Finally, a co-authored paper exploring various ways in which we can think that conceptual engineering is nothing new. In particular, we argue that many past papers can justifiably be seen as part of conceptual engineering, among others on the examples of the use of thought experiments. 11/11

A short piece where I discuss how adopting the conceptual engineering view (here tied to a neo-pragmatic approach) for thought experiments helps avoid modal skepticism, and why we don't have to be afraid of becoming anti-realists after adopting this approach. 10/11

Here I argue that while interpreting thought experiments through conceptual engineering applies to most philosophical methodology, the theory of reference is an exception due to its unique view on intuitions, where they serve as data to be explained. 9/11

First paper: Using Gettier case, I show that thought experiments are justified by arguments which in turn are justified by intuitions on concepts' general features. Moreover, if we interpret them as normative arguments, we can address concerns about the reliability raised by the negative x-phi. 8/11

This is part of my bigger project on the role of intuitions in thought experiments and conceptual engineering. If you're interested in other works, I'd take the opportunity, and I post links below to relevant papers with short descriptions. 7/11

Additionally, the paper provides more data for those interested in intuition-talk in the theory of reference and corpus studies. I raise issues with selecting intuition-talk indicators, analyse what philosophers usually call intuitive, and discuss further corpus studies methodological problems. 6/11

Ad 2. The paper is a case study of how studying original texts can support "unpopular" readings of philosophical methods. It contributes to the debate on whether we should focus on original texts in philosophical methodology or just their reception, as suggested by @ethanlandes.bsky.social. 5/11

These results might simply suggest that thought experiments are justified by arguments, not intuitions. However, building on my other work, I argue that this also opens the way to viewing TEs as a method of conceptual engineering, addressing concerns about their reliability. 4/11

In the paper, I present data supporting this view. First, intuition-talk in the studied literature more often concerns general features of concepts than judgments about cases (or uses). Second, in about half of the studied examples, intuitive claims were justified by further arguments. 3/11

Ad 1. Do intuitions justify philosophers' claims? In several papers (see later posts), I argue that in thought experiments, intuitions about cases aren’t crucial since they’re justified by arguments. However, these arguments stem from intuitions about general features of concepts. 2/11

If it’s an accept or RR, it feels like a good move. But sometimes, you draw the 'query → looking for 2nd reviewer → query → still looking → query → screw the 2nd, reject' loop in the review lottery. So be careful.

Hope you’ve got the better one