed by the military. To raise awareness about the referendum, the network is organizing a run every Wednesday leading up to the election. Next week, the event will take place at 4 public parks in Bangkok: Lumpini Park, Chatuchak Park, Suan Luang Rama VIII Park, Suan Luang Rama IX Park. Activists, politicians, and members of the public participated in the event at Benchakitti Park. People’s Party MP candidate Rukchanok Srinork said that, not only should political parties make their stances clear, content creators and influencers should also help raise awareness. People in rural areas do not know that a referendum is taking place, she said, and the Election Commission has not been very active in making sure people know about the referendum. She is concerned that people would leave the polling station after they voted in the general election without going to vote in the referendum, and called for support in raising awareness. Meanwhile, Pheu Thai MP candidate Chaturon Chaisaeng said that, without a vote in favour, the country would not be able to progress and there would never be a government stable enough to deliver policies. He said that people can vote for whatever party they like in the general election, but that they should vote in favour of a new Constitution. eng editor 1 Fri, 2026-01-09 - 17:08 * News * Constitutional amendment * referendum * People's Constitution Drafting Group (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Forest Youth Voices: From Everyday Environmental Heritage to Bottom-Up Conservation Policy On 2 November 2025, the Forest Youth Voices public forum brought together researchers, Indigenous youth, civil society actors, and members of the public to explore how Everyday Environmental Heritage (EEH) can function as a pathway from community practice to environmental policy. Rather than treating conservation as a purely technical or legal matter, the event foregrounded lived experience, cultural knowledge, and youth-led media as practical tools for reshaping environmental governance in Thailand. The program was deliberately structured to move from critique to practice. It began by examining the social and psychological consequences of top-down conservation policies, transitioned to public perceptions of inequality and participation, and concluded by centering youth storytelling as a form of environmental action. From Research to Practice: Everyday Environmental Heritage in Action The keynote address by Dr. Marco J. Haenssgen framed Everyday Environmental Heritage as a policy-relevant concept that links cultural practice, livelihood, and ecological stewardship. He situated the discussion within the recent controversy surrounding two draft Royal Decrees under the 2019 National Park Act and the 2019 Wildlife Conservation and Protection Act, which generated widespread fear among Indigenous highland communities of land dispossession after a 20-year tenure limit. The keynote presentation on Phycological and Social Impacts of Top-Down Conservation Initiatives on Indigenous Communities: Lessons from the Announcement of two Royal Decree in Thailand While these draft decrees were later revised following public backlash, they revealed a deeper governance problem: conservation policies that position Indigenous residents as potential trespassers rather than long-term stewards of the forest. Rather than responding to such policy threats solely through protest, the keynote argued for the strengthening of community resilience through practical, everyday interventions that make conservation socially and economically viable. Three pilot initiatives under the EEH framework were presented: 1) origin labeling for community products, 2) operational support for community-led conservation activities, and 3) youth media training. Early findings indicated that these interventions helped sustain engagement during periods of policy uncertainty. Market testing showed that consumers were willing to pay a modest premium for products connected to place-based heritage, while participant feedback emphasized continuity, inclusiveness, and long-term support rather than short-term project cycles. Importantly, these initiatives were framed not as substitutes for policy reform, but as buffers that help communities remain connected to conservation when formal governance falters. Market Testing and Evaluation Outcomes from the Everyday Environmental Heritage Pilot.  Credits: Dr. Marco J. Haenssgen Public Reflection: Inequality, Voice, and Policy Priorities The second segment of the program shifted from research evidence to public perception, drawing on findings from a Public Opinion Survey on Indigenous Heritage, Youth Participation, and Climate Justice in Thailand. While respondents expressed strong support for cultural recognition, the survey revealed persistent concerns about fairness and participation in environmental governance. The strongest areas of agreement were that schools should teach Indigenous culture and environmental wisdom (mean score 4.62) and that the government should support community-based tourism that values Indigenous heritage (4.71). By contrast, confidence that forest laws treat ethnic communities fairly scored much lower (2.88), and participation in environmental policymaking received the weakest rating among governance indicators (3.45). These findings point to a structural gap: while public support for Indigenous heritage and youth participation is high, trust in the inclusiveness of environmental governance remains low. The issue, participants suggested, is not merely technical implementation but who holds voice, authority, and legitimacy in conservation decision-making. Policy priorities identified by respondents reflected this concern. The most strongly supported pathways for reducing ethnic bias included equal rights and citizenship recognition, support for Indigenous youth through arts and media, and