At a time when great powers are drifting from restraint, South Asia can stand apart.

Choosing responsibility over rivalry would strengthen both states’ credibility and leadership.
#NukeSky

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Read our full @apln.network piece ⬇️

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Instead, both countries can seize this moment to show responsible nuclear leadership:
- Reaffirm their testing moratoria
- Signal restraint without formal CTBT membership
- Reopen space for nuclear confidence-building measures (NCBMs)

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If the U.S. resumes testing, others could follow, including Russia, China, and potentially South Asia’s nuclear rivals.

But renewed testing would offer little strategic gain for India or Pakistan, while raising diplomatic, economic, and escalation risks.

#NukeSky
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Loved working through this one together, Sahar! Grateful for the chance to unpack such a timely issue with you 🙏

Hahaha
years of fitting arms control complexity into 280 characters finally paying off 😆

As long as no one starts turning off their CTBTO IMS there will be a wealth of global data to further validate the accuracy of the system.

The paradox, as you rightly point out, is it’s counter to their entire purpose.

Though, Russia would probably turn off their IMS. They’ve done it before.

IMS data would be crucial.It sharpens the paradox:technically resilient verification system operating in a politically collapsing armscontrol order
&as you note,if Russia(or others)disengage,the erosion of reciprocal participation could quickly hollow out the system’s credibility&cooperative purpose