Finnish OSINT group. Currently following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
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Our battle damage assessment can confirm the following losses: 12 destroyed and 3 damaged aircraft, of which 14 are strategic bombers and 1 is a transport aircraft. 1/
Our battle damage assessment can confirm the following losses: 12 destroyed and 3 damaged aircraft, of which 14 are strategic bombers and 1 is a transport aircraft. 1/
The northern part of the salient has been abandoned, with Russians capturing Malaya Lokanaya.
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The northern part of the salient has been abandoned, with Russians capturing Malaya Lokanaya.
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The Ukrainians will likely attempt to delay the Russian advance with rearguard battles to secure a large scale withdrawal from the salient.
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The Ukrainians will likely attempt to delay the Russian advance with rearguard battles to secure a large scale withdrawal from the salient.
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Meanwhile the Main Supply Route from Sumy to Sudzha is under Russian drone surveillance making traverse extremely dangerous.
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Meanwhile the Main Supply Route from Sumy to Sudzha is under Russian drone surveillance making traverse extremely dangerous.
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Multiple bridges in the area have been destroyed, leaving some Ukrainian defenders with rivers behind their backs.
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Multiple bridges in the area have been destroyed, leaving some Ukrainian defenders with rivers behind their backs.
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Recent Russian operations may have started as an pre-emptive attempt to disrupt any Ukrainian withdrawal.
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Recent Russian operations may have started as an pre-emptive attempt to disrupt any Ukrainian withdrawal.
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The northern part of the salient has been abandoned, with Russians capturing Malaya Lokanaya.
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The northern part of the salient has been abandoned, with Russians capturing Malaya Lokanaya.
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At the same time, the Russians are still attacking in the area too. 1/
At the same time, the Russians are still attacking in the area too. 1/
In this thread I will examine what is to be expected of the most critical area of the eastern front in the near future, and what can the Russians realistically achieve. 1/
In this thread I will examine what is to be expected of the most critical area of the eastern front in the near future, and what can the Russians realistically achieve. 1/
Why does our @jjhelin.bsky.social keep rejecting the "human waves" narrative, instead calling the reported North Korean attacks in Kursk "basic infantry drills"?
Let’s dive into light infantry on the attack and why this distinction matters.
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Why does our @jjhelin.bsky.social keep rejecting the "human waves" narrative, instead calling the reported North Korean attacks in Kursk "basic infantry drills"?
Let’s dive into light infantry on the attack and why this distinction matters.
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Why does our @jjhelin.bsky.social keep rejecting the "human waves" narrative, instead calling the reported North Korean attacks in Kursk "basic infantry drills"?
Let’s dive into light infantry on the attack and why this distinction matters.
1/
As always our activity is made possible by Jenni and Antti Wihurin Rahasto and their generous grant.
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As always our activity is made possible by Jenni and Antti Wihurin Rahasto and their generous grant.
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However, we see a lack of supporting fires and other fire-support elements. It's unclear why North Koreans don't seem to receive upper-echelon artillery support, although drones seem to be hunting their organic mortars.
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However, we see a lack of supporting fires and other fire-support elements. It's unclear why North Koreans don't seem to receive upper-echelon artillery support, although drones seem to be hunting their organic mortars.
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Reports of North Korean troops in Kursk often mention “human wave” tactics. This narrative oversimplifies what’s likely happening: They’re employing basic, scalable infantry drills. These are rooted in fire and movement, not mindless rushing.
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Reports of North Korean troops in Kursk often mention “human wave” tactics. This narrative oversimplifies what’s likely happening: They’re employing basic, scalable infantry drills. These are rooted in fire and movement, not mindless rushing.
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Western forces have rarely had to fight in a near-peer environment post-WW2, and have almost always had the superiority of fires and other supporting elements.
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Western forces have rarely had to fight in a near-peer environment post-WW2, and have almost always had the superiority of fires and other supporting elements.
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Notable examples include Coles Charge at Carentan in 1944 and the Finnish assault at Äyräpää Church in 1940.
Also pictured: Warfare History Network on the Battle of Best, Holland, September 1944
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Notable examples include Coles Charge at Carentan in 1944 and the Finnish assault at Äyräpää Church in 1940.
Also pictured: Warfare History Network on the Battle of Best, Holland, September 1944
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Success often depends on:
Support from higher-echelon weapons (artillery, mortars, drones).
Coordination with heavier forces (if available).
But when resources are limited, light infantry must rely solely on organic weapons.
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Success often depends on:
Support from higher-echelon weapons (artillery, mortars, drones).
Coordination with heavier forces (if available).
But when resources are limited, light infantry must rely solely on organic weapons.
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There’s no viable flanking route.
Terrain is open
Time is of the essence.
Light infantry attacking prepared positions will likely take heavy losses—it’s the nature of the fight.
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There’s no viable flanking route.
Terrain is open
Time is of the essence.
Light infantry attacking prepared positions will likely take heavy losses—it’s the nature of the fight.
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When advancing, infantry ideally uses cover and concealment to:
Avoid being seen.
Minimize casualties while closing the distance. Maneuver to the enemy's flank or weak point.
But the terrain and situation don't always allow this.
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When advancing, infantry ideally uses cover and concealment to:
Avoid being seen.
Minimize casualties while closing the distance. Maneuver to the enemy's flank or weak point.
But the terrain and situation don't always allow this.
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