Signer doesn’t really have a high-level opinionated behavior, it just does what the equivalent PrivateKey does. There is no equivalent array of default asymmetric encryptions options.
age is maybe too high level and no other stdlib implements it. HPKE might fill that gap at some point.
age is maybe too high level and no other stdlib implements it. HPKE might fill that gap at some point.
October 15, 2024 at 9:28 PM
Signer doesn’t really have a high-level opinionated behavior, it just does what the equivalent PrivateKey does. There is no equivalent array of default asymmetric encryptions options.
age is maybe too high level and no other stdlib implements it. HPKE might fill that gap at some point.
age is maybe too high level and no other stdlib implements it. HPKE might fill that gap at some point.
🔒 A Private Key in Cryptography is a 🔑 secret, unique code used to 🔓 decrypt encrypted messages and authenticate 📜 digital signatures securely.
#Cryptography #CyberSecurity #Koinpark #privatekey
#Cryptography #CyberSecurity #Koinpark #privatekey
June 9, 2024 at 10:03 AM
🔒 A Private Key in Cryptography is a 🔑 secret, unique code used to 🔓 decrypt encrypted messages and authenticate 📜 digital signatures securely.
#Cryptography #CyberSecurity #Koinpark #privatekey
#Cryptography #CyberSecurity #Koinpark #privatekey
können wir nicht einfach alle tech-konzerne in ein einziges, riesengroßes nft fusionieren und dann den privatekey wegwerfen?
September 28, 2023 at 8:47 PM
können wir nicht einfach alle tech-konzerne in ein einziges, riesengroßes nft fusionieren und dann den privatekey wegwerfen?
ACCEPT;
[Peer]
PublicKey =
AllowedIPs = 74.113.97.111/32, 2602:f7e4:1:1010::83/128`
on the client:
`[Interface]
PrivateKey =
Address = 74.113.97.111/32, 2602:f7e4:1:1010::83/128
[Peer]
PublicKey =
AllowedIPs = 0.0.0.0/0, ::/0
Endpoint = 74.113.97.93:51820
PersistentKeepalive = 25` [2/2]
[Peer]
PublicKey =
AllowedIPs = 74.113.97.111/32, 2602:f7e4:1:1010::83/128`
on the client:
`[Interface]
PrivateKey =
Address = 74.113.97.111/32, 2602:f7e4:1:1010::83/128
[Peer]
PublicKey =
AllowedIPs = 0.0.0.0/0, ::/0
Endpoint = 74.113.97.93:51820
PersistentKeepalive = 25` [2/2]
August 4, 2025 at 8:35 PM
ACCEPT;
[Peer]
PublicKey =
AllowedIPs = 74.113.97.111/32, 2602:f7e4:1:1010::83/128`
on the client:
`[Interface]
PrivateKey =
Address = 74.113.97.111/32, 2602:f7e4:1:1010::83/128
[Peer]
PublicKey =
AllowedIPs = 0.0.0.0/0, ::/0
Endpoint = 74.113.97.93:51820
PersistentKeepalive = 25` [2/2]
[Peer]
PublicKey =
AllowedIPs = 74.113.97.111/32, 2602:f7e4:1:1010::83/128`
on the client:
`[Interface]
PrivateKey =
Address = 74.113.97.111/32, 2602:f7e4:1:1010::83/128
[Peer]
PublicKey =
AllowedIPs = 0.0.0.0/0, ::/0
Endpoint = 74.113.97.93:51820
PersistentKeepalive = 25` [2/2]
Front-end and private key exploits drove over $2 billion in crypto thefts during H1 2025: report
animalverse.social/community/p/...
#PrivateKey #FrontEnd #CryptoWallet #Hacker #Crypto #CryptoCurrency #SocialFi #AnimalverseSocial
animalverse.social/community/p/...
