Gilles Deleuze For You
@deleuzeforyou.bsky.social
The writings of Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995), French philosopher, pure metaphysician.
What I’m telling you is, you know, Hegel didn’t invent dialectics, you know that. He hardened it enormously, he hardened it enormously, because the dialectic in Schelling is something with transitions, soft aspects… It’s not there. Hegel made a dialectic of war.
January 4, 2026 at 1:18 AM
What I’m telling you is, you know, Hegel didn’t invent dialectics, you know that. He hardened it enormously, he hardened it enormously, because the dialectic in Schelling is something with transitions, soft aspects… It’s not there. Hegel made a dialectic of war.
Qualitative contrariety is only the reflection of the intense, a reflection which betrays it by explicating it in extensity.
January 2, 2026 at 10:27 PM
Qualitative contrariety is only the reflection of the intense, a reflection which betrays it by explicating it in extensity.
And once again, this runs through all the physics of the Middle Ages, all these attempts to make a science of intensive quantities. We had a kind of mixture that we must take in a very muddled way and that revolved around a kind of thought of degrees of power, of the assemblages
January 1, 2026 at 11:05 PM
And once again, this runs through all the physics of the Middle Ages, all these attempts to make a science of intensive quantities. We had a kind of mixture that we must take in a very muddled way and that revolved around a kind of thought of degrees of power, of the assemblages
Descriptions are not statements, they are visibilities. On my side, I have some very eminent logicians, Bertrand Russell, for example, who in his book that founded modern logic, ‘Principles of Mathematics’, already indicated the difference in nature between propositions and descriptions.
December 31, 2025 at 11:28 PM
Descriptions are not statements, they are visibilities. On my side, I have some very eminent logicians, Bertrand Russell, for example, who in his book that founded modern logic, ‘Principles of Mathematics’, already indicated the difference in nature between propositions and descriptions.
The theorem, the demonstration as a concatenation of definitions, can appeal to syllogistic form; but we go by "enthymemes”, which hold only for syllogisms, and which work by means of "inner suppressions," ellipses, and problematic shortcuts.
December 30, 2025 at 11:56 PM
The theorem, the demonstration as a concatenation of definitions, can appeal to syllogistic form; but we go by "enthymemes”, which hold only for syllogisms, and which work by means of "inner suppressions," ellipses, and problematic shortcuts.
Gilbert Simondon makes no small display of intellectual power with a profoundly original theory of individuation implying a whole philosophy. Simondon begins from two critical remarks: 1) Traditionally, the principle of individuation is modeled on a completed individual, one who is already formed.
December 29, 2025 at 11:40 PM
Gilbert Simondon makes no small display of intellectual power with a profoundly original theory of individuation implying a whole philosophy. Simondon begins from two critical remarks: 1) Traditionally, the principle of individuation is modeled on a completed individual, one who is already formed.
And the disputes between great philosophers of the Middle Ages appear to me less of the kind “And what about your syllogism?” than the kind “How do you distinguish this or that?” That is, fine, God is three persons in one. What kind of distinction? What is this?
December 28, 2025 at 11:35 PM
And the disputes between great philosophers of the Middle Ages appear to me less of the kind “And what about your syllogism?” than the kind “How do you distinguish this or that?” That is, fine, God is three persons in one. What kind of distinction? What is this?
We can not accept the alternative which thoroughly compromises psychology, cosmology, and theology: either singularities already comprised in individuals and persons, or the undifferentiated abyss.
December 27, 2025 at 11:29 PM
We can not accept the alternative which thoroughly compromises psychology, cosmology, and theology: either singularities already comprised in individuals and persons, or the undifferentiated abyss.
It appears at first as though language were incapable of finding a sufficient foundation in the states of the one who expresses herself, or in the denoted sensible things, and that such a foundation were to be located only in the Ideas which offer language a possibility of truth or falsity.
December 27, 2025 at 2:54 AM
It appears at first as though language were incapable of finding a sufficient foundation in the states of the one who expresses herself, or in the denoted sensible things, and that such a foundation were to be located only in the Ideas which offer language a possibility of truth or falsity.
Syntactic creation or style — this is the becoming of language. The creation of words or neologisms is worth nothing apart from the effects of syntax in which they are developed.
December 25, 2025 at 10:49 PM
Syntactic creation or style — this is the becoming of language. The creation of words or neologisms is worth nothing apart from the effects of syntax in which they are developed.
I have always felt like an empiricist, or a pluralist. What does this empiricism-pluralism equivalency mean? It derives from the two traits Whitehead used to define empiricism: 1) abstraction does not explain but must be explained,
December 24, 2025 at 10:48 PM
I have always felt like an empiricist, or a pluralist. What does this empiricism-pluralism equivalency mean? It derives from the two traits Whitehead used to define empiricism: 1) abstraction does not explain but must be explained,
The way people talk about abstraction is amazing, they have absolutely no idea what it is. Philosophy has a kind of technique and a terminology like mathematics. Generally the word abstract is used for things in which there is no abstraction.
December 23, 2025 at 9:42 PM
The way people talk about abstraction is amazing, they have absolutely no idea what it is. Philosophy has a kind of technique and a terminology like mathematics. Generally the word abstract is used for things in which there is no abstraction.
We just need for one little thing to suddenly become concrete, we mustn't demand continuous concreteness. There is the concrete and the opposite of the concrete, the true opposite of the concrete is not the abstract, it's the discrete. Discretion is the moment of thought.
