Kenneth Black
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kennethblack.bsky.social
Kenneth Black
@kennethblack.bsky.social
PhD candidate at MIT philosophy, doing philosophy of: mind/cog sci, language/linguistics, science. Intentionality with a few interlopers, basically. (he/him)

kennethblackphi.com
Fitting aghastness though
November 11, 2025 at 10:41 PM
Having a hard time understanding these T-sentences? Here are some more
November 9, 2025 at 1:19 AM
Well either you look like a troubled and probably rich person living in Vienna who buys psychoanalysis, or you look like a troubled person person living in Vienna who sells psychoanalysis, not sure which is better or why
November 8, 2025 at 10:48 PM
This is why there are no Fodorian monasteries
November 8, 2025 at 3:26 PM
Hold the line my guy
November 7, 2025 at 11:00 PM
Wasn’t demanding that the paper do so! Just trying to see if those of us who don’t want to outsource this to the metaphysicians can still have Greenberg’s account.
November 5, 2025 at 9:31 PM
But in any case, someone worried about naturalness will want to know why Kolmogorov complexity, rather than some other measure, deserves to be the arbiter of naturalness
November 5, 2025 at 9:09 PM
The question is just whether we can make Greenberg’s distinction without the appeal to naturalness. But vis a vis Kolmogorov complexity, I don’t know enough to say whether it will give the comparisons between sets of conditional functions and single gerrymandered functions that G needs
November 5, 2025 at 9:09 PM
The concern is mathematical/structural relations are cheap; you can always define a structural relation which has the right inputs/outputs. So if you state a function with certain formal features (eg conditionality) you can state a function with the same inputs/outputs but without that feature
November 5, 2025 at 8:38 PM
Oh interesting. Being wildly deflationary I tend to think there are just a bunch of properties and have a hard time imagining how any could be any “better” than any other, except with respect to a particular observer’s capacities/interests
November 5, 2025 at 5:44 PM
Man, these Brits discriminating against high-*caliber* individuals like you
November 5, 2025 at 5:39 PM
Yeah I’m not too mad about winding up with interpretivism at the end, but I know some people are allergic to that

Re lightweight naturalness, what do you have in mind?
November 5, 2025 at 5:37 PM
That strikes me as right, but insofar as we’re trying to make a distinction like Greenberg’s, seems like a good question to ask whether and how we can do so without heavy metaphysical machinery
November 5, 2025 at 5:33 PM
I only said it seems pretty popular…but yeah, this probably just shows who I’ve talked to about this stuff
November 5, 2025 at 5:11 PM
So it seems like either we go in for some serious metaphysics or go consumer-based, each of which is seen by some as problematic. Or we drop Greenberg’s account (which would be sad). Anyone thought or have thoughts about this?

(8/8)
November 5, 2025 at 4:56 PM
Problem for solution 2: Some people don’t like consumer-based semantics, or may worry that solution 2 collapses into interpretivism. (E.g. you might worry that saying what rule the consumer implements requires giving a semantics for the consumer system, and the buck has to stop somewhere.)

(7/8)
November 5, 2025 at 4:56 PM
Solution 2: Maybe we can identify the semantic rules for a system with the computations actually performed by the system which consumes the representations. So we’d have a kind of consumer based semantics.

(6/8)
November 5, 2025 at 4:56 PM
Problem for solution 1: Some people think naturalness is really heavy duty metaphysics that deserves serious skepticism. Not going to present arguments for that here; just registering that objective naturalness is something some people would like to avoid.

(5/8)
November 5, 2025 at 4:56 PM
Solution 1: Go in for a notion of objective naturalness. There’s a fact about the right, natural way to write the rule.

Greenberg seems to favor this, as brought out in the discussion of natural dependency:

(4/8)
November 5, 2025 at 4:56 PM
Problem: these features seem highly dependent on how we write the semantic rules. E.g. rather than using a set of conditional sign-independent rules, we can define a highly gerrymandered function and use that instead. (Functions are cheap.)

(3/8)
November 5, 2025 at 4:56 PM
The idea: semantic rules describing an iconic system are sign-dependent and not very conditional, while semantic rules describing a symbolic system are very conditional and not sign dependent. (There’s also natural dependence, on which more in a moment.) E.g. his two tank meter systems:

(2/8)
November 5, 2025 at 4:56 PM
Not too late to take it down
November 3, 2025 at 10:43 PM