Brian Haig
brianhaig.bsky.social
Brian Haig
@brianhaig.bsky.social

Psyc Prof University of Canterbury, New Zealand

research methodology, theoretical psychology, philosophy of science, metascience

Psychology 31%
Philosophy 19%

I think your thread is spot on, James.👍

Yes, really. I was surprised to receive it so early.

Well, I'm excited too! I received a copy of your book in the mail today, and I'm greatly looking forward to reading it. 🙂

Thank you, Lorne. I do remember your visit here as an Erskine Fellow under Garth's sponsorship, and attending a talk of yours on close relationships.

Greetings, Lorne. I too have benefited from Bruno's kindness and intellectual generosity (most recently on a paper of mine on construct validity). I've never met him in person, but we have corresponded over the years. We were both students of Bill Rozeboom at the University of Alberta.

Yes. "In the history of science, one even finds instances of successful scientific advance that relied on poorly replicated evidence. An instructive example is Bogen’s (2001) rich case study of John Jackson’s successful nineteenth-century investigations of ... ." (my 2022 paper on replication)

Please would you add me. I do applied philosophy of science stuff. Thanks

Uljana, the table of contents looks great! I've preordered your book and am really looking forward to reading it.

A recent commentary of mine on a target article in Theory & Psychology (2024, 34, 585-509) challenges the recommendation that psychology should abandon Popper’s philosophy of critical rationalism and adopt Roy Bhaskar’s critical realist philosophy of science. doi.org/10.1177/0959...
Should psychology adopt Bhaskar’s critical realist philosophy of science? - Brian D. Haig, 2024
Robert Archer argues that psychology should abandon its use of Karl Popper’s philosophy of science. He recommends that psychology ought to adopt the philosophy ...
doi.org

Yes, it was (and I still have my own copy).

Thank you, Bruno. 🙂

Reposted by Brian D. Haig

🧵 1/2 New open access paper:
First soup-to-nuts description of my explanation-focused view of test validity.
A dialectic on validity: Explanation-focused and the many ways of being human. “International Journal of Assessment Tools in Education,” vol. 10, pp. 1-96. doi.org/10.21449/ija...

I too was impressed by Smith's book -- as was Skinner himself, who reviewed it positively.

Thanks for your interest, Uljana. For some reason I couldn't get the link to my article to take on my work computer. I'll send you a pdf of my article via email. There, I say some things about interpreting some of Skinner's work as a global theory. Here's the link, now. doi.org/10.1080/1047...

A recent commentary of mine on a target article in Psychological Inquiry by De Boeck, et al. (2023, 34, 261-266) makes use of selected historical and epistemological scholarship in order to correct some common misunderstandings of three major behaviorist psychologists. I argue for the following: 1/

Edward Tolman’s purposive behaviorism, and its attendant idea of cognitive maps, is best understood as a realist interpretation of cognitive learning theory that was an influential forerunner of modern cognitive psychology. It was not an empiricist precursor to it. 2/

Clark Hull was a realist from the outset who took theoretical terms, such as ‘habit strength’, to designate causal mechanisms, which comprised part of the internal structure of the organism. 3/

Plausibly, B. F. Skinner was not a twentieth century (anti-realist) positivist empiricist, but a nonrealist, who was skeptical about the value of deep-running cognitive theories in his time, but open to increasing degrees of realism with genuine advances in relevant scientific knowledge. 4/

Skinner’s value as a psychological theorist can be more fully appreciated by viewing elements of his work as comprising a coherent global theory, in addition to a theory of learning. As such, his theoretical work should be prized, despite its proscription of postulational theories. 5/

The relevant historical scholarship about behaviorism suggests a complex intertwining of different realist and nonrealist strands of thinking, and a view of the evolution of mid-twentieth century American psychology as theoretically pluralist, or multi-paradigmatic, in character. 6/

Welcome, Bruno! It's nicer, though quieter, over here.

Amen to that!

Wimsatt's (1994) paper on the ontology of complex systems is wonderfully suggestive, so its good to see its value recognized.

Many thanks, Eiko.

Thank you Uljana! Our theory group have just read your forthcoming replication paper with interest and profit.

My article, 'Repositioning construct validity theory: From nomological networks to pragmatic theories, and their evaluation by explanatory means', is now available online, with open access, in Perspectives on Psychological Science. doi.org/10.1177/1745...