I still find disjunctivism about hallucination really counterintuitive (compared to perception) after years of following the debate, so kudos for making it accessible

This is pretty informative! Look forward to checking out Pinker's book. But the (prevalent) emphasis on recursive mentalizing for common knowledge seems to me a non-starter. I suspect a confusion here between epistemological models and models about what people actually do, psychological models

philpapers.org/rec/BATEJA

Full text access:

www.tandfonline.com/share/NMEDTJ...

Instead of an epistemic-first approach I offer a psychologically plausible probabilistic account of JA. Usually, a rough assumption of attending to the same target, based on cues/predictions/heuristics, is enough to form a basis for coordination, even if this assumption can be fallible.

But joint attention is a psychological phenomenon, and we also have to explain what capacities or processes are behind it. Since most accounts are focused on a fully epistemically justified state of joint attention, they fall short when trying to address the psychological processes behind it

This paper argues that usually philosophical accounts of joint attention are purpose-built to address an epistemic question: under which conditions are people fully justified to take their and another’s attention to be of the same object?

Joint attention plays a crucial role in allowing for further coordinated behaviours and interactions. How do we explain this role?

@umergurchani.bsky.social‬ This looks like you’ll like it too !

And if our perception is inherently social, what does that mean for our criteria of perceptual justification, usually centred on the "solitary mind"?

Here I introduce the phenomenon and map it epistemic profile. Unlike purely internal biases (like cognitive penetrability), altercentric influence is external (from others) yet cognitively mediated (we represent their view). This creates unique epistemic puzzles for perceptual justification.

Out in Erkenntnis. Full article here:
philpapers.org/archive/BATO...

Nice, I'll be interested to see that! I have a preprint on an approach to joint attention as a process supported by assumptions and good-enough estimations, that would concord with this intuition. Maybe it's of interest: osf.io/preprints/ps...
apologies for the self-plug :/

I'd claim that if you both *assume* (even implicitly) that you are both attending at the same target during the whole duration, then you *are* in joint attention, even without active monitoring/coordination (especially if you start knowing you'll both attend the music). Maybe not everyone'd agree 🤷‍♂️

I’ll say yes! I’m drafting a paper on joint attention to aesthetic objects/properties to explain why and how :) But even for simple perceptual targets the dynamic nature of JA brings challenges to simplistic accounts