If the housing price increase due to population is high, BCt ratio is only 1.32, and BC ratio almost doubles to 2.56 if housing price effect is low. Higher housing price response chokes off job growth, & transfers benefits from workers to property owners.

For this project, its benefit-cost ratio in highly distressed place is 3.45, because job creation has larger effects on boosting employment rates. In booming place, BC ratio only 1.10, because new jobs mostly just boost population -- benefits are lower and skewed more towards property.

The resulting benefits for Tulsa Remote are about half fiscal benefits, and half labor market benefits. Fiscal benefits are increased tax base minus needed spending to keep public service quality constant. Labor market benefits are higher employment rates and real wages.

W/ estimated Tulsa housing supply elasticities, benefit-cost ratio of program is 4.3 to 1. If we instead assumed San Francisco restrictions on housing supply, benefit-cost ratio turns negative. If Tulsa housing supply was perfectly elastic, benefit cost ratio almost doubles.

As a result, Tulsa Remote has relatively low cost per job created, one-sixth of that of business tax incentives. Why? Remote workers are more footloose than typical businesses.

Here is a figure showing estimated costs per job of alternative local job-creation strategies :

In addition, many distressed neighborhoods may have low employment rates, but there are jobs -- the issue is job access. Place-based programs should intervene on "labor supply side" by skills development & child care. Such supply-side programs often have higher B/C ratio than incentives.

Why do I say that business tax incentives are often over-emphasized? First, if we are in a distressed local labor market that lacks sufficient good jobs -- and which needs labor demand boost -- providing customized business services often has lower cost per job than tax incentives.