DE-CONSPIRATOR
@deconspirator.bsky.social
DE-CONSPIRATOR is a Horizon Europe project at the forefront of the battle against Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI).
Learn more about us: https://deconspirator.eu/
Learn more about us: https://deconspirator.eu/
📢 D2.3 – Capturing FIMI in Strategic & Military Doctrines of Russia and China: analyses how #FIMI is embedded in their strategy & military plans, supporting informed responses to manipulation.
Disclaimer: Report is pending EC approval
Full deliverable available here: deconspirator.eu/deliverables/
Disclaimer: Report is pending EC approval
Full deliverable available here: deconspirator.eu/deliverables/
February 3, 2026 at 2:10 PM
📢 D2.3 – Capturing FIMI in Strategic & Military Doctrines of Russia and China: analyses how #FIMI is embedded in their strategy & military plans, supporting informed responses to manipulation.
Disclaimer: Report is pending EC approval
Full deliverable available here: deconspirator.eu/deliverables/
Disclaimer: Report is pending EC approval
Full deliverable available here: deconspirator.eu/deliverables/
🔍 DE-CON Glossary #14: Kompromat
Kompromat is a Soviet-origin tactic involving the collection and use of compromising information to discredit, blackmail, or manipulate targets—and today extends far beyond Russia.
📌Definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
Kompromat is a Soviet-origin tactic involving the collection and use of compromising information to discredit, blackmail, or manipulate targets—and today extends far beyond Russia.
📌Definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
January 30, 2026 at 8:23 AM
🔍 DE-CON Glossary #14: Kompromat
Kompromat is a Soviet-origin tactic involving the collection and use of compromising information to discredit, blackmail, or manipulate targets—and today extends far beyond Russia.
📌Definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
Kompromat is a Soviet-origin tactic involving the collection and use of compromising information to discredit, blackmail, or manipulate targets—and today extends far beyond Russia.
📌Definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
🔄 Recap of DE-CONSPIRATOR Annual Consortium Meeting
On 17–18 December 2025, the consortium gathered at Özyeğin University, Istanbul, and brought partners together to align priorities as the project enters its final year.
🔗Read the the full article on our website: deconspirator.eu/de-conspirat...
On 17–18 December 2025, the consortium gathered at Özyeğin University, Istanbul, and brought partners together to align priorities as the project enters its final year.
🔗Read the the full article on our website: deconspirator.eu/de-conspirat...
DE-CONSPIRATOR M24 Annual Consortium Meeting in Istanbul - DE-CONSPIRATOR
The DE-CONSPIRATOR project successfully held the Annual Consortium Meeting on 17 - 18 of December 2025, hosted by our Project Coordinator, Akin Unver, at Özyeğin University in Istanbul.
deconspirator.eu
January 29, 2026 at 8:48 PM
🔄 Recap of DE-CONSPIRATOR Annual Consortium Meeting
On 17–18 December 2025, the consortium gathered at Özyeğin University, Istanbul, and brought partners together to align priorities as the project enters its final year.
🔗Read the the full article on our website: deconspirator.eu/de-conspirat...
On 17–18 December 2025, the consortium gathered at Özyeğin University, Istanbul, and brought partners together to align priorities as the project enters its final year.
🔗Read the the full article on our website: deconspirator.eu/de-conspirat...
🔎 Interview Highlight | US–China Power Shift
Plamen Tonchev, Head of Asia Unit at IIER & DE-CONSPIRATOR NoI member, examines US–China rivalry, global power shifts, and the risk of a “Kindleberger Trap”, linking geopolitics to information environments.
🔗Read the interview here: lnkd.in/dNSX3wKR
Plamen Tonchev, Head of Asia Unit at IIER & DE-CONSPIRATOR NoI member, examines US–China rivalry, global power shifts, and the risk of a “Kindleberger Trap”, linking geopolitics to information environments.
🔗Read the interview here: lnkd.in/dNSX3wKR
Plamen Tonchev on the U.S.–China power shift and the coming age of uncertainty - GeoTrends
Interview with Plamen Tonchev on U.S.–China rivalry, global power shifts, strategic uncertainty, and leadership prospects
geo-trends.eu
January 19, 2026 at 9:13 AM
🔎 Interview Highlight | US–China Power Shift
Plamen Tonchev, Head of Asia Unit at IIER & DE-CONSPIRATOR NoI member, examines US–China rivalry, global power shifts, and the risk of a “Kindleberger Trap”, linking geopolitics to information environments.