#PrivateKey #FrontEnd #CryptoWallet #Hacker #Crypto #CryptoCurrency #SocialFi #AnimalverseSocial
Members
Front-end and private key exploits drove over $2 billion in crypto thefts during H1 2025: report
Hackers looted $2.1 billion from the cryptocurrency sector in the first half of 2025, and more than 80...
animalverse.social
June 27, 2025 at 1:21 PM
Front-end and private key exploits drove over $2 billion in crypto thefts during H1 2025: report
animalverse.social/community/p/...
#PrivateKey #FrontEnd #CryptoWallet #Hacker #Crypto #CryptoCurrency #SocialFi #AnimalverseSocial
animalverse.social/community/p/...
#PrivateKey #FrontEnd #CryptoWallet #Hacker #Crypto #CryptoCurrency #SocialFi #AnimalverseSocial
DIDとPrivateKeyを使ってるからほかのユーザーのデータを書き換える操作ができない、ということなのかな
November 27, 2024 at 4:13 AM
DIDとPrivateKeyを使ってるからほかのユーザーのデータを書き換える操作ができない、ということなのかな
October 21, 2025 at 9:00 AM
how the hell do i read an ed25519 key (supposedly in pkcs#8 pem) into a java security privatekey object?
using bouncy castle but at this point i'll grasp at any straw
it's this key from an ietf rfc and i can't get it to parse no matter what rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9421.html…
using bouncy castle but at this point i'll grasp at any straw
it's this key from an ietf rfc and i can't get it to parse no matter what rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9421.html…
December 1, 2024 at 12:54 PM
how the hell do i read an ed25519 key (supposedly in pkcs#8 pem) into a java security privatekey object?
using bouncy castle but at this point i'll grasp at any straw
it's this key from an ietf rfc and i can't get it to parse no matter what rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9421.html…
using bouncy castle but at this point i'll grasp at any straw
it's this key from an ietf rfc and i can't get it to parse no matter what rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9421.html…
How to fine-tune your Taproot private key?
I've seen many questions being raised about tweaking the public key for Taproot, but I was able to do that while using a rusty Bitcoin box (see below): let secp = Secp256k1::new(); let private_key = PrivateKey::from_wif(private_key_wif).expect("Invalid…
I've seen many questions being raised about tweaking the public key for Taproot, but I was able to do that while using a rusty Bitcoin box (see below): let secp = Secp256k1::new(); let private_key = PrivateKey::from_wif(private_key_wif).expect("Invalid…
How to fine-tune your Taproot private key?
I've seen many questions being raised about tweaking the public key for Taproot, but I was able to do that while using a rusty Bitcoin box (see below): let secp = Secp256k1::new(); let private_key = PrivateKey::from_wif(private_key_wif).expect("Invalid private key"); let public_key = private_key.public_key(&secp); let mut original_pubkey_bytes = public_key.to_bytes(); original_pubkey_bytes.remove(0); let tap_tweak_hash = TapTweakHash::from_key_and_tweak(UntweakedPublicKey::from_slice(&original_pubkey_bytes)?, None); let tweaked_pub_key = XOnlyPublicKey::from_slice(&original_pubkey_bytes)?.add_tweak(&secp, &tap_tweak_hash.to_scalar())?; But how do you adjust the private key using Bitcoin Last Crate? I was unable to find a suitable module or structure for this because it is required for the keypass spending method.
earlybirdsinvest.com
September 20, 2025 at 9:16 AM
How to fine-tune your Taproot private key?
I've seen many questions being raised about tweaking the public key for Taproot, but I was able to do that while using a rusty Bitcoin box (see below): let secp = Secp256k1::new(); let private_key = PrivateKey::from_wif(private_key_wif).expect("Invalid…
I've seen many questions being raised about tweaking the public key for Taproot, but I was able to do that while using a rusty Bitcoin box (see below): let secp = Secp256k1::new(); let private_key = PrivateKey::from_wif(private_key_wif).expect("Invalid…
3/5
Yer private key is yer crypto. If someone nicks it, ye’re done for. Keep it safe, an’ stop tellin’ folk about it ya daftie. #CryptoSecurity #PrivateKey
Yer private key is yer crypto. If someone nicks it, ye’re done for. Keep it safe, an’ stop tellin’ folk about it ya daftie. #CryptoSecurity #PrivateKey
November 23, 2024 at 10:03 PM
3/5
Yer private key is yer crypto. If someone nicks it, ye’re done for. Keep it safe, an’ stop tellin’ folk about it ya daftie. #CryptoSecurity #PrivateKey
Yer private key is yer crypto. If someone nicks it, ye’re done for. Keep it safe, an’ stop tellin’ folk about it ya daftie. #CryptoSecurity #PrivateKey
Wait I'm sorry but what the hell?
