Sam Huckstep
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samhuckstep.bsky.social
Sam Huckstep
@samhuckstep.bsky.social
Working on climate, migration, governance & green transition at CGDev. Any views mine.
A good summary of the domestic vs. international recruitment tradeoff in a new @ciob.bsky.social report- here focused on the construction sector, but relevant to policy-driven decarbonisation labour demand.

Nutshell: if you want a domestic recruitment focus, you need longterm policy reliability.
October 7, 2025 at 10:09 AM
A striking chart: in 2021 (the last census), there were roughly as many workers leaving UK clean energy industries due to retirement *each year* as there were *in total* aged under 25 in the sector.

www.standardlife.co.uk/centre-for-t...
October 2, 2025 at 11:01 AM
To my surprise, the World Bank's recent 139-page report on 'Making Refugee Self-Reliance Work' doesn't mention the word 'climate' once...

Given the contexts of many refugee-hosting countries, self-reliance initiatives that don't take climate into account are likely to under-perform.
September 8, 2025 at 10:51 AM
...This may indicate a need to review current processes for recognising qualifications and skills acquired overseas, ensuring it is fit for purpose: delivering a stable pipeline of migrant workers without compromising safety standards.'

Critical occupations are already bolstered by migrant workers.
August 28, 2025 at 11:03 AM
Beyond this, the UK could seek bilateral partnerships. It could target countries with which it has particular goals, or focus on countries from which it currently recruits large numbers.

E.g., the UK recruits hundreds of welders from the Philippines. Why not set up a training/migration partnership?
August 5, 2025 at 3:51 PM
Most workers in green-relevant occupations arrive on Skilled Worker visas- see below.

The May 2025 Immigration White Paper, however, clamped down on these visas.

1: it raised the education threshold for visa eligibility.

2: it significantly increased costs to employers.
August 5, 2025 at 3:51 PM
We take a look at the current use of visas across several key occupations, and find that for some they indeed are already crucial- long before labour demand will peak.

In 2023, over 60% of new entrants to the UK welding workforce arrived on visas!
August 5, 2025 at 3:51 PM
This is increasingly recognised. In a recent parliamentary inquiry by the ESNZ Committee, nearly a quarter of respondents highlight the role of migration policy (though it wasn't mentioned in the call for evidence).

Many key respondents (eg the National Grid!) highlight that visas will be crucial.
August 5, 2025 at 3:51 PM
The remittances tax in the US' One Big, Beautiful Bill has dropped from a 3.5% rate to 1% (but has also expanded to cover non-citizens as well).

Which low-/middle-income countries benefit most?

Mexico the clear winner, but welcome news for several.

public.flourish.studio/visualisatio...
July 1, 2025 at 4:30 PM
For a number of recipient countries, bilateral aid cuts will mean that their largest donor in 2023 will probably not be their largest donor in 2026.

This shift in relative responsibility/influence risks disruptions. Will new 'lead donors' reallocate funds to fill gaps left by peers?
June 12, 2025 at 2:24 PM
But ODA will not directly impact GNI (a figure that does not include ODA flows).

To compare post-cut outcomes to countries' economic situations in the counterfactual -a world in which 2023 ODA flows stayed level- we project the (often large) impact of ODA on Gross National Disposable Income levels.
June 12, 2025 at 2:24 PM
These GNI % equivalents lost can be attributed to individual donors.

Somalia, for example, is projected to lose the equivalent of 6.1% of 2023 GNI in 2026 cuts, of which 5.05% is attributable to the US; 0.43% to the UK; 0.34 percent to Germany; and 0.39% to others.
June 12, 2025 at 2:24 PM
We then map these cuts as an equivalent % of GNI.

Nineteen countries are projected to lose the equivalent of more than 1 percent of their 2023 GNI to bilateral ODA cuts in 2026.
June 12, 2025 at 2:24 PM
We also project cuts.

Ethiopia is projected to lose the most bilateral ODA in 2026—nearly US$1.1 billion versus 2023, followed by Jordan (US$896 million), Afghanistan (US$859 million), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (US$814 million).
June 12, 2025 at 2:24 PM
We map how much bilateral ODA recipient countries received in 2023, projecting forward to 2026.

Syria, for example, was the highest recipient of bilateral ODA among low- and lower-middle-income countries in 2023, receiving US$8.7 billion. It is projected to receive US$7.9 billion in 2026.
June 12, 2025 at 2:24 PM
We use projections of ODA levels from Donor Tracker, a widely used resource that projects based on donor government statements and economic forecasts.

Across the 17 biggest DAC donors, the US is projected to be the biggest cutter, followed by the UK. (Several countries are increasing ODA.)
June 12, 2025 at 2:24 PM
As a proportion of GNI, Central American countries are most affected. El Salvador is the only country for which the tax will remove the equivalent of over 1% of GNI. (6 lose over 0.5% GNI).

Mexico is the worst affected in absolute terms: $2.6 billion.
May 28, 2025 at 4:18 PM
Many of the countries affected by the remittance cuts are also losing significant amounts to US ODA cuts.

Remittances can offer a lifeline to low-income households; for many this will be a further bad blow.
May 28, 2025 at 4:18 PM
It's striking to compare the amount of money lost to excessive transaction fees (over 3%) to the amount of money lost to aid cuts.

For several LMIC countries, the amount far exceeds lost ODA! And for many, reductions sending costs to SDG levels could greatly offset losses- by 50% or more.
May 16, 2025 at 3:54 PM
If we look at projections of Gross National Disposable Income, which includes both ODA and remittances, we can see that remittances' role will increase significantly in some countries.

E.g.: in Haiti, remittances could rise from 16.06% GNDI in 2023 to 18.16 % in 2025; in Sudan, from 0.91% to 1.3%.
May 16, 2025 at 3:54 PM
When you tally up aid cuts across bilateral flows, they can get quite big.

We project forward from 2023 distributions, and find that some countries are losing over 30% of their aid- equating to more than 1% of GNI (sometimes much more) in many cases.
May 16, 2025 at 3:54 PM
E.g.-
April 17, 2025 at 11:38 AM
It's also good to see some recognition of the importance of connecting skill policy to industrial policy and migration policy. Domestic training needs to be retargeted and scaled up fast- but it also needs to be accompanied by coherent policy on international recruitment.
April 1, 2025 at 9:43 AM
See eg. in this great @voxdev.bsky.social article- as elsewhere, mobile money remittances to households affected by flooding in Mozambique spike following idiosyncratic shocks.

voxdev.org/topic/financ...
March 31, 2025 at 9:54 AM
Predicted changes in ODA levels in 2025 vs. 2023, using data from DonorTracker. A pretty steep fall in many countries, but good on Korea, Japan and Italy for bucking the trend and actually increasing spend.

donortracker.org/publications...
March 17, 2025 at 5:27 PM