🔗Read the interview here: lnkd.in/dNSX3wKR
Plamen Tonchev, Head of Asia Unit at IIER & DE-CONSPIRATOR NoI member, examines US–China rivalry, global power shifts, and the risk of a “Kindleberger Trap”, linking geopolitics to information environments.
🔗Read the interview here: lnkd.in/dNSX3wKR
📢 Data Collection Notice for DE-CONSPIRATOR
Prepared for the upcoming WP3 research activities on Russian & Chinese #FIMI mapping misinformation networks across social media. Data collected will be pseudonymised & and securely stored.
🔗 Read the full article here: deconspirator.eu/data-collect...
Prepared for the upcoming WP3 research activities on Russian & Chinese #FIMI mapping misinformation networks across social media. Data collected will be pseudonymised & and securely stored.
🔗 Read the full article here: deconspirator.eu/data-collect...
Data Collection Notice for DE-CONSPIRATOR - DE-CONSPIRATOR
Dr. Bharath Ganesh from the University of Amsterdam has prepared a Data Collection Notice for DE-CONSPIRATOR’s WP3 research, collecting public social media data on Russian and Chinese FIMI to map infl...
deconspirator.eu
January 15, 2026 at 12:27 PM
📢 Data Collection Notice for DE-CONSPIRATOR
Prepared for the upcoming WP3 research activities on Russian & Chinese #FIMI mapping misinformation networks across social media. Data collected will be pseudonymised & and securely stored.
🔗 Read the full article here: deconspirator.eu/data-collect...
Prepared for the upcoming WP3 research activities on Russian & Chinese #FIMI mapping misinformation networks across social media. Data collected will be pseudonymised & and securely stored.
🔗 Read the full article here: deconspirator.eu/data-collect...
🎙️Upocoming webinar on 28 January
Graphika analysts will reveal China-linked inauthentic domains mimicking media, spreading pro-China narratives, and using complex corporate networks.
🔗 Read info and register here: launch.graphika.com/when-pr-look...
Graphika analysts will reveal China-linked inauthentic domains mimicking media, spreading pro-China narratives, and using complex corporate networks.
🔗 Read info and register here: launch.graphika.com/when-pr-look...
January 13, 2026 at 9:20 AM
🎙️Upocoming webinar on 28 January
Graphika analysts will reveal China-linked inauthentic domains mimicking media, spreading pro-China narratives, and using complex corporate networks.
🔗 Read info and register here: launch.graphika.com/when-pr-look...
Graphika analysts will reveal China-linked inauthentic domains mimicking media, spreading pro-China narratives, and using complex corporate networks.
🔗 Read info and register here: launch.graphika.com/when-pr-look...
📌Day #2 | DE-CONSPIRATOR Annual Consortium Meeting
The 2nd day of the Annual Consortium Meeting was held on 18 December 2025 at Özyeğin University, Istanbul.
Partners advanced research, and policy work, aligned next steps, and shared insights with NoI members and the Ethics Advisory Board.
The 2nd day of the Annual Consortium Meeting was held on 18 December 2025 at Özyeğin University, Istanbul.
Partners advanced research, and policy work, aligned next steps, and shared insights with NoI members and the Ethics Advisory Board.
January 8, 2026 at 10:04 AM
📌Day #2 | DE-CONSPIRATOR Annual Consortium Meeting
The 2nd day of the Annual Consortium Meeting was held on 18 December 2025 at Özyeğin University, Istanbul.
Partners advanced research, and policy work, aligned next steps, and shared insights with NoI members and the Ethics Advisory Board.
The 2nd day of the Annual Consortium Meeting was held on 18 December 2025 at Özyeğin University, Istanbul.
Partners advanced research, and policy work, aligned next steps, and shared insights with NoI members and the Ethics Advisory Board.