decentralization toward community-based forest governance. These insights set the stage for the panel discussion that followed. What It Takes to Institutionalize Participatory Platforms Panel Discussion on how can participatory platforms be successfully created and institutionalized so that research, community experience, and youth engagement meaningfully shape environmental and climate policy? The panel addressed a central question: how can participatory policy spaces—particularly in the context of climate change—move beyond consultation toward durable, institutionalized forms of governance? Dr. Mukdawan Sakboon emphasized that youth participation should not be narrowly defined through institutional or academic frameworks. Young people, she argued, already engage politically through everyday digital practices. Participatory platforms today are not limited to physical forums but increasingly take shape through online spaces where youth define agendas, not merely respond to them. As she noted, young people are often invited to participate, but rarely allowed to shape the conversation itself. From a legal perspective, Kittisak Rattanakrajangsri stressed the importance of anchoring participation in existing formal mechanisms. He pointed to newly proclaimed legislation on the protection and restoration of ethnic peoples’ livelihoods as a potential institutional space through which communities and youth can collectively articulate concerns. Participation, he argued, becomes durable not through dialogue alone, but through legally recognized platforms that redistribute power and enable collective action. Dr. Prasit Leepreecha further underscored the need for a rights-based and community-centered approach. He argued that affected communities must be recognized as primary actors and problem owners in conservation policy. Many ethnic community members today occupy roles as teachers, school administrators, and local professionals, positioning them to actively shape policy at the local level. Translating Indigenous knowledge—ritual practices, ecological wisdom, everyday ways of living—into publicly legible policy language, he suggested, is essential, particularly in areas such as ecotourism and environmental education. Reflecting on the broader challenge of institutional change, Dr. Haenssgen cautioned against direct confrontation with state institutions that have historically been resistant to listening. Instead, he advocated working through emerging legal frameworks while simultaneously transforming public discourse. Youth-led storytelling, Indigenous media networks, and social media platforms, he argued, are critical for producing counter-narratives that challenge dominant representations of conservation and Indigeneity. Taken together, the panel concluded that participatory platforms become institutionalized not through a single mechanism, but through an ecosystem of legal, social, and communicative spaces—where youth-driven digital arenas are recognized as political, community participation is grounded in rights, and inclusive narratives reshape how conservation is understood. Forest Youth Voices: Media as Environmental Action The youth media screening marked a deliberate shift from policy analysis to lived experience. Rather than presenting films as advocacy outputs, the session foregrounded youth reflections on storytelling as a process of learning, responsibility, and self-representation. Several youth presenters emphasized that the environmental issues depicted in their films were not abstract or distant. One youth participant, Mr. Sarayuth Sitthimahasakul (Bank), explained that the forest was portrayed as part of everyday life, noting that “this is not just about nature disappearing somewhere else—it affects our water, our food, and how our families live every day.” This framing positioned environmental degradation as a lived responsibility rather than a future crisis, reinforcing the idea that conservation begins with daily relationships between people and place. Other reflections focused on the cultural and spiritual dimensions of environmental loss. Responding to the theme “What happens when the spirits grow hungry?”, youth presenters described the forest as inseparable from belief systems, rituals, and intergenerational ties. As Bank reflected, “when the forest is damaged, it’s not only trees that disappear—traditions and respect between generations also weaken.” These reflections challenged narrow ecological definitions of conservation, highlighting that environmental harm also disrupts cultural continuity and social meaning. A recurring concern raised by youth was misrepresentation. Several presenters noted that forest communities are often spoken about in policy debates and media narratives but rarely allowed to speak for themselves. One youth, Mr. Wichit ThechaLertpana (Toa), described making the film as a way to counter this imbalance, stating that “people usually see us as the problem, but through the film we wanted to show how we actually live with the forest.” In this sense, media production was framed not as awareness-raising alone, but as an act of self-representation that contests dominant stereotypes surrounding Indigenous and highland communities. Importantly, youth reflections also pointed inward. Beyond communicating messages to outsiders, presenters described how the process of making films changed their own perspectives. Toa shared that “before doing this, I didn’t think much about my role, but after making the film I feel more responsible for protecting what we still have.” Media-making thus emerged as a formative process—building confidence, agency, and a sense of long-term responsibility rather than delivering a one-off message. Taken together, the youth reflections revealed why creative media matters in environmental governance. Youth did not frame their work in the language of policy