François Bareille
@fbareille.bsky.social
Researcher in Economics (INRAE, Paris). Currently in visiting at GSSI, L’Aquila/Roma. Climate Change, Biodiversity, Land-Use and Rock'n'roll - https://francoisbareille.wordpress.com/
Message for policymakers:
You don’t need new instruments — better design of exisiting schemes to foster cooperation may be enough.
🎯Small institutional changes in enrollment rules can deliver large biodiversity gains!
[End of thread]
You don’t need new instruments — better design of exisiting schemes to foster cooperation may be enough.
🎯Small institutional changes in enrollment rules can deliver large biodiversity gains!
[End of thread]
January 21, 2026 at 8:20 AM
Message for policymakers:
You don’t need new instruments — better design of exisiting schemes to foster cooperation may be enough.
🎯Small institutional changes in enrollment rules can deliver large biodiversity gains!
[End of thread]
You don’t need new instruments — better design of exisiting schemes to foster cooperation may be enough.
🎯Small institutional changes in enrollment rules can deliver large biodiversity gains!
[End of thread]
⚠️Not all cooperation rules are equal.
Open-list ABs (where the size of cooperating groups is not restricted by existing members, in the standard open-membership spirit) generate *larger coalitions*, *more connected habitats*, and *more cost-effective conservation*.
[7/8]
Open-list ABs (where the size of cooperating groups is not restricted by existing members, in the standard open-membership spirit) generate *larger coalitions*, *more connected habitats*, and *more cost-effective conservation*.
[7/8]
January 21, 2026 at 8:20 AM
⚠️Not all cooperation rules are equal.
Open-list ABs (where the size of cooperating groups is not restricted by existing members, in the standard open-membership spirit) generate *larger coalitions*, *more connected habitats*, and *more cost-effective conservation*.
[7/8]
Open-list ABs (where the size of cooperating groups is not restricted by existing members, in the standard open-membership spirit) generate *larger coalitions*, *more connected habitats*, and *more cost-effective conservation*.
[7/8]
Main result:
👉 Allowing cooperation increases biodiversity outcomes by 10–45%, relative to individual schemes with identical payments.
[6/8]
👉 Allowing cooperation increases biodiversity outcomes by 10–45%, relative to individual schemes with identical payments.
[6/8]
January 21, 2026 at 8:20 AM
Main result:
👉 Allowing cooperation increases biodiversity outcomes by 10–45%, relative to individual schemes with identical payments.
[6/8]
👉 Allowing cooperation increases biodiversity outcomes by 10–45%, relative to individual schemes with identical payments.
[6/8]
We compare 4 policy instruments to conserve biodiversity:
1️⃣ standard homogeneous payments,
2️⃣ individual agglomeration bonuses (ABs),
3️⃣ collective ABs with closed membership (as in our previous AJAE paper),
4️⃣ collective ABs with open membership (a new instrument)
[5/8]
1️⃣ standard homogeneous payments,
2️⃣ individual agglomeration bonuses (ABs),
3️⃣ collective ABs with closed membership (as in our previous AJAE paper),
4️⃣ collective ABs with open membership (a new instrument)
[5/8]
January 21, 2026 at 8:20 AM
We compare 4 policy instruments to conserve biodiversity:
1️⃣ standard homogeneous payments,
2️⃣ individual agglomeration bonuses (ABs),
3️⃣ collective ABs with closed membership (as in our previous AJAE paper),
4️⃣ collective ABs with open membership (a new instrument)
[5/8]
1️⃣ standard homogeneous payments,
2️⃣ individual agglomeration bonuses (ABs),
3️⃣ collective ABs with closed membership (as in our previous AJAE paper),
4️⃣ collective ABs with open membership (a new instrument)
[5/8]
Methodologically, we combine:
1️⃣ a spatial ecological-economic model where regulators formulate payments in alternative schemes,
2️⃣ a coalition formation game,
so landowners choose both *how much* to conserve and *with whom* to cooperate in this process.
[4/8]
1️⃣ a spatial ecological-economic model where regulators formulate payments in alternative schemes,
2️⃣ a coalition formation game,
so landowners choose both *how much* to conserve and *with whom* to cooperate in this process.
[4/8]
January 21, 2026 at 8:20 AM
Methodologically, we combine:
1️⃣ a spatial ecological-economic model where regulators formulate payments in alternative schemes,
2️⃣ a coalition formation game,
so landowners choose both *how much* to conserve and *with whom* to cooperate in this process.
[4/8]
1️⃣ a spatial ecological-economic model where regulators formulate payments in alternative schemes,
2️⃣ a coalition formation game,
so landowners choose both *how much* to conserve and *with whom* to cooperate in this process.