📌Day #1 | DE-CONSPIRATOR Annual Consortium Meeting
The 1st day of the Annual Consortium Meeting was successfully held on 17 December 2025 at Özyeğin University, Istanbul.
Partners reviewed progress, discussed outputs, aligned priorities for the final phase, and shared insights with NoI members.
The 1st day of the Annual Consortium Meeting was successfully held on 17 December 2025 at Özyeğin University, Istanbul.
Partners reviewed progress, discussed outputs, aligned priorities for the final phase, and shared insights with NoI members.
December 19, 2025 at 9:48 PM
📌Day #1 | DE-CONSPIRATOR Annual Consortium Meeting
The 1st day of the Annual Consortium Meeting was successfully held on 17 December 2025 at Özyeğin University, Istanbul.
Partners reviewed progress, discussed outputs, aligned priorities for the final phase, and shared insights with NoI members.
The 1st day of the Annual Consortium Meeting was successfully held on 17 December 2025 at Özyeğin University, Istanbul.
Partners reviewed progress, discussed outputs, aligned priorities for the final phase, and shared insights with NoI members.
New article by @jborrasarumi.bsky.social, core research DE-CONSPIRATOR member, examines how China’s AI strategy prioritises open-source models and large-scale diffusion over the AGI race, with implications for standards, governance, and FIMI dynamics.
🔗 Read the full article here: lnkd.in/dAc3fgph
🔗 Read the full article here: lnkd.in/dAc3fgph
Open models and practical diffusion: China’s strategy for AI dominance
AI competition between the United States and China has been presented as a race that will be won by whoever has the most advanced models. Nevertheless, Ch
www.cidob.org
December 15, 2025 at 9:15 AM
New article by @jborrasarumi.bsky.social, core research DE-CONSPIRATOR member, examines how China’s AI strategy prioritises open-source models and large-scale diffusion over the AGI race, with implications for standards, governance, and FIMI dynamics.
🔗 Read the full article here: lnkd.in/dAc3fgph
🔗 Read the full article here: lnkd.in/dAc3fgph
🔍 DE-CON Glossary #13: Three Warfares
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) concept combines Psychological Warfare, Public Opinion Warfare & Lawfare, across domains to shape perceptions, influence narratives, and constrain decision-making.
📌Definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) concept combines Psychological Warfare, Public Opinion Warfare & Lawfare, across domains to shape perceptions, influence narratives, and constrain decision-making.
📌Definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
December 4, 2025 at 1:44 PM
🔍 DE-CON Glossary #13: Three Warfares
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) concept combines Psychological Warfare, Public Opinion Warfare & Lawfare, across domains to shape perceptions, influence narratives, and constrain decision-making.
📌Definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) concept combines Psychological Warfare, Public Opinion Warfare & Lawfare, across domains to shape perceptions, influence narratives, and constrain decision-making.
📌Definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
📢 D2.2 - Concepts/Definitions Literature Review Document: A glossary of TTPs linked to FIMI, supporting a shared framework for analysing complex manipulation tactics
Disclaimer: Report is pending EC approval
Full deliverable available here: deconspirator.eu/deliverables/
Disclaimer: Report is pending EC approval
Full deliverable available here: deconspirator.eu/deliverables/
November 28, 2025 at 3:38 PM
📢 D2.2 - Concepts/Definitions Literature Review Document: A glossary of TTPs linked to FIMI, supporting a shared framework for analysing complex manipulation tactics
Disclaimer: Report is pending EC approval
Full deliverable available here: deconspirator.eu/deliverables/
Disclaimer: Report is pending EC approval
Full deliverable available here: deconspirator.eu/deliverables/
🔍 DE-CON Glossary #12: Flooding the zone
Flooding the zone is a Russian disinformation tactic that drowns facts in noise, spreading confusion and weakening trust in democratic dialogue.
📌Definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
Flooding the zone is a Russian disinformation tactic that drowns facts in noise, spreading confusion and weakening trust in democratic dialogue.
📌Definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
November 12, 2025 at 9:41 AM
🔍 DE-CON Glossary #12: Flooding the zone
Flooding the zone is a Russian disinformation tactic that drowns facts in noise, spreading confusion and weakening trust in democratic dialogue.
