Gabriele Contessa
@gabecontessa.bsky.social
Philosopher @ Carleton University 🇨🇦
SocEpi/PhiSci/PolPhi/PhiEcon
Currently writing a book on public trust in science.
Paper-length overview: https://philpapers.org/rec/CONITA-5
Shorter overview: http://tinyurl.com/49mwupex.
He/him
SocEpi/PhiSci/PolPhi/PhiEcon
Currently writing a book on public trust in science.
Paper-length overview: https://philpapers.org/rec/CONITA-5
Shorter overview: http://tinyurl.com/49mwupex.
He/him
The fourth (and most ambitious) goal is to expose the inadequacy of a popular diagnosis of the epistemic malaise afflicting liberal democracies—the post-truth diagnosis—and to sketch an alternative to it—the post-trust diagnosis.
June 25, 2025 at 6:59 PM
The fourth (and most ambitious) goal is to expose the inadequacy of a popular diagnosis of the epistemic malaise afflicting liberal democracies—the post-truth diagnosis—and to sketch an alternative to it—the post-trust diagnosis.
Its third (and even more ambitious) goal is to argue that none of these specific phenomena warrants all of the concerns that motivate [its critics].
June 25, 2025 at 6:58 PM
Its third (and even more ambitious) goal is to argue that none of these specific phenomena warrants all of the concerns that motivate [its critics].
Its second (and less modest) goal is to distinguish several specific phenomena that are often conflated under the label ‘science denial.’
June 25, 2025 at 6:58 PM
Its second (and less modest) goal is to distinguish several specific phenomena that are often conflated under the label ‘science denial.’
The first and most modest goal of this short book is to bring some conceptual clarity by trying to develop a clearer notion of science denial and gain a better understanding of the concerns raised by the phenomenon it is meant to capture.
June 25, 2025 at 6:57 PM
The first and most modest goal of this short book is to bring some conceptual clarity by trying to develop a clearer notion of science denial and gain a better understanding of the concerns raised by the phenomenon it is meant to capture.
What exactly is science denial? How does it differ from ordinary scientific ignorance? And is it really as concerning as [its critics] make it out to be? Unfortunately, [the critics of science denial] have not given a clear and consistent set of answers to these questions.
June 25, 2025 at 6:56 PM
What exactly is science denial? How does it differ from ordinary scientific ignorance? And is it really as concerning as [its critics] make it out to be? Unfortunately, [the critics of science denial] have not given a clear and consistent set of answers to these questions.
Starter packs jumped the shark the very moment I started one. Coincidence?!?
November 28, 2024 at 3:25 PM
Starter packs jumped the shark the very moment I started one. Coincidence?!?
Reposted by Gabriele Contessa
Nice idea, Gabriele. In this article, Michel Croce and I argue against the view that the norms of good friendship require epistemic partiality by appealing to the idea that friendship requires understanding.
Michel Croce & Matthew Jope, Understanding friendship - PhilPapers
This article takes issue with two prominent views in the current debate around epistemic partiality in friendship. Strong views of epistemic partiality hold that friendship may require biased beliefs ...
philpapers.org
November 28, 2024 at 3:06 PM
Nice idea, Gabriele. In this article, Michel Croce and I argue against the view that the norms of good friendship require epistemic partiality by appealing to the idea that friendship requires understanding.
Reposted by Gabriele Contessa
This is the most recent one and thus my favorite.
The title is descriptive: it's about how to apply norms of testimony / assertion to the presentation of graphs (and other depictions). Plus what (some) philosophers of science get wrong about honesty.
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/...
The title is descriptive: it's about how to apply norms of testimony / assertion to the presentation of graphs (and other depictions). Plus what (some) philosophers of science get wrong about honesty.
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/...
How do you assert a graph? Towards an account of depictions in scientific testimony
I extend the literature on norms of assertion to the ubiquitous use of graphs in scientific papers and presentations, which I term “graphical testimony.” On my account, the testimonial presentation o...
onlinelibrary.wiley.com
November 27, 2024 at 7:54 PM
This is the most recent one and thus my favorite.
The title is descriptive: it's about how to apply norms of testimony / assertion to the presentation of graphs (and other depictions). Plus what (some) philosophers of science get wrong about honesty.
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/...
