Theoretical Economics
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econtheory.bsky.social
Theoretical Economics
@econtheory.bsky.social
Theoretical Economics, a journal of the Econometric Society, publishes research in all areas of economic theory. All content is freely available.
The paper focuses on a single intrinsic difference between physical and digital currency: traceability. This technological advance in record-keeping can be used by the monetary authority to achieve efficiency in a wide range of circumstances econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...
January 14, 2026 at 2:00 AM
The paper studies reputational bargaining in which the stubborn type can choose their initial demand. Types can pool or separate in equilibrium. When the probability of the stubborn type is small, any feasible payoff can be achieved in equilibrium econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...
January 14, 2026 at 1:56 AM
We revisit revealed preference analysis when choices are observed imprecisely. Building on Afriat and Fishburn, we study rationalization when the analyst only knows that the agent chose *some* option within a set econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...
December 16, 2025 at 11:59 PM
if we randomly sample economies from a distribution, will the stable assignments of these economies converge to a stable assignment of the limit economy as we increase the sample? I provide a condition on the economy that guarantees this convergence econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...
December 16, 2025 at 5:43 PM
A dynamic model of durable-good monopoly where the seller minimises lifetime regret against the worst-case type of buyer econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...
December 8, 2025 at 11:22 PM
Theoretical Economics Volume 20, Issue 4 (November 2025) is now online econtheory.org
November 19, 2025 at 4:54 PM
We study stochastic choice using marginal distributions of menus and choices. RUM has no testable implications, but any domain restriction generates data restrictions. Luce also rationalizes any dataset, but unlike RUM its parameters are identified econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...
November 11, 2025 at 6:04 PM
This paper shows that the limit equilibrium payoff set for stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring expands when the monitoring structure improves in the information order based on a weaker notion of garbling called weighted garbling econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...
November 8, 2025 at 1:51 AM
How does verifiable information flow through networks? Full disclosure arises only when all players are biased in the same direction relative to the decision maker. Hence, the optimal network is a line where players are ordered by their preferences econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...
November 4, 2025 at 5:59 PM
Perfectly patient and monotone preferences on infinite utility streams can allow for strict comparisons of almost all utility streams econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...
October 24, 2025 at 2:40 PM
Robust contracts for agents with unknown beliefs econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...
October 21, 2025 at 6:02 PM
Standard dynamic preference models cannot simultaneously satisfy the properties of time consistency, the separation of time and risk preferences and the ability to accommodate an indifference to the timing of when risk is resolved econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...
September 16, 2025 at 5:22 PM
What is the efficient provision of public information in frictional search markets?
I characterize the constrained-efficient market segmentation when agents use it to direct their search econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...
September 16, 2025 at 5:14 PM
The Executive Committee of the Econometric Society has approved an increase in the publication fees for papers in its two Open Access journals, Quantitative Economics and Theoretical Economics. Read more www.econometricsociety.org/society/news...
Changes in Publication Fees for Quantitative Economics and Theoretical Economics - The Econometric Society
The Executive Committee of the Econometric Society has approved an increase in the publication fees for papers in its two Open Access...
www.econometricsociety.org
September 12, 2025 at 3:31 PM
How does information shape monopoly outcomes under interdependent values? We characterize payoff sets across three classes of information structures. With no restrictions, buyers can obtain the entire surplus even though the seller chooses a price econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...
September 10, 2025 at 5:54 PM
We extend Bayesian persuasion to dynamic environments with Markovian states. Optimal info disclosure trades off current vs. future discounted payoffs. We discuss optimal strategies and characterize when the asymptotic value hits its upper bound econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...
August 21, 2025 at 5:09 AM
Under which conditions do Bayesian equilibria exist in Bayesian games with general type spaces? The paper shows the existence of a Bayesian equilibrium when information is nested, provided the sets of actions are finite econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...
August 21, 2025 at 5:05 AM
How does one optimally design mechanisms in contexts where evidence is stochastic, possibly because it must first be aquired? econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...
August 11, 2025 at 11:48 PM
A model a non-Bayesian agent who adjusts estimates based on past data but misattributes selection bias as systematic error. This naive calibration leads to pessimistic choices, reinforced by feedback loops. Applied to auctions & project selection econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...
August 11, 2025 at 11:43 PM
Do partners always benefit from a more profitable partnership? Not necessarily. This paper shows that higher profitability can prompt strategic exits by partners, leaving all partners strictly worse off econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...
July 25, 2025 at 6:38 PM
Theoretical Economics Volume 20, Issue 3 (July 2025) is now online econtheory.org
July 23, 2025 at 4:18 PM
How do sequential information choices affect the extent of coordination failure? We show that in the context of global games, the likelihood of coordination failure is invariant to precision, cost, and availability of information econtheory.org/ojs/index.ph...
July 22, 2025 at 11:27 PM
TE is fortunate to have thoughtful and committed Associate Editors who are essential for the smooth running of the journal. We are pleased to announce the following people joined our team starting July 1st 2025 1/2
July 1, 2025 at 3:58 PM
We are thrilled to have Pablo Kurlat (University of Southern California) join the editorial board as Co-editor, starting July 1st, 2025. He will be handling papers in a wide range of topics, including dynamic general equilibrium theory, and monetary economics.
July 1, 2025 at 12:54 PM
We are thrilled to have Mira Frick (Princeton University) join the editorial board as Co-editor, starting July 1st, 2025. She will be handling papers in a wide range of
topics, including decision theory, game theory, and the theory of learning.
July 1, 2025 at 12:53 PM