or climate targets. Instead, they articulated environmental concerns through lived experience, cultural meaning, and personal transformation. These reflections underscored the session’s broader argument: when young people are given the tools to tell their own stories, participation shifts from symbolic inclusion toward sustained engagement, laying social and cultural foundations that formal conservation policy alone cannot provide. Recognition as Movement-Building The event concluded with a popular vote and awards ceremony recognizing youth as environmental knowledge-holders and cultural communicators. More than a celebratory gesture, the closing ritual reinforced a key message: conservation is sustained not only through laws and institutions, but through recognition, pride, and intergenerational continuity. By centering Everyday Environmental Heritage and amplifying youth voices, Forest Youth Voices illustrated how bottom-up conservation can move from lived practice to policy relevance, without losing sight of the communities and relationships that sustain the forest in everyday life.   eng editor 1 Fri, 2026-01-09 - 15:41 * News * Conservation * Indigenous culture * Indigenous peoples (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Cartoon by Stephff: Thai democratic upside down Cartoon by Stephff: Thai democratic upside down eng editor 1 Thu, 2026-01-08 - 16:34 * Multimedia (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Gambia, Myanmar to Present Their Arguments Before World Court in Rohingya Genocide Case International Court of Justice (ICJ) hearings in the Myanmar genocide case highlight the need for justice for the ethnic Rohingya, Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK, Global Justice Center, Human Rights Watch, Refugee Women for Peace and Justice, and Women’s Peace Network said today (8 January). Hearings on the merits of the case begin on January 12, 2026. In August 2017, Myanmar security forces began a sweeping campaign of massacres, rape, and arson against Rohingya in northern Rakhine State that forced more than 700,000 people to flee to neighboring Bangladesh. In November 2019, Gambia filed a case before the ICJ alleging that Myanmar’s atrocities against the Rohingya constitute genocide and violate the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This is not a criminal case against individuals, but a request for a legal determination of Myanmar’s state responsibility for genocide. “Seeing Gambia’s landmark case against Myanmar finally enter the merits phase delivers renewed hope to Rohingya that our decades-long suffering may finally end,” said Wai Wai Nu, founder and executive director of the Women’s Peace Network. “Amid ongoing violations against the Rohingya, the world must stand firm in the pursuit of justice and a path toward ending impunity in Myanmar and restoring our rights.” In December 2019, the ICJ held hearings on Gambia’s request for provisional measures to protect the Rohingya remaining in Myanmar from genocide, which the court unanimously adopted in January 2020. The court’s provisional measures require Myanmar to prevent all genocidal acts against the Rohingya, to ensure that security forces do not commit acts of genocide, and to take steps to preserve evidence related to the case. Myanmar is legally bound to comply. Human Rights Watch and others have documented ongoing grave abuses against the Rohingya remaining in Myanmar, contravening the court-ordered provisional measures. On February 1, 2021, Myanmar’s military staged a coup, overthrew the democratically elected government, and installed a military junta. Since the coup, armed conflict between Myanmar’s security forces and opposition forces and ethnic armed groups has engulfed much of the country, with security forces committing grave abuses, including airstrikes against civilians in multiple ethnic areas. The Myanmar military has long subjected Rohingya to atrocity crimes, including the ongoing crimes against humanity of apartheid, persecution, and deprivation of liberty. Since late 2023, Rohingya civilians have been caught in the fighting between the junta and ethnic Arakan Army armed group. Both sides have carried out grave abuses, including extrajudicial killings, widespread arson, and unlawful recruitment. “The Myanmar military’s vicious cycles of abuses and impunity need to end,” said Shayna Bauchner, Asia researcher at Human Rights Watch. “This should begin with governments holding the junta to its legal obligation to comply with the ICJ-ordered provisional measures.” In January 2021, Aung San Suu Kyi’s ruling National League for Democracy government filed preliminary objections challenging the ICJ’s jurisdiction and Gambia’s standing to file the case. In February 2022, the ICJ heard Myanmar’s objections from the military junta. In July, the court rejected the objections, allowing the case to proceed on the merits. Establishing that genocide has taken place under the Genocide Convention requires demonstrating that genocidal acts were committed with an intent to destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group in whole or in part. During the three-week hearings at the ICJ, the parties are expected to present their arguments and supporting evidence about whether Myanmar violated the Genocide Convention. Eleven countries intervened in the case but will not present orally at the hearings on the merits. While their written submissions remain confidential, their declarations of intervention outline several arguments in support of Gambia’s position, including on the issue of genocidal intent, the scope of the obligation to prevent and punish genocide, and the role of sexual and gender-based violence for a genocide determination. The latter is detailed in a paper being published by the Global Justice Center. “Genocide does not unfold only through mass killing,” said Elise Keppler, executive