For the other brilliant, fresh, and challenging reflections on Kurdistan(s), see the full special issue here:
polarjournal.org/2025/10/21/k...

Ceci ne concerne donc pas seulement Marie.
La Turquie voulait devenir membre de l’UE en adhérant aux droits humains. Mais il semble que ce soient plutôt les pays membres de l’UE, dont la Belgique, qui deviennent de plus en plus comme la Turquie.
3/3

Si le droit de séjour de notre amie Marie, chercheuse et militante féministe, peut être menacé aussi facilement, alors personne n’est à l’abri d’une telle éventualité. Aujourd’hui, c’est Marie, mais soyez certain·e·s que demain, ce sera peut-être vous, d’une manière ou d’une autre.
2/3

5/The advancement of democratic society in relation to rights and freedoms in Turkey remains unaccaunted for.

These and several other issues require close scrutiny.

2/The regional conditions in which this discourse emerges are absent.
3/Öcalan's own conditions is also a central and decisive point of friction.
4/We should observe how the state reacts to this in practice (beyond mere rhetoric, as we saw with Efkan Ala today).

1/Rojava, Rojhelat, Bashur—in other words, the broader Kurdish political space—is not mentioned at all. Particularly the military agressions and invasion of Rojava is both foundational and decisive of this process.

These were the contextual elements. But what is extra-textual is probably key to the gradual emergence of the "voluntary alliance":

This effectively lays out that all of these developments are likely dependent on pre-agreed mutual steps—whether declared or not.

Most importantly, the İmralı delegation conveyed a message from Öcalan that does not appear in the text: the necessity of creating the conditions for democratic politics and adapting legal frameworks accordingly.

The text outlines the conditions that led to the PKK's creation (an undeniable confirmation of Öcalan’s previous analyses) but then argues that these conditions no longer exist, hence the PKK’s foundational meaninglessness. This latter point is clearly a demand by the state.

The reference to a Kurdish-Turkish unity of 1000 years (which is not historically accurate, sic!) and its deterioration under the conditions of capitalist modernity (over the past 200 years) alludes to these ideational parallels between the two structures.

Similarly, there is emphasize on "anti-imperialist unity," which is deeply rooted in both Turkey’s state discourse against "foreign powers" and the Kurdish movement’s stance against "capitalist modernity," which, for Öcalan, underpins class formation and nationalist exclusions in Turkey.

The emphasis on "voluntary alliance" is a founded in the slogan of the PKK—"fraternity of peoples"—and also aligns well with Bahçeli's "brotherhood" discourse, which does not irritate nationalist sensibilities either.

Öcalan suggests that all groups must lay down their arms. But which groups exactly? Does "all groups" include, for instance, the YPG/YPJ? Does it relate to the SDF? Does it include PJAK? I don’t think so at all.