Turns out, Node.js reuses same buffer for small Buffer "allocations" and this is not considered a security issue but an optimisation? Found on random old Github issue and had to check myself.
Turns out, Node.js reuses same buffer for small Buffer "allocations" and this is not considered a security issue but an optimisation? Found on random old Github issue and had to check myself.
October 24, 2023 at 1:47 PM
Wait I'm sorry but what the hell?
Turns out, Node.js reuses same buffer for small Buffer "allocations" and this is not considered a security issue but an optimisation? Found on random old Github issue and had to check myself.
Turns out, Node.js reuses same buffer for small Buffer "allocations" and this is not considered a security issue but an optimisation? Found on random old Github issue and had to check myself.
$21M Crypto Theft on Hyperliquid Tied to Private Key Leak: PeckShield
According to PeckShield, the theft stemmed from a private key compromise, allowing an attacker to drain the victim’s funds in a single swift move.
#crypto #news #privatekey
According to PeckShield, the theft stemmed from a private key compromise, allowing an attacker to drain the victim’s funds in a single swift move.
#crypto #news #privatekey
$21M Crypto Theft on Hyperliquid Tied to Private Key Leak: PeckShield
According to PeckShield, the theft stemmed from a private key compromise, allowing an attacker to drain the victim’s funds in a single swift move.
www.coindesk.com
October 11, 2025 at 10:36 AM
$21M Crypto Theft on Hyperliquid Tied to Private Key Leak: PeckShield
According to PeckShield, the theft stemmed from a private key compromise, allowing an attacker to drain the victim’s funds in a single swift move.
#crypto #news #privatekey
According to PeckShield, the theft stemmed from a private key compromise, allowing an attacker to drain the victim’s funds in a single swift move.
#crypto #news #privatekey
December 9, 2024 at 12:36 AM
I've reached the point in my firmware where I have to create wrappers around the different crypto constructs because their APIs are so all over the place:
<hpke::kem::X25519HkdfSha256 as Kem>::PrivateKey
rsa::pkcs1v15::SigningKey<rsa::sha2::Sha256>
ed25519_dalek::SigningKey
<hpke::kem::X25519HkdfSha256 as Kem>::PrivateKey
rsa::pkcs1v15::SigningKey<rsa::sha2::Sha256>
ed25519_dalek::SigningKey
May 23, 2025 at 10:28 AM
I've reached the point in my firmware where I have to create wrappers around the different crypto constructs because their APIs are so all over the place:
<hpke::kem::X25519HkdfSha256 as Kem>::PrivateKey
rsa::pkcs1v15::SigningKey<rsa::sha2::Sha256>
ed25519_dalek::SigningKey
<hpke::kem::X25519HkdfSha256 as Kem>::PrivateKey
rsa::pkcs1v15::SigningKey<rsa::sha2::Sha256>
ed25519_dalek::SigningKey
ecdhの算数には興味ないんだけど、どうもいまいちフローを理解してないな。DHするんだから、受信者のPrivateKeyと送信者のPublicKey両方ないと割り切れないなにかで暗号化するんだよね。
わかってないのはキーの作り方かな… なんかシードからどうPrivateKeyを作るのかとかがよくわかってないな…
わかってないのはキーの作り方かな… なんかシードからどうPrivateKeyを作るのかとかがよくわかってないな…
September 20, 2023 at 2:00 AM
ecdhの算数には興味ないんだけど、どうもいまいちフローを理解してないな。DHするんだから、受信者のPrivateKeyと送信者のPublicKey両方ないと割り切れないなにかで暗号化するんだよね。
わかってないのはキーの作り方かな… なんかシードからどうPrivateKeyを作るのかとかがよくわかってないな…
わかってないのはキーの作り方かな… なんかシードからどうPrivateKeyを作るのかとかがよくわかってないな…