📌Definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
Flooding the zone is a Russian disinformation tactic that drowns facts in noise, spreading confusion and weakening trust in democratic dialogue.
📌Definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
📢 D2.1 - Project Concept Workshop Note: establishes a shared understanding of FIMI, defining key concepts, strategies & challenges to enhance Europe’s information resilience.
Disclaimer: Report is pending EC approval & may be revised.
Full deliverable available here: deconspirator.eu/deliverables/
Disclaimer: Report is pending EC approval & may be revised.
Full deliverable available here: deconspirator.eu/deliverables/
November 5, 2025 at 1:47 PM
📢 D2.1 - Project Concept Workshop Note: establishes a shared understanding of FIMI, defining key concepts, strategies & challenges to enhance Europe’s information resilience.
Disclaimer: Report is pending EC approval & may be revised.
Full deliverable available here: deconspirator.eu/deliverables/
Disclaimer: Report is pending EC approval & may be revised.
Full deliverable available here: deconspirator.eu/deliverables/
🔍 DE-CON Glossary #11: Discourse Power
Discourse Power is China’s strategy to shape global narratives through media, diplomacy and soft power by using information control to expand influence and protect regime stability.
📌Definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
Discourse Power is China’s strategy to shape global narratives through media, diplomacy and soft power by using information control to expand influence and protect regime stability.
📌Definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
October 29, 2025 at 11:51 AM
🔍 DE-CON Glossary #11: Discourse Power
Discourse Power is China’s strategy to shape global narratives through media, diplomacy and soft power by using information control to expand influence and protect regime stability.
📌Definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
Discourse Power is China’s strategy to shape global narratives through media, diplomacy and soft power by using information control to expand influence and protect regime stability.
📌Definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
🔍 DE-CON Glossary #10: Botnets
Botnets shape narratives by amplifying divisive content, distorting debate, and faking consensus. In the information space, reach equals power. Combating them is vital to defending against FIMI.
📌 Definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
Botnets shape narratives by amplifying divisive content, distorting debate, and faking consensus. In the information space, reach equals power. Combating them is vital to defending against FIMI.
📌 Definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
October 16, 2025 at 4:39 PM
🔍 DE-CON Glossary #10: Botnets
Botnets shape narratives by amplifying divisive content, distorting debate, and faking consensus. In the information space, reach equals power. Combating them is vital to defending against FIMI.
📌 Definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
Botnets shape narratives by amplifying divisive content, distorting debate, and faking consensus. In the information space, reach equals power. Combating them is vital to defending against FIMI.
📌 Definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
How can the EU maximize cooperation with Taiwan?
A recent EU study, co-authored by our partner Aurelio Insisa (IAI), explores lessons from the US, a twin-track of diplomacy & deterrence, and ways to counter FIMI via strategic comms & EEAS expertise.
🔗 Read more: lnkd.in/de3JmGkZ
A recent EU study, co-authored by our partner Aurelio Insisa (IAI), explores lessons from the US, a twin-track of diplomacy & deterrence, and ways to counter FIMI via strategic comms & EEAS expertise.
🔗 Read more: lnkd.in/de3JmGkZ
October 10, 2025 at 10:38 AM
How can the EU maximize cooperation with Taiwan?
A recent EU study, co-authored by our partner Aurelio Insisa (IAI), explores lessons from the US, a twin-track of diplomacy & deterrence, and ways to counter FIMI via strategic comms & EEAS expertise.
🔗 Read more: lnkd.in/de3JmGkZ
A recent EU study, co-authored by our partner Aurelio Insisa (IAI), explores lessons from the US, a twin-track of diplomacy & deterrence, and ways to counter FIMI via strategic comms & EEAS expertise.
🔗 Read more: lnkd.in/de3JmGkZ
🔍 DE-CON Glossary #9: Information Warfare
Information warfare blends influence ops, disinformation & tech disruption. Russia & China frame it in distinct ways, but both show how it fuels FIMI by shaping perceptions, narratives & data.
📌 Full definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
Information warfare blends influence ops, disinformation & tech disruption. Russia & China frame it in distinct ways, but both show how it fuels FIMI by shaping perceptions, narratives & data.