[4/8]
We ask a simple question:
👉what is the value of cooperation for biodiversity conservation?
Or, say differently: How much biodiversity comes from cooperation itself, holding payments constant?
[3/8]
👉what is the value of cooperation for biodiversity conservation?
Or, say differently: How much biodiversity comes from cooperation itself, holding payments constant?
[3/8]
January 21, 2026 at 8:20 AM
We ask a simple question:
👉what is the value of cooperation for biodiversity conservation?
Or, say differently: How much biodiversity comes from cooperation itself, holding payments constant?
[3/8]
👉what is the value of cooperation for biodiversity conservation?
Or, say differently: How much biodiversity comes from cooperation itself, holding payments constant?
[3/8]
Collective conservation schemes are gaining attention everywhere — but most research focuses on how to design payments to conserve biodiveristy, not on how cooperation actually emerges in response to these incentives.
We argue this is a blind spot.
[2/8]
We argue this is a blind spot.
[2/8]
January 21, 2026 at 8:20 AM
Collective conservation schemes are gaining attention everywhere — but most research focuses on how to design payments to conserve biodiveristy, not on how cooperation actually emerges in response to these incentives.
We argue this is a blind spot.
[2/8]
We argue this is a blind spot.
[2/8]
Promise made, promise kept.
Here’s a short thread on our new Ecological Economics paper (with @mzavalloni.bsky.social ):
"The value of cooperation for biodiversity conservation policies"
👉Link: sciencedirect.com/science/articl
e/pii/S0921800925003842
[1/8]
Here’s a short thread on our new Ecological Economics paper (with @mzavalloni.bsky.social ):
"The value of cooperation for biodiversity conservation policies"
👉Link: sciencedirect.com/science/articl
e/pii/S0921800925003842
[1/8]
sciencedirect.com
January 21, 2026 at 8:20 AM
Promise made, promise kept.
Here’s a short thread on our new Ecological Economics paper (with @mzavalloni.bsky.social ):
"The value of cooperation for biodiversity conservation policies"
👉Link: sciencedirect.com/science/articl
e/pii/S0921800925003842
[1/8]
Here’s a short thread on our new Ecological Economics paper (with @mzavalloni.bsky.social ):
"The value of cooperation for biodiversity conservation policies"
👉Link: sciencedirect.com/science/articl
e/pii/S0921800925003842
[1/8]
Reposted by François Bareille
New in Ecological Economics !
Link for "The value of cooperation for biodiversity conservation policies" (Ecological Economics, with
@mzavalloni.bsky.social):
www.sciencedirect.com/science/arti...
@mzavalloni.bsky.social):
www.sciencedirect.com/science/arti...
January 9, 2026 at 1:55 PM
New in Ecological Economics !
Link for "A meta-analysis on the productive value of crop biodiversity" (American Journal of Agricultural Economics, with B. Largier):
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/...
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/...
January 9, 2026 at 1:30 PM
Link for "A meta-analysis on the productive value of crop biodiversity" (American Journal of Agricultural Economics, with B. Largier):
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/...
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/...
Link for "The value of cooperation for biodiversity conservation policies" (Ecological Economics, with
@mzavalloni.bsky.social):
www.sciencedirect.com/science/arti...
@mzavalloni.bsky.social):
www.sciencedirect.com/science/arti...
January 9, 2026 at 1:30 PM
Link for "The value of cooperation for biodiversity conservation policies" (Ecological Economics, with
@mzavalloni.bsky.social):
www.sciencedirect.com/science/arti...
@mzavalloni.bsky.social):
www.sciencedirect.com/science/arti...
After years in the climate-econ trenches, I’ve resurfaced with two new biodiversity papers out in Ecological Economics (with @mzavalloni.bsky.social) and American Journal of Agricultural Economics (with B. Largier)
More detailed threads soon (once I’ve recovered from the proofs).
More detailed threads soon (once I’ve recovered from the proofs).
January 9, 2026 at 1:30 PM
After years in the climate-econ trenches, I’ve resurfaced with two new biodiversity papers out in Ecological Economics (with @mzavalloni.bsky.social) and American Journal of Agricultural Economics (with B. Largier)
More detailed threads soon (once I’ve recovered from the proofs).
More detailed threads soon (once I’ve recovered from the proofs).
Overall, increasing internal bonuses over external ones thus allows improving AB cost-effectiveness. Interestingly, landowners mostly enroll individually in such differentiated ABs.
As such, habitat agglomeration doesn’t always need cooperation—it just needs smart incentives.
