Moreover, as specified in our preregistered, primary hypothesis, the teachers chose actions according to the new information, such that students in the treatment group received support that better matched their skill level.
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In the treatment group we find that teachers updated their beliefs according to the model, such that they placed relatively more weight on the test scores (which they are informed about) and less on their priors.
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More specifically we repeatedly measured the reading skills of students in both treatment and control group using an IT-based reading test. However, only the treatment group received information on the test scores during the intervention period.
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Thrilled to share that our paper "A Learning Approach to the Governance of Professionals. Field Experimental Evidence" with scandersen.bsky.social has been accepted for publication in jpart1991.bsky.social

See threat and link below below 👇
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In the treatment group we find that teachers updated their beliefs according to the model, such that they placed relatively more weight on the test scores (which they are informed about) and less on their priors.
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More specifically we repeatedly measured the reading skills of students in both treatment and control group using an IT-based reading test. However, only the treatment group received information on the test scores during the intervention period.
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However, measuring performance may itself affect professionals’ behavior, which makes it difficult to isolate the effect of providing performance information. We designed a preregistered field experiment in which we can isolate the effect of making performance information available to teachers
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We propose, based on a Bayesian model of learning, that simply providing professional teachers with performance information— without changing their extrinsic incentives—may be enough to make them update their beliefs about their students and act accordingly
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Performance management is used by governments worldwide to incentivize professionals in schools and other public organizations. Yet, much research shows that these incentives may generate perverse dysfunctional effects.
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Link to publishers version: doi.org/10.1093/jopa...
Link to open access version: drive.google.com/file/d/1t8BS...
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