December 22, 2025 at 10:47 PM
We just need for one little thing to suddenly become concrete, we mustn't demand continuous concreteness. There is the concrete and the opposite of the concrete, the true opposite of the concrete is not the abstract, it's the discrete. Discretion is the moment of thought.
Artaud pursues in all this the terrible revelation of a thought without image, and the conquest of a new principle which does not allow itself to be represented. He knows that ‘difficulty’ as such, along with its cortège of problems and questions, is not a ‘de facto’ state of affairs but a ‘de jure’
December 21, 2025 at 10:12 PM
Artaud pursues in all this the terrible revelation of a thought without image, and the conquest of a new principle which does not allow itself to be represented. He knows that ‘difficulty’ as such, along with its cortège of problems and questions, is not a ‘de facto’ state of affairs but a ‘de jure’
We said above that representation was defined by certain elements: identity with regard to concepts, opposition with regard to the determination of concepts, analogy with regard to judgement, resemblance with regard to objects.
December 20, 2025 at 9:31 PM
We said above that representation was defined by certain elements: identity with regard to concepts, opposition with regard to the determination of concepts, analogy with regard to judgement, resemblance with regard to objects.
Artaud said that the problem (for him) was not to orientate his thought, or to perfect the expression of what he thought, or to acquire application and method or to perfect his poems, but simply to manage to think something.
December 20, 2025 at 2:21 AM
Artaud said that the problem (for him) was not to orientate his thought, or to perfect the expression of what he thought, or to acquire application and method or to perfect his poems, but simply to manage to think something.
Critique has everything — a tribunal of justices of the peace, a registration room, a register — except the power of a new politics which would overturn the image of thought. Even the dead God and the fractured I are no more than a passing bad moment, the speculative moment:
December 19, 2025 at 7:07 AM
Critique has everything — a tribunal of justices of the peace, a registration room, a register — except the power of a new politics which would overturn the image of thought. Even the dead God and the fractured I are no more than a passing bad moment, the speculative moment:
There are two kinds of people who are wrong: those who say that the real battle is on the outside; the people who say that are the traditional Marxists: in order to change man, let's change the external world. And then there are the priests or the moralists who say: the real battle is on the inside:
December 17, 2025 at 10:04 AM
There are two kinds of people who are wrong: those who say that the real battle is on the outside; the people who say that are the traditional Marxists: in order to change man, let's change the external world. And then there are the priests or the moralists who say: the real battle is on the inside:
Collective representations are not of the same nature as individual representations, and sociology is the science of collective representations. Okay. I am simplifying a great deal. But the notion of collective representation is fundamental… I can say that it is typical of molar sociology.
December 14, 2025 at 3:35 AM
Collective representations are not of the same nature as individual representations, and sociology is the science of collective representations. Okay. I am simplifying a great deal. But the notion of collective representation is fundamental… I can say that it is typical of molar sociology.
Repetition is never a historical fact, but rather the historical condition under which something new is effectively produced. It is not the historian's reflection which demonstrates a resemblance between Luther and Paul, between the Revolution of 1789 and the Roman Republic, etc.
December 13, 2025 at 2:11 AM
Repetition is never a historical fact, but rather the historical condition under which something new is effectively produced. It is not the historian's reflection which demonstrates a resemblance between Luther and Paul, between the Revolution of 1789 and the Roman Republic, etc.
In brief, the option of the psychologist may be expressed paradoxically as follows: one must be a moralist, sociologist, or historian ‘before’ being a psychologist, ‘in order to’ be a psychologist.
December 11, 2025 at 10:31 PM
In brief, the option of the psychologist may be expressed paradoxically as follows: one must be a moralist, sociologist, or historian ‘before’ being a psychologist, ‘in order to’ be a psychologist.
I would not say that the reasonable man is worth more than the insane one. I cannot, I have no way of saying that: each has a power of action, each realizes as much power of action as there is in him. This is natural right; this is the world of nature. Fine, from this point of view,
December 10, 2025 at 11:24 PM
I would not say that the reasonable man is worth more than the insane one. I cannot, I have no way of saying that: each has a power of action, each realizes as much power of action as there is in him. This is natural right; this is the world of nature. Fine, from this point of view,
You see, for as long as there’s been thought, philosophy has never in the least way ‘contained’ the sciences. I mean, the Greeks never confused a philosopher with a mathematician…
December 9, 2025 at 9:08 PM
You see, for as long as there’s been thought, philosophy has never in the least way ‘contained’ the sciences. I mean, the Greeks never confused a philosopher with a mathematician…
The noblest games such as chess are those that organize a combinatory system of places in a pure spatium infinitely deeper than the real extension of the chessboard and the imaginary extension of each piece. Or when Althusser interrupts his commentary on Marx to talk about theatre,
December 8, 2025 at 9:47 PM
The noblest games such as chess are those that organize a combinatory system of places in a pure spatium infinitely deeper than the real extension of the chessboard and the imaginary extension of each piece. Or when Althusser interrupts his commentary on Marx to talk about theatre,
Not long ago we used to ask: What is existentialism? Now we ask: What is structuralism? These questions are of keen interest, provided they are timely and have some bearing on work actually in progress.
December 8, 2025 at 1:18 AM
Not long ago we used to ask: What is existentialism? Now we ask: What is structuralism? These questions are of keen interest, provided they are timely and have some bearing on work actually in progress.