As long as Pakistani elites refuse to recommit to an audacious and ambitious global vision for their country, Pakistan (and the Central Asia region) will remain stuck.

/end

5. the “region” of Central Asia—and for me this is the “stans”—cannot achieve its potential if the most important, most powerful, and most populous “stan” is mired in polycrisis. 🇵🇰 has a competence deficit, exacerbated by a voluntarily self imposed political crisis.

/6

Uzbekistan 🇺🇿 has been leading the effort to address at least the rail element of this equation. Sadly, there is far too little uptake of Tashkent’s efforts—both in terms of competence of planning and execution, and in terms of financing.

/5

4. the strategic barrier to connectivity and trade with Afghanistan is low quantity and low quantum infrastructure. Rail, road, and air connectivity between Pakistan and all the other “stans” is embarrassing for anyone that has serious views on the region’s trade potential.

/4

3. the tactical barrier to connectivity & trade w 🇦🇫 is the existing transit APTTA trade arrangement bw 🇦🇫 & 🇵🇰 is dysfunctional. Proof? October 2023 restrictions dramatically decreased ATT volume, w no discernable impact on Afghan economy, nor on the growth of 🇵🇰 transit trade w Central Asia.

/3

2. the immediate operational barrier to connectivity & trade w 🇦🇫 is terrorism. TTP’s (+BLAs) freedom to operate is an unacceptable quid pro quo that IEA seeks to impose on 🇵🇰. Without fixing this, there will not, cannot and should not be a “normal” relationship.

/2

@sahilkapur.bsky.social @simonlester.com

@sahilkapur.bsky.social @simonlester.com

Oof.

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