10/10
As such, habitat agglomeration doesn’t always need cooperation—it just needs smart incentives.
10/10
June 11, 2025 at 7:50 AM
Overall, increasing internal bonuses over external ones thus allows improving AB cost-effectiveness. Interestingly, landowners mostly enroll individually in such differentiated ABs.
As such, habitat agglomeration doesn’t always need cooperation—it just needs smart incentives.
10/10
As such, habitat agglomeration doesn’t always need cooperation—it just needs smart incentives.
10/10
To overcome this issue, the regulator must raise external bonuses high enough to make each landowner better off independently.
This makes external conservation more expensive than internal bonuses. Cooperation is costly!
9/10
This makes external conservation more expensive than internal bonuses. Cooperation is costly!
9/10
June 11, 2025 at 7:50 AM
To overcome this issue, the regulator must raise external bonuses high enough to make each landowner better off independently.
This makes external conservation more expensive than internal bonuses. Cooperation is costly!
9/10
This makes external conservation more expensive than internal bonuses. Cooperation is costly!
9/10
External bonuses are trickier: both landowners must find it individually worthwhile to conserve. If just one of them faces a higher cost than the bonus, the deal collapses and the AB does not work—because they can’t compensate each other (while they can within landholdings)
8/10
8/10
June 11, 2025 at 7:50 AM
External bonuses are trickier: both landowners must find it individually worthwhile to conserve. If just one of them faces a higher cost than the bonus, the deal collapses and the AB does not work—because they can’t compensate each other (while they can within landholdings)
8/10
8/10
Here’s the intuition:
For internal bonuses, only the total surplus from the two plots matters. If the combined bonus exceeds the combined opportunity cost, the landowner will conserve both plots—no matter how the gains are split.
7/10
For internal bonuses, only the total surplus from the two plots matters. If the combined bonus exceeds the combined opportunity cost, the landowner will conserve both plots—no matter how the gains are split.
7/10
June 11, 2025 at 7:50 AM
Here’s the intuition:
For internal bonuses, only the total surplus from the two plots matters. If the combined bonus exceeds the combined opportunity cost, the landowner will conserve both plots—no matter how the gains are split.
7/10
For internal bonuses, only the total surplus from the two plots matters. If the combined bonus exceeds the combined opportunity cost, the landowner will conserve both plots—no matter how the gains are split.
7/10
Our simulations—calibrated with French data—show a clear pattern:
When the regulator's budget is limited, undifferentiated ABs (same internal & external bonuses) perform best.
But as the budget grows, prioritizing internal bonuses becomes increasingly cost-effective. Why?
6/10
When the regulator's budget is limited, undifferentiated ABs (same internal & external bonuses) perform best.
But as the budget grows, prioritizing internal bonuses becomes increasingly cost-effective. Why?
6/10
June 11, 2025 at 7:50 AM
Our simulations—calibrated with French data—show a clear pattern:
When the regulator's budget is limited, undifferentiated ABs (same internal & external bonuses) perform best.
But as the budget grows, prioritizing internal bonuses becomes increasingly cost-effective. Why?
6/10
When the regulator's budget is limited, undifferentiated ABs (same internal & external bonuses) perform best.
But as the budget grows, prioritizing internal bonuses becomes increasingly cost-effective. Why?
6/10
So we ask ourselves whether regulators should differentiate between these two types of bonuses?
To answer, we develop a spatially explicit ecological-economic game, with landowners choosing whether to cooperate and what to conserve, under a fixed regulatory budget.
5/10
To answer, we develop a spatially explicit ecological-economic game, with landowners choosing whether to cooperate and what to conserve, under a fixed regulatory budget.
5/10
June 11, 2025 at 7:50 AM
So we ask ourselves whether regulators should differentiate between these two types of bonuses?
To answer, we develop a spatially explicit ecological-economic game, with landowners choosing whether to cooperate and what to conserve, under a fixed regulatory budget.
5/10
To answer, we develop a spatially explicit ecological-economic game, with landowners choosing whether to cooperate and what to conserve, under a fixed regulatory budget.
5/10
Why? Because external bonuses involve cooperation problems: two landowners must agree to conserve plots side-by-side.
Internal bonuses avoid this: a single landowner can conserve multiple adjacent plots without negotiating with others. This improves AB cost-effectiveness.
4/10
Internal bonuses avoid this: a single landowner can conserve multiple adjacent plots without negotiating with others. This improves AB cost-effectiveness.
4/10
June 11, 2025 at 7:50 AM
Why? Because external bonuses involve cooperation problems: two landowners must agree to conserve plots side-by-side.
