📍 Please come to join the Network Security 1 session on Censorship, Evasion, and Trustworthy Infrastructure (🄰🅄🄶 13, 1:00–2:30 🄿🄼) and visit the poster sessions to discuss the findings.

Details & paper: www.usenix.org/conference/u...

📊 Some highlights:

+ Scanned entire Iran's IPv4 space of ~11M IPs & tested over 500M domains for censorship

+ Found 6.8M IPs hit by DNS poisoning/HTTP blockpages & 5.4M by UDP blocking

+ Discovered over millions of innocuous domains overblocked by blanket bans on entire TLDs

4/
Raw ASN-level data from I2P Metrics shows this collapse clearly — even the largest providers like AS197207 and AS58224 went dark.

Note: I2P Metrics hides or put together ASNs with <20 I2P routers to preserve privacy.

📊 Table from router snapshots below ⬇️

3/
This wasn’t a gradual decline. Iran’s I2P router count fell off a cliff:

🗓️ June 13: 1,496 routers
🗓️ June 18: 209 routers
🗓️ June 19–20: 0 routers

This aligns with a coordinated disruption across multiple Iranian networks. Prior to these days, 🇮🇷 ranked 2nd (only after🇺🇸)

2/
We observed a sharp drop in I2P router presence in Iran beginning June 13, 2025.

On that day, there were 1,496 active routers.
By June 18, this fell to just 209.
And by June 19–20, there were no routers visible from Iran.