The title is descriptive: it's about how to apply norms of testimony / assertion to the presentation of graphs (and other depictions). Plus what (some) philosophers of science get wrong about honesty.
onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/...
Reposted by Gabriele Contessa
Here, I try to ground epistemic normativity in the internal rules of epistemic social practices. The view also vindicates the idea that reasons concerning social inquiry - what I call inquisitive reasons - can be counted as epistemic reasons in good standing.
philpapers.org/rec/FLEEPA
philpapers.org/rec/FLEEPA
Will Fleisher, Epistemic practices: A unified account of epistemic and zetetic normativity - PhilPapers
This paper presents the epistemic practices account, a theory about the nature of epistemic normativity. The account aims to explain how the pursuit of epistemic values such as truth and knowledge ...
philpapers.org
November 27, 2024 at 8:01 PM
Here, I try to ground epistemic normativity in the internal rules of epistemic social practices. The view also vindicates the idea that reasons concerning social inquiry - what I call inquisitive reasons - can be counted as epistemic reasons in good standing.
philpapers.org/rec/FLEEPA
philpapers.org/rec/FLEEPA
Reposted by Gabriele Contessa
What kind of beliefs should policymakers form when experts disagree? (probably not my favorite, but want to get it out there)
The Precautionary Principle and Expert Disagreement - Erkenntnis
The Precautionary Principle is typically construed as a conservative decision rule aimed at preventing harm. But Martin Peterson (JME 33: 5–10, 2007; The ethics of technology: A geometric analysis of ...
link.springer.com
November 27, 2024 at 8:04 PM
What kind of beliefs should policymakers form when experts disagree? (probably not my favorite, but want to get it out there)
Reposted by Gabriele Contessa
This is a service paper, trying to put the conceptual (and very basic formal) tools together to think about what collective inquiry is link.springer.com/article/10.1...
Group Inquiry - Erkenntnis
Group agents can act, and they can have knowledge. How should we understand the species of collective action which aims at knowledge? In this paper, I present an account of group inquiry. This account...
link.springer.com
November 27, 2024 at 8:33 PM
This is a service paper, trying to put the conceptual (and very basic formal) tools together to think about what collective inquiry is link.springer.com/article/10.1...
Reposted by Gabriele Contessa
Knowledgeable voters are perhaps more dangerous to democracy than ignorant ones because they use their knowledge and intelligence to twist the facts and reason their way to whatever they want.
philpapers.org/rec/HANASV
philpapers.org/rec/HANASV
Michael Hannon, Are Knowledgeable Voters Better Voters? - PhilPapers
It is widely believed that democracies require knowledgeable citizens to function well. But the most politically knowledgeable individuals also tend to be the most partisan, and the strength of partis...
philpapers.org
November 27, 2024 at 10:28 PM
Knowledgeable voters are perhaps more dangerous to democracy than ignorant ones because they use their knowledge and intelligence to twist the facts and reason their way to whatever they want.
philpapers.org/rec/HANASV
philpapers.org/rec/HANASV
Reposted by Gabriele Contessa
In this chapter on political deference, I argue that we can be required to defer to others on the ground of their epistemic authority. The account also explains why political deference to experts is not normally required, however.
academic.oup.com/book/46053/c...
academic.oup.com/book/46053/c...
Political Deference
Abstract. Political deference, as I understand it, is deference to others on what the right political decision is in a given situation. If they defer polit
academic.oup.com
November 27, 2024 at 9:16 PM
In this chapter on political deference, I argue that we can be required to defer to others on the ground of their epistemic authority. The account also explains why political deference to experts is not normally required, however.
academic.oup.com/book/46053/c...
academic.oup.com/book/46053/c...
Reposted by Gabriele Contessa
When you discredit knowers because of their identity, that's epistemic injustice. But when you limit their knowledge claims to their identity - by reducing it to 'experience' or to a fixed domain of knowledge (like gender studies) - that's epistemic positioning. journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/...
Epistemic injustice and epistemic positioning: towards an intersectional political economy - Jana Bacevic, 2023
This article introduces the concept of epistemic positioning to theorize the relationship between identity-based epistemic judgements and the reproduction of so...
journals.sagepub.com
November 27, 2024 at 7:27 PM
When you discredit knowers because of their identity, that's epistemic injustice. But when you limit their knowledge claims to their identity - by reducing it to 'experience' or to a fixed domain of knowledge (like gender studies) - that's epistemic positioning. journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/...