director of the Global Justice Center. “In Myanmar, targeted sexual and reproductive violence inflicted on Rohingya women and girls was designed to break families, threaten futures, and eliminate the possibility of survival as a group. A gender-competent analysis makes this intent visible – and without it, the case that genocide against the Rohingya occurred is incomplete.” In addition to Gambia’s ICJ case, there are several ongoing efforts to bring individual perpetrators of crimes in Myanmar to justice. In 2019, the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor opened an investigation into alleged grave crimes against the Rohingya. Although Myanmar is not a member of the ICC, the court’s judges have determined that the ICC has jurisdiction over the situation because at least one element of the alleged crimes took place in Bangladesh, an ICC member. In November 2024, the ICC prosecutor requested an arrest warrant for Min Aung Hlaing, commander-in-chief of Myanmar’s military, alleging his responsibility for the crimes against humanity of deportation and persecution of the Rohingya in 2017. To bring comprehensive accountability, the United Nations Security Council should expand the ICC’s jurisdiction to address the full scope of criminality by referring the situation in Myanmar to the court, the groups said. In November 2019, a group of human rights organizations, including the Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK, filed a criminal case in Argentina under the principle of universal jurisdiction against Myanmar authorities for crimes committed in Rakhine State. In February 2025, an Argentine court issued arrest warrants for 25 individuals from Myanmar, including Min Aung Hlaing. “To fully address the scale of the crimes against the Rohingya, it is key to seek justice and accountability through different avenues,” said Tun Khin, president of the Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK. “This case and the pursuit of justice are not only about accountability for past atrocities, but about preventing future ones.” Gambia’s filing in 2019 was the first time that a country without any direct connection to the alleged crimes used its membership in the Genocide Convention to bring a case before the ICJ. In December 2023, South Africa filed a case with the ICJ alleging that Israel violated the Genocide Convention by committing genocide against Palestinians in Gaza and by failing to prevent it, including by not holding senior Israeli officials and others accountable for their direct and public incitement to genocide. In January, March, and May 2024, the court issued provisional measures, but Israel has flouted the court’s orders to open the crossings into Gaza and allow sufficient humanitarian aid in. “Myanmar’s case before the ICJ is a beacon of hope for hundreds of thousands of people like myself that our plight for justice will not go unheard,” said Lucky Karim, founder and executive director of Refugee Women for Peace and Justice. “This and other cases before the ICJ are powerful warnings to abusive states across the world that one day, they too may be called to respond for their actions before a court of law.” eng editor 1 Thu, 2026-01-08 - 15:33 * Pick to Post * Rohingya * genocide * International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

Rights group welcomes new sexual harassment law, but says concerns remain The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) today welcomes the 30 December 2025 entry into force of the amendment to Thailand’s Criminal Code (No. 30) B.E. 2568 (2025) criminalizing sexual harassment—an abusive conduct that had long remained in legal limbo in the country. At the same time, the ICJ stresses that further reforms are required to ensure effective and human rights-compliant protection for survivors of sexual harassment, to strengthen awareness-raising to support effective enforcement and to prevent an overly broad application of the law. “The long-awaited amendment to the Criminal Code addresses gaps that survivors of sexual harassment and civil society organizations have long highlighted—particularly the absence of a specific legal provision and definition addressing sexual harassment and technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV),” said Sanhawan Srisod, Senior Legal Adviser at the ICJ. “This reform also reflects some of ICJ’s most recent recommendations, including, in our baseline study launched in November last year.” Under the amended Criminal Code, “sexual harassment” is defined as “any act committed by physical means, words, sounds, gestures, communication, watching, stalking, or by any other means—including acts carried out through computer systems, telecommunications devices, or other electronic devices—capable of conveying meaning to another person, that has a sexual connotation and is likely to cause that person distress, annoyance, embarrassment, humiliation, fear, or a sense of sexual insecurity.” Upon conviction, an offender may be liable to imprisonment up to one year, a fine not exceeding 20,000 THB (approximately USD 637), or both, unless aggravating circumstances are present.  