Christian Tarsney
@christiantarsney.bsky.social
Philosopher interested in ethics, decision theory, AI, and time, among other things.
Reposted by Christian Tarsney
So excited that this will be out in the world tomorrow! And grateful to everyone who helped make it happen.
July 7, 2025 at 1:40 PM
So excited that this will be out in the world tomorrow! And grateful to everyone who helped make it happen.
Reposted by Christian Tarsney
I really enjoyed this. Separate from how you feel about population, I repeatedly had assumptions overturned by their really deep stats. Maybe my favorite pop sci read during the last year.
This is one of those "most of your intuitions are wrong" books.
This is one of those "most of your intuitions are wrong" books.
So excited that this will be out in the world tomorrow! And grateful to everyone who helped make it happen.
July 8, 2025 at 3:56 PM
I really enjoyed this. Separate from how you feel about population, I repeatedly had assumptions overturned by their really deep stats. Maybe my favorite pop sci read during the last year.
This is one of those "most of your intuitions are wrong" books.
This is one of those "most of your intuitions are wrong" books.
New paper forthcoming in Phil Review, w @LedermanHarvey and Dean Spears -- read all about it in Harvey's thread!
Our paper A Dominance Argument Against Incompleteness, is now forthcoming in The Philosophical Review! A thread on what’s inside. 1/9
philpapers.org/rec/TARSTS
philpapers.org/rec/TARSTS
Christian Tarsney, Harvey Lederman & Dean Spears, A Dominance Argument Against Incompleteness - PhilPapers
This article presents a new argument against many forms of moral and prudential value incompleteness. The argument relies on two central principles: (i) a weak "negative dominance" principle...
philpapers.org
April 24, 2025 at 1:53 PM
New paper forthcoming in Phil Review, w @LedermanHarvey and Dean Spears -- read all about it in Harvey's thread!
New paper, "Expected Value, to a Point", now out in Noûs!
The aim is to give a principled justification for the intuitively attractive claim that we're required to maximize expected value in "ordinary" situations, but not in "Pascalian" situations involving tiny probabilities of extreme outcomes.
The aim is to give a principled justification for the intuitively attractive claim that we're required to maximize expected value in "ordinary" situations, but not in "Pascalian" situations involving tiny probabilities of extreme outcomes.
Expected value, to a point: Moral decision‐making under background uncertainty
Expected value maximization gives plausible guidance for moral decision-making under uncertainty in many situations. But it has unappetizing implications in ‘Pascalian’ situations involving tiny prob...
onlinelibrary.wiley.com
February 27, 2025 at 1:38 PM
New paper, "Expected Value, to a Point", now out in Noûs!
The aim is to give a principled justification for the intuitively attractive claim that we're required to maximize expected value in "ordinary" situations, but not in "Pascalian" situations involving tiny probabilities of extreme outcomes.
The aim is to give a principled justification for the intuitively attractive claim that we're required to maximize expected value in "ordinary" situations, but not in "Pascalian" situations involving tiny probabilities of extreme outcomes.