📌 Full definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
October 2, 2025 at 12:23 PM
🔍 DE-CON Glossary #9: Information Warfare
Information warfare blends influence ops, disinformation & tech disruption. Russia & China frame it in distinct ways, but both show how it fuels FIMI by shaping perceptions, narratives & data.
📌 Full definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
Information warfare blends influence ops, disinformation & tech disruption. Russia & China frame it in distinct ways, but both show how it fuels FIMI by shaping perceptions, narratives & data.
📌 Full definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
With our third edition coming soon, subscribe to the DE-CONSPIRATOR Newsletter! Be the first to receive:
✅ Project updates.
✅ A sneak peek into our cutting-edge research.
✅ News on events and FIMI-related resources.
Join us and get inspired to de-conspire!
👉 Subscribe here: lnkd.in/dZwTWwZx
✅ Project updates.
✅ A sneak peek into our cutting-edge research.
✅ News on events and FIMI-related resources.
Join us and get inspired to de-conspire!
👉 Subscribe here: lnkd.in/dZwTWwZx
September 25, 2025 at 2:23 PM
With our third edition coming soon, subscribe to the DE-CONSPIRATOR Newsletter! Be the first to receive:
✅ Project updates.
✅ A sneak peek into our cutting-edge research.
✅ News on events and FIMI-related resources.
Join us and get inspired to de-conspire!
👉 Subscribe here: lnkd.in/dZwTWwZx
✅ Project updates.
✅ A sneak peek into our cutting-edge research.
✅ News on events and FIMI-related resources.
Join us and get inspired to de-conspire!
👉 Subscribe here: lnkd.in/dZwTWwZx
DE-CON Glossary #8: Cyber Attacks
From Ukraine’s 2015 grid hack to the Viasat breach & DDoS hits on EU elections, cyber attacks keep testing democratic resilience. The EU fights back with sanctions, NIS2 & the Cyber Solidarity Act.
📌 Full definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
From Ukraine’s 2015 grid hack to the Viasat breach & DDoS hits on EU elections, cyber attacks keep testing democratic resilience. The EU fights back with sanctions, NIS2 & the Cyber Solidarity Act.
📌 Full definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
September 18, 2025 at 2:05 PM
DE-CON Glossary #8: Cyber Attacks
From Ukraine’s 2015 grid hack to the Viasat breach & DDoS hits on EU elections, cyber attacks keep testing democratic resilience. The EU fights back with sanctions, NIS2 & the Cyber Solidarity Act.
📌 Full definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
From Ukraine’s 2015 grid hack to the Viasat breach & DDoS hits on EU elections, cyber attacks keep testing democratic resilience. The EU fights back with sanctions, NIS2 & the Cyber Solidarity Act.
📌 Full definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
🔍 DE-CON Glossary #7: Interference
Interference seeks to disrupt & destabilize. Often tied to elections, it uses disinfo, cyber-attacks & covert ops - such as the Russian-attributed Doppelgänger campaign & GPS jamming in the Baltics.
📌 Definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
Interference seeks to disrupt & destabilize. Often tied to elections, it uses disinfo, cyber-attacks & covert ops - such as the Russian-attributed Doppelgänger campaign & GPS jamming in the Baltics.
📌 Definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
September 5, 2025 at 10:24 AM
🔍 DE-CON Glossary #7: Interference
Interference seeks to disrupt & destabilize. Often tied to elections, it uses disinfo, cyber-attacks & covert ops - such as the Russian-attributed Doppelgänger campaign & GPS jamming in the Baltics.
📌 Definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
Interference seeks to disrupt & destabilize. Often tied to elections, it uses disinfo, cyber-attacks & covert ops - such as the Russian-attributed Doppelgänger campaign & GPS jamming in the Baltics.
📌 Definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
📢 New #Deliverable publicly available! D8.2 – Dissemination & Communication Plan v2.0, led by White Research.
It reviews year-one dissemination & engagement activities, showing strong impact from social media, events & collaborations. Full deliverable available here: bit.ly/45ZAGB4
It reviews year-one dissemination & engagement activities, showing strong impact from social media, events & collaborations. Full deliverable available here: bit.ly/45ZAGB4
September 1, 2025 at 8:06 AM
📢 New #Deliverable publicly available! D8.2 – Dissemination & Communication Plan v2.0, led by White Research.