Aggravating circumstances leading to increased penalties under the amended Criminal Code include continuous or repeated acts; acts committed in public, before the public, or through computer systems accessible to the public; acts committed against children under 15 years of age regardless of consent; and acts involving abuse of power or authority, such as those committed by commanders, employers, or other persons exercising power over survivors. While the amendment marks important progress, the ICJ underscores that its application must be consistent with international human rights law and standards. “Under international human rights law and standards, while some conduct may justify civil or disciplinary penalties, not all acts of sexual harassment necessarily warrant criminal sanctions, such as imprisonment—particularly where the conduct does not amount to a violation of a survivor’s physical, sexual, or psychological integrity or where it is isolated,” Sanhawan said. “We therefore urge Thai justice sector actors to ensure that the law is applied in compliance with international law and standards, with sanctions that are commensurate with the gravity of the offence, and that do not unduly restrict human rights, including the right to freedom of expression.” In addition, the ICJ underscores that other existing legal provisions, which provide a basis for criminalization, still need to be amended to prevent their overly broad application, which has frequently targeted individuals solely for their involvement in consensual sexual activities raising serious freedom of expression and other human rights concerns. For example, certain legal provisions concerned with the production, possession and dissemination of so-called “obscene materials” should be amended to limit their application to non-consensual conduct only and to cases involving child pornography. Certain laws and practices also create additional barriers for sexual harassment and TFGBV survivors and should be repealed or substantially amended, including laws criminalizing sex work and restrictive immigration regulations, which deter survivors from reporting sexual harassment and seeking justice. The ICJ further calls on the authorities to conduct awareness-raising initiatives and to develop and promote clear guidelines to ensure that law enforcement officers are knowledgeable about all forms of sexual harassment, both offline and online. Background The amendment also grants the courts the power to issue provisional protection measures in sexual harassment cases, including orders to prevent the publication or dissemination of harmful content. This new power responds to a longstanding demand by civil society organizations, including the ICJ, and survivors, as such provisional protection measures were previously limited largely to domestic violence cases. In November 2025, the ICJ launched a baseline study titled Access to Justice for Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Thailand. The study analyzed Thailand’s legal and policy framework on sexual and gender-based violence and assessed the country’s compliance with its international human rights law obligations. The report found, among other things, that Thailand lacked a comprehensive legal framework addressing sexual harassment and TFGBV, with existing protections scattered across civil service, labour, and criminal laws. Legal definitions were narrow and inconsistent, penalties were often minor, and there was insufficient guidance for justice sector actors on what constituted “sexual harassment”. The report also found that broadly framed “obscenity” and computer-crime offences had been applied in ways that unduly restricted consensual sexual expression, raising freedom of expression concerns. The production, possession, import, export, or dissemination of adult content deemed “obscene” is criminalized under Section 287 of the Criminal Code and Section 14(4) of the Computer-Related Crimes Act B.E. 2550 (2007). eng editor 1 Thu, 2026-01-08 - 13:21 * Pick to Post * International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) * sexual harassment * Gender violence (Feed generated with FetchRSS)

ECT: 2.41m registered for advance voting, 1.59m for referendum The Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) said this morning (6 January) that 2,410,425 people have registered for advance and overseas voting in the general election. 2,279,890 registered for advance voting, while 139,535 are voting overseas. Meanwhile, 1,598,056 voters registered to vote out-of-constituency or overseas in the constitutional amendment referendum. 1,502,390 are voting early, while 95,666 are voting overseas. The legal watchdog NGO iLaw noted that there is a difference of 812,369 between the number of people registered to vote in the general election and in the referendum. It noted that voters are still able to vote at their home constituencies in the referendum on election day, 8 February. Concerns have previously been raised that voters are not given enough time to register to vote in the referendum, as the registration was only open for three days and fell immediately after the New Year holidays. Commenters on iLaw’s social media posts reported that they had difficulties accessing the registration website, and some said that they could not register in time because the website was down. Despite demands from the civil society for the registration period to be extended, the ECT has refused to do so, claiming that it would affect administrative tasks that need to be completed before the election, such as compiling an electoral roll. ECT secretary-general Sawang Boonmee said during a press conference this morning (6 January) that the registration period cannot be extended and that it should only take each person 3 minutes to register, so they should have been able to register before the deadline they manage their time properly. iLaw director Yingcheep Atchanon and political activist Sombat Boonngamanong also went to the ECT office this morning (6 January) to meet with Sawang. Yingcheep noted that some voters were accidentally allowed to register to vote early in the referendum in their home province even though this was not allowed. He said that an ECT official said that these voters would be allowed to vote in their home province, but that the ECT should send an official instruction to the ECT office in each province to ensure that there would be no issue when these voters come to the poll. eng editor 1 Tue, 2026-01-06 - 17:52 * News * 2026 referendum * Constitutional amendment * 2026 General Elections (Feed generated with FetchRSS)