Jonathan Stäbler
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jonathanstaebler.bsky.social
Jonathan Stäbler
@jonathanstaebler.bsky.social
Assistant Professor at Masaryk University

Experimental and Behavioral Economics | Fraud and Destructive Behavior in Competitive Settings & Social Norms

Website: https://sites.google.com/view/jonathanstaebler
Thus, by concealing the number of contestants, a designer can mitigate the welfare-destroying effects of sabotage, without curbing the provision of value-creating effort.
September 16, 2025 at 8:46 AM
This is because the resulting performances, which are shaped both by effort and sabotage, are on average higher if people are unaware of how many competitor they compete with.
September 16, 2025 at 8:46 AM
I run an experiment and largely confirm my theoretical predictions: It is better not to give information about the realized group sizes if the the chance of a single competitor is not too low.
September 16, 2025 at 8:46 AM
In this paper, I study how revealing the number of contestants affects constructive effort and destructive sabotage in contests where players are unaware of the group size.
September 16, 2025 at 8:46 AM
Thank you @steffenhuck.bsky.social, Nikolaus Schweizer, and @martaserragarcia.bsky.social for a great review process and for putting this special issue together!
September 16, 2025 at 8:46 AM