UB Game Theory Research Group
@ubgametheory.bsky.social
Financially supported by the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades through grant PID2023-150472NB-I00 and PID2024-161723NB-I00.
https://www.ub.edu/gametheory
https://www.ub.edu/gametheory
It turns out that non-manipulability via merging (the non-participating agents should not be worse off) identifies constrained egalitarianism in awards, while non-manipulability via splitting points out constrained egalitarianisms in losses. #ClaimsProblems #FairDivision #GameTheory
November 9, 2025 at 5:52 PM
It turns out that non-manipulability via merging (the non-participating agents should not be worse off) identifies constrained egalitarianism in awards, while non-manipulability via splitting points out constrained egalitarianisms in losses. #ClaimsProblems #FairDivision #GameTheory
In the problem of fair distribution of an homogeneous resource given the demands of the agents, we study the incentives of the participants to either merge or split their claims, provided that some specific rule is going to be applied. #ClaimsProblems #FairDivision #GameTheory
November 9, 2025 at 5:52 PM
In the problem of fair distribution of an homogeneous resource given the demands of the agents, we study the incentives of the participants to either merge or split their claims, provided that some specific rule is going to be applied. #ClaimsProblems #FairDivision #GameTheory
In this paper, Martí introduces a new power index called the "essential coalitions index" for games with restricted cooperation. Moreover, a normalization of the essential coalitions index generalizes the Deegan-Packel index to restricted games. For the full paper: link.springer.com/article/10.1...
The essential coalitions index in games with restricted cooperation - International Journal of Game Theory
We propose a new power index, which we call the essential coalitions index. The index is defined on the class of simple games with cooperation restricted by a cooperation index, which encompasses othe...
link.springer.com
November 1, 2025 at 5:24 PM
In this paper, Martí introduces a new power index called the "essential coalitions index" for games with restricted cooperation. Moreover, a normalization of the essential coalitions index generalizes the Deegan-Packel index to restricted games. For the full paper: link.springer.com/article/10.1...
We were also delighted to welcome Leslie Marx (Fuqua School of Business at Duke University) and Alfonso Díez Minguela (the University of Valencia).
October 24, 2025 at 5:22 PM
We were also delighted to welcome Leslie Marx (Fuqua School of Business at Duke University) and Alfonso Díez Minguela (the University of Valencia).
Our group member Oihane Gallo presented her work on stability under the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution.
October 24, 2025 at 5:22 PM
Our group member Oihane Gallo presented her work on stability under the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution.