Many thanks to Otavio Bueno for making this possible.
10/10

arxiv.org/abs/2510.10251

So, I will try to put together a monograph and turn this paper into at least two of its chapters. The monograph is tentatively entitled Neurocognitive Architecture: Foundations for a Unified Theory of Mind and is under contract with Springer for their Synthese Library.
9/

The paper is 25,000 words, too long for a journal article and yet rather compressed. Several aspects deserve to be addressed in more detail. It would also benefit from being placed in a broader context.
8/

As always, further feedback is welcome, especially in light of the following.
7/

The paper defends the Nonclassical LOT thesis that some neural representations represent in a (natural) language-like way, yet they encode information nondigitally and are processed by ordinary (Nonclassical) neural computations that rely not only on syntactic structure but other features.
6/

(3) It discusses the degree to which different LOT hypotheses are supported or undermined by neuroscientific evidence about computational architecture and concludes that Classical LOT is ruled out while a version of Nonclassical LOT is plausible.
5/

2) It rebuts some popular arguments for Classical (Fodorian) LOT, including the argument that neuroscientific evidence is merely relevant to how computations are implemented.
4/

The paper advances the debate in three ways: (1) It distinguishes different LOT hypotheses—including Representational, Computational, Classical, and Nonclassical LOT hypotheses—in terms of the computational architecture they require. This clarifies LOT's empirical commitments.
3/

The main argument is the same but I've made a few tweaks and added some footnotes. I have now posted it on the ArXiv (link in comments) and a couple of other places so it can be cited in a stable form.
2/

is this better: www.academia.edu/144367493/Th...

I don't think you need to go to a lower leve: bsky.app/profile/gual...

For now I've just posted it on Academia.edu. If you want to see it but lack access, let me know.
4/4

Therefore, computational functionalism fails and one of the following holds: biological naturalism, a nonbiological yet noncomputational version of functionalism, or a view according to which consciousness requires specific (macro)physical qualities.
3/

Abstract: I argue that creature consciousness depends on specific neurobiophysical properties that constitute the medium for phenomenally conscious states. Such properties are not medium flexible in the way required by computational functionalism.
2/

I’ll send you an e-copy