Ripple Co-Founder Chris Larsen Lost $150M in XRP Due to Lastpass Hack, Forfeiture Complaint Says
A recent forfeiture complaint by U.S. law enforcement revealed that Ripple co-founder Chris Larsen lost $150 million in XRP due to compromised private keys stored in Lastpass,…
#crypto #privatekey #xrp
A recent forfeiture complaint by U.S. law enforcement revealed that Ripple co-founder Chris Larsen lost $150 million in XRP due to compromised private keys stored in Lastpass,…
#crypto #privatekey #xrp
Ripple Co-Founder Chris Larsen Lost $150M in XRP Due to Lastpass Hack, Forfeiture Complaint Says
A recent forfeiture complaint by U.S. law enforcement revealed that Ripple co-founder Chris Larsen lost $150 million in XRP due to compromised private keys stored in Lastpass, a password manager breached in 2022, according to onchain investigator ZachXBT and the complaint filing. Private Keys Stored in Lastpass Resulted in $150M Crypto Hack, Feds Allege The […]
news.bitcoin.com
March 9, 2025 at 5:16 PM
Ripple Co-Founder Chris Larsen Lost $150M in XRP Due to Lastpass Hack, Forfeiture Complaint Says
A recent forfeiture complaint by U.S. law enforcement revealed that Ripple co-founder Chris Larsen lost $150 million in XRP due to compromised private keys stored in Lastpass,…
#crypto #privatekey #xrp
A recent forfeiture complaint by U.S. law enforcement revealed that Ripple co-founder Chris Larsen lost $150 million in XRP due to compromised private keys stored in Lastpass,…
#crypto #privatekey #xrp
on the server:
`[Interface]
Address = 192.168.56.2, fd71:2a6a:d717::/48
PrivateKey =
ListenPort = 51820
PostUp = ip6tables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -o wg0 -j ACCEPT; ip6tables -A FORWARD -i wg0 -j ACCEPT;
PostDown = ip6tables -D FORWARD -i eth0 -o wg0 -j ACCEPT; ip6tables -D FORWARD -i wg0 -j [1/2]
`[Interface]
Address = 192.168.56.2, fd71:2a6a:d717::/48
PrivateKey =
ListenPort = 51820
PostUp = ip6tables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -o wg0 -j ACCEPT; ip6tables -A FORWARD -i wg0 -j ACCEPT;
PostDown = ip6tables -D FORWARD -i eth0 -o wg0 -j ACCEPT; ip6tables -D FORWARD -i wg0 -j [1/2]
August 4, 2025 at 8:35 PM
on the server:
`[Interface]
Address = 192.168.56.2, fd71:2a6a:d717::/48
PrivateKey =
ListenPort = 51820
PostUp = ip6tables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -o wg0 -j ACCEPT; ip6tables -A FORWARD -i wg0 -j ACCEPT;
PostDown = ip6tables -D FORWARD -i eth0 -o wg0 -j ACCEPT; ip6tables -D FORWARD -i wg0 -j [1/2]
`[Interface]
Address = 192.168.56.2, fd71:2a6a:d717::/48
PrivateKey =
ListenPort = 51820
PostUp = ip6tables -A FORWARD -i eth0 -o wg0 -j ACCEPT; ip6tables -A FORWARD -i wg0 -j ACCEPT;
PostDown = ip6tables -D FORWARD -i eth0 -o wg0 -j ACCEPT; ip6tables -D FORWARD -i wg0 -j [1/2]
How to Set Up a Private VPN on Your Web Hosting Server #Vpn #Hosting #Server #Security #Openvpn #Wireguard #Configuration #Installation #Linux #Windows #Privatekey #Client #Network
How to Set Up a Private VPN on Your Web Hosting Server
Setting up a private Virtual Private Network (VPN) on your web hosting server can enhance your online security, provide access to restricted content, and allow secure remote ...