Reposted by Gabriele Contessa
This is a paper where I argue that game theory is a critical tool for even the most "pure" of social epidemiologists.
link.springer.com/article/10.1...
link.springer.com/article/10.1...
The theory of games as a tool for the social epistemologist - Philosophical Studies
Traditionally, epistemologists have distinguished between epistemic and pragmatic goals. In so doing, they presume that much of game theory is irrelevant to epistemic enterprises. I will show that thi...
link.springer.com
November 27, 2024 at 7:43 PM
This is a paper where I argue that game theory is a critical tool for even the most "pure" of social epidemiologists.
link.springer.com/article/10.1...
link.springer.com/article/10.1...
Reposted by Gabriele Contessa
Upcoming handbook chapter offering an overview of the philosophical debate about epistemic injustice kicked up by Miranda Fricker's work, with an eye towards more sharply delineating the target phenomena from her particular theoretical and terminological choices:
Aidan McGlynn, Epistemic Injustice: Phenomena and Theories (Author's preprint) - PhilPapers
Epistemic injustice has become one of the most widely discussed topics in social epistemology, and has revived interest in issues in the intersections between epistemology and ethics and political phi...
philpapers.org
November 27, 2024 at 7:53 PM
Upcoming handbook chapter offering an overview of the philosophical debate about epistemic injustice kicked up by Miranda Fricker's work, with an eye towards more sharply delineating the target phenomena from her particular theoretical and terminological choices:
It sounds very interesting!
November 27, 2024 at 7:20 PM
It sounds very interesting!
Reposted by Gabriele Contessa
Group belief ascriptions are highly ambiguous. What’s more, in many cases, neither the available contextual factors nor known pragmatic considerations are sufficient to allow the audience to identify which of the many possible meanings is intended. I argue we shouldn’t make such ascriptions.
philpapers.org
November 27, 2024 at 4:28 PM
Group belief ascriptions are highly ambiguous. What’s more, in many cases, neither the available contextual factors nor known pragmatic considerations are sufficient to allow the audience to identify which of the many possible meanings is intended. I argue we shouldn’t make such ascriptions.
Reposted by Gabriele Contessa
"Bald-Faced Bullshit and Authoritarian Political Speech: Making Sense of Johnson and Trump. (Co-authored with Tim Kenyon). Defends a new definition of bullshit, which allows for audience variation. Discusses the role of Power Bullshit in authoritarianism.
www.researchgate.net/publication/...
www.researchgate.net/publication/...
November 27, 2024 at 2:59 PM
"Bald-Faced Bullshit and Authoritarian Political Speech: Making Sense of Johnson and Trump. (Co-authored with Tim Kenyon). Defends a new definition of bullshit, which allows for audience variation. Discusses the role of Power Bullshit in authoritarianism.
www.researchgate.net/publication/...
www.researchgate.net/publication/...
Reposted by Gabriele Contessa
philpapers.org/rec/WORSCB
The fact that a belief of yours is suspiciously convenient to you is a reason for you to become less confident that it's true. A kind of ideal epistemological theory can be used to resist this conclusion, but that only brings out the pathologies of such ideal theory.
The fact that a belief of yours is suspiciously convenient to you is a reason for you to become less confident that it's true. A kind of ideal epistemological theory can be used to resist this conclusion, but that only brings out the pathologies of such ideal theory.
Alex Worsnip, Suspiciously Convenient Beliefs and the Pathologies of (Epistemological) Ideal Theory - PhilPapers
Public life abounds with examples of people whose beliefs—especially political beliefs—seem suspiciously convenient: consider, for example, the billionaire who believes that all taxation is unjust, or...
philpapers.org
November 27, 2024 at 2:34 PM
philpapers.org/rec/WORSCB
The fact that a belief of yours is suspiciously convenient to you is a reason for you to become less confident that it's true. A kind of ideal epistemological theory can be used to resist this conclusion, but that only brings out the pathologies of such ideal theory.
The fact that a belief of yours is suspiciously convenient to you is a reason for you to become less confident that it's true. A kind of ideal epistemological theory can be used to resist this conclusion, but that only brings out the pathologies of such ideal theory.
Great! (I think the game is also fun to play in itself)
November 27, 2024 at 2:41 PM
Great! (I think the game is also fun to play in itself)