Internal bonuses avoid this: a single landowner can conserve multiple adjacent plots without negotiating with others. This improves AB cost-effectiveness.
4/10
Internal bonuses avoid this: a single landowner can conserve multiple adjacent plots without negotiating with others. This improves AB cost-effectiveness.
4/10
Most ABs reward landowners when two conserved plots are adjacent, regardless of who owns the plots.
Yet, the two plots can be either on the same landholding (internal bonus), or on different landholdings (external bonus).
Raphaël and I show that this distinction matters.
3/10
Yet, the two plots can be either on the same landholding (internal bonus), or on different landholdings (external bonus).
Raphaël and I show that this distinction matters.
3/10
June 11, 2025 at 7:50 AM
Most ABs reward landowners when two conserved plots are adjacent, regardless of who owns the plots.
Yet, the two plots can be either on the same landholding (internal bonus), or on different landholdings (external bonus).
Raphaël and I show that this distinction matters.
3/10
Yet, the two plots can be either on the same landholding (internal bonus), or on different landholdings (external bonus).
Raphaël and I show that this distinction matters.
3/10
This work extends my 2023 paper with @mzavalloni.bsky.social in AJAE, where we showed that landowners enroll into agglomeration bonus (AB) in small groups—not the idealized "grand coalition" often assumed in previous AB models.
That finding led us to rethink how incentives work.
2/10
That finding led us to rethink how incentives work.
2/10
June 11, 2025 at 7:50 AM
This work extends my 2023 paper with @mzavalloni.bsky.social in AJAE, where we showed that landowners enroll into agglomeration bonus (AB) in small groups—not the idealized "grand coalition" often assumed in previous AB models.
That finding led us to rethink how incentives work.
2/10
That finding led us to rethink how incentives work.
2/10
Thrilled to share my new paper in @jeem-econ.bsky.social
, coauthored with Raphaël Soubeyran:
We explore how differentiating agglomeration bonus *within* vs. *between* landholdings can make biodiversity policies on habitat agglomeration more effective.
📄 sciencedirect.com/science/arti...
🧵 1/10
, coauthored with Raphaël Soubeyran:
We explore how differentiating agglomeration bonus *within* vs. *between* landholdings can make biodiversity policies on habitat agglomeration more effective.
📄 sciencedirect.com/science/arti...
🧵 1/10
Individual versus group-level agglomeration bonuses to conserve biodiversity
Agglomeration bonuses (ABs) are payments conditional on the contiguity of landowners’ conservation areas. We study whether differentiating the bonuses…
sciencedirect.com
June 11, 2025 at 7:50 AM
Thrilled to share my new paper in @jeem-econ.bsky.social
, coauthored with Raphaël Soubeyran:
We explore how differentiating agglomeration bonus *within* vs. *between* landholdings can make biodiversity policies on habitat agglomeration more effective.
📄 sciencedirect.com/science/arti...
🧵 1/10
, coauthored with Raphaël Soubeyran:
We explore how differentiating agglomeration bonus *within* vs. *between* landholdings can make biodiversity policies on habitat agglomeration more effective.
📄 sciencedirect.com/science/arti...
🧵 1/10
I had the chance to present my ongoing work "Adapting to climate change with (in)complete land rights: Evidence from the Greece land registry reform" this morning at the University degli studi of Milano. Plenty of good comments from the audience!
Thanks for the engaging discussion ☺️
Thanks for the engaging discussion ☺️
March 14, 2025 at 4:09 PM
I had the chance to present my ongoing work "Adapting to climate change with (in)complete land rights: Evidence from the Greece land registry reform" this morning at the University degli studi of Milano. Plenty of good comments from the audience!
Thanks for the engaging discussion ☺️
Thanks for the engaging discussion ☺️
Reposted by François Bareille
Cela semble absurde, et j’ai été choqué la première fois que je l’ai compris, mais la France – il n'y a pas d'autre mot – est bien un paradis fiscal pour milliardaire
Explications détaillées 🧵
Explications détaillées 🧵
February 7, 2025 at 2:55 PM
Cela semble absurde, et j’ai été choqué la première fois que je l’ai compris, mais la France – il n'y a pas d'autre mot – est bien un paradis fiscal pour milliardaire
Explications détaillées 🧵
Explications détaillées 🧵
Malheureusement le devoir m’appelle à Milan ! (Tu viens à l’IAERE à Rome la semaine prochaine ?)
February 6, 2025 at 3:26 PM
Malheureusement le devoir m’appelle à Milan ! (Tu viens à l’IAERE à Rome la semaine prochaine ?)