The paper is now out, and you can read it here: authors.elsevier.com/a/1lhYz51f8w...

This is joint work with Zak Tormala and Christian Wheeler at Stanford.

Across six studies, we find that as people’s opinions on political issues become more part of their identity, they are drawn to extreme (vs. moderate) candidates.

What can be done to minimize backlash from meddle ads?
‣ Candidates are not penalized when meddling is done by parties or outside organizations
‣ Candidates are not penalize if they reframe meddling as necessary to protect democracy

This aversion is remarkably robust! It emerged across:

‣ measures of aversion (choice, donations, attitudes, word-of-mouth)
‣ control conditions (no information, issue ads, attack ads, microtargeting)
‣ paradigms (conjoint, vignette studies, NLP analysis of online comments)

As more information becomes available about this strategy, we ask: How do consumers react to the use of "meddle ads"?

Consumers might tolerate meddle ads because of polarization and wanting to keep the out-party out of power.

Consumers might be averse to meddle ads. It is underhanded and risky.

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Feel free to nominate anyone whom I might have missed.

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What can be done to minimize backlash from meddle ads?
‣ Candidates are not penalized when meddling is done by parties or outside organizations
‣ Candidates are not penalize if they reframe meddling as necessary to protect democracy

This aversion is remarkably robust! It emerged across:

‣ measures of aversion (choice, donations, attitudes, word-of-mouth)
‣ control conditions (no information, issue ads, attack ads, microtargeting)
‣ paradigms (conjoint, vignette studies, NLP analysis of online comments)

Dems and Reps spent $53M on ads supporting extreme members of the other party in primaries.

Their goal? To boost their own chances in the general election by helping candidates who might are easier to defeat.

How do consumers react to this novel advertising strategy, which we call #meddle ads?

These costs reverse or attenuate when receptive people are receptive to opposing ideas coming from ...
‣ in-party members
‣ someone whose partisan identity is unknown
‣ non-prototypical out-party sources
‣ out-party sources who humanize and individuate themselves

These costs-of-receptiveness occur because observers tend to stereotype out-partisans as immoral (above and beyond incompetent or unfriendly) and hence penalize others who are open to their immoral ideas.

For example, on political subreddits, we find that people reward receptiveness. Except if receptiveness is directed toward political opponents. In such cases, the more receptive a comment is, the *fewer* likes it receives.

Across 16 studies, we find that receptiveness to political opponents has reputational costs, not benefits.

When people are receptive to opposing views coming from members of the opposing party, receptiveness backfires.