Presidential Perils
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Presidential Perils
@presidentialperils.bsky.social
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Tweeting out quotes by political scientist Juan Linz on the "Perils of Presidentialism" –- one constitutional crisis at a time
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presidentialperils.bsky.social
In fact, Linz argues, accountability and identifiability may be better in parliamentary systems.

Why?

🗳️ No fixed term, no reelection limits (accountability)

🔍 Shadow cabinet, candidates with clear political records tied to ideologically differentiated parties (identifiability)
The argument that in a parliamentary system the voter does not know who will govern is not true in most cases because parties are identified with highly visible leaders. Those leaders appeal directly to the voters, and the campaigns increasingly are focused on the leader who aspires to be prime minister or chancellor. No Conservative voter could ignore that he was voting for Mrs. Thatcher, no PSOE voter that he was casting his ballot for Felipe Gonzalez, no CDU (Christlieb Demokratische Union) voter that Helmut Kohl would form the government. It could be argued that the party's parliamentary group or the notables of the party could remove the chosen leaders, that those who voted for Mrs. Thatcher, for example, had for the remainder of the legislature to accept Major as prime minister. But why would a party change leaders after the investment made in building them up, unless there is a feeling that they have proved inadequate? After all, the parliamentarians and party leaders have much to lose if the voters disapprove; they can be held accountable. As to the indeterminacy of who will govern when coalitions are necessary in multiparty systems, with some exceptions, this again is not true. Parties commit themselves to an alliance, such as the CDU-CSU-FDP (CSU, Christlieb Soziale Union; FDP, Frei Demokratische Partei) before the elections, and the voter for any of those parties knows that a particular person will be chancellor and also that unless one party wins an absolute majority (and even then) the government will include representatives of all the parties in the coalition. This is particularly interesting to those wanting a minor coalition party, such as the FDP, to have an influence. Voters do not know the exact composition of the coalition cabinet-which cabinet posts will go to which parties and leaders-but they know much more than voters for a president in the United States or Brazil know. Parties in parliamentary systems often have a well-known shadow cabinet, while a president-elect starts naming a cabinet only after the election. The identifiability in presidentialism is of one person; in parliamentary government most of the time it is of a pool of people and often a number of well-known subleaders Accountability to the voters for performance is presumably enhanced by the fact that a president is directly and personally responsible for policies-not the cabinet, not a coalition, and not the leaders of the party that might have occupied the prime minister's office in a succession. Only one person is clearly identified as governing for the entire period of a mandate. There are no confused or shared responsibilities. So the argument goes. Let us analyze this argument. First of all there is no way to hold accountable a president who cannot be presented for reelection. Such a president can neither be punished by the voters by defeat nor rewarded for success by reelection with the same or a larger vote than in the previous election. A president who cannot be reelected is "unaccountable." It could be argued that in the case of no reelection the party that supported the election of the president would be held accountable, but in fact that party's new presidential candidate is the person accountable. He would try to identify with his successful predecessor or to disidentify from him in case of failure. In a personalized election this might be easier than when the voter has to support a party that has not changed its leadership or has done so belatedly. Besides, it is partly unfair to punish a party for the actions of a president who, after the election, could govern independently of its confidence. When reelection is possible, the incumbent president who is perceived negatively paradoxically can try, more or less successfully, to escape blame by shifting it to the congress, particularly if it was dominated by the opposition but even if his own party was in the majority. Just before the election he can propose legislation that the congress rejects and can claim that if his policies had been approved he would have been successful. A prime minister with a majority cannot play such a game. The division of powers can therefore provide an alibi for failure. The congress, even the president's party in the congress, can play a similar game by blaming the executive for not implementing policies it has approved or not submitting the measures necessary to deal with problems. In conclusion, accountability with separation of powers is not easy to enforce. In a parliamentary system the party with a majority, or even a stable coalition of parties, can easily be made accountable to the voters, as long as the voters do not exclude in principle a vote for parties in the opposition.
February 3, 2025 at 2:05 AM
presidentialperils.bsky.social
"colleagues vs creatures" is great terminology btw
February 2, 2025 at 8:06 PM
presidentialperils.bsky.social
Why, according to Linz, are presidential cabinets weaker than parliamentary ones?

1) they are easier to get rid of
2) they face less formal scrutiny by the legislature
A presidential cabinet is less likely than its parliamentary counterpart to contain strong and independent-minded members. The officers of a president's cabinet hold their posts purely at the sufferance of their chief; if dismissed, they are out of public life altogether. A premier's ministers, by contrast, are not his creatures but normally his parliamentary colleagues; they may go from the cabinet back to their seats in parliament and question the prime minister in party caucuses or during the ordinary course of parliamentary business just as freely as other members can. A president, moreover, can shield his cabinet members from criticism much more effectively than can a prime minister, whose cabinet members are regularly hauled before parliament to answer queries or even, in extreme cases, to face censure.
February 2, 2025 at 8:02 PM
presidentialperils.bsky.social
Why presidentialism is associated with "ill-conceived policy initiatives, overly hasty stabs at implementation, unwarranted anger at the lawful opposition, and a host of other evils" 👇
Even if a president entertains no inordinate ambitions, his awareness of the time limits facing him and the program to which his name is tied cannot help but affect his political style. Anxiety about policy discontinuities and the character of possible successors encourages what Albert Hirschman has called "the wish of vouloil- conclure." This exaggerated sense of urgency on the part of the president may lead to ill-conceived policy initiatives, overly hasty stabs at implementation, unwarranted anger at the lawful opposition, and a host of other evils. A president who is desperate to build his Brasilia or implement his program of nationalization or land reform before he becomes ineligible for reelection is likely to spend money unwisely or risk polarizing the country for the sake of seeing his agenda become reality. A prime minister who can expect his party or governing coalition to win the next round of elections is relatively free from such pressures. Prime ministers have stayed in office over the course of several legislatures without rousing any fears of nascent dictatorship, for the possibility of changing the government without recourse to unconstitutional means always remained open.
February 2, 2025 at 6:48 PM
Reposted by Presidential Perils
aphclarkson.bsky.social
Maybe it turns out that Juan Linz was right all along
November 7, 2024 at 8:53 AM
presidentialperils.bsky.social
pfp inspiration 🙏
February 2, 2025 at 6:09 PM
Reposted by Presidential Perils
mcopelov.bsky.social
As it turns out, the Founders were very wrong & Juan Linz was very right. And here we are, watching exactly how & why.
February 1, 2025 at 3:59 AM
presidentialperils.bsky.social
"By contrast, the only presidential democracy with a long history of constitutional continuity is the United States.
...
The burden of this essay is that the superior historical performance of parliamentary democracies is no accident"

- Juan Linz, The Perils of Presidentialism, 1990
February 2, 2025 at 5:54 PM