It reviews year-one dissemination & engagement activities, showing strong impact from social media, events & collaborations. Full deliverable available here: bit.ly/45ZAGB4
It reviews year-one dissemination & engagement activities, showing strong impact from social media, events & collaborations. Full deliverable available here: bit.ly/45ZAGB4
🔍 DE-CON Glossary #6: Censorship
From selective controls in authoritarian regimes to digital takedowns & limits on sharing info, censorship raises key questions for democracy.
EU guidelines on freedom of expression: bit.ly/4mNz6ck
📌 Full definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
From selective controls in authoritarian regimes to digital takedowns & limits on sharing info, censorship raises key questions for democracy.
EU guidelines on freedom of expression: bit.ly/4mNz6ck
📌 Full definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
August 22, 2025 at 10:27 AM
🔍 DE-CON Glossary #6: Censorship
From selective controls in authoritarian regimes to digital takedowns & limits on sharing info, censorship raises key questions for democracy.
EU guidelines on freedom of expression: bit.ly/4mNz6ck
📌 Full definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
From selective controls in authoritarian regimes to digital takedowns & limits on sharing info, censorship raises key questions for democracy.
EU guidelines on freedom of expression: bit.ly/4mNz6ck
📌 Full definition from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
📢 D3.1 - Methodology Working Paper: presenting a framework to identify & analyse domestic actors that support or amplify FIMI campaigns in Europe. The methodology includes typology, data collection, & network analysis.
Full deliverable available here: deconspirator.eu/deliverables/
Full deliverable available here: deconspirator.eu/deliverables/
August 14, 2025 at 1:09 PM
📢 D3.1 - Methodology Working Paper: presenting a framework to identify & analyse domestic actors that support or amplify FIMI campaigns in Europe. The methodology includes typology, data collection, & network analysis.
Full deliverable available here: deconspirator.eu/deliverables/
Full deliverable available here: deconspirator.eu/deliverables/
DE-CON Glossary #4: Conspiracy Theories
Beliefs that multiple actors secretly control events. They thrive in uncertain times & offering false clarity. EC guides show why they spread & how to counter them: bit.ly/3J2SV12
📌 Flashcard definition comes from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
Beliefs that multiple actors secretly control events. They thrive in uncertain times & offering false clarity. EC guides show why they spread & how to counter them: bit.ly/3J2SV12
📌 Flashcard definition comes from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
August 6, 2025 at 11:28 AM
DE-CON Glossary #4: Conspiracy Theories
Beliefs that multiple actors secretly control events. They thrive in uncertain times & offering false clarity. EC guides show why they spread & how to counter them: bit.ly/3J2SV12
📌 Flashcard definition comes from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
Beliefs that multiple actors secretly control events. They thrive in uncertain times & offering false clarity. EC guides show why they spread & how to counter them: bit.ly/3J2SV12
📌 Flashcard definition comes from the DE-CONSPIRATOR FIMI Glossary (D2.2).
📢 D7.3: "FIMI Policy Brief v1.0: Diverging Policy Approaches to FIMI by Russia and China - a tour d'horizon" by EDAM.
Russia & China use digital disinfo & FIMI to challenge democracies. The EU, US & NATO can respond with media literacy, cooperation & AI tools.
Full deliverable at the link below.
Russia & China use digital disinfo & FIMI to challenge democracies. The EU, US & NATO can respond with media literacy, cooperation & AI tools.
Full deliverable at the link below.
Deliverables - DE-CONSPIRATOR
deconspirator.eu
July 31, 2025 at 12:50 PM
📢 D7.3: "FIMI Policy Brief v1.0: Diverging Policy Approaches to FIMI by Russia and China - a tour d'horizon" by EDAM.
Russia & China use digital disinfo & FIMI to challenge democracies. The EU, US & NATO can respond with media literacy, cooperation & AI tools.
Full deliverable at the link below.
Russia & China use digital disinfo & FIMI to challenge democracies. The EU, US & NATO can respond with media literacy, cooperation & AI tools.
Full deliverable at the link below.