3/3 Moreover, the very fact of discussing these provisions in such a format implies an acceptance of the Russian narrative that the conflict extends beyond Ukraine itself.

2/3 Concluding such an agreement would amount to a de facto recognition that the EU, NATO, and their member states were parties to the conflict with Russia, rather than actors merely fulfilling their international legal obligations to assist the victim of aggression.

2/2 The author, visited, among other places, Kysylyn and Bazaltove (Janowa Dolina), where I told him about the complicated Polish-Ukrainian relations. He also quoted witnesses of massacre and recent declaration of Poland’s and Ukraine’s ministers of foreign affairs, @radek-sikorski.bsky.social

16/16 Two general conclusions emerge: 1) If we want an end to the war under bearable conditions, let us help Ukraine with whatever we can. 2) There is a risk that the war come also to us, so we need to increase the effectiveness of the functioning of our states and the resilience of our societies.

15/16 Let’s remember that the Russian-Ukrainian war could end not only in a cease-fire, but in other scenarios 1) victory for Ukraine in the event of internal turmoil in Russia after the death of Putin or his ousting 2) conquest of most of Ukraine by Russia. 3) the outbreak of World War III.

14/16 other questions: who is to pay for the reconstruction of Ukraine? How to regulate the transit of oil, gas, ammonia? What about sanctions on Russia? What about the frozen assets of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation?

13/16 The humanitarian issues of the process will also have to be resolved in the cease-fire negotiations. This is not only about the return of prisoners of war and refugee but also, from a Russian perspective, about the rights of pro-Moscow orthodoxy in Ukraine or the Russian language?

12/16 At the same time, Russia may also want a 'deal' on Belarus, i.e. a commitment by the West not to interfere in political processes in that country - read - recognition of Belarus as a Russian protectorate. Do we consider response for such demands?

11/16 How to resolve the issue of Ukraine's integration into NATO, the right to exercise. What confidence- and security-building measures should be implemented?

10/16 A number of issues remain, the resolution of which could delay a cease-fire for months. Some questions: Who is to be the broker? Who should control and supervise the implementation of the armistice’s provisions. Should there be some kind of demilitarised zone?

9/16 If NATO membership is not on the table, Kyiv would demand strong security guarantees that would discourage Russia from renewing war within a generation. Ukraine would also like to negotiate the 23 February 2022 line, but more and more people in Kyiv understand that this may be difficult.

8/16 Ukraine - in return for not committing to the use of force, but only diplomacy,in its efforts to regain lands occupied by Russia since 2014. (Crimea and Donbas) - would like confirmation that it is treated as part of the political West, and optimally receive a NATO membership.

7/16 Kyiv believes that a cease-fire is even possible next year if the US commits strongly, rearms Ukraine and puts more pressure on the Kremlin to negotiate. A truce is also favoured by the slow depletion of Russian resources and the Kremlin's reluctance to announce another mobilisation.