Michał Król
harnen.bsky.social
Michał Król
@harnen.bsky.social
Senior lecturer (associate professor) in cyber security at City, University of London. https://harnen.github.io
If you want more, our full paper is available here: arxiv.org/abs/2501.11605

Our data was also used (and complemented by surveys!) in this @nature.com article: nature.com/articles/d41...
🧵 11/11
January 26, 2025 at 10:06 PM
However, users also spot some things to be wary of. People flag that SPs can be used as lists of accounts to block or even harass. Some users also dislike being added to starter packs without their consent, especially when this is used to legitimize malicious SPs.
🧵10/11
January 26, 2025 at 10:06 PM
And what do users think about SPs? They are positively perceived with ~5x more positive than negative comments back in July. The ratio increases over time with ~10x more positive comments at the end of 2024. The SP perception improves as the users start to use them more.
🧵9/11
January 26, 2025 at 10:06 PM
Popular accounts are more likely to be included in SPs, increasing their existing popularity even further. We observe a “rich get richer” effect, with the gap between more and less popular accounts widening over time.
🧵8/11
January 26, 2025 at 10:06 PM
What macro-level impact do SPs have on the social graph? SPs provide tighter connections within existing communities rather than promoting connections across the entire system. This raises the possibility of SPs exacerbating potential echo chambers.

🧵7/11
January 26, 2025 at 10:06 PM
But is it beneficial to be an SP member or creator? We assessed the impact on users' visibility. In the first week after its inclusion, the members received ~39% more follows than similar users not in SPs. This trend reaches 85% after four weeks.
🧵6/11
January 26, 2025 at 10:06 PM
However, the created SPs ended up being highly impactful! Over the last 6 months, they accounted for up to 40% of all daily follow operations and represent an impressive ~20% of all the follow relations in the network!
🧵 5/11
January 26, 2025 at 10:06 PM
Starter packs (SPs) were introduced in June 2024. Since then, 335k SPs have been created. Is it a lot? By the end of 2024, 1% of users created at least one SP, 6% were members of at least one SP, and 4% had employed the follow-all operation on an SP.
🧵4/11
January 26, 2025 at 10:06 PM
@bsky.app grew from ~2.5M users in Jan'24 to ~25M in Dec'24. An impressive 10x increase in just a year! This was driven by (1) opening to the public, (2) Twitter/X banning in Brazil; (3) X’s change making content visible to blocked users, and (4) the 2024 US elections.
🧵3/11
January 26, 2025 at 10:06 PM
But are the SPs used? Do they bring benefits to their users and the social network? And what do users think about the starter packs? We answer these questions in our recent study!
🧵2/11
January 26, 2025 at 10:06 PM
The full paper "Guardians of the Galaxy: Content Moderation in the InterPlanetary File System" is available here: usenix.org/conference/u...

Written with @ignactro.bsky.social @asonur.bsky.social @bibo7086.bsky.social @leobalduf.bsky.social
Guardians of the Galaxy: Content Moderation in the InterPlanetary File System | USENIXusenix_logo_notag_white
usenix.org
October 18, 2024 at 3:55 PM
Finally, we showed multiple ways of circumventing the moderation techniques implemented by HTTP gateways. This includes changing the CID scheme versions, using relative paths and alternative hash functions.
🧵 6/7
October 18, 2024 at 3:54 PM
Phishing websites are delivered to victims via gateways that serve @ipfs.tech content via HTTP. We found that some of the most popular gateways are used almost uniquely to serve phishing websites.
🧵 5/7
October 18, 2024 at 3:54 PM
The number of requests for problematic content is steadily increasing. The majority of the traffic is related to shadow libraries (Anna’s Archive) migrating to @ipfs.tech. However, we also observed a sharp increase in the number of phishing websites hosted on the platform.
🧵4/7
October 18, 2024 at 3:53 PM
We used ML to create textual descriptions of every CID and represent them as word clouds.
For terrorist content, we observe collections of literature acting as motivation ("love"). We also spot guides on how to blend into society without raising suspicions ("home").
🧵3/7
October 18, 2024 at 3:51 PM
We recovered 417,912 Content Identifiers (CIDs) that were moderated by different @ipfs.tech entities. We then downloaded, analyzed and classified 368,762 (≈ 86.60%) of them. Most of the CIDs represent DMCA. However, we also discovered phishing, terrorist content or CSAM.
🧵 2/7
October 18, 2024 at 3:50 PM