www.sharpcoderblog.com
June 30, 2025 at 1:49 PM
How to Set Up a Private VPN on Your Web Hosting Server #Vpn #Hosting #Server #Security #Openvpn #Wireguard #Configuration #Installation #Linux #Windows #Privatekey #Client #Network
待ってｗｗｗ
PrivateKey指定しないといけないところにPublicKey指定してたｗｗｗ
PrivateKey指定しないといけないところにPublicKey指定してたｗｗｗ
January 12, 2025 at 6:59 PM
待ってｗｗｗ
PrivateKey指定しないといけないところにPublicKey指定してたｗｗｗ
PrivateKey指定しないといけないところにPublicKey指定してたｗｗｗ
✨Introducing "Shake for Bitcoin"! ✨
Test your luck by shaking your device to find wallets with non-zero balances! Will you find the needle in the haystack?
Download now on Google Play!👇
play.google.com/store/apps/d...
#Bitcoin #PrivateKey #CryptoChallenge
Test your luck by shaking your device to find wallets with non-zero balances! Will you find the needle in the haystack?
Download now on Google Play!👇
play.google.com/store/apps/d...
#Bitcoin #PrivateKey #CryptoChallenge
Shake For Bitcoin! - Apps on Google Play
Can you guess the Bitcoin private key?
play.google.com
June 12, 2025 at 12:51 PM
✨Introducing "Shake for Bitcoin"! ✨
Test your luck by shaking your device to find wallets with non-zero balances! Will you find the needle in the haystack?
Download now on Google Play!👇
play.google.com/store/apps/d...
#Bitcoin #PrivateKey #CryptoChallenge
Test your luck by shaking your device to find wallets with non-zero balances! Will you find the needle in the haystack?
Download now on Google Play!👇
play.google.com/store/apps/d...
#Bitcoin #PrivateKey #CryptoChallenge
weak.Pointer (Go 1.24+), runtime.AddCleanup (Go 1.24+), and sync.Map combine wonderfully into a 20-lines weak map. #golang
It associates values to keys, with automatic garbage collection once the key becomes unreachable. Using it to tie precomputed FIPS keys to PrivateKey values we can't modify.
It associates values to keys, with automatic garbage collection once the key becomes unreachable. Using it to tie precomputed FIPS keys to PrivateKey values we can't modify.
![type Cache[K, V any] struct {
m sync.Map
}
// Get returns the result of new.
//
// If Get was called on k before and didn't return an error, Get will return the
// same value it returned from the previous call.
//
// If Get is called concurrently on the same k value, new might get called
// multiple times. All calls will return the same value or an error from new.
//
// The cache is evicted some time after k becomes unreachable.
func (c *Cache[K, V]) Get(k *K, new func() (*V, error)) (*V, error) {
p := weak.Make(k)
if cached, ok := c.m.Load(p); ok {
return cached.(*V), nil
}
v, err := new()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if cached, loaded := c.m.LoadOrStore(p, v); loaded {
// We lost the race, return the cached value and discard ours.
return cached.(*V), nil
}
runtime.AddCleanup(k, c.evict, p)
return v, nil
}
func (c *Cache[K, V]) evict(p weak.Pointer[K]) {
c.m.Delete(p)
}](https://cdn.bsky.app/img/feed_thumbnail/plain/did:plc:x2nsupeeo52oznrmplwapppl/bafkreieim4wanlcu5wlb34hzkw7xdhyihsx3buwtltvtnv2g3xqtngdgyu@jpeg)
January 23, 2025 at 1:42 PM
weak.Pointer (Go 1.24+), runtime.AddCleanup (Go 1.24+), and sync.Map combine wonderfully into a 20-lines weak map. #golang
It associates values to keys, with automatic garbage collection once the key becomes unreachable. Using it to tie precomputed FIPS keys to PrivateKey values we can't modify.
It associates values to keys, with automatic garbage collection once the key becomes unreachable. Using it to tie precomputed FIPS keys to PrivateKey values we can't modify.